According to a common argument in defense of border control, legitimate states have a right to exclude on grounds of collective self-determination. I argue that the value of self-determination can also serve as a basis for criticizing states’ immigration policies. Specifically, I contend that the externalization policies of states in the Global North often undermine the self-determination of peoples in the Global South. I identify five pathways by which externalization policies undermine self-determination. I conclude by tentatively suggesting some potential implications (...) of this argument for broader debates about the governance of migration. (shrink)

It is widely believed that there’s a right to emigrate. But what justifies this right? This paper explores this issue. It first argues that existing defenses of the right to emigrate are incomplete. It then outlines a novel egalitarian defense of the right to emigrate, on which that right is in part justified as a protection against social inequality. After considering objections, it argues that this account of the right to emigrate entails a limited right to immigrate and that states (...) are under a collective duty to institute a global migration system which protects effective exit. (shrink)

It is widely believed that immigrants, after some time, acquire a claim to naturalize and become citizens of their new state. What explains this claim? Although existing answers (may) succeed in justifying some of immigrants' rights claims, they cannot justify the claim that immigrants are owed the opportunity to naturalize because these theories lack a sufficiently rich account of the purpose of citizenship. To fill this gap, I offer a novel egalitarian account of citizenship. Citizenship, on this account, partially protects (...) immigrants against social hierarchy by realizing social equality in a publicly accessible manner. This explains claims to naturalize. (shrink)

In ‘Are Citizenship Tests Necessarily Illiberal?’, Michael Blake argues that difficult citizenship tests are not necessarily illiberal, so long as they test for the right things. In this paper, I argue that Blake’s attempt to square citizenship tests with liberalism fails. Blake underestimates the burdens citizenship tests impose on immigrants, ignoring in particular the egalitarian claims immigrants have on equal social membership. Moreover, Blake’s positive justification of citizenship tests – that they help justify immigrants’ coercive voting power – both neglects (...) the fact that such tests are coercively imposed on immigrants and that the citizenship test Blake envisions does little to help ensure immigrants’ votes are legitimate. Citizenship tests thus aren’t, even in principle, a way of protecting citizens from unjustified coercive power. They are, even under favourable circumstances, an illiberal way of obstructing immigrants’ quest for social equality. (shrink)

Unlike natural-born citizens, many immigrants have agreed to undertake political obligations. Many have sworn oaths of allegiance. Many, when they entered their adopted country, promised to obey the law. This paper is about these agreements. First, it’s about their validity. Do they actually confer political obligations? Second, it’s about their justifiability. Is it permissible to get immigrants to undertake such political obligations? Our answers are ‘usually yes’ and ‘probably not’ respectively. We first argue that these agreements give immigrants political obligations. (...) We then argue that getting immigrants to undertake such obligations is morally wrong. This is because it makes immigrants’ political obligations more burdensome than those of natural-born citizens. We conclude that the practice of getting immigrants to undertake such obligations should be abolished. (shrink)

This review essay critically discusses Robert Talisse’s account of democracy and polarization. I argue that Talisse overstates the degree to which polarization arises from the good-faith practice of democratic citizenship and downplays the extent to which polarization is caused by elites and exacerbated by social structures; this leads Talisse to overlook structural approaches to managing polarization and leaves his account of how citizens should respond to polarization incomplete. I conclude that Talisse’s insights should nevertheless be integrated into a broader agenda (...) for thinking about the causes and solutions to polarization. (shrink)

In Beyond Empathy and Inclusion: The Challenge of Listening in Deliberative Democracy, Mary F. Scudder defends a listening-based approach to deliberative democracy. On this account, democratic legitimacy requires that citizens listen to each other’s deliberative contributions to give them fair consideration. She opposes this listening-based approach to a recent “empathic turn” in deliberative democratic theory, which emphasizes the importance of imaginative perspective-taking in democratic deliberation. Scudder develops an incisive critique of relying on empathy in democratic deliberation. According to her argument, (...) our capacity to empathize is severely limited, and empathy cannot replace, but only distort listening. This argument suggests that we should listen rather than empathize in democratic deliberation. In this paper, we challenge the implicit assumption that empathy and listening must be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives. We argue that empathy still has an important place within a listening-centric approach to democracy because empathy can improve listening broadly understood, according to its own inherent aim of ensuring fair consideration. Specifically, we identify three constructive roles that empathy can play in facilitating democratic listening: it can help us to understand what someone has said, see where someone is coming from, and promote mutual understanding. We argue that recognizing these constructive roles for empathy in democratic deliberation is compatible with acknowledging empathy’s limits and accepting that we should sometimes prefer listening without empathy. Ceasing to conceive of empathy and listening as mutually exclusive options opens up new questions and we close by discussing some potential directions of future study. (shrink)

Migration blackmail occurs when one state threatens to engineer a “migration crisis” on the borders of a target state by creating or permitting an irregular migration flow unless political or economic concessions are made by the target state. States may have legitimate interests in resisting migration blackmail. However, migrants have strong interests in accessing international protection and avoiding harm. These goals may seem to stand in tension and generate a dilemma: it may seem that there is no way for target (...) states to effectively resist and deter blackmail while adequately respecting migrants’ interests. This paper explores what is problematic about migration blackmail and how states may permissibly respond to it. I argue that target states are not permitted to close their borders in response to migration blackmail but instead must respect the right to seek asylum. I offer four complementary arguments for this conclusion: (1) not all cases of migration blackmail are dilemmatic; (2) target states have often contributed to the circumstances that give rise to migration blackmail and so may bear some responsibility for the situation; (3) the interests of migrants in accessing protection and avoiding harm outweigh states’ interests in resisting blackmail; and (4) states have options available to resist migration blackmail without contravening the right to asylum. (shrink)

“Pop culture” is a ubiquitous but vexing category in social theory. While often invoked, it is notoriously difficult to define with any clarity. This paper begins by exploring the pitfalls of standard definitions of popular culture. It then asks what a Wittgensteinian approach to the concept of pop culture might entail and what (if any) its benefits might be. I consider three ways Wittgensteinian ideas might be brought to bear on the concept of pop culture. The first approach draws on (...) Wittgenstein’s early-middle-period writings, which, under the influence of Spengler and others, invoke a distinction between culture and civilization. I suggest that this approach is not particularly fruitful both because it rests on a highly parochial set of metaphysical and evaluative assumptions and because it does not furnish a suitable contrast between pop culture and other domains of culture. A second, more promising approach draws on Wittgenstein’s conception of family resemblance. Here, I explore the conjecture that “pop culture” is a family resemblance concept. I suggest the conjecture is plausible and argue that recognizing this can help dissolve certain philosophical problems concerning the boundaries of popular culture. However, I contend that this approach does not on its own furnish a useful notion of pop culture for analytic purposes. I, therefore, consider a third approach to defining pop culture. This approach asks what the point of having a concept like “pop culture” is, and seeks to construct a concept that is usable for those purposes. This “conceptual engineering” approach to pop culture, however, seems to stand in tension with Wittgenstein’s dictum that “philosophy leaves everything as it is.” However, I suggest the tension might not be as deep as it seems. I conclude by exploring whether the notion of “pop culture” is still a helpful conceptual tool. I suggest, tentatively, that the concept obscures as much as it illuminates. (shrink)

After the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, most states enacted new measures to constrain international mobility. By May 8th, 2020, more than 93% of the world’s population lived in states with special entry bans and more than three billion lived in countries whose borders were almost completely closed to non-citizens. Can such measures be justified? If so, would this undermine the open borders view? This paper examines these questions. It argues, first, that, although short-term entry bans and other similar measures (...) designed to protect public health can be justified, these bans need to be designed with a number of exemptions, in particular, for asylum seekers and refugees. Even in times of pandemic, completely closed borders are indefensible. It argues, second, that although extreme versions of the open borders position may have difficulty accepting this conclusion, other versions of the position can consistently justify special entry restrictions. (shrink)