Visual illusions are systematic misperceptions that can help us glean the heuristics with which the brain constructs visual experience. In a recently discovered visual illusion (the “frame effect”), it has been shown that flashing a stimulus inside of a moving frame produces a large misperception of that stimulus's position. Across two experiments, we investigated a novel illusion (the “split stimulus effect”) where the symmetrical motion of two overlaid frames produces two simultaneous positional misperceptions of a single stimulus. That is, one (...) stimulus is presented but two are perceived. In both experiments, a single red dot was flashed when the moving frames reversed direction, and participants were asked to report how many dots they saw. Naïve participants sometimes reported seeing two dots when only one was presented, indicating spontaneous perception of the illusion. A Bayesian analysis of the population prevalence of this effect was conducted. The dependence of this effect on the frames’ speed, the dot's opacity, spatial attention, as the presence/absence of pre-flash motion (“postdiction”) was also investigated, and the features of this illusion were compared to similar motion position illusions within a predictive processing framework. In demonstrating this illusory “splitting” effect, this study is the first to show that it is possible to be simultaneously aware of two opposing perceptual predictions about a single object and provides evidence of the hyperpriors that limit and inform the structure of visual experience. (shrink)

This article presents Franz Rosenzweig’s concept of redemption as a vehicle for raising some important questions for confronting the contemporary movement of Transhumanism. The upshot of our discussion is located in the existential questions asked, following a philosophical comparison of Rosenzweig’s religious and philosophical commitment to human life in its most robust form, with Transhumanism’s scientistic vision. To do so, the article first discusses some techno-scientistic assumptions of Transhumanism, showing that it presumes what was once a core principle of German (...) Idealism, the identity of reason and being, against which Rosenzweig rebelled. Then, the article turns to examine Rosenzweig’s humanistic redemptive vision and its emphasis on the corporeal, the temporal, and the worldly. The conclusion makes explicit the ways in which Rosenzweig’s redemptive vision provides a contrasting model to the one set forth by Transhumanism. (shrink)

Joseph Persky's excellent book, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism, shows that J. S. Mill's support for socialism is a carefully considered element of his political and economic reform agenda. The key thought underlying Persky's argument is that Mill has an ‘evolutionary theory of justice’, according to which the set of institutions and practices that are appropriate to one state of society should give way to a new set of institutions as circumstances change and (...) the people themselves improve. However, Persky does not spend a great deal of time discussing Mill's theory of reform, in particular the principles he believes should guide our reform efforts. Reflecting on these principles – notably his principle of impartiality or equal treatment – shows the consistency of Mill's thought over time. (shrink)

This is a long review of Charles Camic's book on Veblen in which he argues that Veblen was basically a conventional academic economist, in contrast to his depiction in such standard works as those of Joseph Dorfman. However, this account omits much of Veblen's career, on the grounds that during the period after he left Stanford he was not in a prestigious academic setting. So the analysis is circular: he ignores most of Veblen's work on then grounds that he (...) was no longer in a conventional setting. But in fact he was in one, during his highly productive period at the University of Missouri, then a conventionally distinguished university and AAU member in the same category as Wisconsin and Minnesota. And there he was not only highly productive but also produced some of his most famous concepts and works-- works Camic ignores. (shrink)

This book-chapter investigates the pragmatist Zionist thought of Mordecai M. Kaplan, and considers its pluralistic and holistic traits, vis-a-vis monist and fundamentalist approaches to Zionism.

In the present book, the starting line is defined by a morphogenetic perspective on human communication and culture. The focus is on visual communication, music, religion (myth), and language, i.e., on the “symbolic forms” at the heart of human cultures (Ernst Cassirer). The term “morphogenesis” has more precisely the meaning given by René Thom (1923-2002) in his book “Morphogenesis and Structural Stability” (1972) and the notions of “self-organization” and cooperation of subsystems in the “Synergetics” of Hermann Haken (1927- ). The (...) naturalization of communication and cultural phenomena is the favored strategy, but the major results of the involved disciplines (art history, music theory, religious science, and linguistics) are respected. Visual art from the Paleolithic to modernity stands for visual communication. The present book focuses on studies of classical painting and sculpture (e.g., Leonardo da Vinci, William Turner, and Henry Moore) and modern art (e.g., Jackson Pollock and Joseph Beuys). Musical morphogenesis embraces classical music (from J. S. Bach to Arnold Schönberg) and political songwriting (Bob Dylan, Leonhard Cohen). The myths of pre-literary societies show the effects of self-organization in the re-assembly (bricolage) of traditions. Classical polytheistic and monotheistic religions demonstrate the unfolding of basic germs (religious attractors) and their reduction in periods of crisis, the self-organization of complex religious networks, and rationalized macro-structures (in theologies). Significant tendencies are analyzed in the case of Buddhism and Christianism. Eventually, a holistic view of symbolic communication and human culture emerges based on state-of-the-art in evolutionary biology, cognitive science, linguistics, and semiotics (philosophy of symbolic forms). (shrink)

Ontological Nihilism. It’s an extreme view—to extreme to be defended by most, even though variants and close cousins have their champions. Turner 2010 argues against the view with a dilemma. Some have resisted one horn of the dilemma. Less attention has been paid to the dilemma’s other horn. But a variant of Ontological Nihilism can avoid that other horn: Global Nihilism, which attempts to describe an object-free world all in one go. Despite appearances, Global Nihilism cannot be eliminated on (...) grounds of simplicity or parsimony. However, one may object to its implicit holism. The argument here is that we learn the world by encountering it one piece at a time, but the Global Nihilist cannot provide the metaphysical ‘pieces’ of the world needed to explain how we do this. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic communities. I introduce the (...) notion of an epistemic environment, roughly the totality of resources and circumstances relevant to assessing the epistemically interesting statuses, such as knowledge. Fake news degrades our epistemic environment by undermining confidence in epistemic institutions and altering epistemic habits, thereby making the environment less conducive to achieving positive epistemic statuses. This is problematic even if the decrease in confidence and the altering of habits are rational. I end by considering solutions to these problems, stressing the importance of reproaching each other for proliferating fake news. I argue that we should reproach even faultless purveyors of fake news. This is because fake news typically arises in abnormal epistemic contexts, where there is widespread ignorance of, and noncompliance with, correct epistemic norms. (shrink)

A pressing question for the philosophy of personal identity in the digital age is the extent to which people can be identical to their various digital self-representations, from virtual avatars and social media profiles to AI digital duplicates and future mind uploads. This article addresses this question in the case of virtual avatars: user-controlled, visual representations of self in online environments like video games and virtual reality worlds. I interpret the metaphysical relationship between avatar and user implied by the ‘avatar (...) identity question’ through the lens of the extended self thesis. Drawing on the narrative theory of identity, I argue for the avatar extended self (AES): the view that virtual avatars can become constitutive components of a user’s personhood. After establishing criteria for avatar-user narrative integration and responding to objections to the view, I examine its ethical implications, arguing that AES raises the ethical significance of virtual actions involving one’s avatar and, in so doing, sheds light on the question of what grounds the moral weight of virtual phenomena. (shrink)

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which (...) put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of which depends (...) not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals. (shrink)

This chapter aims to offer a contemporary brand of foundationalist epistemology in an Islamic milieu. In focusing on Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) concept of fiṭra, the chapter develops a faculty-based epistemology and noninferentialist religious epistemology. It positioned itself as a plausible alternative to classical foundationalism, in that it avoids an implausible kind of scepticism and resonates with some of our basic intuitions about knowledge. If successful in countering some key objections, it has shown how theistic belief may be a type (...) of foundational knowledge for religious believers. (shrink)

Citing the basis on which an agent acts explains her acting in a distinctive way: it brings the action within the purview of rational agency. Many have appealed to the guise of the good thesis to secure the distinctiveness of basing explanation, by showing that the agent’s action is rationally intelligible. But the thesis threatens to artificially sanitize rational agency. Some, notably Setiya, deny both the guise of the good and the claim that basing explanation involves rational intelligibility. Here I (...) pursue a middle path, which rejects the guise of the good but retains the rational intelligibility underpinning of basing explanation. (shrink)

An influential way of distinguishing inferential from non-inferential processes appeals to representational states: an agent infers a conclusion from some premises only if she represents those premises as supporting that conclusion. By contrast, when some premises merely cause an agent to believe the conclusion, there is no relevant representational state. While promising, the appeal to representational states invites a regress problem, first famously articulated by Lewis Carroll. This paper develops a novel account of inference that invokes representational states without succumbing (...) to regress. The key move is to reject the tempting idea that the relevant representational states are causally prior to inferences. I argue, instead, that an inference constitutes the relevant representational state. To infer is thus—in the very drawing of the conclusion—to represent the premises as supporting the conclusion, and thereby to commit to that support relation. (shrink)

Augmented reality (AR) technologies function to ‘augment’ normal perception by superimposing virtual objects onto an agent’s visual field. The philosophy of augmented reality is a small but growing subfield within the philosophy of technology. Existing work in this subfield includes research on the phenomenology of augmented experiences, the metaphysics of virtual objects, and different ethical issues associated with AR systems, including (but not limited to) issues of privacy, property rights, ownership, trust, and informed consent. This paper addresses some epistemological issues (...) posed by AR systems. I focus on a near-future version of AR technology called the Real-World Web, which promises to radically transform the nature of our relationship to digital information by mixing the virtual with the physical. I argue that the Real-World Web (RWW) threatens to exacerbate three existing epistemic problems in the digital age: the problem of digital distraction, the problem of digital deception, and the problem of digital divergence. The RWW is poised to present new versions of these problems in the form of what I call the augmented attention economy, augmented skepticism, and the problem of other augmented minds. The paper draws on a range of empirical research on AR and offers a phenomenological analysis of virtual objects as perceptual affordances to help ground and guide the speculative nature of the discussion. It also considers a few policy-based and designed-based proposals to mitigate the epistemic threats posed by AR technology. (shrink)

There are three main accounts of the proper function of the low mood system (LMS): the social risk theory, the disease theory, and the propitiousness theory. Adjudicating between these accounts has proven difficult, as there is little agreement in the literature about what a theory of the LMS’s proper function is supposed to explain. In this article, drawing upon influential work on the evolution of other affective systems, such as the disgust system and the fear system, I argue that a (...) theory of the proper function of the low mood system should: (i) account for the reliable, distal causes and effects of the system’s activation, and (ii) explain how having a system that performed such a function increased fitness in ancestral environments. On this basis, I show that the proper function of the low mood system is to limit resource expenditure in relatively unpropitious circumstances, exactly as hypothesised by the propitiousness theory. (shrink)

This article aims to draw on the ‘Qur'anic Rationalism’ of Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) in elucidating an Islamic epistemology of theistic natural signs, in the lens of contemporary philosophy of religion. In articulating what Ibn Taymiyya coins ‘God's method of proof through signs (istidlāluhu taʿālā bi'l-āyāt)’, it seeks aid in particular from the work of C. Stephen Evans and other contemporary philosophers of religion, in an attempt to understand the relevance and force of this alternative to natural theology within (...) the Islamic tradition. In doing so, it aims to respond to existing criticisms of Ibn Taymiyya's perspective in the literature, and to consider the implications of a Taymiyyan reading of theistic natural signs, on the epistemic function of Qur'anic āyāt as theistic evidence. (shrink)

In reference to the philosophical theology of medieval Islamic theologian Ibn Taymiyya, this paper outlines a parallel between Taymiyyan thought and Alvin Plantinga’s thesis of ‘Reformed Epistemology’. In critiquing a previous attempt to build an account of ‘Islamic externalism’, the Taymiyyan model offers an account that can be seen as wholly ‘Plantingan’.

This chapter examines Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the leading figure of the Ḥanbalī/Atharī tradition, whose theology combines strict textualism with a distinctive realism about God, nature, and knowledge. Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology recognises sense perception, reason, and report as the main sources of knowledge, all grounded in the fiṭra, the innate human disposition that enables recognition of both truth and moral value. Ibn Taymiyya maintains that belief in God is intuitive and non-inferential, though it can also be supported (...) by rational argument from contingency and origination. God acts perpetually and voluntarily, creating and sustaining the world in time without beginning, and all divine acts proceed from His wisdom and purpose. Rejecting Ashʿarī occasionalism, he affirms that God creates natural bodies with real causal powers that operate within His will, giving rise to stable natural regularities and allowing a dynamic relation between divine and created agency. Miracles are exceptional signs that confirm prophethood by breaking the normal course of nature, but they remain acts of God within His created order. Ibn Taymiyya's hermeneutics rejects both figurative reinterpretation and consignment of meaning, affirming that divine attributes such as God's hand or settling on the throne are real yet unique to Him and ontologically unlike the corresponding attributes of creation. Human beings, endowed with will and power, act freely within divine determination and fulfil their purpose through worship and moral formation, reflecting God's wisdom on earth. Ibn Taymiyya's outlook accommodates a pragmatic form of methodological naturalism, seeing scientific enquiry as a way of discerning the regularities and wise purposes that God has placed in creation while insisting that divine agency remains the ultimate ground of all causation. (shrink)

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism (...) about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative. (shrink)

This article introduces the concept of virtual trespassing, a novel privacy violation enabled by photographic virtual reality (VR). Photographic VR refers to VR experiences that allow users to inhabit real captured spaces through 360° photography or video. We argue that the privacy risks posed by access in photographic VR exceed those associated with analogous forms of access in traditional 2D photography like Google Street View. Our argument extends Helen Nissenbaum’s (2004) contextual integrity theory of privacy beyond informational privacy to include (...) sensorial privacy. Contextual integrity can be violated not only through the inappropriate flow of one’s personal information, but also through inappropriate access to one’s sensorial personal space (Véliz, 2018). Photographic VR makes possible unique kinds of contextually inappropriate access to one’s sensorial personal space through its capacity to create a sense of presence, a feeling of “being there.” We draw on empirical research on presence in VR to support our argument before outlining different forms of virtual trespassing and identifying an inherent value-privacy tradeoff in photographic VR. Specifically, the same capabilities that make photographic VR valuable (presence, authenticity, and unrestricted access) also enable privacy violations. We conclude by suggesting practical privacy measures grounded in contextual integrity theory that can mitigate virtual trespassing while preserving the technology’s unique value proposition. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. A key objection to logical pluralism is that it collapses into monism. The core of the Collapse Objection is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does any genuine normative work; since a logic must do genuine normative work, this means that the pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her strongest logic being the one true logic. This paper considers a neglected question in the collapse (...) debate: what is it for a logic to do genuine normative work? As well as having wider upshot for the connection between logic and normativity, grappling with this question provides a new response to the Collapse Objection on behalf of the pluralist. I suggest that we should allow logics to generate pro tanto reasons in a way that bears not just on combinations of attitudes but on how an agent’s attitudes are based on one another. This motivates adopting normative principles that allow the pluralist’s weaker logics to earn their normative keep. Rather than being ad hoc, these principles capture a sense in which good reasoning goes beyond the consistency of an agent’s attitudes. Good reasoning is also concerned with how an agent’s attitudes are based on one another. (shrink)

This paper engages in what might be called anticipatory virtue epistemology, as it anticipates some virtue epistemological risks related to a near-future version of brain-computer interface technology that Michael Lynch (2014) calls 'neuromedia.' I analyze how neuromedia is poised to negatively affect the intellectual character of agents, focusing specifically on the virtue of intellectual perseverance, which involves a disposition to mentally persist in the face of challenges towards the realization of one’s intellectual goals. First, I present and motivate what I (...) call ‘the cognitive offloading argument’, which holds that excessive cognitive offloading of the sort incentivized by a device like neuromedia threatens to undermine intellectual virtue development from the standpoint of the theory of virtue responsibilism. Then, I examine the cognitive offloading argument as it applies to the virtue of intellectual perseverance, arguing that neuromedia may increase cognitive efficiency at the cost of intellectual perseverance. If used in an epistemically responsible manner, however, cognitive offloading devices may not undermine intellectual perseverance but instead allow us to persevere with respect to intellectual goals that we find more valuable by freeing us from different kinds of menial intellectual labor. (shrink)

Nicholas Smyth's recent argument that political conservatism fails to constitute a comprehensive political theory rests on overly restrictive criteria for what qualifies as political theory. Smyth argues that conservatism fails to provide action-guiding principles when institutions conflict and cannot maintain its distinctiveness when forced to create new institutions. His criteria for political theory, however, are overly restrictive and demand abstract doctrines that exclude practical political engagement. I contend that political theories are better understood as normative visions that orient political action (...) rather than abstract principles. Following Burke's critique of theoretical abstraction and Aristotle's emphasis on practical wisdom, I argue that conservatism constitutes a coherent political theory when understood as a vision oriented toward preserving institutions. By reconceptualizing political theories as visions rather than abstract doctrines, and by offering a more nuanced understanding of institutions as communities rather than mere patterns of norms, I demonstrate that conservatism qualifies as a normative, action-guiding political theory focused on preserving institutions. (shrink)

In this chapter I offer two novel arguments for what I call strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology, the thesis that there exists a phenomenology of cognition that is neither reducible to, nor dependent upon, sensory phenomenology. I then contend that strong primitivism implies that phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing. This latter contention has implications for the philosophy of artificial intelligence. For if sensory processing is not a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness, then it plausibly follows that AI consciousness (...) (assuming that it is possible) does not require embodiment. The overarching goal of this paper is to show how different topics in the analytic philosophy of mind can be brought to bear on an important issue in the philosophy of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

. This article seeks to outline how a Muslim believer can deflect a defeater for Islamic belief put forward by Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb. In doing so, it aims to reject the suggestion that an Islamic religious epistemology is somehow antithetical to a model of Reformed epistemology which is not fully compatible with Plantingian. Taken together with previous work on Islam and RE, the article not only aims to provide reason to think that Baldwin and McNabb’s proposed epistemic defeater (...) for Islamic belief isn’t problematic, it also seeks to show how the concerns raised by Baldwin and McNabb over a Plantingian model of RE in Islamic milieu, are no longer tenable. (shrink)

A comprehensive draft overview of John Stuart Mill's public life and philosophy, including discussion of: 1. A System of Logic. – 2. The Greatest Happiness Principle. – 3. Progress, Liberty, and Democracy. – 4. Equality. – 5. India and Empire. – 6. Distribution, Socialism, and Sustainability.

This paper provides an opinionated guide to discussions of acting and believing on the basis of reasons. I aim to bring closer together largely separate literatures in practical rea- son and in epistemology. I focus on three questions. First, is basing causing? Causal theories of basing remain popular despite the notorious Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. Causal theorists in both the epistemic and practical domains have begun to appeal to dispositions to try and solve the problem. Second, how unified are (...) acting and believing on the basis of reasons? I consider an important challenge to their unity due to Setiya. I sketch a response, which posits unity of causal structure across acting and believing on the basis of reasons. Third, how does acting or believing on the basis of a good reason relate to acting or believing on the basis of a reason simpliciter? I generalize a recent argument of Lord and Sylvan's to include acting as well as believing. The conclusion is that, for both believing and acting, ϕing on the basis of a good reason does not amount to ϕing on the basis of a reason that just so happens to be good. (shrink)

In his article ‘The Metaverse: Surveillant Physics, Virtual Realist Governance, and the Missing Commons,’ Andrew McStay addresses an entwinement of ethical, political, and metaphysical concerns surrounding the Metaverse, arguing that the Metaverse is not being designed to further the public good but is instead being created to serve the plutocratic ends of technology corporations. He advances the notion of ‘surveillant physics’ to capture this insight and introduces the concept of ‘virtual realist governance’ as a theoretical framework that ought to guide (...) Metaverse design and regulation. This commentary article primarily serves as a supplementary piece rather than a direct critique of McStay’s work. First, I flag certain understated or overlooked nuances in McStay’s discussion. Then, I extend McStay’s discussion by juxtaposing a Lockean inspired argument supporting the property rights of Metaverse creators with an opposing argument advocating for a Metaverse user's ‘right to virtual abundance,’ informed by the potential of virtual reality technology to eliminate scarcity in virtual worlds. Contrasting these arguments highlights the tension between corporate rights and social justice in the governance of virtual worlds and bears directly on McStay’s assertion that there is a problem of the missing commons in the early design of the Metaverse. (shrink)

Neither special nor general relativity make any use of a notion of absolute simultaneity. Since A-Theories about time do make use of such a notion, it is natural to suspect that relativity and A-Theory are inconsistent. Many authors have argued that they are in fact not inconsistent, and I agree with that diagnosis here. But that doesn’t mean, as these authors seem to think, that A-Theory and relativity are happy bedfellows. I argue that relativity gives us good reason to reject (...) the A-Theory, even though strict inconsistency isn’t that reason. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on AI-based cognitive and perceptual enhancements. AI-based brain enhancements are already under development, and they may become commonplace over the next 30–50 years. We raise doubts concerning whether radical AI-based enhancements transhumanists advocate will accomplish the transhumanists goals of longevity, human flourishing, and intelligence enhancement. We urge that even if the technologies are medically safe and are not used as tools by surveillance capitalism or an authoritarian dictatorship, these enhancements may still fail to do their job for (...) philosophical reasons. In what follows, we explore one such concern, a problem that involves the nature of the self. We illustrate that the so called transhumanist efforts to “merge oneself with AI” could lead to perverse realizations of AI technology, such as the demise of the person who sought enhancement. And, in a positive vein, we offer ways to avoid this, at least within the context of one theory of the nature of personhood. (shrink)

This white paper addresses the philosophy and governance of neurotechnologies. To do so, it is organized in the following sections: Section II addresses metaphysical and epistemological questions surrounding neurotechnology, covering the topics of personal identity and authenticity, neural self-knowledge and cognitive atrophy, agency and responsibility, the extended mind thesis, and brain-to-brain interfaces and the possibility of collective minds. Section III then addresses ethical considerations. It explains how neurotechnology challenges all major normative ethical theories, summarizes the neurorights debate, outlines the emerging (...) threats of neurohacking and neurocapitalism, and discusses informed consent protocols and challenges across different neurotechnology contexts. Section IV examines the broader societal implications of neurotechnology, including social justice concerns and risks of neurodiscrimination, the interplay between neurotechnology and religion, military deployments and the geopolitical neurotech arms race, recent policy initiatives in neurorights protection, and regulatory challenges for neurotechnology governance. The final sections conclude the analysis and provide specific policy recommendations tailored to the content of the white paper. (shrink)

In this article, I consider how the epistemic problem of religious disagreement has been viewed within the Islamic tradition. Specifically, I consider two religious epistemological trends within the tradition: Islamic Rationalism and Islamic Traditionalism. In examining the approaches of both trends toward addressing the epistemic problem, I suggest that neither is wholly adequate. Nonetheless, I argue that both approaches offer insights that might be relevant to building a more adequate response. So, I attempt to combine insights from both by drawing (...) a distinction between inferential and noninferential reflective responsibility. Given this distinction, I argue that it may be possible for a theist to remain steadfast in upholding their tradition-specific theistic belief, without having to hold that belief by way of inference; but nevertheless, having to be sufficiently reflectively responsible in forming their theistic belief noninferentially. (shrink)

This chapter makes the case for a new way of doing natural theology, which sets its sight on a more religiously interesting form of theistic belief than traditional approaches to natural theology.

This paper presents a philosophically illuminating explanation of the concepts, from mathematics and formal model theory, of filters and ultrafilters. If a propositional theory is just a set of propositions, then a filter is a propositional theory that is (i) consistent, (ii) closed under finite conjunction, and (iii) closed under implication. An ultrafilter is a filter that is also negation‐complete. I prove the central theorem on ultrafilters and explain how it is a propositional variant of Lindenbaum’s Lemma (which says that (...) every consistent set of sentences can be expanded to a negation‐complete, consistent set). Next I introduce the idea of products and ultraproducts of filters and ultrafilters, which are models constructed from the filters or ultrafilters, and prove Łos’s theorem, which shows that the ultraproduct of an ultrafilter makes true all and only the sentences which express propositions in the ultrafilter. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore whether a living being can have a medical disorder purely in virtue of its current structure, or whether its historical origins are also relevant. We do so by presenting two dialogues based on the Swampman thought experiment. These dialogues bring out two key points. First, although evolutionary history plays a central role in theoretical accounts of disorder, its relevance is less obvious in everyday medical practice. Second, there may be an asymmetry between somatic and mental (...) disorders: somatic disorders are typically identified by biological dysfunction, while many paradigmatic mental disorders appear to involve violations of rationality. Nevertheless, we suggest that dysfunctions—and thereby historical considerations—still play a role in distinguishing normal from pathological irrationality. Rather than introducing a new theory, this paper tests existing accounts of function and disorder by applying them to an extreme but instructive case. (shrink)

The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain (...) steadfast amid disagreement with epistemic peers who hold a contrary theistic belief (i.e., atheistic belief). For if we’re unable to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, then for all we know, God has some reason for not revealing Himself to our apparent epistemic peer. Thus, their epistemic credentials needn’t provide reason to reduce one’s confidence to such a degree as to no longer uphold one’s theistic belief. (shrink)

This chapter aims to draw on the critical threads of those vibrant theological conversations within the formative years of Islamic thought in considering the different theological models of the Divine within the broader Islamic tradition under the purview of classical theism as it is understood today in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In doing so, it makes reference to the major strands within the theological (‘ilm al- kalām & atharī scripturalism) and philosophical (falsafa) schools of the Islamic tradition. It aims (...) to consider how these different trends, schools, and thinkers construct a model of God in light of the classical and neo-classical theistic model of God. (shrink)

One version of the problem of hell when posed against Islamic theism runs something like this: (1) if the model of hell in the Islamic theistic tradition involves eternal conscious torment, then, plausibly, Islamic theism is false, (2) the model of hell in the Islamic theistic tradition involves eternal conscious torment, (3) therefore, plausibly, Islamic theism is false. Significantly, however, and in contrast to the traditional soteriological model, the oft-labelled staunch traditionalist medieval Muslim theologian, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 (...) CE), controversially argued for salvific universalism. In this article, I critically examine the three theological arguments Ibn Taymiyya offers for universalism. Following an assessment of these arguments, I conclude that although independently inconclusive, when taken together they constitute a plausible cumulative case for universalism and thus reason to dismiss the problem of hell for Islamic theism. (shrink)

My argument proceeds in two stages. In §I, I sum up the intuitions of a popular argument for 'satisfaction accounts' of Purgatory that I label, TAP. I then offer an argument, taken from a few standard orthodox Christian beliefs and one axiom of Christian theology, to so show that TAP is unsound. In the same section, I entertain some plausible responses to my argument that are prima facie consistent with these beliefs and axiom. I find these responses wanting. In §II, (...) I offer a sorites problem for TAP, given the orthodox Christian understanding of Christ’s parousia, showing that TAP and the intuitions driving it are faulty. To attempt something of a corrective, I end by offering some modest theological suggestions for thinking through “the logic of total transformation.”. (shrink)

Does low mood have intentional content? If so, what is it? Philosophers have tried to answer both questions by appealing to low mood’s phenomenal character. However, appeals to phenomenology have not settled this debate. Thus, I take a different approach: I tackle both questions by examining low mood’s complex functional role in cognition. I argue that if we take this role into account, we have excellent reason to believe that low mood a) has content, and b) has the following indicative-imperative (...) content: Good events are, on average, less likely to occur than bad events & Limit [the subject’s] resource expenditure! (shrink)

Logical consequence is typically construed as a metalinguistic relation between sentences. Deflationism is an account of logic that challenges this orthodoxy. In Williamson’s recent presentation of deflationism, logic’s primary concern is with universal generalizations over absolutely everything. As well as an interesting account of logic in its own right, deflationism has also been recruited to decide between competing logics in resolving semantic paradoxes. This paper defends deflationism from its most important challenge to date, due to Ole Hjortland. It then presents (...) two new problems for the view. Hjortland’s objection is that deflationism cannot discriminate between distinct logics. I show that his example of classical logic and supervaluationism depends on equivocating about whether the language includes a “definitely” operator. Moreover, I prove a result that blocks this line of objection no matter the choice of logics. I end by criticizing deflationism on two fronts. First, it cannot do the work it has been recruited to perform. That is, it cannot help adjudicate between competing logics. This is because a theory of logic cannot be as easily separated from a theory of truth as its proponents claim. Second, deflationism currently has no adequate answer to the following challenge: what does a sentence’s universal generalization have to do with its logical truth? I argue that the most promising, stipulative response on behalf of the deflationist amounts to an unwarranted change of subject. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Stei assumes that the correctness of a logic is a matter of the relation between the formal validity of a logical theory and extra-theoretic validity. I reject the assumption, on the grounds that it’s not clear that extratheoretic validity can be determined independently of formal validity. I formulate instead quietist logical pluralism, which is quietist with respect to the nature of extra-theoretic validity and its relation to formal (...) validity. Because of this, quietist logic pluralism needs a different correctness criterion for logic: correctness is a matter of a logic’s having normative upshot for deductive reasoning. I argue that this approach has the advantage of resisting the collapse of logical pluralism into monism. In particular, I suggest that deductive reasoning has two distinct roles, one with respect to the coherence of our attitudes and another with respect to how our attitudes are based on one another. I give two different normative principles that correspond to these roles; doing so requires abandoning the idea that normative bridge principles are universally quantified over all logics. That idea has been inherited from MacFarlane, but it’s not clear why the pluralist should accept it, as long as she can avoid giving principles that are ad hoc. By tying the principles to crucial roles of deductive reasoning, I aim to avoid both ad hockery and collapse. (shrink)

Science is traditionally thought to be motivated by truth-seeking. But the practical value of science and the grant system have introduced quite different motivations that can conflict with and override this value, and indeed scientists often appeal to them first to justify science. But the system creates moral hazards for the scientist.

C endorses the doctrine of Composition as Identity, which holds that a composite object is identical to its many parts, and entails that one object can be identical to several others. In this dialogue, N argues that many‐one identity, and thus composition as identity, is conceptually confused. In particular, N claims it violates two conceptual truths: that existence facts fix identity facts, and that identity is no addition to being. In response to pressure from C, N considers several candidate interpretations (...) of the first slogan. Each interpretation imagines God issuing a divine existential decree that counts as ‘fixing the existence facts’, and then considers what questions about identity are left open by it. N eventually hits on an appealing interpretation of the slogan that C can neither undermine nor accommodate, and uses it to interpret the second slogan as well. (shrink)

Universal Logic is the study of the formal properties of logical systems in terms of the ways in which these formal features are found across systems of various kinds. A crucial example of this problematic is found at the heart of cognitive science. Brains are computers or computer-like things. But the digital logic of computers and the logic of computer programs do not correspond in any direct way with the processes of brains, either at the neural level, or at the (...) level of psychological descriptions of reasoning and inference processes. There have been many approaches to this problem, typically involving the idea of some sort of brain-based universal semantics or syntactics that is realized in different forms in different languages. These accounts do not extend very successfully to other supposed forms of common tacit mental life, such as culture, climates of opinion, habitus, practices, norms, scripts, schemas, worldviews, and so forth. Nor do any of these concepts fit very well with known neural processes. The alternative approaches appeal to versions of the notion of individual habit, most recently summarized in a major book recently published by Cambridge University Press (Caruana in Habits: Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020). My approach is to see the language capabilities of each person as an assemblage of language patterns that have patterned relations to one another, and that are unique to each person. The evidence that this is how the brain actually works comes from bilinguals, who do not have two parallel downloaded language systems, but who have a mixed system with no neural separation between linguistic capacities. This is a better model for the heterogeneous tacit capacities that make up the logic of practices: an assemblage of patterns that allow for mutual interaction. What makes up the “system” are patterned forms of behavior that are recognized by others as “signals.” Language and linguistic expressions serve, among other things, as props to inferences: as substitutes for elements of inferences, and as surrogates for inferences, which enable extensions of inferences beyond experience. It is a “system” not in the sense that it corresponds to some neural structure, but in the sense that the patterns which are learned in the course of language learning have causal relations with one another in the brain, and in the behavioral responses of others, form the “signal system.”. (shrink)

Representationalism is a metaphysical theory of quantities which explains the fact that we use unit-relative numbers to represent quantities by appealing to intrinsic, non-numeric relations between individual quantities plus a representation theorem. While the theory is well-developed for quantities such as mass or length, that development has not been extended to "mixed quantities" such as kilogram meters per second or cubed meters per kilogram-seconds-squared. Since typical instances of nomic constants are given in mixed units, this lack of development has gotten (...) tangled up in issues about the metaphysics of constants, including David Baker’s "Pandora" argument against comparativism about quantities. This paper develops a representationalist theory of mixed quantities and explores how it can be used, in tandem with another thesis, to answer Baker’s Pandora argument. (shrink)

Models are the coin of the realm in current philosophy of science, as they are in science itself, having replaced laws and theories as the primary strategy. Logical Positivism tried to erase the older neo-Kantian distinction between ideal constructions and reality. It returns in the case of models. Nowak’s concept of idealization pro- vided an alternative account of this issue. It construed model application as concretizations of hypotheses which improve by accounting for exceptions. This appears to account for physical law. (...) But it raises the problem of uniqueness: is the result unique, as physical law should be? Neo-Kantianism failed this test. Its solutions were circular justifications for claims of uniqueness. Nowak inherited the problem without resolving it. (shrink)

A leading classical utilitarian, John Stuart Mill is an unlikely contributor to the public reason tradition in political philosophy. To hold that social rules or political institutions are justified by their contribution to overall happiness is to deny that they are justified by their being the object of consensus or convergence among all those holding qualified moral or political viewpoints. In this chapter, I explore the surprising ways in which Mill nevertheless works to accommodate the problems and insights of the (...) public reason tradition, and the extent to which he makes arguments that can help those working within that tradition. Mill’s utilitarian theory incorporates the claim that the demands of social life require a publicly accepted set of normative expectations to govern judgments about when one has met one’s obligations and, relatedly, about the appropriateness of blame or punishment. (shrink)