Natural Rights

This article addresses issues of distributive justice and the justification of the state’s political authority. According to Robert Nozick, only a minimal state is morally justifiable: one that protects the natural rights of its citizens but does not redistribute wealth and income among them. This article offers an argument that, contrary to Nozick’s assumptions, a minimal state can redistribute without exceeding its minimal functions. This is possible because a minimal state can use its budget in any non-violent manner as long (...) as it contributes to its primary goal–ensuring public safety. Poverty and inequality significantly increase the risk of violent crime. Therefore, a minimal state has the right to provide social support to the poor to reduce the risk of violent crime. This argument is further defended against objections. (shrink)

This dissertation contains the following sections: Introduction, Chapter 1. Libertarianism and Its Foundations, § 1. Libertarianism as a Theory of Basic Rights, § 2. Self-Ownership and Property Rights, § 3. The Right of Original Appropriation, Chapter 2: Conceptual Diversity in Libertarianism, § 1. Moral Foundations of Libertarian Rights, § 2. The State, Taxation, and Redistribution, Chapter 3. Right-Libertarianism, § 1. The Problem of Original Appropriation, § 2. The Nozick’s Proviso, Chapter 4. Centrist Libertarianism, § 1. Sufficientarian Provisos, § 2. The (...) Utilitarian Proviso, Chapter 5. Left-Libertarianism, § 1. Egalitarian Provisos, § 2. The Reciprocity Principle, Chapter 6. Other Justifications for Basic Income, § 1. The Catastrophe Clause, § 2. The Rectification Principle, Conclusion, References. (shrink)

From a traditional environmental ethics perspective, rights of nature are linked to debates about non-anthropocentrism because they give legal force to the idea that nature has intrinsic moral value. However, we claim that the emergence of Indigenous-led rights of nature initiatives shows that intercultural respect is also an important aspect of this issue. Supported by an example involving an Indigenous nation in Peru, we explain how intercultural respect encourages greater engagement between Western and Indigenous philosophies. On this basis, we advance (...) an argument that a river can be a living being with interests of its own. We also explain how intercultural respect is helpful for understanding the relationship between rights of nature and climate change. In general, our contention is that rights of nature should be understood in the context of efforts to counteract the disrespect of marginalized groups commonly found in environmental injustices. [Open access]. (shrink)

Perhaps the most fundamental question in political philosophy is whether any state is justified. The most impressive modern attempt to justify the state is in part 1 of Robert Nozick’s "Anarchy, State, and Utopia". Nozick argues that a minimal state, and only a minimal state, is compatible with our having natural rights. Here, I clarify the logic of Nozick’s strategy and show that his attempt to justify the state fails at every step. A central issue is that Nozick implicitly adopts (...) a restricted, rather than absolute or even bounded absolute, conception of natural rights. I argue that the nature of Nozick’s failure should make natural rights theorists doubt that any state is justified. My discussion also clarifies the historical background to Nozick’s work and explains his later (apparent?) turn away from libertarianism. (shrink)

In the 1780s through the end of 1790s, Kant made various references to slavery (in its different forms) and the transatlantic slave trade in the context of his political philosophy or philosophy of right; he thereby had opportunities to speak in favor of abolitionism, which was gaining momentum in parts of Europe, or at least to articulate a normative critique of the race-based chattel slavery or Atlantic slavery and the associated slave trade qua (legalized) INSTITUTIONS; but he did neither. Why? (...) In raising and seeking an answer to this question, I am not interested in what Kant’s normative silence about the institutions of Atlantic slavery and slave trade may tell us about him as a person (for example, whether he was blinded by his own racist prejudices or whether he was affected by some kind of cognitive dissonance). Rather, I will focus on what it may tell us about certain limitations of his political philosophy, limitations that might have made it THEORETICALLY DIFFICULT for him to figure out exactly what to DO about those institutions as entrenched political realities. (shrink)

Some contemporary philosophers, such as Gary Chartier, Matt Zwolinski, and Miranda Fleischer, propose that a basic income should be seen as an instrument for rectifying historical injustices. This article examines the arguments for this proposal based on Robert Nozick’s historical theory of justice. The first part of the article formulates the normative basis of Nozick’s theory, as well as his three principles of distributive justice: the principle of original appropriation, the principle of voluntary transfer, and the principle of rectification. Nozick (...) himself believed that, in modern societies, the principle of rectification may require the redistributive policies envisaged by John Rawls’s difference principle. The second section examines reasons why historical justice theorists should prefer basic income, including the arguments by Milton Friedman, Matt Zwolinski, and Philippe Van Parijs. The third section responds to several objections to rectification redistribution proposed by Loren Lomasky and Jan Narveson. In order to counteract these objections, Hillel Steiner’s liberal theory of exploitation is proposed, which serves as an additional argument in favor of the fact that rectification can be organized through a basic income. (shrink)

Do people have any natural welfare rights? This article examines this question from the perspective of the most influential contemporary natural rights concept, the new natural law theory. This theory was developed by John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph Boyle in the second half of the 20th century and remains an influential position in moral, legal and political philosophy. The first section of this article describes the general theoretical foundations of the new natural law theory: basic goods and basic principles (...) of practical rationality. According to the new natural law, natural human rights are normatively protected interests in the realization of basic goods, the normative protection of which is provided by a pluralistic concept of practical rationality. The following sections consider how this general description justifies giving all people natural welfare rights and institutionalizing these rights in the form of a basic income. The second section is devoted to the natural law concept of property, which includes a left-libertarianesque equal right to common resources. The third section is devoted to the formulation of a more practice-oriented natural right of property, which is based on a strict requirement of moral autonomy or self-constitution. It is demonstrated how this right simultaneously justifies both limited property rights and redistribution to guarantee everyone the minimum resources for moral autonomy. However, this same claim to autonomy limits the forms of provision of this minimal share of resources to a basic income, since it protects the broadest opportunities to independently dispose of one’s share of resources, using them in various self-constitutive projects. The conclusion concludes sums up that the new natural law allows for various forms of institutionalization of basic income, but justifies a strong presumption in favor of its unconditional provision. (shrink)

In Origin of the German Trauerspiel, Benjamin offers a “natural history” of Baroque sovereignty. This paper examines how the Baroque allegory of nature, implied in the natural history approach, informs Benjamin’s legal critique and analysis of Fascism. I begin by discussing Benjamin’s historico-philosophical approach to law and justice in “Critique of Violence,” where the evocation of natural history occurs against the backdrop of Benjamin’s rejection of any affirmative concept of natural right. This negative criticism is shown to have originated in (...) Trauerspiel, where natural history as a method contains the discoveries Benjamin made about the 17th-century Baroque allegory of nature in philosophical, theological, and aesthetic terms. The portrayal of nature as fallen, transient, and positivized informs Benjamin’s theory of Baroque sovereignty and his understanding of the fate of legal positivism. At the crux of this paper, I show that this conservative-revolutionary hermeneutics enables a profound understanding of reactionary political phenomena from the 19th-century Romantic counter-revolution and restoration to the 20th-century Fascist triumph of legal positivism. In particular, Benjamin’s natural history reveals the origins of Schmitt’s total state in these persisting tendencies with origins in the political theory of the 17th-century absolute monarchy. However, regardless of the metaphysical depth of Benjamin’s natural history of Baroque sovereignty, his dismissal of the natural right tradition leads him to pit fallen positive law against redemptive utopianism in a way that fails to expound any realizable just ends. I conclude that the limitation of this approach, which is reflected in antinomian interpretations of Benjamin, can be remedied with an expanded program of natural history that calls forth the materialist dialectical critique of historical contradictions of rational natural right without rejecting it. (shrink)

In recent years, Fabian Wendt’s sufficientarian or moderate libertarianism has stood out among theories of distributive justice. This theory is based on the project pursuit argument and recognizes individual’s rights to self-ownership and ownership of external resources. But the second of these rights is limited by the sufficiency proviso, which requires that all people have a minimum sufficient share of resources to engage in personal projects. This article takes a critical look at moderate libertarianism, showing that its limitation to the (...) sufficiency threshold is incompatible with its reliance on the project pursuit argument, since this argument implicitly assumes a presumption of equal concern for persons. In the absence of additional reasons, this presumption requires that people as projects pursuers be given not a sufficient, but an equal share of external resources. (shrink)

Robert Nozick formulated the libertarian theory of justice, which condemns any form of redistribution of wealth and income. However, Nozick himself recognized the “Lock­ean proviso”, which limits the scope of permissible appropriations and transfers of pro­perty. Nozick offered his own interpretation of this proviso, which would exclude any re­distributive implications inherent in stricter readings of this condition. This article exa­mines whether Nozick’s proviso succeeds in avoiding redistributive implications. Various objections to the standard interpretation of Nozick’s proviso raised by Gerald Cohen, (...) Hil­lel Steiner, John Arthur, Brian Powell, Eric Mack, and Steven Daskal motivate us to re­think the proviso. To this end, three redistributive reinterpretations of Nozick’s proviso, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, Matt Zwolinski, and Steven Daskal, are considered. Both Vallentyne and Zwolinski propose using Nozick’s proviso as an argument for basic in­come, although their approaches differ. Vallentyne suggests that Nozick’s proviso im­poses compensation obligations on appropriators of natural resources, then distributing that compensation in proportion to the extent to which the appropriation has made some­one worse off. But since everyone has the right to a minimum compensation payment, it can be provided in the form of a basic income. Zwolinski focuses more on the prop­erty system as a whole, but highlights the fact that its positive externalities do not af­fect certain individuals. And the most inclusive way to reach everyone who is entitled to compensation is to pay it as a basic income. Daskal proposes to limit the payment of compensation for violation of the proviso to job requirements. However, an analysis of Daskal’s argument shows that he fails to justify these requirements, and therefore his line of argument leads to a dilemma between a basic income or an even more egalitarian policy – market socialism. (shrink)

The scholarship on the ethics of abortion was stimulated by the legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973. The recent overturning of Roe v Wade will likely have the same effect. This book discusses the libertarian perspective on the subject, drawing attention to the implications of self-ownership, Lockean appropriation and abandonment, private property rights, and so on. Much ground is covered, from history to the Supreme Court decisions to natural law to ensoulment. Choice sheds new philosophical light on (...) this thorny issue. (shrink)

Natural rights play a fundamental role in the political, legal, and economic system of John Locke. Many of his views are based on natural rights. Although Locke is not the first scholar to discuss natural rights, and before him, other thinkers have theorized about it in different eras and intellectual traditions, it must be claimed that Locke is a modern natural rights theorist and has presented a novel interpretation of this theory. Locke's natural rights are based on equality and individual (...) independence. Freedom, life, and property are the three basic pillars of Locke's theory. However, many international charters that defend human rights also in some way protect personal freedom, life, and property of individuals around the world. One of the international agreements is the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the United Nations, which defends the freedom and security of children worldwide and guarantees their basic rights. In this convention, natural rights patterns, especially those of Locke, can be seen, and he is also considered the spiritual father of human rights and one of the sources of modern human rights, the foundations of natural rights. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to examine the foundations of natural rights in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and compare them with the foundations of John Locke. (shrink)

Many political and moral philosophers try to reconcile freedom and equality. One such theory is left-libertarianism, which establishes exclusive property rights over one’s own body and egalitarian property rights over natural resources. These rights are realized through the policy of unconditional basic income. Recently, left-libertarianism has come under fire from another similar approach, reciprocal libertarianism. This concept combines exclusive rights over one’s own body with the requirement for an egalitarian distribution of the fruits of social cooperation among those who make (...) a fair contribution to its system. On the face of it, reciprocal libertarians reject basic income because it doesn’t satisfy the fair contribution condition. This article explores the case for a basic income from a reciprocal libertarian perspective. In particular, two institutional regimes will be examined: reciprocal left-libertarianism and libertarian socialism. Each is compatible with a basic income coupled with broader redistribution according to the principle of reciprocity. (shrink)

Most right-libertarians deny the permissibility of government redistribution, referring to the inviolability of private property rights. In a rare exception, Eric Mack offers a right-libertarian argument for luck sufficientarianism based on the catastrophe clause. In this view, people who find themselves in trouble through no fault of their own may violate someone else’s property rights in minor ways to save their own lives. But since a literal interpretation of this clause makes property rights too uncertain, Mack proposes a system of (...) redistribution that will protect people from dire circumstances. As it only applies to those who find themselves in poverty through no fault of their own, Mack’s argument rules out a basic income. However, one can combine Mack’s argument with basic income by arguing that responsibility-insensitive sufficientarianism is superior to luck sufficientarianism. First, luck sufficientarianism allows for the counterintuitive conclusion that people who have made mistakes in their lives do not deserve help from the rest of the community, even if they are engaged in some socially important activity. Second, luck sufficientarianism unduly interferes with people’s private lives to distinguish between deserving and undeserving recipients of social assistance, and inevitably excludes some deserving recipients from the pool of recipients. Third, a condition for holding people responsible for their choices is that they have agency. But maintaining agency requires the presence of some kind of material resources that would protect people from the fear and stress associated with poverty. Thus, responsibility-insensitive sufficientarianism is superior to luck sufficientarianism as an interpretation of the catastrophe clause. And within a libertarian framework, this requires introducing a basic income. First, a basic income technically guarantees everyone protection from extreme poverty and destitution. Second, a basic income guarantees everyone autonomy in how they manage their resources. Third, a basic income does not require means testing and is therefore responsibility-insensitive. Mack’s catastrophe clause therefore offers a right-libertarian argument for a basic income. (shrink)

The book comprises contemporary legal theory pertaining to Democratic States based on the Rule of Law from the perspective of general principles of law. It explains in detail, theoretically and based on the specific case law, the phenomenon of general principles of law - as a source of law and directly applicable legal norms. It is a work of legal theory, legal philosophy, and legal method, but it will also assist scholars and practitioners in the transitional justice field as it (...) shows how this theory of general principles of law has assisted Latvia to move away from the socialist legal tradition. (shrink)

Distributive justice is one of the central questions of contemporary moral and political philosophy. Discussions on this topic are often presented as a confrontation between two groups of thinkers: libertarians and luck egalitarians. The former emphasize the dependence of the existing distribution on the individual choice and personal responsibility of people, and therefore are skeptical about various redistribution programs. The latter, on the contrary, emphasize the influence of morally arbitrary luck on the economic situation of people, and therefore welcome redistributive (...) measures to compensate for this brute luck. Left-libertarian claims to reconcile these two types of moral considerations. The classical left-libertarian point of view seeks to offset the influence of brute luck through an egalitarian distribution of the benefits of owning natural resources that are independent of anyone’s choice and responsibility. However, this position does not sufficiently take into account the influence of other factors of brute luck and, in particular, genetic endowments on the distribution of economic wealth. This article discusses three approaches that allow left-libertarians to take into account the factor of genetic luck in interpersonal distribution. First, it is Hillel Steiner’s proposal to attribute genetic information to natural resources, the benefits of which are subject to egalitarian redistribution. Second, it is the concept of equal opportunity for welfare by Peter Vallentyne, Michael Otsuka and Eric Roark. Third, it is the universal dominance criterion of Philippe Van Parijs and Kasper Ossenblok. The first two approaches face a number of moral and practical difficulties, but the third approach is able to overcome them. Thus, the universal dominance criterion is the most promising way to reconcile left-libertarianism and justice in the distribution of genetic endowments. (shrink)

Robert Nozick is the most discussed libertarian philosopher of these days. The paper examines the question of whether he supported forced taxation. The normative basis of Nozick’s position, the neo-Lockean theory of natural human rights are analyzed. On the basis of this theory, his argument in favor of the moral justification of the minimal state is reconstructed. While this reconstruction leaves it ambiguous whether such the state should be funded by taxation, six arguments are offered in favor of such tax (...) funding. These arguments are based on the same normative premises as Nozick’s own argument and can therefore be supported by contemporary Nozickians even if Nozick himself rejected taxation. These arguments are shown to help overcome some of the critical objections faced by Nozick’s theory and neo-Lockeanism as a whole. However, accepting these arguments entails accepting not only the tax financing of the minimal state, but also the expansion of the functions of this state to provide citizens with a social minimum in the form of an unconditional basic income or some other form of redistribution. (shrink)

Part of a Festschrift for Fred Miller, this essay reconsiders Miller's interpretation of Aristotle in terms of natural rights. After defending Miller against his numerous critics, I draw a somewhat different lesson from his interpretation than he himself does: Miller helps us to see that an Aristotelian theory of justice can do all the work that we would reasonably want a theory of rights to do while avoiding significant problems that the idiom and rhetoric of rights tend to generate.

Ward posits the existence of a classical liberalism that runs from Hobbes to John Stuart Mill and is composed of two boxes, rights-talk and interests-talk. He further presumes the existence of poli...

This chapter surveys libertarian thought on the question of “historic injustice,” which is when serious injustice goes unresolved for many years. After some historical discussion of early libertarian writing on the subject, I turn to the contemporary debate surrounding reparations for slavery. After outlining three arguments common among libertarians for reparations, common reasons for skepticism are also discussed. Then, special focus is given to the topic of land theft. In particular, I hone in on what I call the “Poisoning Problem,” (...) or the idea that natural rights approaches to property fail because so much of actually-existing property is founded in conquest. In the conclusion, I highlight two areas where libertarian writing on historic injustice is relatively quiet compared with broader writing on these topics: reparations of a less material sort and transitional injustice. Throughout this chapter, I typically refer to American slavery and land theft, but the discussion is meant to apply much further than those two cases. (shrink)

In this book Billy Christmas advances an interpretation of justice grounded in a distinctive theory of property. Christmas’ account of property is at the same time pluralistic – it justifies various forms of property of external objects – and grounded in one original natural right: the right to freedom. Indeed, one main take-away of the book is that freedom as non-interference does not only justify private property: it can also justify common property.

Libertarianism is a theory of justice that places significant moral weight on exclusive property rights. On this basis, many libertarian philosophers, from Robert Nozick to Michael Huemer, criticize any form of income redistribution. Ironically, some libertarians, following Philippe Van Parijs, Matt Zwolinski, and Charles Murray, have supported the introduction of an unconditional basic income. This essay seeks to prove that this support is not just a political compromise. By contrast, libertarian justice advocates have a strong moral basis for supporting income (...) redistribution in the form of unconditional cash payments. This essay explores one such reason, the Lockean proviso. The Lockean proviso is a moral requirement for the appropriation of unowned resources to leave “enough and as good” for others. There are many interpretations of the Lockean proviso, but the most ambitious are the egalitarian proviso and the sufficiency proviso. Each of them, but for different reasons, requires the introduction of a basic income. The egalitarian proviso establishes the equal rights of all people to natural resources, and therefore requires that all benefits from the ownership of natural resources be shared egalitarianly — in the form of unconditional equal payments. The sufficiency proviso establishes some threshold of sufficiency, and then imposes a restriction on exclusive property rights so that they can’t prevent redistribution in order to raise all people to the threshold of sufficiency. However, while both provisos require a basic income, they diverge on three important dimensions in assessing this basic income: applicability, taxable base, and amount of cash payments. (shrink)

Lays out an account of the origins and development of liberal political and economic theoryIncludes case studies that cover thinkers and ideas from the English Civil War through to liberalism's first encounters with socialism Provides comparative analysis of distinct intellectual traditions including English natural rights theory, the Scottish Enlightenment, Victorian-era utilitarianism and classical political economyIntegrates history of economic thinking into broader milieu of modern political, moral and natural philosophyExamines secondary literature and research from a range of disciplinary areas including political (...) theory, modern intellectual history, economic thought and modern British history and philosophyThis book re-examines the philosophical roots of classical liberal political economy, as well as addressing the relationship between the empire and liberalism. It proposes an interpretive model based upon the interconnection between distinct theories of natural rights and the harmony of interests. It takes a fresh look at classical liberalism by exploring economic arguments in thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Paine, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, who are not typically viewed as economic thinkers, and by highlighting the importance of Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith in the development of interest-based liberalism. It also re-examines lesser-known economic tracts by thinkers such as John Locke, David Hume and John Stuart Mill in light of their more well-known political writings. With classical liberal assumptions still prominent in contemporary debates about economic justice, it is vital for every democratic citizen to understand the complex origins and development of the ideas that did so much to shape our world today. (shrink)

This book gives an account of a full spectrum of property rights and their relationship to individual liberty. It shows that a purely deontological approach to justice can deal with the most complex questions regarding the property system. Moreover, the author considers the economic, ecological, and technological complexities of our real-world property systems. The result is a more conceptually sound account of natural rights and the property system they demand. If we think that liberty should be at the centre of (...) justice, what does that mean for the property system? Economists and lawyers widely agree that a property system must be composed of many different types of property: the kind of private ownership one has over one's person and immediate possessions, as well as the kinds of common ownership we each have in our local streets, as well as many more. However, theories of property and justice have not given anything approaching an adequate account of the relationship between liberty and any other form of property other than private ownership. It is often thought that a basic commitment to liberty cannot really tell us how to arrange the major complexities of the property system, which diverge from simple private ownership. Property and Justice demonstrates how philosophical rigour coupled with interdisciplinary engagement enables us to think clearly about how to deal with real-world problems. It will be of interest to political philosophers, political theorists, and legal theorists working on property rights and justice. (shrink)

Consciousness, which is one of the central issues of German idealism, has received various interpretations among German philosophers. Assuming the thing-in-itself, Kant presented consciousness in pieces and presented it in the form of three critiques. After him, Reinholt and Schultze, by criticizing the thing-in-itself, provided the ground for a new interpretation of consciousness by Fichte. Fichte with approval Schultze's critique of the thing-in-itself, rightly gathered consciousness into the unity of the absolute subject. He then gave a revolutionary interpretation of how (...) consciousness develops by creating a dialectical relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and intersubjectivity. In this article, we try to explain Fichte's interpretation of consciousness according to the relationship that he establishes between consciousness, self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, and to present the calendar of consciousness and self-consciousness in the political situation. He first argues that consciousness logically requires an order in which self-consciousness provides its development and He then considers the order in consciousness as dependent on the creation of a relationship that occurs in the process of recognition between subjects. (shrink)

Since Austin and Searle, performatives are taken to be crucial for the construction of social reality. More recently, performatives have been proposed to be essential for the construction of personal identities, too. I intend to analyze the postmodern assumption according to which this identity construction is in the power of individuals, an assumption which presupposes a view of performatives as endowed with unconstrained power – that is, with a power that is not subject to objective constraints. I will consider some (...) reasons to reject this view. The first is rooted in Judith Butler’s idea that – since normative approaches to political correctness undesirably reduce freedom of speech in the name of equality – we should seriously consider how offensive performatives may fail, due to objective constraints on their felicity. A second reason to reject the postmodern view of performatives lies in the consideration of narcissism as an individual and political issue. Narcissism in the political sphere can be described as a transformation of the “passion for equality” in an individualistic appetite, deaf to everything else, and especially to social constraints and responsibilities. A different – less narcissistic and more social – model of the self is provided. (shrink)

Human rights are thought to guarantee pluralism by protecting individual liberty from imposed religious conceptions of virtue. Yet critics often argue that this secular focus on merely avoiding violations can also enable unfettered individualism and undermine appeals to the common good. This book uncovers in secular rights pioneer Hugo Grotius a rights theory that points toward the enlargement of individual responsibility. It grounds this connection in Grotius' unexplored theological corpus, which reveals a dual metaethics and jurisprudence. Here a deontological natural (...) law undergirds a secular theory of rights that is self-aware of its own limitations. A teleological practical reason then guides the exercise of these rights, so as not to compromise the political order that defends them. The book then illustrates this symbiosis of rights and responsibilities in five areas: consent theories of government, rights of rebellion, criminal punishment, war and international responsibility, and Atonement theology. This reassesses Grotius' legacy as a secularist opponent of classical political thought, and suggests that modern liberalism and universal human rights are compatible with a world of resurgent religion. (shrink)

As controversial as Lockean interpretation relating to the ideas of the law of nature and natural rights has always been, few would dispute the inextricable connection between them in the context of John Locke's thought. The historical development of natural rights language out of the natural law tradition is mirrored to a certain extent in the order within and between Locke's own writings. Locke intimates a persuasive account of the concurrent univocal property of God and the human being in the (...) particular human being herself. The particular human being is the property of God and herself in the very same sense of the word "property", i.e. the product of workmanship or labor. Both slavery and suicide fall foul of Locke's doctrine of the law of nature and natural rights: slavery is a violation of self‐ownership, and suicide is as direct a violation of divine ownership as one can imagine. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the morality of two types of national security electronic surveillance (SIGINT) programs: the analysis of communication “metadata” and dragnet searches for keywords in electronic communication. The chapter develops a standard for assessing coercive government action based on respect for the autonomy of inhabitants of liberal states and argues that both types of SIGINT can potentially meet this standard. That said, the collection of metadata creates opportunities for abuse of power, and so judgments about the trustworthiness and competence (...) of the government engaging in the collection must be made in order to decide whether metadata collection is justified in a particular state. Further, the moral standard proposed has a reflexive element justifying adversary states’ intelligence collection against one another. Therefore, high-tech forms of SIGINT can only be justified at the cost of justifying cruder versions of signals intelligence collection practiced by a state’s less-advanced adversaries. (shrink)