Abstract

A key proposition in epistemic regress problems is that good reasons for belief must themselves be supported by good reasons: _Reasons Require Reasons_. To solve a regress problem, infinitists accept versions of this claim in addition to the claim that it is possible for us to have non-circular endless regresses of reasons. This chapter argues that there is no single epistemic regress problem but a family of problems. The central notion in each problem is the concept of a kind of epistemic reason that it would be good to have. On the basis of accounts of regress problems, reasons for belief, and epistemic responsibility, the chapter argues that _Reasons Require Reasons_ is true of a range of kinds of reasons, including responsibility-affording reasons. It also argues that, unfortunately, it is impossible for responsibility-affording reasons to satisfy this principle. Responsibility-affording reasons must be basing reasons and we cannot have infinitely many basing reasons. A troubling version of skepticism follows from these conclusions. The chapter ends by suggesting that this skepticism might be mitigated since accepting the infinitist ideal might put us in a position to acquire other kinds of good reasons and epistemic responsibility might be a matter of degree.