Strategic behavior and counterfactuals

Synthese 76 (1):135-169 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an equilibrium will be attained. In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs. In this case it becomes necessary to explicitly model the process of belief formation. This model attributes to the players a theory of counterfactuals which they use in restricting the set of possible equilibria. If it were possible to attribute to the players the same theory of counterfactuals, then the players'' beliefs would eventually converge.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games.Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux - 2017 - Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (3):318-343.
History as a coordination device.Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):501-512.
Learning with Hazy Beliefs.Dean Foster & H. Young - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:325-335.
Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated Equilibrium.Isaac Levi - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:173-185.
A Study in Inductive Deliberation.Peter P. Vanderschraaf - 1995 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
226 (#179,379)

6 months
25 (#407,746)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Cristina Bicchieri
University of Pennsylvania

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 2008 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

View all 39 references / Add more references