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Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology?
In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop, Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 14–29 (2009)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V References.Author's Profile
role for representational content in scientific psychology Stich ‐ right to reject eliminativism ideological similarity and reference similarity content in scientific psychology Qualified Autonomy Principle (QAP) QAP is weaker than Stich's Autonomy Principle domain‐general processes ‐ processes underlying decision making and rational revision of belief construal of folk psychology ‐ if construal, then folk psychology can respect the Autonomy Principle
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Citations of this work
Brains and Beliefs.Dominic Murphy - 2017 - In David Michael Kaplan, Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 119-144.
References found in this work
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
The mind doesn't work that way: The scope and limits of computational psychology.Josh Weisberg - manuscript
Deconstructing the mind.Stephen P. Stich - 1996 - In Deconstructing the mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 479-482.
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