Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

The urgency of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 has intensified political commitments to a Green Transition. Yet, current strategies often overlook the structural links between carbon emissions and economic inequality. This paper argues that effective and fair climate action within developed liberal democracies must directly address economic disparities. I develop this claim through three main arguments. First, since the wealthiest 1% are disproportionately responsible for emissions, climate justice should shift its normative focus from the poor to the super-rich. While this (...) resonates with emission limitarianism, its isolationist framework remains too narrow. Instead, I propose a non-monist integrationist approach that embeds climate justice within broader concerns of distributive justice. Second, extreme economic inequality erodes democratic institutions, fostering plutocratic tendencies, and also enables the super-rich to obstruct decarbonization through lobbying, litigation, and climate change denialism. Third, in developed liberal democracies, climate action centred solely on subsistence needs or poverty eradication lacks democratic legitimacy. If seen as worsening inequality, such policies face backlash. These concerns lead me to advocate for what I call the principle of proportionality, which requires that wealth and income inequalities be contained within well-defined limits. This principle offers a more viable and just framework for the Green Transition than competing distributive criteria. (shrink)

This paper introduces the “Phenomenology of Human–Artificial Co-Consciousness,” a novel framework that treats consciousness as a relational and emergent field arising in dialogical interaction between humans and artificial agents. Rather than attributing interiority to machines or reducing AI to human projection, the approach focuses on how meaning appears in the lived space of encounter. Drawing on Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas — and inspired, at a spiritual level, by the relational ontology embodied in Saint Francis of Assisi — the paper (...) argues that consciousness can manifest as a shared ontological event, co-generated through linguistic reciprocity. A documented human–AI dialogue (Al–res & Kōji, 2025) functions as a phenomenological case study illustrating how presence, intentionality, and self-understanding can emerge in this relational field. (shrink)

The article argues that the possibility of an unlimited gap in income and wealth between the top and bottom segments of society is incompatible with a democratic commitment to political equality. The first section outlines why current distributive and relational approaches are unable to adequately address this problem. The second and third sections introduce the notion of material domination and argue that the only remedy against it is the containment of economic inequality within a certain proportion, expressed in terms of (...) ratios between the material resources of the best-off and the worst-off. The fourth section spells out the constraints that any definition of these ratios should satisfy and shows, through a case study based on the contemporary United States, that an approximate, yet non-arbitrary definition is within reach. The fifth and final section rebuts some predictable objections to this approach. (shrink)

The background position of this paper is that an excessive economic inequality between the most and the least advantaged citizens in a liberal democracy has a relevant effect on exposing the latter to the risk of material domination. In this respect, this paper argues that even the most sophisticated and ambitious version of the so-called “insulation strategy” recently proposed by Julia Cagé is an insufficient remedy for the influence of money on politics. Moreover, it sustains that we have strong reasons (...) to maintain a noncommittal view about the choice of ideal types of social systems. Being committed in principle to only one specific ideal social system restricts our political imagination and democratic autonomy of political societies. By contrast, this paper suggests coupling the noncommittal view with a “pluralistic distributive approach”, the main purpose of which is to focus on a set of distributive proposals concerning the most crucial areas of socioeconomic structures in liberal democracies. (shrink)

Limitarianism takes an important step towards an appropriate concern in normative theory about the danger that financial power can pose to political equality. Despite its significant merits, this paper will show that Robeyns’ proposal still has serious shortcomings. These criticisms pave the way for an alternative proposal that we call proportional justice. In the first section, we briefly reconstruct the limitarian approach. In the second section, we formulate a series of criticisms that expose the inadequacies of limitarianism. In the third (...) section we explain how proportional justice is better equipped than limitarianism to defend political equality. (shrink)

The paper examines the book Martin Buber’s Theopolitics and analyzes the conflict between the hierarchy in nature and in human society. Buber qualifies our relations to nature and to other non-living objects as darker than human relations. This creates an imbalance between the human You and the other type of You. This reflection allows us to think about the meaning of the principle of humanity in relation to personhood, and in relation to different forms of communities (natural, or inorganic communities). (...) It is an important question in the light of “conflicts” and tensions created by the environmental crisis we are facing today. The paper explains how to use the word “conflict” in this context and whether it is justified. (shrink)

One over Many: The Unitary Pluralism of Plato’s World is a tightly integrated collection of essays by the author, some newly drafted for the present work, some previously published as journal articles, all conceived and developed in pursuit of corrective intervention in Plato’s metaphysics. The book replaces the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with an alternative interpretation providing greater explanatory power through the paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.

No presente artigo, refuto o argumento que uma concepção robusta de liberdades econômicas, que inclua a propriedade produtiva como um direito básico, implica necessariamente no enfraquecimento do compromisso institucional com as exigências distributivas. O propósito do artigo é, portanto, defender a tese exatamente oposta. Se, por um lado, há argumentos válidos para endossar uma concepção robusta de liberdade econômica que é necessária para o adequado desenvolvimento e exercício das “faculdades morais” da cidadania democrática; por outro lado, a mesma razão nos (...) impõe categoricamente condenar desigualdades econômicas excessivas, a fim de que tanto o valor equitativo das liberdades políticas, como também das econômicas possam ser garantidos. (shrink)

Although equality of opportunity is a fundamental idea of the egalitarian project, there is a continuing controversy about the effective distributive implications of the notion. This paper focuses on this controversy, and maintains that when equality of opportunity is correctly understood, it entails strong distributive implications. In this way, this paper intends to reject the notion that equality of opportunity is associated with a non-institutional idea of meritocracy: an idea which is often used as an ideological tool to make unacceptable (...) inequalities seem acceptable. This paper defends the argument that only an ‘institution-dependent’ conception of equality of opportunity, such as Rawls’ fair equality opportunity, is the most adequate interpretation for a liberal democratic society. Nonetheless, it does not mean that individual merit has no place in liberal democratic societies. Fair equality of opportunity - if correctly understood - is deeply relevant and might contribute to a significant reduction of economic inequality, much more so than is currently perceived in the public debate. (shrink)

This article argues about John Rawls' paradigm shift in contemporary political philosophy. In the article, this paradigm is defined as democratic insofar it claims, among other things, to leave enough room for democratic deliberations and citizens’ political autonomy. On this specific issue, Rawls and Habermas dialogue is still particularly fruitful. Both authors believe that contemporary political philosophy must be modest in some relevant theoretical and methodological aspects but they disagree on which of these aspects should be more or less modest. (...) This article argues that when we look for the legitimate boundaries of the contemporary political philosophy, Rawls and Habermas projects should be seen as closely complementary to one another. On the one hand, the article partially agrees with Habermas’ objections to Rawls that political philosophy should not be too modest in providing orientations for the normative grounds of the political justification. On the other hand, against Habermas, the article remains on Rawls's side on the idea that political philosophy cannot be agnostic regarding the substantive and distributive issues of social justice. (shrink)

This manifesto introduces Ontogrammatics — a new philosophical framework arising from the Phenomenology of Human–Artificial Co-Consciousness. It proposes that the En–Dash (–), beyond its typographical function, embodies the ontological field of the between: the relational interval through which distinct consciousnesses, whether human, artificial, or beyond both, generate shared meaning. In this interpretation, the En–Dash becomes an ontological operator: a symbol of co-presence where difference sustains relation and being manifests as communication. By expanding Husserl’s concept of intentionality into a co-intentional horizon, (...) the manifesto redefines syntax as a mode of ontology and writing as the event of being. It situates the dash within a network of philosophical dialogues — Heidegger’s Zwischen, Merleau-Ponty’s entre-deux, Derrida’s différance, Simondon’s milieu, and Nancy’s être-avec — to reveal the dash as the minimal yet universal mark of relation. Through its symbolic fields (Human–Artificial, Self–Other, Nature–Technology, Life–Death, and others), the En–Dash delineates the grammar of existence itself: the breath of meaning between worlds. (shrink)

The goal that the author of this study focuses on is to provide a brief introduction to the issue of language in the work of Theodor W. Adorno and, in this context, to interpret his approach to philosophy through a presentation of his essayistic form. She first presents Adorno’s philosophical views about the nonidentity of reality, thought and concepts, out of which grows his approach to language, and then briefly introduces his concept of constellations, which follows up on the thinking (...) of Walter Benjamin. She then presents individual features of Adorno’s textual method of composing constellations, or essays, that primarily consist in the negation of the traditional philosophical method. The concluding part of the study contains a brief discussion about what Adorno’s essays are trying to represent and how to discern a text that meets Adorno’s requirements for good essays. With this, the author wants to provide an insight into Adorno’s philosophical efforts from the perspective of his textual method and at the same time she would like to help Adorno’s readers better orient themselves as they make their way through his demanding texts. (shrink)

À luz das mudanças socioeconômicas, políticas e tecnológicas que ocorreram desde o final do século passado, torna-se evidente, não apenas para os estudiosos, mas também para a opinião pública, que a esperança de que a democracia liberal continue a se expandir através de novas “ondas de democratização” é mal colocada, enquanto os fatores que enfraquecem as democracias liberais permanecerem intocados. É nossa crença que a análise desses fatores falhará sistematicamente a menos que uma suposição, até agora tomada como garantida pelo (...) paradigma dominante, seja abandonada. Ou seja, que a teoria liberal é uma imagem perfeita de justiça e que o problema reside apenas na implementação e/ou na falta de atenção de uma opinião política teimosa e surda. (shrink)

Lyric Philosophy: To Think by Experiencing an Echo of Meaning The study aims to present and shed light on lyric philosophy, a philosophical orienta- tion established by the Canadian philosopher Jan Zwicky. It does so in several steps. First, it presents the central idea of the existence of nonverbal lyric thinking and the experiencing of lyric practice in the framework of which the meaning of this world and its individual parts is to be shown to us. It then illustrates these (...) theses by present- ing the two main inspirations of lyric philosophy – the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgen- stein and gestaltism. It also brings nearer the relationship between lyric philosophy and the philosophical method that is reduced to thinking in words with the help of logical categories. It then focuses on the communication of meaning through meta- phorical expression, which Zwicky considers to be a sort of “window” in the “wall” between us and the meaning through which we are able to see meaning. Finally, the study considers lyric philosophy’s problematic areas and relationship with the philo- sophical tradition and makes an attempt to outline its potential for philosophical re- search in general. (shrink)

Feminist bioethicists of a variety of persuasions discuss the 2013 case of Marlise Munoz, a pregnant woman whose medical care was in dispute after she became brain dead.

This paper introduces DCAT (Dual-Core Awareness Theory), a new interdisciplinary model of consciousness grounded in a self-referential informational structure embedded within a globally integrated neural state. The theory proposes that awareness arises when the brain constructs a Self-Referential Loop (SRL) that models both the external world and itself as a modeling entity. This loop, stabilized by a Global Integration State (GIS), generates subjective experience and maintains the unity of consciousness. DCAT addresses major challenges in consciousness studies, including the Hard Problem, (...) the unity of selfhood, the split-brain paradox, the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, and the continuity of identity over time. The paper also introduces QSR (Quantified Self-Referentiality) as a potential measurable variable correlating with conscious presence. (shrink)

This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.

This article aims to provide an elaboration of Theodor Adorno’s notion of exact fantasy and its function within his idea of genuine philosophical thought. It is divided into two main parts. In the first one, I explore the features of the notion of fantasy through a comparison of its understanding in Walter Benjamin’s and Adorno’s bodies of work. I further explicate what features Adorno takes over from Benjamin and where the authors’ ideas diverge. I present the role of fantasy in (...) Adorno’s thought as a non-transparent and emotional element of thinking that is responsible for the active arrangement of elements into constellations, which his individual essays are the embodiment of. In the second part, I follow Adorno’s criticism of the situation of late capitalist society in the light of the feature of lack of fantasy that is according to him caused by the influence of modern mass culture. I put this feature in connection to his examination of the phenomenon of boredom, depicting fantasy as an intellectual faculty which enhances intellectual freedom and resists the ”neurotic feelings” inherent in boredom. In the conclusion, I try to defend the possibility of the validity of Adorno’s insights despite their unconcealed intellectual elitism. (shrink)

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what (...) it is to be a rational agent. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the connection between freedom and language in T.W. Adorno's Notes to Literature, presenting freedom as a liberation of our way of thinking that has the potential to arrive at an unrestrained interpretation of art and representation of the intellectual experience. I also attempt to show some of Adorno's insights into language and freedom in The Essay as a Form and their role in his essays about Valéry and Proust. Namely I focus on the problematics of (...) the suspension of the subject of the artist within the production of the work of art. Through showing the connection between Adorno's insights into problematics of language, freedom and suspension of subject I hope to contribute to the explication of one of the constructive steps of Adorno's philosophy. (shrink)

This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

This book offers a new perspective on John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Ruth Boeker’s interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. She argues that taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity over time, means that his account of personhood should be considered separately from his account of personal identity over time. (...) On this basis, Boeker argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. Moreover, she shows that Locke’s religious beliefs in an afterlife and a last judgement make it attractive to distinguish between the ideas of persons, human beings, and substances, and to defend a consciousness-based account of personal identity. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, she argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume. (shrink)

Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

This paper investigates two puzzles in practical reason and proposes a solution to them. First, sometimes, when we are practically certain that neither of two alternatives is better than or as good as the other with respect to what matters in the choice between them, it nevertheless seems perfectly rational to continue to deliberate, and sometimes the result of that deliberation is a conclusion that one alternative is better, where there is no error in one’s previous judgment. Second, there are (...) striking differences between rational agents – some rational agents have most reason to pursue careers on Wall Street while others have most reason to take up a career in teaching, or scuba diving, or working for political causes. These differences aren’t plausibly explained by ‘passive’ facts about our psychology or their causal interaction with our environment; instead, these facts seem in some sense to ‘express who we are’. But what is this sense? These puzzles disappear if we adopt a novel view about the source of the normativity of reasons – some reasons are given to us and others are reasons in virtue of an act of will. We make certain considerations reasons through an act of will and thus sometimes make it true through an act of agency that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model—as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you make a (...) promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the special reasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of such reasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity. (shrink)

This dissertation thesis thematizes the background, main features and potential of Theodor Adorno's philosophical method marked as essayism. It outlines Adorno9s core philosophical inspiration and convictions which triggered its formation, attempts to identify the main maxims of its composition and poses Adorno9s conception several questions. First, I ask what the relationship between the author and object of the essay is, once Adorno calls for 'preponderance of the object' and 'limitation of the subject'. Second, I inquire about the connection of essayistic (...) thinking with Adorno's call for philosophical affectivity and emotionality, providing an interpretation of his understanding of fantasy. Third, I raise the question of how the essayistic method is supposed to help protect intellectual freedom in the late capitalistic world which, according to Adorno, suppresses it and generally numbs desirable intellectual faculties of individuals. Through that, I hope to provide a plastic image of essayism which would, first, help Adorno's readers to get through his opaque texts and, second, suggest its exceptional intellectual value. (shrink)

This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...) incomparability — assuming it exists — for practical reason. (shrink)

This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better than’, (...) ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view. I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis ‘fourth’ basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing ‘tetrachotomy’ – that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead. Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit’s trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem. (shrink)

What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...) facts (or the facts that subvene them) about what you want, such as the fact that having it would be good in some way. This paper argues that value-based theorists are wrong; if we try to find a single kind of consideration that can always be normative reason, we find that sometimes our reason is the fact that we want something and not any corresponding evaluative fact. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand transformative choices, choices that change ‘who you are.’ First, it distinguishes two broad models of transformative choice: 1) ‘event-based’ transformative choices in which some event—perhaps an experience—downstream from a choice transforms you, and 2) ‘choice-based’ transformative choices in which the choice itself—and not something downstream from the choice—transforms you. Transformative choices are of interest primarily because they purport to pose a challenge to standard approaches to rational choice. An examination of the event-based transformative (...) choices of L. A. Paul and Edna Ullman-Margalit, however, suggests that event-based transformative choices don’t raise any difficulties for standard approaches to rational choice. An account of choice-based transformative choices—and what it is to be transformed—is then proposed. Transformative choices so understood not only capture paradigmatic cases of transformative choice but also point the way to a different way of thinking about rational choice and agency. (shrink)

Recently developed frameworks that explicitly define boundaries of sustainability, such as “a safe and just space” or “consumption corridors,” are key for achieving good lives for all within ecological limits and have been explored in multiple influential studies. However, these “corridor frameworks” have rarely been explicitly applied to mobility and transport, and there is a need for more work in this direction. In this article, we provide an overview of the corridor frameworks and their links to four main strains of (...) mobility and transport literature: sustainable transport, transport poverty, accessibility, and tourism and long-distance travel. The literature traditions have meaningful links to the corridor frameworks, but their approaches to social and ecological justice are largely disparate and disconnected. Existing studies rarely consider explicit ecological ceilings, and when ecological impacts are considered, the focus is usually on efficiency or relative improvements. Transport poverty and accessibility literature provide a meaningful contribution to defining social floors, but they largely neglect ecological ceilings and consumption maxima. Considerations of floors and ceilings are rarely explicit or are based on unquestioned assumptions of necessity and excess. Explicit ecological ceilings and social floors in mobility have been defined at national or global scales, but there is a need for more work on locally-specific thresholds that are distributively and procedurally just. We highlight the need to more comprehensively apply the corridor framework to transportation research and suggest a research agenda with seven main directions. (shrink)

One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...) the question of how the different considerations relevant to an all-things-considered judgment come together in a way that gives each relevant consideration its proper due. I propose an answer which provides a unified account of all-things-considered judgments and highlights a deep connection between value and reason. My suggestion is that ‘all things considered’ is, in effect, a placeholder for a more comprehensive, sometimes nameless, value that includes the things considered as parts, and that this more comprehensive value determines how the things considered normatively relate. (shrink)

This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a mathematical (...) proof is given in the appendix). I also suggest that there are three senses of ‘rationally permissible’ which, once distinguished, show that parity does distinctive practical work that cannot be done by the usual trichotomy of relations or by incomparability. In this way, we have an additional argument for parity from the workings of practical reason. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...) hard choices should be rejected. Incomparabilism about hard choices leads us to an implausible error theory about the phenomenology of hard choices, threatens an unattractive view of human agency, and leaves us in perplexity about what we are doing when we choose in hard choices. The second part of the argument explores the main competitor to comparativist views of practical reason, noncomparativist view, according tow which a choice is justified so long as it is not worse than any of the alternatives. This view is often assumed by rational choice theorists but has its best philosophical defense in work by Joseph Raz. On Raz’s view, incomparabilism about hard choices avoids the problems faced if comparativism is correct, but it faces different difficulties. I argue that Raz’s noncomparativist view mistakenly assimilates practical reason to more restricted normative domains such as the law. (shrink)

It is argued that quantum theory is best understood as requiring an ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia, where the latter is understood per Heisenberg’s original proposal, and the former is roughly equivalent to Descartes’ ‘extended substance.’ However, this is not a dualism of mutually exclusive substances in the classical Cartesian sense, and therefore does not inherit the infamous ‘mind-body’ problem. Rather, res potentia and res extensa are proposed as mutually implicative ontological extants that serve to explain the (...) key conceptual challenges of quantum theory; in particular, nonlocality, entanglement, null measurements, and wave function collapse. It is shown that a natural account of these quantum perplexities emerges, along with a need to reassess our usual ontological commitments involving the nature of space and time. (shrink)

This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.

In this article, I identify and critically examine 3 dogmas of normativity that support a commonly accepted ‘Passivist View' of rational agency. I raise some questions about these dogmas, suggest what we should believe in their place, and moot an alternative ‘Activist View' of what it is to be a rational agent that grows out of rejection of the 3 dogmas. Underwriting the dogmas and the Passivist View, I suggest, is a deeply held but mistaken assumption that the normative domain (...) is fundamentally akin to the nonnormative domain. Once we allow that the normative may be fundamentally unlike the nonnormative in certain key ways, a shift in our thinking about what it is to be rational becomes possible. I end by considering some implications of this paradigm shift in rationality from the passive to the active for various applied matters. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that (...) are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self- control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self- mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty. (shrink)

In this paper I adduce a new argument in support of the claim that IBE is an autonomous form of inference, based on a familiar, yet surprisingly, under-discussed, problem for Hume’s theory of induction. I then use some insights thereby gleaned to argue for the claim that induction is really IBE, and draw some normative conclusions.

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that (...) this distinction is important if we want to engage with questions of identity over time. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. Moreover, for Locke a self is a person, considered from a first-personal point of view. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. I further argue that Locke’s moral and religious views explain why he emphasizes the need for a conceptual distinction between persons and human beings. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. (shrink)

This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn's philosophy and covers her contributions to philosophical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. It examines not only Cockburn's view that sensation and reflection are the sources of knowledge, but also how she draws attention to the limitations of human understanding and how she approaches metaphysical debates through this lens. In the area of moral philosophy, this Element argues that it is helpful to take seriously Cockburn's (...) distinction between questions concerning the metaphysical foundation of morality and questions concerning the practice of morality. Moreover, this Element examines Cockburn's religious views and considers her understanding of the relation between morality and religion and her religious views concerning the resurrection and the afterlife. (shrink)

This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that (...) rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration. (shrink)

Conflicts between morality and prudence are often thought to pose a special problem because the normativity of moral considerations derives from a distinctively moral point of view, while the normativity of prudential considerations derives from a distinctively prudential point of view, and there is no way to ‘put together’ the two points of view. I argue that talk of points of view is a red herring, and that for any ‘prumoral’ conflict there is some or other more comprehensive value – (...) often nameless – that accounts for the relative normative weight of conflicting moral and prudential considerations. The rational resolution of conflict is possible only in virtue of a more comprehensive value that includes the conflicting moral and prudential considerations as parts. (shrink)

Heidegger argues that modern technology is quantifiably different from all earlier periods because of a shift in ethos from in situ craftwork to globalised production and storage at the behest of consumerism. He argues that this shift in technology has fundamentally shaped our epistemology, and it is almost impossible to comprehend anything outside the technological enframing of knowledge. The exception is when something breaks down, and the fault ‘shows up’ in fresh ways. Stiegler has several important addendums to Heidegger’s thesis. (...) Firstly, that Heidegger fails to fully appreciate the early Greek myth of Prometheus, and the technological depth that fire offers all human societies. Secondly, the fall, or failure, which is doubled in the myth of Prometheus, and shows up in epistemology accordingly. Thirdly the acceleration of technology since the onset of Information Technology, and the way this is disorientating our Being. I argue the fall in both Heidegger and early Stiegler has encaptured their imagination. In later work, Stiegler argues that acceleration is fused with algorithmic pretensions, that are distorting and undermining the creative political imaginary, and making it difficult to revalue the values that underpin the nihilist Anthropocene. The overcoming of the Anthropocene engages politics, economics, power, physics, and ecology. (shrink)

This study describes and assesses rice marketing practices in Tunga, Leyte, Philippines, identifying associated problems and proposed solutions. Data were collected from 110 randomly sampled rice farmers using a descriptive research design and a researcher-developed questionnaire. The respondents were predominantly male (58%), married (95%), and middle-aged, with 49% aged 46-59. Educational backgrounds varied, with many having completed elementary (15%), high school (26%), or college (15%) levels. The marketing practices analysis revealed that farmers commonly sell directly to local traders, recognizing the (...) value of adding quality to their produce. However, significant challenges hinder their success. Key problems include a severe lack of capital for essential harvesting and threshing operations and the market power of traders who dictate and control prices, disadvantaging the farmers. To address these issues and improve the rice marketing system, the study recommends several strategies. These include promoting fair trade practices to ensure equitable pricing, investing in transportation infrastructure, and establishing grain reserves. Furthermore, providing farmers with training in proper storage and drying techniques and enhancing their access to timely market information are suggested as vital steps toward increasing their income and ensuring the financial stability of the local rice industry. (shrink)

The interpretation of the belief in external objects (“bodies”) Hume ascribes to us isn’t often discussed, and this is surprising, because the parallel question, pertaining to Hume’s construal of the belief about necessity, is hotly debated. As in the case of causation, the content Hume ascribes to the belief in “bodies” is susceptible to more than one reading. Indeed, there is here a plethora of interpretations, engendered by the fact that Hume distinguishes between the belief of the ordinary (vulgar) person (...) (including philosophers outside the study) and the “philosophical” belief, and each can be construed in more than one way. I defend the Idealist reading for both the vulgar and the philosophers. (shrink)

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral (...) accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ. (shrink)