Abstract

Recently, scholars have been investigating the hidden moral and political valence of apparently non-political forms of communication, by looking at how certain prima facie harmless uses of language can spread prejudice and contribute to social injustice. In this chapter I argue that while analyses such as Langton’s convincingly explain how descriptive contents are transmitted and can contribute to belief formation and knowledge transmission, a different model is required to satisfactorily account for value judgments. I submit that while individuals can come to believe and, in the good cases, know certain descriptive facts about the world only based on what others tell them, testimony cannot transmit evaluative contents in the same way. Informative evaluative presupposition contributes to the creation of beliefs and knowledge, but it does not determine them in the way in which testimony typically works with descriptive contents: I argue for this claim by examining taste, moral and aesthetic value judgments. My point does not undermine the idea that presupposing certain value contents may affect one’s audience, but challenges the idea that testimony is the right notion to account for how value talk can spread and impose contents on the participants to a conversation.