Since sending explicit messages can be costly, people often utilize “what is not said,” i.e., informative silence, to economize communication. This paper studies the efficient communication rule, which is fully informative while minimizing the use of explicit messages, in cooperative environments. It is shown that when the notion of context is defined as the finest mutually self-evident event that contains the current state, the efficient use of informative silence exhibits the defining property of indexicals in natural languages. While (...) the efficient use of silence could be complex, it is also found that the efficient use of silence can be as “simple” as the use of indexicals in natural languages if and only if the information structure satisfies some centrality and dominance properties. (shrink)

According to standard assumptions in semantics, ordinary users of a language have implicit beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences in that language, and they often agree on those beliefs. For example, it is assumed that if Anna and John are both competent users of English and the former utters ‘grass is green’ in conversation with the latter, they will both believe that that sentence is true if and only if grass is green. These assumptions play an important role in (...) an intuitively compelling picture of communication, according to which successful communication through literal assertoric utterances is normally effected thanks to our shared beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences uttered in the course of the conversation. Against these standard assumptions, this paper argues that the participants in a conversation rarely have the same beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences involved in a linguistic interaction. More precisely, it argues for Variance, the thesis that nearly every utterance is such that there is no proposition which more than one language user believes to be that utterance’s truth-conditional content. If Variance is true, we must reject the standard picture of communication. Towards the end of the paper I identify three ways in which ordinary conversations can be communication-like despite the truth of Variance and argue that the most natural amendments to the standard picture fail to explain them. (shrink)

Recent discussions of animal communication and the evolution of language have advocated adopting a ‘pragmatics-first’ approach, according to which “a more productive framework” for primate communication research should be “pragmatics, the field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the meaning of linguistic utterances”. After distinguishing two different conceptions of pragmatics that advocates of the pragmatics-first approach have implicitly relied on, I argue that neither conception adequately serves the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the origins (...) of human linguistic communication. My main aim in this paper is to motivate–and begin to articulate–an intermediary conception whose scope is narrower than Carnapian pragmatics but broader than Gricean pragmatics. To do so, I first spell out what I take to be the key insight offered by proponents of the Gricean approach concerning the emergence of linguistic communication, namely, its being communication ‘from a psychological point of view’. I then develop this insight using key elements from the anti-Gricean ‘biosemantic’ account of linguistic communication due to Ruth Millikan, Philosophical Perspectives 9, Ridgeview Publishing, Atascedero CA, 1995, Millikan R Varieties of Meaning. Mass.: The MIT Press, Cambridge, Millikan, Beyond concepts: unicepts, language, and natural information, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2017, and elsewhere). I argue that the intermediary pragmatics-first approach that I propose, which draws on both Gricean and Millikanian resources, would be better equipped to serve the purposes of those who search for potential precursors of human linguistic communication in animal communication. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that when we trust the results of scientific research, that trust is inevitably directed at least in part at collective bodies rather than at single researchers, and that accordingly, reasonable assessments of epistemic trustworthiness in science must attend to these collective bodies. In order to support this claim, I start by invoking the collaborative nature of most of today’s scientific research. I argue that the trustworthiness of a collaborative research group does not supervene (...) on the trustworthiness of its individual members and point out some specific problems for the assessment of epistemic trustworthiness that arise from the specific nature of today’s collaborative research. Next, I argue that the social diffusion of trustworthiness goes even further; we always also need an assessment of the trustworthiness of the respective research community as a whole. Communities, I claim, play an essential role in the epistemic quality management of science. To see why this role is indispensible, we have to appreciate the full complexity of determining what is desirable in a method of inquiry. The relevant features of a method include three different dimensions: the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the method’s power. Every methodological choice involves a trade-off between these three dimensions. The right balance between them (the “distribution of inductive risks”, or DIR) depends on value judgments about the costs of false results and the benefits of correct ones. Conventional methodological standards of research communities impose constraints on admissible DIR and thereby harmonize the implicit value judgments. Trusting that the research community has set the limitations on DIR in a suitable way is thus always part of placing our trust in a scientific result. (shrink)

Metaphors are considered as instruments crucial for persuasion. However, while their emotive, communicative and persuasive effects are the focus of different studies and discussions, the core of their persuasive function, namely their argumentative dimension, is almost neglected. This paper addresses the problem of explaining how metaphors can communicate arguments, and how it is possible to reconstruct and justify them. To this purpose, a distinction is drawn between the arguments that are communicated metaphorically and reconstructed “top down,” namely based on relevance (...) considerations, and the ones that are triggered implicitly by the use of a metaphorical expression. In both cases, metaphorical arguments are reconstructed through different patterns of argument, called argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008). However, while the purpose of a metaphorical sequence of discourse (called metaphorical move) can guide and justify the reconstruction of the argument that can sufficiently support the intended conclusion in a persuasive move, a more complex analysis is needed for analyzing the inferences that a metaphorical move can trigger. These inferences are claimed to represent part of the connotation of the metaphorical expression and can be captured through its most frequent collocations, determinable using some tools of the corpus linguistics. (shrink)

The scientific community takes for granted a view of science that may be called standard empiricism. This holds that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth, the basic method being to assess theories with respect to evidence. A basic tenet of the view is that science must not accept any thesis about the world as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence, let alone in violation of evidence. But physics only accepts unified (...) theories, and persistently rejects infinitely many ad hoc rivals that fit the phenomena even better. In persistently rejecting these infinitely many empirically more successful rival theories, physics thereby makes a substantial assumption about the universe – it is such that all ad hoc theories are false – an assumption that is accepted implicitly independently of evidence, even in a sense against the evidence. That contradicts standard empiricism. The scientific community needs to adopt a new conception of science that represents the assumption of physics as a hierarchy of assumptions, thus facilitating the improvement of the assumption that is made, as science proceeds. (shrink)

Numerous societal issues, from climate change to pandemics, require public engagement with scientific research. Such engagement reveals challenges that can arise when experts communicate with laypeople. One of the most common frameworks for framing these communicative interactions is the deficit model of science communication, which holds that laypeople lack scientific knowledge and/or positive attitudes towards science, and that imparting knowledge will fill knowledge gaps, lead to desirable attitude/behavior changes, and increase trust in science. §1 introduces the deficit model in (...) more detail and shows that adhering to this model often fails to achieve its aims, which motivates the main question of this chapter: how can Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thinking collectives address the persistent problem of deficit approaches in science communication? I suggest that it can do so by exposing the deficit model’s implicit assumption of an expert-lay divide. Accordingly, §2 lays out Fleck’s theory and §3 contrasts it with contemporary debates about science communication. Following this descriptive work, §4 draws on Fleck’s ideas to make four concrete suggestions for further questioning the expert-lay divide. (shrink)

Psychologists and philosophers have not yet resolved what they take implicit attitudes to be; and, some, concerned about limitations in the psychometric evidence, have even challenged the predictive and theoretical value of positing implicit attitudes in explanations for social behavior. In the midst of this debate, prominent stakeholders in science have called for scientific communities to recognize and countenance implicit bias in STEM fields. In this paper, I stake out a stakeholder conception of implicit bias that (...) responds to these challenges in ways that are responsive to the psychometric evidence, while also being resilient to the sorts of disagreements and scientific progress that would not undermine the soundness of this call. Along the way, my account advocates for attributing collective (group-level) implicit attitudes rather than individual-level implicit attitudes. This position raises new puzzles for future research on the relationship (metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical) between collective implicit attitudes and individual-level attitudes. (shrink)

Phase-Locked Logical Synthesis (PLLS) provides a formal framework for modeling rapid, implicit interpersonal coordination. Building on the accumulation-detonation mechanisms originally established in the IASER Experience for human-AI collaboration (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18258286), PLLS extends these principles to dyadic and group interactions. -/- By integrating empirical findings from psychology and nonverbal behavior research — including interactional synchrony, micro-behavior mirroring, and temporal compression of signals — PLLS captures how minimal cues can trigger high-fidelity, coordinated responses. -/- The framework formalizes internal correlation dynamics through (...) a threshold-based model, allowing quantitative predictions of synchronization onset and stability. This approach bridges theoretical constructs from Cognitional Mechanics, which establish non-commutativity and irreversibility in intelligence operations, with empirically grounded social phenomena, providing a unified basis for simulating, analyzing, and comparing implicit coordination across contexts. (shrink)

The main hypothesis of the article is that there has been an attitude change in the field of pragmatics: the philosophical notion of intentionality has penetrated in a cognitive approach. The first aim is to argue for this attitude change via analyzing classical pragmatical writings (works of J. R. Searle and H. P. Grice) and the relevance- theoretical approach of D. Sperber and D. Wilson. The second aim is to argue for the legitimacy of the attitude change by presenting a (...) new direction of research within the field of cognitive pragmatics. The author summarizes Dan Sperber's metarepresentations-first hypo-thesis about the evolution of ostensive-inferential communication, identifies its implicit presuppositions and analyzes its implications for evolutionary psychology and other related disciplines. The conclusions are the following: (1) the philosophical notion of intentionality play an important role in cognitive pragmatics as well (i.e. it uses the Gricean concept of non-natural meaning, and the Searleian distinction of first- and second-order intentionality), (2) the attitude change has enriched the notion of intentionality, (3) this enrichment makes new research directions possible in the field of pragmatics. (shrink)

While social geographers have convincingly made the case that space is not an external constant, but rather is produced through inter-relations, anthropologists and sociologists have done much to further an understanding of time, as itself constituted through social interaction and inter-relation. Their work suggests that time is not an apolitical background to social life, but shapes how we perceive and relate to others. For those interested in exploring issues such as identity, community and difference, this suggests that attending to how (...) temporal discourses are utilised in relation to these issues is a key task. This article seeks to contribute to an expansion of the debate about time and sociality by contributing an analysis of a variety of ways in which Gloria Anzaldúa utilises temporal concepts as part of her work of rethinking social identity and community. In particular, I suggest that in contesting homogeneous identity, Anzaldúa also implicitly contests linear temporal frameworks. Further, in creating new frameworks for identity, I suggest the possibility of discerning an alternative approach to time in her work that places difference at the heart of simultaneity. I suggest that the interconnection between concepts of time and community within Anzaldúa’s work indicates, more broadly, that attempts to rework understandings of relationality must be accompanied by reworked accounts of temporality. (shrink)

Menstrual health is a critical yet underexplored dimension of adolescent wellbeing that is profoundly shaped by language, culture, and communication practices. While existing reviews have focused largely on infrastructure, product access, and general education interventions, limited attention has been paid to how indigenous and mother-tongue languages mediate comprehension, stigma, and behavioural uptake. This systematic review synthesised evidence from 110 peer-reviewed journal articles, ethnographic monographs and chapters, and international technical reports to examine how household discourse, school-based instruction, community programmes, and (...) vernacular media influence adolescents menstrual-health literacy, hygiene practices, stigma experiences, and school participation. Following PRISMA-guided screening and quality appraisal, findings were analysed using inductive thematic synthesis. Four interconnected themes emerged: indigenous-language instruction as a facilitator of comprehension; linguistic taboo and euphemism; mothers and female relatives as linguistic gatekeepers; school and community programmes as sites of discursive change. Across diverse global contexts, indigenous languages functioned simultaneously as resources for learning and as carriers of cultural ideologies that may reproduce silence unless deliberately reframed. The review concludes that menstrual-health education operates as an implicit form of language policy and argues for integrating multilingual pedagogy, participatory terminology development, caregiver engagement, and vernacular media into adolescent-health strategies. These insights position linguistic inclusion as central to equitable and sustainable menstrual-health interventions worldwide. (shrink)

Classical interpretations of Goedels formal reasoning, and of his conclusions, implicitly imply that mathematical languages are essentially incomplete, in the sense that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is, both, non-algorithmic, and essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse, which intends to mathematically express, and unambiguously communicate, intuitive concepts that correspond to scientific investigations, cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth (...) verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic---classically accepted as the foundation of all our mathematical Languages---is verifiably complete in the above sense. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can, then, be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth. (shrink)

When independent laboratories or readers attempt to reproduce, contest, or extend a published result, who decides which attempts count? This paper, the sixty-sixth in a sequence developing an interpretive framework that redescribes physical reality as a causally consistent history of information updates, personifies the implicit answer as the Global Arbiter: the authority for whom "X replicated" or "X failed to replicate" is a decree rather than a typed, auditable record. The replication-crisis literature prescribes norms — preregistration, severity testing, disclosure (...) — but ships no executable mechanism; in practice, standing is settled by editorial fiat, prestige weighting, and undeclared aggregation (the reception of the Open Science Collaboration's coordinated replication estimate as headline scalar rates is the paper's displayed case, and Goodman, Fanelli and Ioannidis have documented that the field's own reproducibility vocabulary is untyped). The sequence's earlier papers froze what a single laboratory's certified execution is, and legislated how a frozen corpus revises itself once a typed defect is declared; this paper builds the missing layer between them — the community record interface — and retires the arbiter role constructively. -/- A Replication Specification declares, before any attempt exists, what an attempt at a given claim is: target address, comparison grain, protocol identity, admissible deviation classes, a two-layer independence typing (core independence fields — apparatus, data acquisition, analysis chain, calibration protocol — as computational inputs, each carried with an evidence grade of evidenced, asserted, challenged, or unknown; disclosure fields — personnel, funding, institution — as annotation only, never decisive), evidence-backed replicator eligibility, and outcome vocabulary; every field has a declared, mechanically checkable codomain, and a legacy adapter derives the target-side specification from already-deposited objects. The question "which attempts count" is answered three times, at three decidable layers, never once by decree: schema admission (well-formedness), attempt-status typing, and profile contribution. The attempt register types every admitted record as concordant, discordant, incomparable, defect-suspected, or extension under a fixed exclusive evaluation order — a typing of the attempt-target relation, never a truth verdict on the target: incomparability is a first-class landing rather than a rejection, and suspicion of a defect in the target is structurally separated from mere discordance by typed evidence requirements — disagreement alone never suffices, and a well-formed suspicion converts into a declaration-ready packet for the corpus's revision law, an input document rather than a declaration act. Standing travels as a profile whose components are relation tables, graded vectors, and finite sets; the flagship lemma — the no-aggregation invariant — proves as a type theorem that no mechanism clause collapses the profile into a single scalar replication verdict. A replication authority layer closes with a boxed theorem: no role, from original owner to reader, holds decree authority over any replication-standing claim. An arbiter-freedom lemma walks every clause: inputs are frozen records, declared record fields, or mechanism data; community consensus, journal uptake, and reviewer opinion enter as recorded events only, never as evaluation inputs. -/- The ceiling is deliberate: no datum is scored, no effect size computed, no meta-analysis performed, no consensus machinery built — each omission is named, seated for future work, and declared inside every profile instance by flag. The paper's worked instances are typed honestly as registry-grade rehearsals outside the register, and the corpus's lack of genuine cross-laboratory attempts is displayed rather than papered over, with the unexercised statuses supported by independent constraints and four barred counterfactual cases. The registered slogans carry the philosophical point: a profile is not a verdict; a register is not a court — and yet a replication profile can carry evidence without becoming an arbiter verdict. What is removed is only the external authority's role as an evaluation input; what replaces it is a type system for community evidence. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je considère l’influence possible des recherches récentes sur les attitudes en psychologie sociale, principalement dans le paradigme des théories des processus duaux [dual process theories], sur notre compréhension de la responsabilité. La thèse que je soutiens est que certaines révisions à notre façon de comprendre la responsabilité et nos pratiques d’attribution de la responsabilité pourraient être justifiées par ces travaux. Avant de présenter les révisions que j’introduis, je décris les grandes lignes du paradigme que j’utiliserai, soit celui (...) des théories processus duaux tel qu’appliqué aux attitudes. Puis, m’inspirant de Vargas (2004, 2005), je présente les différentes formes que peuvent prendre le révisionnisme. Parce que ces révisions s’appliquent à des notions qui sont utilisées à la fois par le commun des mortels et par les philosophes (qui tentent soit de les reconstruire rationnellement, soit de les modifier), je présente ce que l’on présume que pense chacun des groupes sur la question. Finalement, je présente trois révisions, plutôt « locales », que ces travaux pourraient inspirer. (shrink)

The nonverbal cues that accompany speech (for example, facial expressions, gestures, and eye gaze) can be as communicatively significant as the content of the speech itself. I identify what I argue is a very common—but largely philosophically unexamined—phenomenon: our tendency to allocate nonverbal cues in ways that are sensitive to conversational participants' levels of respective social power such that people with more power receive comparatively more positive and affirming nonverbal cues than people with less power. I call this ‘nonverbal marginalization’ (...) and argue that it reflects and reinforces harmful social prejudices. In this paper, I introduce and empirically situate nonverbal marginalization within a broader account of nonverbal communication, showing how implicit and explicit biases are subtly reflected in automatic patterns of nonverbal behavior. I go on to propose a new conceptual resource and intervention strategy to identify and address the various ethical, psychological, and epistemic harms of nonverbal marginalization. (shrink)

In this chapter, I critically examine issues relevant to the construction and reality of social categories, focusing on issues concerning conceptual schemes and conventionalism. Conceptual schemes (‘paradigms,’ ‘linguistic frameworks,’ ‘forms of life’) are systems of concepts that organize and give (intersubjective) meaning to empirical experience. In discussions about the construction of social categories, a common assumption is that social categories and kinds (e.g., ‘money,’ ‘marriage,’ ‘liberal’) require the presupposition of a conceptual scheme that gives meaning to those terms. One prominent (...) position in social ontology (Lewis, 1969, Gilbert 1989, 2014, Searle 1995) holds that the reality of social categories is grounded in a conventionalist conceptual scheme: social categories are conventionally accepted categories that reflect explicit or implicit agreements within a community. According to this view, the reality of social categories and kinds is established (and maintained) by contingent and arbitrary conventional decisions about social categories (e.g., laws about legal tender, marriage laws, the one-drop rule). Conventions can be understood as social customs (e.g., rules governing traffic, marriage laws, institutionalized rules about sex and gender) that serve some human purpose or interest. They are important for the establishment and maintenance of social norms (see Bicchieri 2006, 2017). -/- The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I examine the general idea of conceptual schemes, focusing on Kuhn’s influential theory of paradigms. While Kuhn’s position implies a conceptual relativity and anti-realism (or instrumentalism) about scientific concepts, Davidson and Popper challenge the Kuhnian orthodoxy that the presence of conceptual schemes implies conceptual relativity or ‘incommensurability’ of competing conceptual schemes. I argue that a key difference between scientific and social conceptual schemes is that the former are oriented towards describing nature, whereas the latter are oriented towards social utility or usefulness. In section 3, I examine some foundational works in social ontology—focusing on the accounts of Lewis, Gilbert, and Searle—that hold that social categories are grounded by a conventionalist conceptual scheme. These accounts of social categories imply that the reality of social categories is constituted by (or grounded in) social conventions, which ultimately reflect (or are anchored by) explicit or implicit community-level agreements. In section 4, I survey some prominent accounts of social human categories, focusing on the views of Hacking, Khalidi, Mallon, Haslanger, and Ásta. A common tendency in these accounts is the portrayal of social categories as social to the extent that they are conventionally determined. This suggests that the proper contrast class for social categories is natural categories (as opposed to individual categories or innate categories). (shrink)

‘Dogwhistle’ refers to a kind of political manipulation that some people carry out for political gains. According to Saul (2018), dogwhistles can be either intentional or unintentional depending on whether the speaker carried out the dogwhistle deliberately or not —although one cannot always recognize whether a particular case was intentional. In addition to being intentional or not, dogwhistles can also be overt or covert depending on whether the audience is aware or not of the dogwhistle. In the case of overt (...) dogwhistles, the speaker addresses a message to an audience with two possible interpretations. One of these is coded and affects only a subset the audience (Witten 2014). Covert dogwhistles, on the other hand, are not really about sending a “coded message.” Instead, they raise attitudes to salience, so people will act on them without realizing they are being moved on them. As Stanley (2015) points out, these kinds of dogwhistles work as a strategy for undermining democratic ideals without immediate rejection. Our key question is whether covert dogwhistles constitute a special form of implicit communication or whether they can be reduced to already existing forms of implicit communication such as presuppositions or implicatures. We will focus on covert dogwhistles because they seem more difficult to accommodate within the traditional categories of presuppositions and implicatures. To carry out this task, we compare the features of each of the mentioned phenomena and analyse how they behave in the face of retraction. (shrink)

The notions of types of dialogue and dialectical relevance are central themes in Walton’s work and the grounds for a dialectical approach to many fallacies. After outlining the dialogue models constituting the background of Walton’s account, this article presents the concepts of dialectical relevance and dialogue shifts in their application to biased argumentation, fallacious moves, and illicit argumentative strategies. Showing the different dialectical proposals Walton advanced in several studies on argumentation as a development of a dialogical system, it has proved (...) possible to highlight the fundamental aspects of his theory in a comprehensive model of communication and interaction. (shrink)

This essay explores the speech act of dogwhistling (sometimes referred to as ‘using coded language’). Dogwhistles may be overt or covert, and within each of these categories may be intentional or unintentional. Dogwhistles are a powerful form of political speech, allowing people to be manipulated in ways they would resist if the manipulation was carried outmore openly—often drawing on racist attitudes that are consciously rejected. If philosophers focus only on content expressed or otherwise consciously conveyed they may miss what is (...) most powerful and pernicious in the speech of political culture. This essay is a call to start paying attention to these more covert speech acts, and a first attempt at beginning to theorize them. It argues that dogwhistles present a complex and interesting case for the philosopher of language, and explores their implications for democratic politics. (shrink)

Pragmatic presupposition is analyzed in this paper as grounded on an implicit reasoning process based on a set of presumptions, which can define cultural differences. The basic condition for making a presupposition can be represented as a reasoning criterion, namely reasonableness. Presuppositions, on this view, need to be reasonable, namely as the conclusion of an underlying presumptive reasoning that does not or may not contain contradictions with other presumptions, including the ordering of the hierarchy of presumptions. Presumptions are in (...) turn analyzed considering their nature and their hierarchy, namely their object and their possible contextual backing, which eliminates some of their possible defaults. This analysis of presupposition brings to light the relationship between communicative infelicities or misunderstandings deriving from presuppositional failures and the underlying system of presumptions and presumptive reasoning. This approach can be applied to the investigation of communicative problems within the medical context, and more precisely the communication in diabetes cases. (shrink)

We have introduced the concept of a cognitive-system community related to language (hereafter simply “community”). I consider this to be an important concept, one that accords with our actual cognitive processes. Each of us lives within such a community, and every member of the community possesses a distinctive cognitive system. Accordingly, we are faced with two extremely important questions: First, how is an individual’s cognitive system established? In the previous section, we attempted to answer this question, but we discussed only (...) the formation of concepts. Clearly, in addition to concepts, we must also examine the formation of general knowledge. In this section, we will explore this issue. Although we discussed the formation of concepts within a cognitive system in the previous section, it is evident that this account is incomplete. We need a deeper and more comprehensive investigation of how concepts within a cognitive system are established. The previous section merely served as a preliminary step. The second extremely important question is: how do we come to know a new object within a community? What is this process like? How do we arrive at a new theory? And how does such a theory gain recognition? These are likewise extremely important questions, and we will offer a preliminary discussion of them in the next section. In fact, I believe that, under the framework of cognitive systems, epistemology as a whole must be reconstructed. Traditional epistemology has not explicitly acknowledged that the knowing subject possesses a cognitive system (even though it implicitly presupposes one). As a result, the first question does not arise within it. At the same time, the second question differs entirely depending on whether the existence of a cognitive system is explicitly assumed or not. (shrink)

The central claim of my paper is that pragmatics has a wider scope of application than has been generally appreciated. In particular, I will argue that many discussions of pragmatics are guilty of a problematic form of provincialism. The provincialism at issue restricts the class of target systems of study to those involving groups of developmentally typical humans (or slightly idealized versions thereof), either explicitly as a matter of principle or implicitly as consequence of how it construes the underlying pragmatic (...) notions. In what follows, I will argue that this kind of provincialism is problematic because there are patterns of non-human animal social interaction that cannot be properly explained without recourse to the theoretical tool-kit of pragmatics. Crucially, rejecting provincialism about pragmatics does not entail that there are not important theoretical differences between human and non-human systems of pragmatics. It does, however, require that our core philosophical theories of social interaction and communication be centered on features independent not merely of those at work in human languages but also of uniquely human features of cognition and sociality more generally. (shrink)

Proponents of evidence-based conservation (EBC) maintain that environmental intervention ought to be based on biodiversity data and data synthesis, instead of relying on unproven theory, individual expertise, and customary practices. This paper analyzes the epistemology of EBC, in which data are bestowed, explicitly or implicitly, with a privileged status and intrinsic evidential significance. I problematize this view by reviewing the complex knowledge infrastructure and dynamics involved in turning data into evidence within biodiversity conservation. Building on the philosophical literature on the (...) nature, journey, and social embeddedness of data, I highlight the critical role of scientific protocols in producing reliable, actionable knowledge for conservation. I argue that protocols are established precisely because data do not have the highest epistemic privilege or intrinsic evidential significance. To illustrate my point, I examine two case studies: the Conservation Evidence project and the Red List of Threatened Species. I discuss some of the conceptual and practical consequences of improving the epistemology of EBC. Furthermore, I show how protocol implementation can generate multiple data communities that are constrained by, yet open to, negotiations regarding evidential standards. (shrink)

That philosophy is an outlier in the humanities when it comes to the underrepresentation of women has been the occasion for much discussion about possible effects of subtle forms of prejudice, including implicit bias and stereotype threat. While these ideas have become familiar to the philosophical community, there has only recently been a surge of interest in acquiring field-specific data. This paper adds to quantitative findings bearing on hypotheses about the effects of unconscious prejudice on two important stages along (...) career pathways: tenure-track hiring and early career publishing. (shrink)

Although Kant’s view of the rational subject has been enormously influential, less attention has been paid to his account of what occurs when a subject fails to reflect on her reasons and falls under the influence of what he calls prejudice. My first goal in this paper is to explain Kant’s definition of prejudice by drawing on related discussions scattered across his published texts, notes and lectures. Next, I discuss his prescriptions for how prejudice can be identified and overcome. Although (...) he is often portrayed as requiring subjects to internally monitor their beliefs and intentions, I show that he in fact takes individual reflection to be a limited tool. Rather, he argues that communication with other subjects can be indispensable in fully overcoming prejudice. Finally, I argue that Kant’s account successfully avoids either over- or under- intellectualizing prejudice. In allowing that subjective causes like a subject’s associations and inclinations can lead her to judge and act in prejudiced ways, I suggest that he anticipates contemporary discussions of implicit bias. At the same time, however, he continues to maintain that a subject is rationally accountable for her prejudices, since, on his view, she can always refrain from unreflectively endorsing her associations and inclinations. (shrink)

In this chapter I zoom in on a topic in climate ethics that has not previously received academic scrutiny: the intersection between evolutionary ethics and climate change. I argue that in the context of climate discourse, an evolutionary perspective can be illuminating, but may also invite moral corruption and reasoning fallacies. Relating my discussion to the general theme of the book, I argue that academic philosophy is well-positioned to fulfil a specific societal role, which is particularly important in the age (...) of popular science: to raise awareness of the ethical predicaments to which scientific findings can give rise, and to highlight the normative assumptions implicit in the reasoning of science communicators. (shrink)

The central thesis of my article is that people live a life worthy of a human being only as self-ruling members of some autarchic (or self-governing) communities. On the one hand, nobody is born as a self-ruling individual, and on the other hand, everybody can become such a person by observing progressively the non-aggression principle and, ipso facto, by behaving as a moral being. A self-ruling person has no interest in controlling her neighbors, but in mastering his own impulses, needs, (...) wishes, desires, behaviors, etc. Inasmuch as he is an imperfect being who lives in an imperfect world, he needs to share certain interests, beliefs, values, customs and other characteristics with other people, i.e. to be involved in some communities. Depending on the following four criteria – the regulatory principle, the essential resources, the specific feedback and the fundamental values –, the countless and manifold human communities can be grouped in three categories: (1) affinity communities, (2) economic communities, and (3) civic communities. In other words, every community or human behavior has an affinity, an economic, and a civic dimension. If a civic community is merely a state shaped society, it can be called a political community. All communities are intrinsically variable. Throughout time, they ceaselessly change their composition, values, interpersonal processes and relations, territory, etc. Interestingly enough, the variability is unanimously recognized and accepted in affinity and communities economic, but is denied or abusively interpreted in the case of state shaped societies. If we confuse two types of order − cosmos and taxis – and two types of rule – nomos and thesis –, as well as we exaggerate the importance of certain type of community we bring some social maladies, namely the traditionalism, the commercialism and the civism, (with the worst form of it – the politicality). Whatever the communities they are involved in, all persons relate (implicitly or explicitly) to the libertarian non-aggression principle, living their life in strict accordance with the logical implications of the position they adopt. People who respect the non-aggression axiom necessarily manifest self-control, consideration for the life and property of the others, commitment to offer value for value, love of freedom and a high level of individual responsibility. By contrast, people who violate this axiom – the villains and the statists – invariably strive to control their neighbors, behave as parasites or predators, prefer forced exchanges, reject the personal responsibility (at most accepting the idea of social responsibility), and apply double moral standards. The first category of people generates a libertarian civic discourse as a spontaneous order, and the second creates a political/ statist civic discourse as a result of the human design and will to power. As a spontaneous order, the libertarian civic discourse implies free involvement, peaceful coordination, free expression, free reproduction of ideas and the power of one. Every communication performance in the frame of the libertarian civic discourse is important and has relevant results. All participants to the libertarian civic discourse are automatically members of some self-governing communities (at least members of the general libertarian community). The most important thing for these communities is to be connected to a communicational infrastructure which would make possible free involvement, free expression and the free reproduction of ideas. Inasmuch as today democracy means the tyranny of majority and participatory democracy the tyranny of majority plus the power of vested (and illegitimate) interests, only the emergence of self-governing communities by libertarian discourse offers us a little hope. It’s high time to fall in love (again) with liberty and to embrace the non-aggression principle. We don’t have to create a perfect world, but we can strive to develop our human nature. (shrink)

This essay treats language as a paradoxical cognitive technology: a compact, lossy code that nonetheless seems to enable the felt continuity of consciousness and deliberation. I propose that inner speech is primarily a communicative act—even when its audience is oneself—because producing language requires implicitly modeling an interpreter. That recursive “communicator–interceptor” loop yields a third-person stance on the self: we experience ourselves as an object because the brain simulates how another would parse our explanations. On this view, consciousness is not the (...) executive source of action but an emergent side-effect of self-communication, which can sometimes influence behavior by feeding structured, compressed summaries back into the subconscious system that largely decides and acts. The model also clarifies familiar frictions between stated intentions and action, and suggests a resource trade-off: language can refine control and insight by forcing thought through an efficient channel, yet it can also inhibit performance by consuming neural capacity, explaining the phenomenology of flow, skill acquisition, and the difficulty of sustained narration. Finally, I sketch a continuum hypothesis: non-linguistic animals may possess forms of second-order volition without the same self-modeling phenomenology, while communicative species may exhibit graded consciousness and agency. (shrink)

Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.

The summer of 2020 witnessed perhaps the largest protests in American history in response to police and vigilante brutality against the black community. New protests are still erupting every time another suppressed video, such as of Daniel Prude, surfaces, or another killing, such as Breonna Taylor’s, goes unpunished. As communities demand meaningful reform, the point – or pointlessness – of “implicit bias training” takes on renewed urgency. Implicit bias trainings aim to raise awareness about the unwitting or unwilling (...) prejudices and stereotypes that shape our habits of thinking, feeling, and navigating through the social world. These trainings have been widely adopted by businesses, schools, and law enforcement agencies. Do they make any difference? -/- Although I conduct implicit bias trainings myself (including for courts, judges, police, and attorneys), I share many critics’ concerns. Many trainings are too brief and oversimple, and too often their real function is to permit organisations to “check a box” to protect against litigation, rather than to spark real change. But “implicit bias training” is just another way of saying “education about implicit bias,” and, like all kinds of education, it can be done well or poorly. If implicit bias is one important piece of a large and complex puzzle, then education about it – when done right – should have a meaningful role to play in helping us understand ongoing inequities and enact reforms. (shrink)

The original work emerges from a hybrid intellectual context in which philosophical satire, post-Soviet epistemic fragmentation, mathematical formalism, and traditions of serio-comic writing coexist without stable disciplinary separation. Rather than resolving these heterogeneous influences into a unified framework, the text preserves their structural tension as part of its internal logic. Certain marginal strands within the material point toward broader transformations in modes of collective communication, disciplinary segmentation, and the implicit emergence of informational and cognitive asymmetries. These elements remain (...) deliberately undeveloped in the present exposition but contribute to the background conditions under which the conceptual architecture operates. Additional, later-developed conceptual parallels may be noted in relation to discussions of quantification without stable referential grounding and related attempts to formalize informational indeterminacy across heterogeneous domains. The work does not aim at systematic closure. Instead, it maintains an intentionally non-exhaustive structure in which incomplete articulation is not a limitation but a constitutive feature of the analytical perspective adopted. (shrink)

The original work emerges from a hybrid intellectual context in which philosophical satire, post-Soviet epistemic fragmentation, mathematical formalism, and traditions of serio-comic writing coexist without stable disciplinary separation. Rather than resolving these heterogeneous influences into a unified framework, the text preserves their structural tension as part of its internal logic. Certain marginal strands within the material point toward broader transformations in modes of collective communication, disciplinary segmentation, and the implicit emergence of informational and cognitive asymmetries. These elements remain (...) deliberately undeveloped in the present exposition but contribute to the background conditions under which the conceptual architecture operates. Additional, later-developed conceptual parallels may be noted in relation to discussions of quantification without stable referential grounding and related attempts to formalize informational indeterminacy across heterogeneous domains. The work does not aim at systematic closure. Instead, it maintains an intentionally non-exhaustive structure in which incomplete articulation is not a limitation but a constitutive feature of the analytical perspective adopted. (shrink)

How did human communication first escape the "here and now"? The capacity for displaced reference — referring to entities not present in the immediate perceptual environment — is widely recognized as a defining feature of human language (Hockett, 1960), and Bickerton (2009) rightly placed it at the center of the language origins problem. Yet the dominant scenario, which locates displacement in the need to recruit coalition members to distant food sources, does not compellingly explain why an offline representational system (...) would be selected when pointing, leading, and pantomime would suffice. The Name-Leash hypothesis proposes that the first displaced signal was not a food reference but a proper name — an individualized vocalization addressed to an absent infant. In cooperative breeding contexts characteristic of early Homo (Hrdy, 2009; Burkart et al., 2025), mothers regularly transferred infants to allomothers and departed to forage, generating an irreducible affective pressure — separation anxiety directed at a specific, non-fungible child — that no perceptually grounded gesture could resolve. The hypothesis identifies a semiotic mechanism for this transition: when the referent of an indexical signal disappears, the index "breaks," creating pressure for a vocal substitute that maintains the referent's mental representation in absence. The proper name fills this role as a repaired index — preserving the singularity of indexical pointing while acquiring the context-independence of a symbol. In Kripke's (1980) terms, the name functions as a rigid designator: it carries no descriptive content requiring environmental verification, making it the only signal type that operates precisely when there is nothing to perceive. The mechanism is grounded in the physiological platform created by habitual upright walking (decoupled respiration, enhanced vagal regulation), in the neural architecture of invariant identity representation (concept cells; dedicated name-retrieval systems in the left temporal pole), and in the ethology of cooperative breeding. Developmental evidence — the coincidence of peak solitary babbling with separation anxiety, Freud's Fort/Da, and Porshnev's analysis of the first word as self-regulatory — independently supports the proposed dynamic. Comparative data show that the two prerequisites for the mechanism — vocal individuation and vocal mimesis — exist separately in other species but converge only in cooperative-breeding hominins. The proto-name, born as a tool of affective self-regulation, already carries relational (genitive) structure and functions as an implicit promise of return — suggesting that reference and social obligation may have co-emerged as properties of the same vocal gesture. (shrink)

How did human communication first escape the "here and now"? The capacity for displaced reference — referring to entities not present in the immediate perceptual environment — is widely recognized as a defining feature of human language (Hockett, 1960), and Bickerton (2009) rightly placed it at the center of the language origins problem. Yet the dominant scenario, which locates displacement in the need to recruit coalition members to distant food sources, does not compellingly explain why an offline representational system (...) would be selected when pointing, leading, and pantomime would suffice. The Name-Leash hypothesis proposes that the first displaced signal was not a food reference but a **proper name** — an individualized vocalization addressed to an absent infant. In cooperative breeding contexts characteristic of early *Homo* (Hrdy, 2009; Burkart et al., 2025), mothers regularly transferred infants to allomothers and departed to forage, generating an irreducible affective pressure — separation anxiety directed at a specific, non-fungible child — that no perceptually grounded gesture could resolve. The hypothesis identifies a semiotic mechanism for this transition: when the referent of an indexical signal disappears, the index "breaks," creating pressure for a vocal substitute that maintains the referent's mental representation in absence. The proper name fills this role as a **repaired index** — preserving the singularity of indexical pointing while acquiring the context-independence of a symbol. In Kripke's (1980) terms, the name functions as a rigid designator: it carries no descriptive content requiring environmental verification, making it the only signal type that operates precisely when there is nothing to perceive. The mechanism is grounded in the physiological platform created by habitual upright walking (decoupled respiration, enhanced vagal regulation), in the neural architecture of invariant identity representation (concept cells; dedicated name-retrieval systems in the left temporal pole), and in the ethology of cooperative breeding. Developmental evidence — the coincidence of peak solitary babbling with separation anxiety, Freud's Fort/Da, and Porshnev's analysis of the first word as self-regulatory — independently supports the proposed dynamic. Comparative data show that the two prerequisites for the mechanism — vocal individuation and vocal mimesis — exist separately in other species but converge only in cooperative-breeding hominins. The proto-name, born as a tool of affective self-regulation, already carries relational (genitive) structure and functions as an implicit promise of return — suggesting that reference and social obligation may have co-emerged as properties of the same vocal gesture. (shrink)

This book analyzes the uses of emotive language and redefinitions from pragmatic, dialectical, epistemic and rhetorical perspectives, investigating the relationship between emotions, persuasion and meaning, and focusing on the implicit dimension of the use of a word and its dialectical effects. It offers a method for evaluating the persuasive and manipulative uses of emotive language in ordinary and political discourse. Through the analysis of political speeches and legal arguments, the book offers a systematic study of emotive language in argumentation, (...) rhetoric, communication, political science and public speaking. (shrink)

Whenever we communicate, we inevitably have to say one thing before another. This means introducing particularly subtle patterns of salience into our language. In this paper, I introduce ‘order-based salience patterns,’ referring to the ordering of syntactic contents where that ordering, pretheoretically, does not appear to be of consequence. For instance, if one is to describe a colourful scarf, it wouldn’t seem to matter if one were to say it is ‘orange and blue’ or ‘blue and orange.’ Despite their apparent (...) triviality, I argue that order-based salience patterns tend to make the content positioned first more salient – in the sense of attention-grabbing – in a way that can have surprising normative implications. Giving relative salience to gender differences over similarities, for instance, can result in the activation of cognitively accessible beliefs about gender differences. Where those beliefs are epistemically and/or ethically flawed, we can critique the salience pattern that led to them, providing an instrumental way of evaluating those patterns. I suggest that order-based salience patterns can also be evaluated on constitutive grounds; talking about gender differences before similarities might constitute a subtle form of bias. Finally, I reflect on how the apparent triviality of order-based salience patterns in language gives them an insidious strength. (shrink)

Presuppositions are at the same time a crucial and almost neglected dimension of arguments and fallacies. Arguments involve different types of presuppositions, which can be used for manipulative purposes in distinct ways. However, what are presuppositions? What is their dialectical function? Why and how can they be dangerous? This paper intends to address these questions by developing the pragmatic approaches to presupposition from a dialectical perspective. The use of presuppositions will be analyzed in terms of presumptive conclusions concerning the interlocutor’s (...) acceptance of a proposition, which can be assessed as reasonable or unacceptable. Their dialectical function is described in terms of dark side commitments attributed to a collective "voice" representing what is commonly shared. For this reason, they count as attempts to include the presupposed contents into the hearer’s commitment store, which in some circumstances can reverse the burden of proof. The different manipulative strategies grounded on controversial presuppositions will be examined by showing the distinct roles that the latter play and the relationship between the degrees of presuppositional implicitness and the speaker’s burden of retraction. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker’s concept of “epistemic injustice” has been crucial in revealing how identity prejudice can wrong individuals in their capacity as knowers. Yet this framework implicitly presupposes neurotypical norms of social communication and interaction as the baseline of epistemic exchange. In this paper, we argue that such presuppositions obscure how epistemic injustices against neurodivergent people often emerge not through identity prejudice but rather through socio-material environments that privilege certain neurotypes over others. Drawing on frameworks such as the neurodiversity paradigm (...) and niche construction theory, we reframe the concept of epistemic injustice as a distributed phenomenon that is enacted through the interaction of cognitive agents, cultural practices, and material affordances to accommodate these more structural forms of epistemic injustice. In particular, we argue that José Medina’s concept of “meta-lucidity” can be used as a methodological resource for reconstructing epistemic niches such that neurodivergent perspectives are given a role in co-constituting the fabric of a “neurodiversified” social imagination. (shrink)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define four (...) criteria for individual and group epistemic rationality, and then prove that the four definitions diverge, in the sense that individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We conclude by explaining implications of the inconsistency thesis for (i) descriptive history and sociology of science and (ii) normative prescriptions for scientific communities. (shrink)

Since the noun phrase `artificial intelligence' (AI) was coined, it has been debated whether humans are able to create intelligence using technology. We shed new light on this question from the point of view of themodynamics and mathematics. First, we define what it is to be an agent (device) that could be the bearer of AI. Then we show that the mainstream definitions of `intelligence' proposed by Hutter and others and still accepted by the AI community are too weak even (...) to capture what is involved when we ascribe intelligence to an insect. We then summarise the highly useful definition of basic (arthropod) intelligence proposed by Rodney Brooks, and we identify the properties that an AI agent would need to possess in order to be the bearer of intelligence by this definition. Finally, we show that, from the perspective of the disciplines needed to create such an agent, namely mathematics and physics, these properties are realisable by neither implicit nor explicit mathematical design nor by setting up an environment in which an AI could evolve spontaneously. (shrink)

This book shows how research in linguistic pragmatics, philosophy of language, and rhetoric can be connected through argumentation to analyze a recognizably common strategy used in political and everyday conversation, namely the distortion of another’s words in an argumentative exchange. Straw man argumentation refers to the modification of a position by misquoting, misreporting or wrenching the original speaker’s statements from their context in order to attack them more easily or more effectively. Through 63 examples taken from different contexts (including political (...) and forensic discourses and dialogs) and 20 legal cases, the book analyzes the explicit and implicit types of straw man, shows how to assess the correctness of a quote or a report, and illustrates the arguments that can be used for supporting an interpretation and defending against a distortion. The tools of argumentation theory, a discipline aimed at investigating the uses of arguments by combining insights from pragmatics, logic, and communication, are applied to provide an original account of interpretation and reporting, and to describe and illustrate tactics and procedures that can be used and implemented for practical purposes.. This book will appeal to scholars in the fields of political communication, communication in general, argumentation theory, rhetoric and pragmatics, as well as to people working in public speech, speech writing, and discourse analysis. (shrink)

This essay is not about what love is. It is about what self-ascriptions of love do. People typically self-ascribe romantic love when a nexus of feelings, beliefs, attitudes, values, commitments, experiences, and personal histories matches their conception of romantic love. But what shapes this conception? And (how) can we adjudicate amongst conflicting conceptions? -/- Self-ascriptions of love do not merely describe the underlying nexus of attitudes and beliefs. They also change it. This essay describes how conceptions of love affect romantic (...) experience. I limn distinctions between love and obsessive infatuation and explore ways language can cultivate queer romantic preferences. Since conceptions of love are shaped, often implicitly, by terms available in one’s linguistic community, the resulting nexus of concepts and conceptions manifests linguistic luck. I suggest ways we might sculpt the language of love to better understand—and change—ourselves. Love can help us flourish and so can our “love” language. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all (...) of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether. (shrink)

This volume brings together three contributions that address a shared theoretical and legal question: under what conditions do forms of structural violence toward neurodivergent people arise, and why do these forms of violence frequently remain invisible within modern institutional systems. The point of departure is the observation that contemporary social, legal, and administrative orders implicitly rely on assumptions about a uniform, neurotypical form of human existence. Perception, communication, work capacity, self-regulation, and social interaction are treated as general standards. Forms (...) of existence that structurally diverge from these assumptions tend to appear within this framework either as illness, as individual deficit, or as insufficient adaptation. -/- The contributions develop an ontological and legal-theoretical perspective for analyzing this problem. At the center lies the thesis that many conflicts between neurodivergent persons and institutional systems do not primarily arise from individual difficulties, but from a structural incompatibility between different forms of human existence and the normative architecture of modern societies. This incompatibility produces predictable forms of harm which, within legal and administrative procedures, are often individualized, pathologized, or interpreted as communicative disturbance. -/- The volume unfolds this diagnosis in three interconnected steps. The first contribution introduces the concept of representational violence as an ontological critique of modern knowledge and administrative systems. It argues that, within many institutional contexts, reality is recognized only insofar as it can be translated into symbolic, administrative, or diagnostic formats. Forms of experience, perception, or existence that resist such translation do not merely remain unnoticed; they are structurally excluded from the sphere of what can appear as real. -/- The second contribution develops, on this basis, the concept of a right to ontological coexistence. Neurodivergent forms of human existence are understood not as deviations from a general norm, but as autonomous variants of human world- and meaning-relation. Equality, therefore, cannot be conceived primarily as integration into a single social order. Instead, it must be understood as the legally protected coexistence of different forms of existence without coercion toward normalization, pathologization, or economic functionalization. -/- The third contribution applies this perspective to the analysis of modern state institutions. Drawing on examples from social law, administrative procedures, and criminal-law attribution, it demonstrates how structural incompatibilities between neurodivergent forms of existence and work- and performance-centered systems generate foreseeable harms. Where existential dependency, known incompatibility, and predictable harm converge, state action can no longer be understood as neutral governance but must be recognized as a form of structural violence. -/- Taken together, the volume develops a theoretical framework for analyzing modern societies under conditions of real ontological diversity. By connecting ontological critique, human rights reasoning, and legal system analysis, it aims to make visible forms of institutional violence that remain largely unrecognized in contemporary legal and social orders and to contribute to a reconsideration of equality, responsibility, and protective duties in plural societies. (shrink)

The present volume brings together four contributions that examine the structural relationship between neurodivergence, welfare-state institutions, and legal evaluative practices. The point of departure is the observation that modern welfare and legal systems operate on implicit assumptions of normality that presuppose neurotypical forms of communication, employment trajectories, conflict regulation, and social adaptation. For individuals whose modes of living and working diverge from these assumptions, systematic misinterpretations, institutional conflicts, and forms of structural vulnerability frequently arise. -/- The contributions analyze (...) these dynamics from several complementary perspectives. A first focus concerns the interaction between neurodivergent persons and welfare-state institutions. The analyses show that administrative and legal procedures often interpret behaviors as deficits that are in fact expressions of neurodivergent perceptual and communicative styles. The resulting escalation dynamics therefore do not primarily stem from individual incapacity but from structural incompatibilities between neurodivergent ways of living and institutional expectation structures. -/- A second line of inquiry addresses the question of epistemic authority within legal contexts. The contributions investigate how statements made by neurodivergent individuals about their own life situations are frequently relativized or reinterpreted in administrative and judicial proceedings. This dynamic produces forms of epistemic disenfranchisement in which affected persons are no longer treated as reliable sources regarding their own needs and experiences. -/- A third analytical perspective focuses on the institutional organization of social security. Using central instruments of German social law—particularly the concept of the Bedarfsgemeinschaft—the contributions demonstrate how welfare systems organize subsistence security relationally and thereby generate dependency structures and conflict dynamics that are particularly burdensome for neurodivergent individuals as well as for non-standardized forms of work. -/- Taken together, the contributions argue that many conflicts between neurodivergent individuals and state institutions do not primarily arise from personal deficits but from structural mismatches between institutional systems and neurodivergent modes of existence. Under conditions of existential dependency, these mismatches can produce predictable forms of institutional harm. The volume therefore contributes to a critical analysis of welfare-state institutions from the perspective of neurodivergent experience and asks under which structural conditions systems of law, administration, and social security provide protection—and under which conditions they generate predictable forms of institutional harm. (shrink)

A neglected and non-trivial problem exists for a central cluster of Strawsonian accountability theories of moral responsibility, namely those that, following Gary Watson, understand the reactive attitudes to be implicit forms of moral address, particularly moral demand. The problem consists in the joint acceptance of two claims: (a) Accountability is a matter of agents holding one another to moral demands, and (b) accountability is a view of blame and praise. I label joint acceptance of these claims the Strawsonian’s demand (...) dogma. Symptomatic of a larger tendency among responsibility theorists to focus on blame to the neglect of its positive counterpart, the demand dogma saddles the Strawsonian with an impoverished and ultimately untenable view of praise. This is because moral demand occupies a dual role on the Strawsonian's view of blame, one that it is incapable of occupying for praise. For, demands figure not only in the contents of blame responses; demand typifies the form of these responses themselves. That is, reactive attitudes of blame, unlike those of praise, implicitly make demands of their targets. The force of this problem is highlighted by considering the inadequacy of various strategies for shoehorning “demand” into our conception of praise. If reactive attitudes generally are incipient forms of moral address, praise-manifesting attitudes must communicate something other than demand. Though primarily critical, this paper invites Strawsonian responsibility theorists to give renewed attention to the foundations of the proposal that the reactive attitudes are incipiently communicative, focusing this time on the form of address that lies at the heart of praise. (shrink)

The reasoning process of analogy is characterized by a strict interdependence between a process of abstraction of a common feature and the transfer of an attribute of the Analogue to the Primary Subject. The first reasoning step is regarded as an abstraction of a generic characteristic that is relevant for the attribution of the predicate. The abstracted feature can be considered from a logic-semantic perspective as a functional genus, in the sense that it is contextually essential for the attribution of (...) the predicate, i.e. that is pragmatically fundamental (i.e. relevant) for the predica-tion, or rather the achievement of the communicative intention. While the transfer of the predicate from the Analogue to the analogical genus and from the genus to the Primary Subject is guaranteed by the maxims (or rules of inference) governing the genus-species relation, the connection between the genus and the predicate can be complex, characterized by various types of reasoning patterns. The relevance relation can hide implicit arguments, such as an implicit argument from classification , an evaluation based on values, consequences or rules, a causal relation, or an argument from practical reasoning. (shrink)

This paper advances an approach to relevance grounded on patterns of material inference called argumentation schemes, which can account for the reconstruction and the evaluation of relevance relations. In order to account for relevance in different types of dialogical contexts, pursuing also non-cognitive goals, and measuring the scalar strength of relevance, communicative acts are conceived as dialogue moves, whose coherence with the previous ones or the context is represented as the conclusion of steps of material inferences. Such inferences are described (...) using argumentation schemes and are evaluated by considering 1) their defeasibility, and 2) the acceptability of the implicit premises on which they are based. The assessment of both the relevance of an utterance and the strength thereof depends on the evaluation of three interrelated factors: 1) number of inferential steps required; 2) the types of argumentation schemes involved; and 3) the implicit premises required. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the question of whether recognition relations are based on trust. Theorists of recognition have acknowledged the ways in which recognition relations make us vulnerable to others but have largely neglected the underlying ‘webs of trust’ in which such relations are embedded. In this paper, I consider the ways in which the theories of recognition developed by Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, not only point to our mutual vulnerability but also implicitly rely upon mutual relations of trust. (...) The paper first offers a novel examination of the relation between recognition, vulnerability and trust in Habermas’ account of communicative action with the aim of arguing that such a consideration helps to elucidate important features of recognition. My claim is that a consideration of the dynamics of recognition and vulnerability in language-use, leads to an acknowledgment of the forms of trust that not only underpin communicative action, but recognition more generally. I conclude by considering the elements that are underplayed in Habermas’ account by turning to an examination of Axel Honneth’s alternative affective theory of recognition, specifically considering the interrelation between vulnerability and recognition. In doing so, I also turn to a consideration of the kind of trust that must be assumed in Honneth’s account of mutual recognition and point to a recognitive notion of trust. (shrink)