Theodicy, Anti-Theodicy, and Oppression : A Non-Ideal Approach

Abstract

This study investigates the plausibility of the claim that theodicies have harmful socio-political effects. Traditionally, scholars working on the problem of evil have constructed theodicies in order to answer the question of why God might allow evil and suffering to exist. As increasing numbers of scholars have expressed concern with theodicies, and protested their construction, some of these critics have argued that such justifications of God have harmful socio-political consequences. These socio-political anti-theodicists have argued that theodicies ignore so-called structural evils; that theodicies paint distorted pictures of reality; that theodicies are dishonest; that theodicies produce epistemic harm; that theodicies encourage an abusive outlook; that theodicies uphold unjust social structures; that theodicies lead to apathy and political inaction in the face of injustice; that theodicies distract attention away from the causes of social suffering. This study investigates the plausibility of these claims by considering them, and the theodical enterprise as a whole, against a case of structural racism. The investigation is conducted through a non-ideal theory and with a structural analysis. It is argued that most of these socio-political anti-theodical claims are either plausible to different degrees or sound, with some caveats. It is also argued that traditional theodical approaches to the problem of evil have relied on methodological commitments that are highly problematic when theorising structural forms of suffering. It is recommended that scholars abandon these methodological commitments in their future work on the problem of evil.

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