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Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
In Essays on skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 358-366 (2010)
Abstract
This chapter addresses a recent challenge from Marian David and Ted Warfield: Can you state a closure principle that is both plausible and usable in a sceptical argument that applies to every putative knower? They argue ‘No’ while the author replies ‘Yes’.Categories
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