Abstract

This article examines the evolution of the concept of virtue from classical antiquity to modernity, with special attention to its reception in Rome and its transformation in the Christian and modern eras. A distinction is made between the theory of virtue and the compendiums of virtues, analyzing the Platonic and Aristotelian models, and projecting onto the modern world the main problems—factionalism, greed, and lack of freedom—that Cicero, Sallust, and Tacitus considered as causes of the moral decline of their time. The text explores how modernity marked a rupture with the tradition of virtue ethics, which underwent various inflections, and how it believed it could overcome these same problems by relying on the rule of law backed by the state, the primacy of legal order, and the invisible action of interest-aggregation mechanisms. Finally, it is argued that the persistence of these issues confirms the ongoing need for virtue ethics as a key to addressing contemporary challenges.