Scholarly discussion of Kant’s republicanism focuses heavily on his ‘negative’ conception of freedom as independence. Much less attention has been paid to Kant’s ‘positive’ conception of freedom as being subject to one’s own legislation. I argue that Kant’s positive conception of external freedom plays a crucial role in his Doctrine of Right: external freedom in the negative sense (mutual independence) requires and is realized by freedom in the positive sense (joint self-legislation). After discussing the ‘innate right to freedom’, (...) I argue that, on Kant’s account, this fundamental right is only fully realized when external freedom is realized in both senses and in all three spheres of public right. I conclude that a satisfactory account of Kant’s republican theory must complement the focus on independence with an emphasis on citizenship and self-legislation. (shrink)

Background independence begins life as an informal property that a physical theory might have, often glossed as 'doesn't posit a fixed spacetime background'. Interest in trying to offer a precise account of background independence has been sparked by the pronouncements of several theorists working on quantum gravity that background independence embodies in some sense an essential discovery of the General Theory of Relativity, and a feature we should strive to carry forward to future physical theories. This paper (...) has two goals. The first is to investigate what a world must be like in order to be truly described by a background independent theory given extant accounts of background independence. The second is to argue that there are no non-empirical reasons to be more confident in theories that satisfy extant accounts of background independence than in theories that don't. The paper concludes by drawing a general moral about a way in which focussing primarily on mathematical formulations of our physical theories can adversely affect debates in the metaphysics of physics. (shrink)

We often get evidence that bears on the reliability of some of our own first-order reasoning. The rational response to such “higher-order” evidence would seem to depend on a rational assessment of how reliable we can expect that reasoning to be, in light of the higher-order evidence. “Independence” principles are intended to constrain this reliability-assessment, so as to prevent question-begging reliance on the very reasoning being assessed. However, extant formulations of Independence principles tend to be vague or ambiguous, (...) and coming up with a tolerably precise formulation turns out to be tricky. This paper aims to make some progress toward developing a more precise Independence principle, and also to highlight some of the difficulties the project entails. The hope is to take a step toward understanding how rational belief is informed by evidence bearing on agents’ cognitive reliability. (shrink)

Some metaphysically interesting notions fall outside of the realm of the mind-independent, and as such will erroneously be considered unworthy of our attention by any view that thinks only of realist metaphysics as substantive (Taylor, 2023). In this article I propose two ways of conceiving of substantive metaphysics that includes some mind-dependent phenomena. The first is to understand substantivity in terms of carving at the joints, but to take where the ‘joints’ are to depend in part on our own interests, (...) preferences, and conceptual schemes (the joints are ours, not nature’s). The second is to think of ‘reality’ as a system of explanatory dependence that includes some suitably embedded mind-dependent phenomena, and thus to deny (if we continue to characterize realism in terms of mind-independence) that we should be realists about all of ‘reality’. (shrink)

This commentary on Haueis and Colaço's 'Metabolic considerations for cognitive modeling' emphasizes the importance of how we individuate cognitive capacities, operations, and vehicles. It challenges the target article’s reliance on mechanistic notions of computation and medium-independence, and uses examples from the memory literature to suggest that the role played by metabolic considerations in cognitive models will depend on questions of taxonomy and cognitive ontology.

This paper introduces the axiom of Negative Dominance, stating that if a lottery f is strictly preferred to a lottery g, then some outcome in the support of f is strictly preferred to some outcome in the support of g. It is shown that if preferences are incomplete on a sufficiently rich domain, then this plausible axiom, which holds for complete preferences, is incompatible with an array of otherwise plausible axioms for choice under uncertainty. In particular, in this setting, Negative (...) Dominance conflicts with the standard Independence axiom. A novel theory, which includes Negative Dominance, and rejects Independence, is developed and shown to be consistent. (shrink)

Intuitively, a classical field theory is background-in- dependent if the structure required to make sense of its equations is itself subject to dynamical evolution, rather than being imposed ab initio. The aim of this paper is to provide an explication of this intuitive notion. Background-independence is not a not formal property of theories: the question whether a theory is background-independent depends upon how the theory is interpreted. Under the approach proposed here, a theory is fully background-independent relative to an (...) interpretation if each physical possibility corresponds to a distinct spacetime geometry; and it falls short of full background-independence to the extent that this condition fails. (shrink)

Scientific confirmation relies on the convergence of independent sources of evidence. When multiple observers, instruments, or experiments yield the same result, the improbability of coincidence supports the conclusion that an external fact caused the agreement. This paper argues that the independence assumptions underwriting such inferences cannot be justified without presupposing the external-world framework they are meant to establish. Independence is not an observable property of data but a structural claim about data-generating processes---a claim that requires substantive background assumptions (...) about distinct systems, causal separation, and error mechanisms. These background assumptions are justified only relative to models that already presuppose external reality. The result is not that external realism is false, nor that intersubjective agreement provides no evidence, but that the degree of confirmation is underdetermined without framework-level commitments that cannot themselves be confirmed by the same methods. This underdetermination extends to perception itself: the intervention-structured patterns of experience are compatible with multiple metaphysical embeddings. The paper concludes not with an alternative metaphysics but with the recognition that questions about the ultimate source of experience are underdetermined by any evidence expressible within experience. (shrink)

Preface to First Issue- It is with great humility and enthusiasm that I present the inaugural issue of the India Independent Philosophical Journal. This peer-reviewed platform is a testament to the enduring power of free inquiry, rigorous analysis, and thoughtful dialogue—values that lie at the heart of both Indian and world philosophy. At this pivotal moment, I offer my sincere and profound gratitude to all the esteemed members of the Editorial and Advisory Board, whose scholarship, insights, and rigorous reviews have (...) greatly enriched the quality and integrity of this issue. Their thoughtful engagement with submitted papers, valuable suggestions, and philosophical rigor have helped shape this journal into a credible academic forum from its very inception. I am especially grateful to Prof. (Dr.) Jatashankar Tiwari, an eminent scholar and a guiding force in the field of Indian philosophy. As a former member of the Governing Body of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR), Government of India, his long-standing academic contributions and institutional experience have greatly enriched the philosophical community. His continued encouragement, critical insights, and moral support have been instrumental in shaping the vision and direction of this journal from its inception. I am deeply thankful to Prof. (Dr.) Dwarka Nath, former Head of the Department of Philosophy at DDU Gorakhpur University, for his scholarly suggestions and continued guidance, which have helped refine the academic quality of this journal. I also extend my sincere gratitude to Prof. (Dr.) Prashant Shukla, Associate Professor at the University of Lucknow, whose rigorous feedback and insightful review process have contributed significantly to maintaining the philosophical depth and precision in the published articles. My heartfelt thanks also go to our distinguished editorial board members: • Prof. (Dr.) Shivani Sharma • Prof. (Dr.) Gopalchandra Misra • Prof. (Dr.) C. Upendra • Dr. Surendra Pratap Singh • Prof. (Dr.) Mario Lupoli (International Member) Each of you has contributed not only through intellectual guidance but also by offering careful peer review and helping improve the scholarly standards of the journal. Your collective presence reflects the interdisciplinary and pluralistic spirit we wish to cultivate. Dr. Dhananjay Trivedi Chief Editor India Independent Philosophical Journal, Assistant Professor, Gyanmanjari Innovative University, Bhavnagar, Gujarat. (shrink)

An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011, 1-2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. (...) I then formulate and endorse a third version of Independence that avoids those counterexamples. Lastly, I show how this third version of Independence reveals two new ways one may remain steadfast in the face of two real life disagreements: one about God’s existence and one about moral realism. (shrink)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define (...) four criteria for individual and group epistemic rationality, and then prove that the four definitions diverge, in the sense that individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We conclude by explaining implications of the inconsistency thesis for (i) descriptive history and sociology of science and (ii) normative prescriptions for scientific communities. (shrink)

In cognitive science, the concept of dissociation has been central to the functional individuation and decomposition of cognitive systems. Setting aside debates about the legitimacy of inferring the existence of dissociable systems from ‘behavioural’ dissociation data, the main idea behind the dissociation approach is that two cognitive systems are dissociable, and thus viewed as distinct, if each can be damaged, or impaired, without affecting the other system’s functions. In this article, I propose a notion of functional independence that does (...) not require dissociability, and describe an approach to the functional decomposition and modelling of cognitive systems that complements the dissociation approach. I show that highly integrated cognitive and neurocognitive systems can be decomposed into non-dissociable but functionally independent components, and argue that this approach can provide a general account of cognitive specialization in terms of a stable structure–function relationship. 1 Introduction2 Functional Independence without Dissociability3 FI Systems and Cognitive Architecture4 FI Systems and Cognitive Specialization. (shrink)

There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and (...) only those natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real. (shrink)

In spite of its everyday connotations, the term independence as republicans understand it is not a celebration of individualism or self-reliance but embodies an acknowledgement of the importance of personal and social relationships in people’s lives. It reflects our connectedness rather than separateness and is in this regard a relational ideal. Properly understood, independence is a useful concept in addressing a fundamental problem in social philosophy that has preoccupied theorists of relational autonomy, namely how to reconcile the idea (...) of individual human agency with the inevitable and necessary influence of other people, both directly and indirectly. I derive my account from the work of Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay, whose contributions have remained largely overlooked by current republican theorists. I have three purposes in this chapter. First, I set out the relational character of independence. Secondly, I outline a republican approach to the problem of structural social threats to agency. Finally, I hope to establish the basis for a fruitful dialogue between republicans and relational autonomy theorists on the requirements and dynamics of individual agency and freedom in oppressive social situations. I identify three distinctive features of the internal logic of freedom as independence that give it a relational character: it always locates the person within a community; there is a mediating role played by the notion of arbitrariness in connecting individual and collective perspectives; a causal relationship exists linking each person’s freedom as independence such that that the dependence of one class of persons jeopardizes the independence of the whole community. (shrink)

Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We argue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic independencies. We show, however, that this assumption is implausible, as updating beliefs with conditional information does (...) not in general preserve independencies. We conclude that the approach taken by van Rooij and Lassiter does not succeed in resolving the proviso problem. (shrink)

This independent treatise presents a conceptual framework for understanding how modern systems of governance, science, and technological development can maintain coherence and legitimacy amid rapidly expanding technical capacity. Drawing on philosophical traditions concerning dignity, recognition, and institutional responsibility, the work advances the concept of Community in Reverence as an orienting ethical posture rather than a prescriptive doctrine. Within this framework, solitary compassion and communal recognition function as relational mechanisms through which ethical orientation can circulate between individual judgment and institutional practice. (...) The treatise argues that many contemporary challenges arise from a structural imbalance in which technical capacity outpaces shared ethical orientation, producing fragmentation across governance, scientific practice, and cultural interpretation. Reverence is examined not as sentiment or inherited tradition but as an operational ethic capable of stabilizing decision-making, sustaining institutional legitimacy, and enabling interdisciplinary cooperation within pluralistic societies. Positioned as a transitional afflux, this framework offers a non-ideological lens through which scholars and practitioners may reconsider how modern systems integrate human dignity, responsibility, and adaptive progress. The work is intended as a foundational conceptual synthesis supporting future empirical, philosophical, and policy-oriented inquiry across the humanities, social sciences, and emerging technological domains. (shrink)

Editorial -/- The India Independent Philosophical Journal is pleased to present Volume 2, Issue I (January 2026). Following the successful publication of its inaugural volume, the journal continues its commitment to promoting high-quality, peer-reviewed philosophical research rooted in both Indian and global intellectual traditions. This issue brings together scholarly contributions that address a broad spectrum of philosophical concerns, including Indian philosophy, comparative and contemporary thought, ethics, philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, existentialism, and emerging debates related to science, technology, and artificial (...) intelligence. The diversity of themes and methodological approaches represented here reflects the journal’s objective of encouraging rigorous, critical, and interdisciplinary philosophical inquiry. All manuscripts published in this issue have undergone a double-blind peer-review process, with each submission evaluated by independent subject experts. The editorial decision-making has been guided by criteria of originality, conceptual clarity, methodological soundness, and scholarly relevance. Through this process, the journal seeks to uphold academic integrity and contribute constructively to ongoing philosophical discourse. The Editorial Team expresses its sincere appreciation to the members of the Editorial and Advisory Board and to the reviewers for their careful assessments and valuable recommendations, which have been instrumental in maintaining the academic standards of the journal. The editors also thank the contributors for their original research and for engaging thoughtfully with the review process. As the journal moves forward, it remains committed to fostering philosophical scholarship that is reflective, inclusive, and socially relevant. The India Independent Philosophical Journal aims to serve as a credible academic platform for sustained dialogue across traditions and disciplines, and it welcomes future contributions that advance philosophical understanding in meaningful ways. -/- Dr. Dhananjay Trivedi Chief Editor India Independent Philosophical Journal -/- . (shrink)

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental condition that creates social interaction, communication problems, and sensory processing difficulties, which create substantial learning challenges for children in standard educational settings. The combination of hypersensitivity and hyposensitivity in autistic students creates overwhelming anxiety when they experience transitions through hallways and corridors. Research shows that sensory-informed interior design promotes engagement, comfort, and self-regulation for learners with ASD. Grounded in Sensory Integration Theory, this paper reviews current research on how transition space design can be (...) harnessed to foster greater independence for children with autism. The methodology involved a synthesis of interdisciplinary peer-reviewed articles covering sensory-friendly strategies, spatial zoning, adaptive technologies, and biophilic principles within learning environments. The research indicates that transition spaces with carefully planned acoustic control, calming lighting, and visual navigation tools, as well as designated spatial protection areas and self-regulation zones, can help reduce stress levels and behavioral problems. These design strategies enable autistic children to handle transitions more effectively while improving their ability to navigate spaces independently. The paper presents evidence-based design recommendations that unite theoretical knowledge with practical applications to establish sensory-sensitive transition areas that support the independence, active involvement, and emotional well-being of neurodiverse children. (shrink)

The value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists. Here I present a view of the optimality approach as at once playing a crucial explanatory role and yet also depending on external sources of confirmation. Optimality models are not alone in facing this tension between their explanatory value and their dependence on other approaches; I suspect that the scenario is quite common in science. This investigation of the optimality approach thus serves as a case (...) study, on the basis of which I suggest that there is a widely felt tension in science between explanatory independence and broad epistemic interdependence, and that this tension influences scientific methodology. (shrink)

The computational properties of a system are generally thought to be independent in some sense from its physical properties, in virtue of the fact that computation is a formally characterized concept. Several philosophers have recently challenged the idea that such “medium‐independence” is an essential feature of computation by arguing that some kinds of computation lack medium‐independence. This paper explores and rejects three such arguments in an attempt to defend the essential medium‐independence of computation.

We investigate epistemic independence for choice functions in a multivariate setting. This work is a continuation of earlier work of one of the authors [23], and our results build on the characterization of choice functions in terms of sets of binary preferences recently established by De Bock and De Cooman [7]. We obtain the independent natural extension in this framework. Given the generality of choice functions, our expression for the independent natural extension is the most general one we are (...) aware of, and we show how it implies the independent natural extension for sets of desirable gambles, and therefore also for less informative imprecise-probabilistic models. Once this is in place, we compare this concept of epistemic independence to another independence concept for choice functions proposed by Seidenfeld [22], which De Bock and De Cooman [1] have called S-independence. We show that neither is more general than the other. (shrink)

Delegation to independent agencies can reap real benefits for policy-making. In the case of monetary policy, it shores up the credibility of the central bank. However, the discretion of IAs needs to be constrained to ensure their legitimacy. This letter focuses on one potential constraint, namely, the idea that IAs should not make choices on distributional trade-offs. Given that monetary policy today has significant distributive consequences, if this constraint were respected, the independence of central banks would have to be (...) repealed. This would be just as undesirable as a monetary policy whose distributive consequences remain unchecked. Instead, this letter encourages the search for alternative solutions and puts forward three possible institutional arrangements to manage the tension between the distributive consequences of monetary policy on the one hand and central bank legitimacy on the other. (shrink)

On an increasingly popular view of rationality, rationality is fundamentally about responding correctly to reasons and there is no independent rational requirement to avoid incoherence: having an incoherent combination of attitudes is irrational not because there is a fundamental requirement of rationality that prohibits it, but rather because you are guaranteed to fail to respond correctly to reasons in having it. This paper argues that any such attempt to explain the irrationality of incoherence in terms of responsiveness to reasons fails. (...) For there is something distinctively irrational about incoherence that is not explained in terms of the guaranteed failure to respond to reasons. Any adequate account of the nature of coherence requirements on belief and intention should take into account the distinctive kind of commitments involved in each type of attitude. (*published with open access). (shrink)

In this paper, I consider particular attempts by E. J. Lowe and Michael Gorman at providing an independence criterion of substancehood and argue that the stipulative exclusion of non-particulars and proper parts (or constituents) from such accounts raises difficult issues for their proponents. The results of the present discussion seem to indicate that, at least for the case of composite entities, a unity criterion of substancehood might have at least as much, and perhaps more, to offer than an (...) class='Hi'>independence criterion and therefore ought to be explored further by neo-Aristotelians in search of a defensible notion of substancehood. I indicated briefly how such a unity criterion might be used by neo-Aristotelians to support the inclusion of hylomorphic compounds in the category of substance, given the traditional role of form as the principle of unity within the compound. (shrink)

Materialism asserts that matter exists independently of mind while also asserting that matter causally produces mind. This paper demonstrates that these two claims are not compatible. Independence means absence of connection. Causation is connection. The standard materialist defense invokes asymmetric temporal priority to dissolve the apparent contradiction, but this defense secretly requires external time as an unexamined premise. Since external time is itself an unjustified externalist assumption, the independence claim and the temporal assumption are mutually load-bearing, making the (...) entire structure circular at the foundational level rather than merely at the evidential level already documented in Experiential Empiricism (Sergent, n.d., "The Three-Step Argument"). (shrink)

Orthodox semantics for natural language modals give rise to two puzzles for their interactions with disjunction: Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free choice permission. It is widely assumed that each puzzle can be explained in terms of the licensing of ‘Diversity’ inferences: from the truth of a possibility or necessity modal with an embedded disjunction, hearers infer that each disjunct is compatible with the relevant set of worlds. I argue that Diversity inferences are too weak to explain the full (...) range of data. Instead, I argue, modals with embedded disjunctions license ‘Independence’ inferences: from the truth of a modal with an embedded disjunction, hearers infer that each disjunct is an independent alternative among the relevant set of worlds. I then develop a bilateral inquisitive semantics for modals that predicts the validity of these Independence inferences. My account vindicates common intuitions about both Ross’s puzzle and the puzzle of free choice permission, and explains the full range of data. (shrink)

In this paper, we initiate the study of a new restricted parameter of convex Roman domination in graphs, called the outer-independent convex Roman dominating function, and discuss some of its combinatorial properties.

Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how (...) independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) Ultimately, I suggest that the two attitudes are more independent than one might think. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this Journal San Pedro I formulated a conjecture relating Measurement Independence and Parameter Independence, in the context of common cause explanations of EPR correlations. My conjecture suggested that a violation of Measurement Independence would entail a violation of Parameter Independence as well. Leszek Wroński has shown that conjecture to be false. In this note, I review Wroński’s arguments and agree with him on the fate of the conjecture. I argue that what (...) is interesting about the conjecture, however, is not whether it is true or false in itself, but the reasons for the actual verdict, and their implications regarding locality. (shrink)

Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent (threatening the ‘wisdom of crowds’) even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how (...) individuals are causally affected by environmental factors such as commonly perceived evidence. In a general theorem, we identify causal conditions guaranteeing each kind of opinion independence. These results have implications for whether and how ‘wisdom of crowds’ arguments are possible, and how truth-conducive institutions can be designed. (shrink)

SInC (Substrate-Independent Consciousness) is a mathematically explicit theory proposing that conscious experience arises through coupling between a higher-dimensional Witness sector possessing intrinsic subjective capacity and a computational substrate possessing appropriate informational organization. The theory supplements this ontological postulate with an explicit dynamical coupling architecture based on resonance acquisition, phase locking, carrier-mediated information transfer, and substrate-selective coupling. -/- Beyond its foundational ontological assumptions, SInC develops a quantitative mechanism from which specific, in-principle falsifiable predictions are derived, including resonance structure, critical-state dependence, lock-acquisition (...) dynamics, and carrier-sector observables. The theory further introduces explicit substrate-selection criteria intended to connect its ontological assumptions to the physical conditions under which conscious coupling is predicted to occur. -/- The present work is offered as a speculative but mathematically structured research program whose central claims are ultimately empirical: if the proposed carrier architecture and coupling dynamics are incorrect, the predicted signatures should not be observed. -/- Like all contemporary theories of consciousness, SInC operates under the epistemic limitation that physical observables can at most provide evidence consistent with a proposed account of subjective experience; they cannot directly establish the existence of subjective experience itself. In this respect, the theory faces the same fundamental constraint as Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory, Orch-OR, and related approaches. (shrink)

Condorcet's Jury Theorem shows that on a dichotomous choice, individuals who all have the same competence above 0.5, can make collective decisions under majority rule with a competence that approaches 1 as either the size of the group or the individual competence goes up. The theorem assumes that the probability of each voter's being correct is independent of the probability of any other voter being correct. Contrary to several authors, the presence of mutual or common influences such as opinion leaders (...) does not easily rule independence either in or out. Indeed, and this ought to be surprising,under certain conditions deference to opinion leaders can improve individual competence without violating independence, and so can raise group competence as well. (shrink)

Bilateralism is a theory of meaning according to which assertion and denial are independent speech acts. Bilateralism also proposes two coordination principles for assertion and denial. I argue that if assertion and denial are independent speech acts, they cannot be coordinated by the bilateralist principles.

There is a substantial class of collective decision problems whose successful solution requires interdependence among decision makers at the agenda-setting stage and independence at the stage of choice. We define this class of problems and describe and apply a search-and-decision mechanism theoretically modeled in the context of honeybees and identified in earlier empirical work in biology. The honeybees’ mechanism has useful implications for mechanism design in human institutions, including courts, legislatures, executive appointments, research and development in firms, and basic (...) research in the sciences. Our paper offers a fresh perspective on the idea of “biomimicry” in institutional design and raises the possibility of comparative institutional analysis across species. (shrink)

In the face of an impossibility result, some assumption must be relaxed. The Mere Addition Paradox is an impossibility result in population ethics. Here, I explore substantially weakening the decision-theoretic assumptions involved. The central finding is that the Mere Addition Paradox persists even in the general framework of choice functions when we assume Path Independence as a minimal decision-theoretic constraint. Choice functions can be thought of either as generalizing the standard axiological assumption of a binary “betterness” relation, or as (...) providing a general framework for a normative (rather than axiological) theory of population ethics. Path Independence, a weaker assumption than typically (implicitly) made in population ethics, expresses the idea that, in making a choice from a set of alternatives, the order in which options are assessed or considered is ethically arbitrary and should not affect the final choice. Since the result establishes a conflict between the relevant ethical principles and even very weak decision-theoretic principles, we have more reason to doubt the ethical principles. (shrink)

In January 2026 two papers were deposited on Zenodo establishing that information loss at dimensional boundaries in discrete systems is a geometric phenomenon with an architecture-independent magnitude: 86.01% ± 2.39% in cellular automata across 1,500 patterns (Thornhill 2026b, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18262424, 01/14/2026), and 84.39% ± 1.55% on transformer hidden states (GPT-2, Gemma-2), supported by a formal proof of the component transformations S, R, and D (Thornhill 2026c, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.18319430, 01/20/2026). It was predicted, in the closing discussion of Thornhill 2026c, that the (...) geometric account should hold across substrates wherever density dilution and neighborhood-structure expansion occur together at a representational boundary. -/- In March 2026, Barman, Starenky, Bodnar, Narasimhan, and Gopinath independently published two arXiv preprints (arXiv:2603.27116 and arXiv:2604.06222) reporting that production retrieval embedding models — MiniLM-L6-v2, BGE-base, BGE-large — concentrate their variance into approximately 16 effective dimensions regardless of nominal dimensionality (384, 768, 1024), and that this concentration places those models in an interference-vulnerable geometric regime that reproduces quantitative signatures of human memory failure (power-law forgetting with exponent b = 0.460 ± 0.183, Deese–Roediger–McDermott false-alarm rate of 0.583, spacing-effect ordering, tip-of-tongue behavior). They establish a parallel theorem — the No-Escape Theorem — characterizing what cannot be repaired within semantically continuous kernel-threshold memory systems. -/- The two bodies of work are methodologically distinct. They use different metrics (Φ = R·S + D vs. participation ratio), study different substrates (cellular automata and transformer hidden states vs. pretrained retrieval embeddings), and report different specific quantities (an 86% loss constant in Φ vs. a fixed point at ~16 effective dimensions across nominal sizes). They also reach the same broader conclusion from independent directions: that representational memory failure is a geometric property of the embedding operation, not a property of any particular architecture, training regime, or biological substrate. -/- The present note records the chronology of the two lines of evidence in a single citable document, summarizes the methodological differences, and identifies the substantive convergence: an architecture-independent geometric fixed point as the principal explanatory mechanism for representational memory failure in the systems studied. (shrink)

We articulate John Dewey’s “independent factors” approach to moral philosophy and then adapt and extend this approach to address contemporary debate concerning the nature and sources of epistemic normativity. We identify three factors (agent reliability, synchronic rationality, and diachronic rationality) as each making a permanent contribution to epistemic value. Critical of debates that stem from the reductionistic ambitions of epistemological systems that privilege of one or another of these three factors, we advocate an axiological pluralism that acknowledges each factor as (...) an independent “spring” of epistemic value within responsible inquiry. (shrink)

This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ①. The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these (...) notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts :539–555, 2017; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49:835–841, 2008; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5:73–75, 2011) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics. (shrink)

How do adults get the right to parent a child? In this paper, I argue for a broadly Kantian account called “Parental Independence.” In short, Parental Independence says that when citizens set out to raise their offspring, they exercise their equal freedom to set and pursue their ends. Insofar as their pursuit of the end of parenthood avoids the domination of others, they are entitled to raise their offspring. The distinctive feature of Parental Independence is that it (...) is neither a dual-interest nor a child-centered account of the right to parent, but is instead grounded in a commitment to Independence. (shrink)

Robustness arguments hold that hypotheses are more likely to be true when they are confirmed by diverse kinds of evidence. Robustness arguments require the confirming evidence to be independent. We identify two kinds of independence appealed to in robustness arguments: ontic independence —when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories—and probabilistic independence. Many assume that OI is sufficient for a robustness argument to be warranted. However, we argue that, as typically construed, OI (...) is not a sufficient independence condition for warranting robustness arguments. We show that OI evidence can collectively confirm a hypothesis to a lower degree than individual lines of evidence, contrary to the standard assumption undergirding usual robustness arguments. We employ Bayesian networks to represent the ideal empirical scenario for a robustness argument and a variety of ways in which empirical scenarios can fall short of this ideal. (shrink)

This study examines the essential role of eco-innovation in harmonizing ecological sustainability with economic growth while tackling urgent environmental issues. This study uses social networks, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories to scrutinize the relationship among independent directors, ESG performance, and eco-innovation. Based on the data of 4,902 listed Chinese companies from 2010 to 2023, this study reveals that independent directors and ESG performance can significantly promote eco-innovation. This study also finds that internal corporate contexts can affect the relationship between independent (...) directors, ESG performance, and eco-innovation. Furthermore, the results indicate that the relationship among independent directors, ESG performance, and eco-innovation is positively moderated by digital transformation. This study also offers noteworthy implications for corporations seeking eco-innovation performance and policymakers seeking ways to accomplish the mission of carbon dioxide reduction. (shrink)

Quine's famous assertion that "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" translates, in syntactic form, the way in which first-order formal logic correctly expresses existence, which can no longer be taken as a real predicate since Kant. However, this operation of quantification does not exhaust the metaphysical breadth of the theme of Being, involved by dragging through the use of the verb "to be". In particular, when it comes to mathematical objects, it is verified that quantification (...) depends on the reality of non-empirical and non-mental domains, which support the truth of mathematical propositions. This work seeks to demonstrate that such domains must have an autonomous, independent, abstract and necessary way of being, which implies the adoption of mathematical Platonism in a strong sense, a position similar to that adopted by G. Frege in the proposition of his thesis of the "Third Kingdom" ("drittes Reich") in his famous article Der Gedanke. (shrink)

The paper takes up a traditional view that has also been a part of some recent analytic metaphysics, namely, the view that substance is to be understood in terms of independence. Taking as my point of departure some recent remarks by Kit Fine, I propose reviving the Aristotelian-scholastic idea that the sense in which substances are independent is that they are non-inherent, and I do so by developing a broad notion of inherence that is more usable in the context (...) of contemporary analytic metaphysics than the traditional notion is. I end by showing how non-inherence, while necessary for being a substance, cannot be taken as sufficient without some qualifying remarks. (shrink)

Much of the discussion of set-theoretic independence, and whether or not we could legitimately expand our foundational theory, concerns how we could possibly come to know the truth value of independent sentences. This paper pursues a slightly different tack, examining how we are ignorant of issues surrounding their truth. We argue that a study of how we are ignorant reveals a need for an understanding of set-theoretic explanation and motivates a pluralism concerning the adoption of foundational theory.

Green innovation plays a critical role in mitigating environmental issues and balancing the interaction between economic growth and the natural environment. Drawing on social network and resource-dependence theory, this article scrutinises the relationship between independent director interlocks and corporate green innovation. Using the data from listed Chinese companies from 2010 to 2022, this study finds that independent director interlocks can significantly promote corporate green processes and product innovation. This research further finds that internal corporate contexts can also influence the relationship (...) between independent director interlocks and green innovation. Moreover, the results indicate that corporate environmental commitment positively moderates the relationships between independent director interlocks and corporate green innovation. This study also provides significant implications for firms seeking green innovation performance and for policymakers seeking ways to fulfill the mission of carbon dioxide abatement. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest involving members of national governments create a distinct legal problem when European Union funds are involved. Domestic conflict-of-interest law may determine whether a minister, head of government, or other public office-holder complies with national rules. EU financial law, however, asks a different question: whether expenditure submitted to the Union budget has been implemented, controlled, audited, certified, and reimbursed under conditions compatible with impartiality, objectivity, sound financial management, and the protection of the Union budget. -/- This paper argues (...) that domestic compliance alone is not always sufficient where EU-funded expenditure may benefit undertakings economically connected to a member of government. It identifies “governmental self-verification” as a structural weakness in EU financial governance: the executive branch may be asked to certify the neutrality of a process from which one of its own political leaders may directly or indirectly benefit. The paper therefore distinguishes domestic compliance from EU financial eligibility, and political eligibility from financial eligibility. -/- The paper proposes that, in structurally sensitive cases, EU-funded expenditure connected to members of national governments should be subject to independent verification outside the ordinary governmental chain of command. Such a mechanism would not determine who may hold political office. It would determine whether expenditure connected to such office-holders may be charged to the Union budget with sufficient legal and institutional assurance. Recent Czech controversies concerning undertakings economically linked to a head of government are used only as an illustration of a broader structural problem in the management of Union funds. (shrink)

Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms in consciousness and (...) characterized as fallacious if generalized. There are, however, underlying commonalities between pain perception and unpleasant affect, e.g. formal content or evolutionary ancestry. (shrink)

Discussions of political obligation and political authority have long focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of content-independence is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or increasingly irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their source or container. I then solve the long-standing puzzle of whether the fact that laws can constitute content-independent (...) reasons is consistent with the fact that some laws must fail to bind due to their egregiously unjust content. Finally I defend my understanding of content-independence against challenges and show why it retains a place of special importance for questions about the law and political obligation. Content-independence highlights that it is some feature of the law or law-making process in general that is supposed to generate moral obligations for citizens, not the merits of particular laws. (shrink)

There is currently a general consensus on the existence of a scope of discretion, the extent of which is debated but in our opinion is high, available to the judge to apply the law. This leads to the need to analyze the extra-legal factors, from the ideology and social background of the judge to his or her political loyalties or personal ambitions, which may have an impact on his or her independence and lead to unreasonable sentences that are highly (...) detrimental to the judiciary or the public in general. In short, it is essential to promote judicial independence through specific legislative measures, and to this end we will devote this paper to examining in detail the threats to such independence and proposing regulatory solutions to address them. (shrink)

This paper presents LBTBB (Laat Bestaande Theorieën Buiten Beschouwing — Leave Existing Theories Out of Consideration), a methodological principle for foundational theory construction in which internal coherence is developed to a self-sustaining degree before comparison with existing frameworks is undertaken. The method is motivated by the observation that premature incorporation of external frameworks tends to suppress the structural distinctiveness of an emerging theory before its internal architecture is sufficiently developed to survive the comparison. The paper introduces three associated concepts: the (...) Δ-zone (the formal boundary where argument ends and axiomatic choice begins), Architectural Modesty (the principle that every architectural choice must explicitly refer to the Δ-zone from which it originates), and the Falsification Horizon (the explicit registration of what a theory cannot reach from its own internal resources). These concepts are illustrated through the Lindersberg-Codex, a foundational framework for theoretical physics developed independently over six decades, in which differentiability serves as the transcendental primitive (ZP0). The neutrino mass prediction Σmν ≈ 58 meV, derivable internally from the Codex structure, serves as a concrete falsification checkpoint: the Euclid satellite DR1 release (October 2026) provides an external test with falsification. (shrink)