Knowledge-closure and skepticism

In Quentin Smith, Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 137-188 (2008)
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Abstract

This chapter begins with some preliminary remarks about epistemic closure principles, knowledge-closure principles in particular, and the role of knowledge-closure principles in sceptical argumentation. It discusses some implausible knowledge-closure principles and identifies two key problems for such principles. The chapter then discusses more plausible knowledge-closure principles and their possible use in sceptical argumentation.

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Author Profiles

Marian David
University of Graz
Ted Warfield
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.
Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.
On the Tracking Account of Inferential Knowledge.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.

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