What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, developing our own account, offering two reasons for our account, and meeting two objections and solving one puzzle.

We critique two popular philosophical definitions of intellectual humility: the “low concern for status” and the “limitations-owning.” accounts. Based upon our analysis, we offer an alternative working definition of intellectual humility: the virtue of accurately tracking what one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. We regard this view of intellectual humility both as a virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and diffidence and as having advantages over other recent conceptions of intellectual (...) humility. After defending this view, we sketch remaining questions and issues that may bear upon the psychological treatment of intellectual humility such as whether evidence will help determine how this construct relates to general social humility on the one hand, and intellectual traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity, and honesty on the other. (shrink)

How should we respond to extremist views that we know are false? This paper proposes that we should be intellectually humble, but not open-minded. We should own our intellectual limitations, but be unwilling to revise our beliefs in the falsity of the extremist views. The opening section makes a case for distinguishing the concept of intellectual humility from the concept of open-mindedness, arguing that open-mindedness requires both a willingness to revise extant beliefs and other-oriented engagement, whereas intellectual humility (...) requires neither. Building on virtue-consequentialism, the second section makes a start on arguing that intellectually virtuous people of a particular sort—people with ‘effects-virtues’—would be intellectually humble, but not open-minded, in responding to extremist views they knew were false. We suggest that while intellectual humility and open-mindedness often travel together, this is a place where they come apart. (shrink)

We must proceed with both epistemic humility—the recognition that we don’t know everything, and in fact know very little—and flagrant optimism about the positive surprises that await us. This paper develops a philosophical framework for thinking about artificial intelligence, large language models, and the prospect of artificial general intelligence under conditions of radical uncertainty. Drawing on Kant’s critical philosophy, Leibniz’s monadology, and contemporary cosmology, I argue that our situation with respect to intelligence mirrors our situation with respect to the (...) physical universe: approximately 95% of what matters remains unknown. Just as dark matter and dark energy constitute the overwhelming majority of the cosmos while remaining deeply mysterious, so too do the “dark variables” of cognition, consciousness, and intelligence constitute vast lacunae in our understanding. -/- This epistemic situation demands humility about confident predictions, whether optimistic or pessimistic, regarding AI capabilities, timelines, and risks. Yet it equally demands openness to radical positive surprises. A systematic analysis of “attained fantasies”—dreams once dismissed as impossible that subsequently became reality—reveals a consistent pattern: from Lucian of Samosata’s lunar voyage (150 CE →1969 CE) to Turing’s thinking machines (1950 → 2015), human imagination has repeatedly underestimated what the universe permits. The paper connects this analysis to my 1995 prediction of digital resurrection technology, which anticipated by three decades the emergence of AI systems capable of simulating deceased individuals. The conclusion is not skepticism but calibrated wonder: we are at the beginning of understanding intelligence, not the end, and the space of positive possibilities vastly exceeds our current imagination. (shrink)

Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based (...) accounts of humility. (shrink)

What do humility, intellectual humility, and open-mindedness mean in the context of inter-group conflict? We spend most of our time with ingroup members, such as family, friends, and colleagues. Yet our biggest disagreements —— about practical, moral, and epistemic matters —— are likely to be with those who do not belong to our ingroup. An attitude of humility towards the former might be difficult to integrate with a corresponding attitude of humility towards the latter, leading to (...) smug tribalism that masquerades as genuine virtue. These potentially conflicting priorities have recently come to the fore because “tribal epistemology” has so thoroughly infected political and social discourse. Most research on these dispositions focuses on individual traits and dyadic peer-disagreement, with little attention to group membership or inter-group conflict. In this chapter, we dilate the social scale to address this pressing philosophical and social problem. (shrink)

Intellectual humility has something important in common with trust: both, independently, help secure knowledge. But they also do so in tandem, and this chapter discusses how. Intellectual humility is a virtue of a person’s cognitive character; this means that it disposes her to perceive and think in certain ways that help promote knowledge. Trust is a form of cooperation, in which one person depends on another (or on herself) for some end, in a way that is governed by (...) certain norms. Epistemic trust is trust for epistemic ends, where the one that I will focus on here is knowledge. When the parties to an epistemic-trust relationship exhibit intellectual humility, I will argue, they are in a better position than otherwise to secure knowledge. Some think that this is true trivially, on the grounds that knowledge (on their view) is constituted by the exercise of epistemic virtues. Whether or not this is so, I will focus on two different ways in which intellectual humility makes epistemic trust knowledge-conducive: first, it equips trusters to invest trust effectively – that is, in those who are trustworthy; second, it equips trustees to be epistemically trustworthy. (shrink)

Philosophers often claim that humility is a dependent virtue: a virtue that depends on another virtue for its value. I consider three views about this relation: Specific Dependence, Unspecific Dependence, and Fittingness. I argue that, since humility cannot uniquely depend on another virtue, and since this uniqueness is desirable, we should reject Specific and Unspecific Dependence. I defend a Fittingness view, according to which the humble person possesses some objectively good quality fitting for humility. I show beyond (...) Slote’s original characterization of the dependence relation that, even if humility’s value depends on having objectively good qualities, humility itself can be one such quality. So, humility can depend on itself. I call this view Bootstrapped Fittingness. (shrink)

This paper argues that scientific humility is essential for preserving human curiosity and intellectual progress. Drawing from paradigm shifts in astronomy and physics, contemporary cosmology’s 5% visible-matter framework, and philosophical accounts of provisional knowledge, it critiques epistemic finality—particularly when theological or metaphysical claims function as cognitive closure. Expanding the discussion, the paper introduces a phenomenological framework grounded in the concept of “zero and infinity,” proposing that reality is encountered as an open field of awareness rather than a completed system (...) of answers. The universe is interpreted not as a final solution to be possessed, but as an ongoing question that deepens consciousness. -/- Keywords: scientific humility, epistemology, curiosity, dark matter, phenomenology, zero and infinity, cosmology. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that intellectual humility is related to argumentation in several distinct but mutually supporting ways. I begin by drawing connections between humility and two topics of long-standing importance to the evaluation of informal arguments: the ad verecundiam fallacy and the principle of charity. I then explore the more explicit role that humility plays in recent work on critical thinking dispositions, deliberative virtues, and virtue theories of argumentation.

This article argues that fiduciary obligations include epistemic duties governing how entrusted discretion is exercised under conditions of dependency and authority—specifically, how fiduciaries form, sustain, and revise the beliefs that structure their discretionary judgment. While legal doctrine extensively regulates fiduciary conduct, conflicts of interest, and outcomes, it leaves the epistemic posture of fiduciaries under-theorised, despite the fact that fiduciary judgment is necessarily belief-mediated. Drawing on fiduciary theory, legal philosophy, and accounts of responsibility for belief, the article develops a role-relative conception (...) of epistemic humility as a fiduciary obligation rather than an intellectual virtue. It shows how epistemic responsibility can attach without presupposing voluntary control over belief or collapsing into tort-based standards of harm and causation. Situating epistemic duties within the justificatory structure of fiduciary law itself, the article builds on accounts of loyalty as a condition of legitimate discretion and breach as the violation of beneficiaries’ justified expectations. It further draws on Fuller’s internal morality of governance to explain why epistemic discipline is internal to lawful fiduciary authority rather than an ethical overlay. Finally, it distinguishes fiduciary epistemic responsibility from power-based accounts of institutional epistemic governance and explains how epistemic failures can constitute fiduciary wrongs independently of compensable loss. (shrink)

My argument in this paper is that humility is implied in the concept of teaching, if teaching is construed in a strong sense. Teaching in a strong sense is a view of teaching as linked to students’ embodied experiences (including cognitive and moral-social dimensions), in particular students’ experiences of limitation, whereas a weak sense of teaching refers to teaching as narrowly focused on student cognitive development. In addition to detailing the relation between humility and strong sense teaching, I (...) will also argue that humility is acquired through the practice of teaching. My discussion connects to the growing interest, especially in virtue epistemology discourse, in the idea that teachers should educate for virtues. Drawing upon John Dewey and contemporary virtue epistemology discourse, I discuss humility, paying particular attention to an overlooked aspect of humility that I refer to as the educative dimension of humility. I then connect this concept of humility to the notion of teaching in a strong sense. In the final section, I discuss how humility in teaching is learned in the practice of teaching by listening to students in particular ways. In addition, I make connections between my concept of teaching and the practice of cultivating students’ virtues. I conclude with a critique of common practices of evaluating good teaching, which I situate within the context of international educational policy on teacher evaluation. (shrink)

A chapter exploring the relations between humility and the sciences.

Judaism has historically played a foundational role in shaping moral monotheism, yet its theological self-understanding has remained constrained by anthropomorphic language and tribal exclusivity. This paper proposes a conceptual transition from what is termed “Judaism 1.0” to “Judaism 2.0”: a theological framework grounded in epistemic humility informed by evolutionary cognition. Drawing on insights from Darwinian evolution, philosophy of science, and Jewish intellectual history, the paper argues that human cognitive limitations preclude any positive description of God’s nature beyond existence itself. (...) Judaism 2.0 retains the practical and ethical structures of classical Judaism while rejecting anthropomorphic and attribute-based theology. Additionally, it proposes an inclusive theological posture that addresses historical exclusion and its sociopolitical consequences. The resulting framework advances a single meta-commandment: the reduction of human ignorance as a religious imperative. (shrink)

Current climate trajectories are alarming, with rising global temperatures, extreme weather events, and looming tipping points threatening ecosystems and human communities alike (Marlon et al. 2025; Wolf et al. 2025; NASA 2025). The prospect of geoengineering the Earth—the deliberate, large-scale intervention in Earth’s climate system to help mitigate the negative impacts associated with climate change—forces us to confront more than just scientific and technological questions. It challenges us to examine questions about our character. What should be said about the character (...) of those who would geoengineer the Earth? While the public discourse on geoengineering has tended to emphasize the technological risks associated with geoengineering, this article examines geoengineering through the lens of environmental character, with a special focus on ecological humility. Is geoengineering the Earth consistent with this environmental virtue? While ecological humility is widely discussed among environmental virtue ethicists, detailed accounts of this virtue are scarce. Matthew Pianalto (2013) is the exception. Pianalto argues that ecological humility involves several characteristic dispositions, such as acknowledging and accepting that one is part of nature and dependent upon it. Moreover, the ecologically humble person is open to learning from nature, appreciates the intrinsic value of nature, and is motivated to adopt ways of living that minimize impact on the natural world to preserve the intrinsic value of nature. The ecologically arrogant, on the other hand, are characterized by the impulse to dominate and control the nonhuman world (Whyte 2018; 2017). For the ecologically arrogant, there are no limits on the human will. Human beings are often assumed to stand atop the hierarchy of life on Earth, and they are the only creatures truly worthy of moral consideration. Non-human species and abiotic parts of the environment may be valuable, but only insofar as they contribute to human well-being. This article builds on Pianalto’s (2013) account of ecological humility and considers whether the virtue is consistent with geoengineering. Our new account is grounded in philosophy and recent advances in environmental psychology. On this account, ecological humility is what Nancy Snow (1995) refers to as existential virtue. The ecologically humble recognize and take seriously the limitations and vulnerabilities associated with human existence, especially in relation to non-human parts of nature. We will show that psychologists have investigated components of ecological humility, linking them to greater concern for, and action to ensure the protection of the environment. Although psychologists have yet to measure ecological humility directly, individuals who, for instance, espouse biospheric values also experience awe, reverence, and care toward their ecological communities (Wang et al., 2021; Yan & Jia, 2021), adopt non-anthropocentric beliefs (Lou et al., 2025), and act to promote the flourishing of both human and non-human members (Bouman et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2021). Importantly, this includes intentional actions and omissions that confer benefits and emphasize care over strict non-interference. Conceptually, we argue that the virtue of ecological humility is linked to care via self-respect, recognition of one’s own vulnerability, and attentiveness to interdependent ecological relationships. Moreover, our account is empirically informed, and action-guiding. By emphasizing care, vulnerability, and community flourishing rather than minimizing one’s impact on nature, we argue that ecological humility is consistent with human interventions that contribute to ecological flourishing, which may include geoengineering the Earth. (shrink)

This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This (...) is surprising because intellectual humility is often regarded as an antidote to cognitive biases, whereas I claim that a particular cognitive bias (namely, the curse of knowledge) may help foster an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

Unlike its moral and intellectual counterparts, the virtue of aesthetic humility has been widely neglected. In order to begin filling in this gap, I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is a promising resource for developing a model of aesthetic humility. Initially, however, this may seem like an unpromising starting point as Kant’s aesthetics might appear to promote aesthetic arrogance instead. In spite of this prima facie worry, I claim that Kant’s aesthetics provides an illuminating model of aesthetic humility (...) that sheds light not only on the self- and other-directed attitudes it involves, but also on how aesthetic humility can serve as a corrective to the vices of aesthetic arrogance and aesthetic servility. In addition to revealing the ways in which Kant’s aesthetics prizes humility rather than arrogance, I aim to show that the Kantian model of aesthetic humility can enrich our understanding of humility more generally and contribute to the on-going effort in aesthetics to analyse specific aesthetic virtues and vices. (shrink)

A case could be made that the practice of philosophy demands a certain humility, or at least intellectual humility, requiring such traits as inquisitiveness, openness to new ideas, and a shared interest in pursuing truth. In the positive psychology movement, the study of both humility and intellectual humility has been grounded in the methods and approach of personality psychology, specifically the examination of these virtues as traits. Consistent with this approach, the chapter begins with a discussion (...) of the examination of intellectual humility as a “character trait,” comparing intellectual humility to various well-known traits in the personality psychology literature (e.g the “Big 5” and the “Big 2”) as well as other key traits such as the need for cognition and the need for closure. The chapter then turns to the proverbial issue of whether virtues in general, and intellectual humility in particular, are a matter of “nature”- that is, an innate trait determined by heritability, or “nurture” – a trait mostly shaped by situation and environment. While the chapter does not resolve the issue, it provides occasion for an examination of the role of situations in the expression of intellectual humility, and for the interaction of “situation” and “trait.” The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the interaction of trait with situation provides the most robust understanding of the psychology of any character virtue, including humility and intellectual humility. (shrink)

People don't always speak the truth. When they don't, we do better not to trust them. Unfortunately, that's often easier said than done. People don't usually wear a ‘Not to be trusted!’ badge on their sleeves, which lights up every time they depart from the truth. Given this, what can we do to figure out whom to trust, and whom not? My aim in this paper is to offer a partial answer to this question. I propose a heuristic—the “Humility (...) Heuristic”—which is meant to help guide our search for trustworthy advisors. In slogan form, the heuristic says: people worth trusting admit to what they don't know. I give this heuristic a precise probabilistic interpretation, offer a simple argument for it, defend it against some potential worries, and demonstrate its practical worth by showing how it can help address some difficult challenges in the relationship between experts and laypeople. (shrink)

Intellectual humility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectual humility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multidisciplinary investigation.

This article presents an overview and critique of current interdisciplinary research on the nature and development of intellectual humility (IH), with the aim of systematically outlining currently debated open questions. We focus on four specific areas of research: (1) theoretical questions regarding the nature of IH, (2) issues with the measurement of IH in development, (3) existing research on the development of IH and related socio- cognitive abilities, and (4) interventions to increase IH in children and adolescents. We critically (...) review the existing empirical and theoretical literature in these areas, identify and articulate open questions, and map out directions for future research that follow from these questions. The main theoretical issues we identify concern the distinction between different features of IH (i.e., internal vs external, self- vs other-directed) and their relation to each other as well as the distinction between IH as a prescriptive virtue as opposed to a descriptive character trait. As we will demonstrate, taking seriously the notion of IH as a virtue raises crucial questions for its empirical study in the contexts of measurement, development, and potential interventions. (shrink)

Much of the literature from political psychology has focused on the negative traits that are positively associated with affective polarization—e.g., animus, arrogance, distrust, hostility, and outrage. Not as much attention has been focused on the positive traits that might be negatively associated with polarization. For instance, given that people who are intellectually humble display greater openness and less hostility towards conflicting viewpoints (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Hopkin et al., 2014; Porter & Schumann, 2018), one might reasonably expect them to be (...) less polarized. -/- We ran two studies designed to explore the relationship between various forms of humility and polarization. Our chief finding is that people who value humility are prone to what we are calling epistemic polarization—that is, judging the epistemic traits of contrapartisans negatively—which in turn plays a role in polarization more generally. Not only are contrapartisans deemed to have the wrong moral and political beliefs, they are also viewed as less humble and more arrogant, close-minded, and irrational. This makes matters even worse when it comes to the growing partisan divide. In light of our findings, we believe that the novel concept of epistemic polarization that we introduce is a promising target for further investigation. (shrink)

In this exploratory paper, I consider how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might contribute to the failure of testimonial exchanges. In §1, I will briefly highlight four broad ways a testimonial exchange might fail. In §2, I will very briefly review the nature of epistemic injustice. In §3, I will explore how both epistemic injustice and intellectual humility can lead to failures in testimonial exchange, and I’ll conclude by suggesting how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might be (...) related. (shrink)

Since the wife-husband team of Anne Case and Angus Deaton popularized the term deaths of despair, psychologists have become more interested in decoupling despair from clinical depression and anxiety. Despair’s central marker is the loss of hope. It is characterized by feelings of social and spiritual isolation, meaninglessness, hopelessness, helplessness, demoralization, and shame. Causes of despair are complex, ranging from individual (e.g., grief, bad health, addiction, abuse), to societal (e.g., social and cultural dislocation, unemployment, economic disaster, poverty), to a combination (...) of both. Sometimes, acknowledging and/or addressing despair’s material causes is enough. But the problem with despair is that it tends to generate a vicious cycle of self-defeat. Often, it manifests in self-perpetuating negative cognitive biases, self-defeating emotional reactions, and self-destructive behavior. To break free, the person must address the psychological and spiritual roots of her despair. Here, I offer insights from a Christian tradition grounded in the monastic spirituality of the Desert Fathers in the hopes that these might help a therapist seeking to do just that. After distinguishing between an emotion and a sin of despair, I locate the latter’s roots in the vices of acedia and pride. Finally, I point to the virtue of humility as a traditional cure for despair. (shrink)

Contemporary analytic philosophy often thinks of humility as about how someone places themselves in a larger context, often by acknowledging values of others or outside of oneself. This framework admits of a wide variety of views about what exactly this acknowledgement amounts to and what sorts of values are the relevant ones. Buddhist philosophy includes many different conceptions of pride and humility, many of which fit very easily into this framework. But here I focus on a way that (...) Buddhists have understood humility as not about how you compare yourself with others or place yourself in a larger context, but about denying the reality of such a self. This type of humility is connected with Buddhist metaphysical views about the nature of the self and appears in the work of Buddhist philosophers such as Śānetideva and Nāgārjuna. Nevertheless, even if one does not accept the Buddhist denial of self, Buddhism offers a unique conception of humility as not about placing ourselves but giving up our investment in the very idea of a self. (shrink)

Most historians explains changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the (...) virtue of epistemic humility in 19th century intellectual culture - specifically the scientific naturalists. (shrink)

Recently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance, and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility. I will argue that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility bear (...) an interesting relationship to one another in that they are interconnected and mutually supporting intellectual virtues. In sections 2 and 3 I will provide a brief overview of the predominant accounts of intellectual humility (section 2) and epistemic autonomy (section 3) in the literature. With an understanding of these intellectual virtues in hand, we will examine their relationship of mutual support in section 4. Section 5 will explore a challenge to this relationship coming from the epistemology of disagreement, and section 6 concludes. (shrink)

Intellectual humility, lauded as an important intellectual virtue, is theorized to encompass metacognitive tendencies (i.e., appreciation of the limits of one’s knowledge and intellectual abilities) and interpersonal ones (i.e., appreciation of others’ knowledge and intellectual abilities). Although prior research has investigated potential epistemic benefits, it remains unclear whether intellectual humility is personally beneficial—i.e., conducive to individuals’ well-being. Two main studies and one supplemental study (total N = 4,049) tested for associations cross-sectionally, within and between persons, and in longitudinal (...) changes over two years. Results indicated that, whereas interpersonal intellectual humility is associated with better well-being, metacognitive intellectual humility is generally associated with worse. These findings highlight the importance of the distinction between these two forms of intellectual humility, align with theoretical work on the determinants of well-being, and have implications for intellectual humility’s status as a virtue and for efforts to encourage people to cultivate intellectual humility. (shrink)

This discussion analyzes Lady Mary Shepherd’s response to the skeptical question raised by Hume about necessary causation: how can we know that like causes will necessarily give rise to like effects? Regardless of whether her account is metaphysically tenable in principle, this discussion seeks to assess if it is feasible in practice. Specifically, Shepherd’s response is considered in the context of scientific inquiry. If the inductive claims germane to scientific inquiry can be grounded in reason, as Shepherd believes, then her (...) anti-skeptical account prevails. However, a treatment of Shepherd’s oft-neglected epistemology reveals that she has not entirely silenced the Humeans here. Shepherd’s epistemic humility about external objects, when considered alongside her strict conception of natural kinds, forces us to employ an extra-rational inference when positing scientific claims. We must make an assumption about nature’s regularity which, crucially, is not guaranteed by reason. Shepherd’s response to Hume’s challenge cannot thus be considered an unmitigated success, at least by her own lights. To get induction off the ground, she has to make a concession to Hume about reason’s limits, albeit a subtle one. (shrink)

Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails.

In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. (...) I argue, however, that even in a world full of misleading evidence against true religious beliefs, cultivating epistemic humility is the better way to achieve believers’ epistemic aims. The reason is that dogmatic belief courts certain epistemic dangers, including to the true religious beliefs themselves, whereas epistemic humility empowers believers to counter them. (shrink)

While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of sub-personal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian advocacy (...) of a minimal conception of ‘belief’ was motivated by ethical concerns: avoiding any sort of commitment, he attempted to preserve his peace of mind. In this article, I argue for a Cartesian model of rational guidance that, in line with some current versions of an agential virtue epistemology, does involve judgment and risk, and thus which is true both to our rational constitution and to our finite and fallible nature. Insofar as epistemic humility is a virtue of rational agents that recognise the limits of their judgments, Pyrrhonian scepticism, and a fortiori any variety of naturalism, is unable to accommodate this virtue. This means that, in contrast to the Cartesian model, the Pyrrhonist does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of cognitive disintegration. The Pyrrhonist thus becomes a social rebel, one that violates the norm of serious personal assent that enables the flourishing of a collaborative and social species which depends on agents that, however fallible, are accountable for their actions and judgments. (shrink)

Ramseyan humility is the thesis that we cannot know which properties realize the roles specified by the laws of completed physics. Lewis seems to offer a sceptical argument for this conclusion. Humean fundamental properties can be permuted as to their causal roles and distribution throughout spacetime, yielding alternative possible worlds with the same fundamental structure as actuality, but at which the totality of available evidence is the same. On the assumption that empirical knowledge requires evidence, we cannot know which (...) of these worlds is actual. However, Lewis also appeals to a range of familiar semantic principles when framing his argument, which leads some authors to suppose that he can also plausibly be interpreted as offering a purely semantic argument for humility in addition. In this paper I grant that these arguments are Lewisian, but argue that Lewis is also committed to a theory of mind that licenses a purely metaphysical argument for humility based on the idea that mental properties supervene on fundamental structure. Given that knowing which x is the F requires knowing that a is the F, the supposition that we could come to know which properties actually occupy the fundamental roles entails differences in mental properties between worlds with the same fundamental structure, violating supervenience. Humility follows right away, without any further epistemic or semantic principles. This argument is immune to almost every way of rebutting the sceptical and semantic arguments; conversely, almost every way of rebutting the metaphysical argument tells equally against the others. (shrink)

New research suggests that a healthy democracy requires intellectual humility. When citizens are intellectually humble, they are less polarized, more tolerant and respectful of others, and display greater empathy for political opponents. But a flourishing democracy also requires people with political convictions. If the electorate were apathetic, they would not participate in democratic decision-making. Do these two democratic ideals conflict? The standard view in philosophy and psychology is that intellectual humility and political conviction are compatible. In this paper, (...) we challenge the standard view. We appeal to empirical and theoretical work indicating that intellectual humility can result in political apathy or lack of conviction. We conclude by suggesting that there are different varieties of intellectual humility, some aligned with conviction and engagement, and others of a more quietist character. To illustrate this, we sketch a kind of ‘political quietism’ modelled by philosophical thinkers such as Burke and Oakeshott. (shrink)

In some circles, faith is said to be one of three theological virtues, along with hope and agape. But not everyone thinks faith is a virtue, theological or otherwise. Indeed, depending on how we understand it, faith may well conflict with the virtues. In this chapter we will focus on the virtue of humility. Does faith conflict with humility, or are they in concord? In what follows, we will do five things. First, we will sketch a theory of (...) the virtue of humility. Second, we will summarize a common view of faith, arguably held by Thomas Aquinas among others, and we will argue that Thomistic faith is not an intellectual virtue and that it conflicts with humility in the domain of inquiry. Third, we will plump for an older view of faith, one that predates Aquinas by at least 1500 years, Markan faith. Fourth, we will argue that Markan faith is an intellectual virtue and it is in concord with humility in the domain of inquiry. Fifth, we will argue that Markan faith, unlike Thomistic faith, is a personal virtue and that it is in concord with humility in the domain of personal relationships, both human-human and human-divine. (shrink)

This paper advances an original philosophical framework integrating fiduciary theory and epistemic virtue ethics through the concept of epistemic transposition—the reformulation of ethical duties as epistemic obligations grounded in epistemic humility. It argues that fiduciary and ethical duties such as loyalty, honesty, and openness are not merely moral in nature but fundamentally epistemic, expressing virtues of intellectual honesty, transparency, and responsiveness to evidence. Drawing on the fiduciary scholarship of Lionel Smith and Paul B. Miller, the institutional epistemic ethics of (...) Ronald Barnett, and my own prior work on fiduciary openness and epistemic justice, the paper demonstrates that epistemic humility is the foundational virtue underpinning both ethical and fiduciary accountability. By reconceptualising fiduciary responsibility as epistemic responsibility, this work unifies previously distinct traditions in ethics, epistemology, and governance. The resulting fiduciary-epistemic theory positions epistemic humility as a normative virtue with independent moral authority, essential to institutional integrity, epistemic justice, and trustworthy governance. This study constitutes Part I of the research series Epistemic Humility as the Architecture of Duty. It establishes the theoretical foundations for Part II, From Epistemic Humility to Fiduciary Cognition: Re-founding Ethical Duty as Epistemic Governance, which will extend the inquiry by modelling fiduciary cognition as the dynamic architecture of epistemic responsibility. (shrink)

The Humility Thesis is a persistent thesis in contemporary metaphysics. It is known by a variety of names, including, but not limited to, Humility, Intrinsic Humility, Kantian Humility, Kantian Physicalism, Intrinsic Ignorance, Categorical Ignorance, Irremediable Ignorance, and Noumenalism. According to the thesis, we human beings, and any knowers that share our general ways of knowing, are irremediably ignorant of a certain class of properties that are intrinsic to material entities … Continue reading Humility Regarding Intrinsic (...) Properties →. (shrink)

I offer an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, construed as a pair of dispositions enabling proper management of one's intellectual confidence. I then show its integral role in a range of familiar educational practices and concerns, and finally describe how certain entrenched educational attitudes and conceptions marginalise or militate against the cultivation and exercise of this virtue.

Suppose that you are engaging with someone who is your oppressor, or someone who espouses a heinous view like Nazism or a ridiculous view like flat-earthism. In contexts like these, there is a disparity between you and your interlocutor, a dramatic normative difference across which you are in the right and they are in the wrong. As theorists of humility, we find these contexts puzzling. Humility seems like the *last* thing oppressed people need and the *last* thing we (...) need in dealing with those whose views are heinous or ridiculous. Responding to such people via humility seems uncalled for, even inappropriate. But how could this be, given that humility is a *virtue*? The purpose of the paper is to explore this puzzle. We explain what the puzzle is and then attempt to draw some lessons from it: first, the lesson that the importance of humility is limited in several ways, and second, the lesson that humility nonetheless has several important roles to play, even for people who are in the right in contexts of disparity. (shrink)

Beginning with the Untimely Meditations (1873) and continuing until his final writings of 1888-9, Nietzsche refers to humility (Demuth or a cognate) in fifty-two passages and to modesty (Bescheidenheit or a cognate) in one hundred and four passages, yet there are only four passages that refer to both terms. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, he often speaks positively of modesty, especially in epistemic contexts. These curious facts might be expected to lead scholars to explore what Nietzsche thinks of humility and (...) modesty, but to date there have been no systematic analyses of Nietzsche’s reflections on these dispositions. In this chapter, I fill that gap in the literature using semantic network analysis and systematically-guided close-reading. In so doing, I show that Nietzsche sharply distinguished between humility and modesty, considering the former a vice (for certain types of people in certain contexts) and the latter a virtue (again, for certain types of people in certain contexts). (shrink)

This chapter explores prominent respects in which humility figures into ubuntu, the southern African (and specifically Nguni) term for humanness often used to capture moral philosophies and cultures indigenous to the sub-Saharan region. The chapter considers respects in which humility is prescribed by ubuntu, understood not just as a relational normative ethic, but also as a moral epistemology. Focusing specifically on philosophical ideas published in academic fora over the past 50 years or so, the chapter contends that, although (...) the concept of humility has not often been explicitly invoked in them to make sense of African normative ethics and moral epistemology, it is a useful lens through which to view key facets of these literate philosophies. In many ways, by ubuntu we are to be humble in respect of what an individual should claim from others, how she should appraise her own virtue, and what she may claim to know about morality (although no suggestion is made that it is some kind of ‘master virtue’ for the tradition). (shrink)

Does intellectual humility preclude the possibility of religious dogmatism and firm religious commitments? Does intellectual humility require religious beliefs to be held with diffidence? What is intellectual humility anyway? There are two things I aim to do in this short article. First, I want to briefly sketch an account of intellectual humility. Second, drawing from such an account, I want to explore whether intellectual humility could be compatible with virtuous religious dogmatism.

It is sometimes claimed that faith is a virtue. To what extent faith is a virtue depends on what faith is. One construal of faith, which has been popular in both recent and historical work on faith, is that faith is a matter of taking oneself to have been spoken to by God and of trusting this purported divine testimony. In this paper, I argue that when faith is understood in this way, for faith to be virtuous then it must (...) be accompanied by intellectual humility. I defend this view by showing how someone ought to respond to purported divine testimony if her faith is to be intellectually humble, and how, if it fails in this respect, it will instead be accompanied by the vices of either servility or arrogance. (shrink)

What qualities do we need in order to be good philosophers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character – such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are more important for our philosophizing than the relevant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are essential because doing good philosophy demands both knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming demands all of these virtues working in concert. In this (...) paper I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seemingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to reconstruct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them. (shrink)

The ”dark night of the soul’ is a common motif in Christian spiritual writing; and the locus classicus for this motif is the work of John of the Cross, a Spanish Carmelite friar of the sixteenth century. My aim in this paper is to use John’s account of the ”night’ to consider how the themes of mystery, humility and religious practice may be subsumed, and related to one another, within a Christian conception of God and of human life lived (...) out in relation to God. (shrink)

There is currently a tremendous surge in interest in the virtue of humility among contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Yet despite its recent popularity, identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for humility has proven quite difficult. Here, drawing on insights from several ‘inattentive’ accounts of humility, I offer a new account that locates the virtue in a transcendent orientation to the self and others such that one sees the self and others in proper perspective. I call this account the (...) transcendent account of humility. (shrink)

In Faith and Humility, Jonathan Kvanvig argues for an account of two virtues that balance, or provide correction for, the other: faith and humility. Faith is the disposition to act in service of an ideal, a disposition that remains despite difficulties or setbacks. One can, however, pursue distorted ideals or pursue them in the wrong way—with unquestioning zeal, for example. Humility, which helps to correct this extreme, is the disposition to attend to the value of one’s aims (...) and the extent of one’s contribution toward accomplishing them. To establish these accounts, Kvanvig first argues for a method that directs his arguments, and he then develops the accounts as he articulates and responds to alternative views. In what follows, instead of summarizing the book chapter by chapter, I provide a summary of Kvanvig’s positions and his arguments for them as they are eventually developed throughout the book. (shrink)

Epistemic humility, a cornerstone of philosophical and scientific inquiry, emphasizes the recognition of human fallibility and the provisional nature of knowledge. This concept contrasts with epistemic arrogance by promoting a humble acknowledgment of the limits of understanding and a willingness to revise beliefs in light of new evidence. Historical perspectives, from Socrates' dialogues to Descartes' methodological doubt and Hume's critique of induction, illustrate the evolution of epistemic humility as a critical component of skeptical thought. Philosophical reflections on intellectual (...) virtues, such as curiosity and open-mindedness, underscore the importance of embracing uncertainty in the pursuit of truth. Contemporary discourse on epistemic humility addresses its role in scientific progress, public policy, and societal dialogue, highlighting its potential to foster intellectual integrity and informed decision-making amidst complexity and uncertainty. (shrink)