Where Disagreements Can Lie

In The Fight Against Doubt. How to Bridge the Gap Between Scientists and the Public. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 130-143 (2018)
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Abstract

Chapter 10 proposes a second recommendation to deal with the negative adverse effects that normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) can have: it calls for a recognition of the limits of scientific evidence when it comes to public policymaking and for an increased focus on potential differences in the values that underlie policy decisions. It contends that while confusion and doubt about the existing empirical evidence or about its strength can contribute to stalled policies, disagreements about values can also play a significant role. Such disagreements can involve what people take to be valuable, how to interpret shared values, how to weigh conflicting values, and what policies are better for promoting certain valuable goals.

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Inmaculada de Melo-Martin
Weill Cornell Medicine--Cornell University

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