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The Bayesian and Classical Approaches to statistical inference
Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12867 (2022)
Abstract
The Bayesian Approach and the Classical Approach are two very different families of approaches to statistical inference. There are many different versions of each view, often with very substantial differences among them. But I will here endeavor to explain the philosophical core of each family of approaches, as well as to identify four main philosophical differences between them.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Belief Revision Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2025 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 54 (1):1-49.
References found in this work
Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.
Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
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