Abstract

Nick Bostrom's simulation argument holds that, under certain conditions, it is highly probable that we are living in a computer simulation. This paper argues that this probabilistic inference fails to establish the rational grounds for the near-certainty it purports to justify. Three independent failures are identified, operating at distinct levels: physical constraints, structural incompatibility, and diagnostic inversion. The thermodynamic limits on computation — in particular Landauer's Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics — impose fundamental constraints on the number of simulations that can be simultaneously active, undermining the statistical dominance required by Bostrom. Additionally, the argument is shown to depend on the conjunction of three conditions: (R1) creators with sufficiently humanoid psychology to be motivated to run Ancestor-Simulations; (R2) capacity to run an astronomically large number of simulations; and (R3) operation within some form of computational physics. Formal analysis shows that no consistent configuration exists in which all three conditions can be simultaneously satisfied, rendering the intended probabilistic inference structurally untenable. Finally, it is argued that Bostrom commits a diagnostic inversion by treating technological capacity as a statistical multiplier for the probability of being simulated. This paper demonstrates that such capacity should instead be interpreted as ontological evidence regarding one's position in the hierarchy of realities: the greater the capacity to simulate, the less likely one is to be simulated.