Ground is all the rage in contemporary metaphysics. But what is its nature? Some metaphysicians defend what we could call, following Skiles and Trogdon (2021), the inheritance view: it is because constitutive forms of metaphysical explanation are such-and-such that we should believe that ground is so-and-so. However, many putative instances of inheritance are not primarily motivated by scientific considerations. This limitation is harmless if one thinks that ground and science are best kept apart. Contrary to this view, we believe that (...) ground is a highly serviceable tool for investigating metaphysical areas of science. In this paper, we defend a naturalistic version of the inheritance view which takes constitutive scientific explanation as a better guide to ground. After illustrating the approach and its merits, we discuss some implications of the emerging scientific conception for the theory of ground at large. (shrink)

Grounding is a non-reductive relation which promises to help physicalists deal with the hard problem of consciousness. Grounding physicalists, however, are yet to face the new challenge for physicalism, which consists of explaining our substantive phenomenal knowledge. Among the difficulties posed by this challenge, grounding physicalists struggle the most in accounting for revelation, the claim that our phenomenal knowledge is not only substantive, but also essence-revealing. Revelation is said to be in tension with the view that grounding relations are essence-mediated. (...) We argue that grounding physicalists can accommodate revelation in two ways. First, they can drop the claim that the physical/phenomenal grounding relation is essence-mediated and adopt a law-based formulation of grounding physicalism. However, to make this work, they must show that the resulting view does not bear the costs of dualism. Second, they can retain essence-mediation and explain why, contrary to introspective appearances, phenomenal properties do not have purely phenomenal essences. We contend that both approaches are viable, grounding physicalism can address the new challenge. (shrink)

This article argues that one of the main arguments against metaphysical infinitism—the argument from vicious infinite regress—is unsuccessful. I suggest that a proper interpretation of the argument takes the charge against infinitism to be one of metaphysical insufficiency: without the fundamental facts fully grounding the rest of reality, derivative facts lack the necessary grounding base for their obtaining. I disambiguate the insufficiency claim by examining it from two different perspectives on the regress: the local perspective, which focuses on the obtaining (...) of the individual derivative facts, and the global perspective, which focuses on the obtaining of the entire collection of derivative facts. For each perspective, I argue that the reasons for believing that infinitism cannot provide sufficient grounds are problematic. (shrink)