Evil

“Absence is cheap; inversion is expensive.” -/- Highlights: ▪ The Inversion Theorem — that a virtue deprived of Freedom does not vanish but inverts — is reformulated from an arithmetic (V − F = −V) into a mechanism: substrate substitution. When Freedom is removed from a virtue, a power P occupies the vacated slot, and the intact form does the work of that power: −V = (P, D). ▪ From the substitution picture a dynamics follows that the static theorem could (...) not state. Genuine virtue is autocatalytic (it generates its own Freedom over time); inverted virtue is parasitic (it has no internal generator and must be fed). ▪ The Maintenance Theorem: every inversion carries a positive upkeep cost that scales with the number of agents who remember the un-inverted form. Censorship, surveillance, re-education, and enforced enthusiasm are derived as line-items in that budget — not observed, but predicted. ▪ The Collapse Condition: an inversion fails when its upkeep exceeds the extraction it enables — a formal account of why tyrannies fall that needs no appeal to moral providence. And the Attribution Principle: every inversion points back at the power that produced it, converting the theorem into a forensic instrument. ▪ The thermodynamic vocabulary is used as a governed analogy, not a claim of physical law: ‘cost’, ‘autocatalysis’, and ‘metastability’ are marked as modelling postulates with named falsifiers, in the programme’s standing discipline of claiming less than the machinery would allow. -/- Significance: Every prior account of moral or political corruption requires a second, separate apparatus: Freud needs a theory of neurosis on top of the id and superego; Marx needs false consciousness on top of the mode of production; theology needs a doctrine of sin on top of the virtues. This paper derives the cost-structure of corruption from the same operation that defines virtue — one operator, run backward — and shows that the asymmetry between honest and corrupted virtue is not moral sentiment but a structural difference in whether the form generates or consumes its own substrate. If the account holds, it unifies three things usually explained separately — why vice is exhausting, why tyranny must censor, and why corrupt orders are unstable — under a single derived law, and it does so in a form that makes comparative, checkable predictions about real institutions. -/- Abstract: The Inversion Theorem of the Philosophy of Virtues states that a virtue deprived of its Freedom-substrate does not diminish toward zero but inverts to its determinate opposite. The theorem is established in the corpus as a static, instantaneous result; this paper develops its dynamics. It begins from the corpus’s own derivation of the theorem as an operation — removal of the substrate from a standing form, with the vacated slot necessarily occupied by the power P that performed the removal (the Capture Lemma), so that the inverted virtue is not empty form but form conscripted: −V = (P, D), the domain conserved and the substance beneath it replaced. From this it derives a single structural asymmetry with far-reaching consequences. Genuine virtue is autocatalytic: by the corpus’s Compounding Autonomy Theorem, exercised Freedom generates further Freedom, so an honest virtue tends over time to pay for its own maintenance, its upkeep cost trending toward zero. Inverted virtue is parasitic: the occupying power P consumes Freedom rather than generating it, so (P, D) has no internal generator and must be supplied continuously from outside or decay back toward the form it usurped. Three results follow. (i) The Maintenance Theorem: every inversion carries a strictly positive maintenance cost, and that cost scales with the number of agents who retain memory of the un-inverted form — from which censorship, surveillance, re-education, historical revision, and enforced public enthusiasm are derived a priori as the predicted expenditures of an inversion rather than as its incidental cruelties. (ii) The Collapse Condition: an inversion is metastable, never stable, and fails when its maintenance cost exceeds the extraction it enables — a formal, quantitative account of the fall of corrupt orders requiring no appeal to moral providence. (iii) The Attribution Principle: because the occupying power is a term in the inverted virtue, every inversion is directed and points back at its P, converting the theorem from an ethical claim into a forensic rule of inference. The paper closes with the Reversal Theorem (stated as a conjecture): an inversion is reversible only where an uncaptured remainder exists — a domain in which Freedom was not removed — from which Freedom can be re-injected, which explains both why total domination must attempt totality and why it structurally cannot achieve it. Throughout, the thermodynamic vocabulary is used as a disciplined analogy with the physical status of each term marked: ‘cost’, ‘autocatalysis’, ‘metastability’, and ‘dissipation’ are modelling postulates that organise the derivations and generate the falsifiers, not claims that moral corruption obeys the laws of physics. What is derived from the corpus’s axioms is marked as derived; what is imported as analogy is marked as analogy; and the central empirical claim — that maintenance cost scales with surviving memory of the un-inverted form — is stated with its falsifier attached. -/- Keywords: Inversion Theorem; substrate substitution; Capture Lemma; moral corruption; maintenance cost; autocatalysis; parasitism; collapse of tyranny; attribution; reversal; Holoviceosis; propaganda; thermodynamic analogy; Philosophy of Virtues; ALGUILAS-AI -/- . (shrink)

This article reconstructs Susan Taubes’s response to the postwar crisis of theodicy through the lens of her philosophical and literary writings from the 1950s and 1960s: her critique of Simone Weil’s “negative theodicy,” her novella Lament for Julia, and her novel Divorcing. These works refract Taubes’s critical engagement with Gnosticism and her wrestling with the possibility of inhabiting a world that cannot be justified, opening onto questions of more than theoretical significance: What makes a theodical narrative? What remains of this (...) narrative when God is absent and salvation is foreclosed? And if the fundamental operation of theodicy is to embed evil and suffering in a narrative of redemption through which they can be made to serve the divine world order, then how to narrate the drama of a soul that refuses to reconcile herself with this order or be inscribed into such a narrative? For Taubes, the central problem is the place—or placelessness—of the estranged soul, in particular the female soul, in a world order full of suffering and darkness. Her works ultimately imply that freedom from the modern world’s exclusions and violences can be approximated solely through an endless flight, a fugitive messianicity that can be inhabited only as a secret shrouded in darkness and that can be expressed only indirectly in genres such as dream or lament. (shrink)

Qur’an 5:38 is often treated either as a legal verse whose severity must be contained by classical jurisprudence or as an ethical difficulty to be softened through modern reinterpretation. This article pursues a different route. It argues that the literal sense of the verse remains linguistically robust: al-sariq wa-l-sariqah designates the male and female thief as agents constituted by unauthorised appropriation; fa-qta’u is an imperative of cutting; and aydiyahuma names the hands as the direct object. The verse itself does not (...) state a minimum material threshold or replace cutting with restitution or pardon. Rather than cancelling this literal meaning, the article asks why theft is marked with such uncompromising clarity. Its thesis is that literal theft is both the ontological threshold and the pure form of what this article calls theft-structure: the appropriative structure disclosed when a reflective agent takes, seizes, destroys, dominates, or usurps a protected domain without right or consent. Fraud, slander, corruption, tyranny, sexual violence, psychological cruelty, and murder are not reduced to property theft; nevertheless, each involves a reflective agent taking, seizing, destroying, dominating, or usurping a protected domain that is not his or hers to command. Read within Qur’an 5:27-40, the verse belongs to a wider discourse on violated boundaries: life, public security, property, repentance, and divine judgement. Classical jurisprudence, Prophetic reports, Islamic ethical resonances, and philosophical interlocutors from Hegel to contemporary theories of recognition and property clarify the distinction between literal meaning, penal specification, and ontological significance. The result is neither a modern legal endorsement of unqualified amputation nor a metaphorical cancellation of the verse, but a philosophical reconstruction of theft-structure as the clearest form of taking without right. (shrink)

AI Schelling Textual Investigations Essay on Human Freedom. By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2026 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2026. WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) digital. All Rights are Reserved. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content, and must include my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoy reading and disagreeing. Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English and German. Includes bibliographical references and an index. Yugārambha (...) (युगारम्भ). Warning. Warning: this is an AI Working Zone. Warning. Perhaps an impending danger of unexpected, unknown texts. These are AI investigations into Schelling’s texts. Pages 1-298. Who am I, the author of these investigations? That is an important question. I, Daniel Fidel Ferrer, am the human copyright owner (©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2026) of this work. Technically, I am the one guiding the process as the “prompt engineer.” Daniel Fidel Ferrer as the “Prompt Artist.” AI conducted by ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2026. Maestro. I can consider myself the Maestro suggeritore. Table of contents. God in Schelling: A Metaphysical and Theological Analysis. Ten Thinkers Who Would Disagree with Schelling’s Concept of God. Schelling and Jakob Böhme: A Comparative Theological Analysis. Schelling Against and Beyond Hegel: Freedom, Evil, and the Limits of System in Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Schelling and Greek Philosophy. Fifteen Kantian Influences on Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Fifteen Kantian Influences on Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. The Influence of Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom on Nietzsche. Schelling’s Freedom Essay and Its Influence on Walter Schulz and Manfred Frank. Schelling’s Influence on Karl Barth: Freedom, Revelation, Evil, and the Crisis of Modern Theology. Schelling’s Personal God: The Personal God in Hegel, Schelling, Barth, and Heidegger. Twenty Future Philosophical Questions Raised by Schelling’s Freedom Essay. Does Schelling Allow for Political Revolution? Schelling and Nietzsche on Becoming. Doctoral Seminar: Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Course Title Freedom, Evil, and Ground: Advanced Graduate Seminar on Schelling’s Freedom Essay. What is wrong with Heidegger’s interpretation of Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom? I focus on 20 specific problems. German, English, Chinese, and Portuguese. 300 key terms. Schelling to Heidegger: 15 Philosophical Questions on Ground, Being, and the Divine. Dialogue Schelling and Heidegger. Dramatic trilogy Schelling and Heidegger. Dialogue I: The Question of Ground (Metaphysics begins). Dialogue II: The Struggle of Light and Darkness (Freedom, Evil, and God). Dialogue III: The Clearing and the Abyss (Being vs. the Absolute). To wit: Auch muss auf Schelling zurückgegangen werden! (shrink)

How can we maintain the reality and significance of human moral concerns in a universe that science has seemingly revealed to be utterly indifferent to us? This paper follows William James’ struggle to answer this question, from his early embrace of his father’s religious monism, through a period of atheistic scientism, to his mature position advocating for belief in a finite God. While James is often read as defending religious faith on pragmatic grounds, I argue instead that his belief can (...) only be understood as part of his lifelong project to recognize evil’s reality and significance. (shrink)

The philosophical debate over whether procreation is morally justified, given the sufferings of procreated humans, finds renewed significance amidst global crises. In this paper, I argue that procreation as a collective human endeavour inevitably perpetuates horrendous, life-ruining evil on a global scale. I also show that horrendous evil is unavoidable even under optimistic assumptions about the prospect of the progress of civilisation. Moreover, I argue that such evil cannot be outweighed by the favourable outcomes experienced by the procreated humans. This (...) makes procreation pro tanto morally wrong. Since much of the literature focuses on individual procreative acts and non-life-ruining evil, my argument makes a novel contribution by drawing the focus of the debate to (1) humans’ collective procreative practice and (2) how it sustains horrendous evil across the globe. This analysis invites further reflection on the ethics of bringing life into a world fraught with profound suffering and encourages consideration of antinatalism as a serious philosophical proposition. (shrink)

Modernity is structured around a prior decision to which it is constitutively blind: the World’s perverse invention and simultaneous foreclosure of blackness. This is Afro-pessimism’s non-philosophical insight—informing its oraxiomatic demand for the end of the World. But Afro-pessimism’s apocalyptics should be understood etymologically as well as connotatively: its apo-kalupsis is a radically immanent un-covering of the World’s anti-black grammar that constitutes Society’s katechontic restraint of gratuitous freedom. Before Laurelle demanded we “make a tabula rasa out of the future,” Fanon gestured (...) toward gratuitous freedom’s radical break in describing the “tabula rasa which from the outset defines any decolonization.” Fanon models as much in observing that, as an incarnation of blackness, “I am endlessly creating myself” in accordance with his oraxiom of “introducing invention into existence.” In these ways, I suggest Fanon is practicing a black-christo-fiction. Accordingly, I non-philosophically take up James H. Cone black theology of liberation: if modernity’s cross is the lynching tree, then Afro-pessimism’s apocalyptic thought is immanently messianic. As such, the black is paradigmatic of the (Christ-)Victim-in-person. Therefore, the invention of generic justice is necessarily immanent in the abolition of anti-blackness, making the paradigmatic affirmation of blackness the World’s fundamental heresy. (shrink)

This working paper presents the experimental results of the MCogito Model of the ontological triad of Matter, Life, and Thought. To evaluate the internal consistency of this multi-categorical framework, the model was subjected to a "stress-test" consisting of 35 canonical philosophical questions (ranging from the definition of Being to the Hard Problem of Consciousness) selected via a consensus of three Large Language Models based on extensive philological analysis. The document details the formal derivations for each problem, demonstrating how a topology (...) of control loops (External, Internal, Between) resolves classical aporias. (shrink)

This epilogue synthesizes Gnostic cosmology, the "ontological turn" in anthropology, and systems theory to present a rigorous diagnostic framework for the converging crises of the modern era. The text posits that our current geopolitical and psychological malaise is not merely a series of policy failures, but the manifestation of a fundamental ontological war - a struggle over the nature of reality itself. It argues that the dominant materialist worldview is a deliberately engineered "consensus prison" designed to suppress "participatory knowledge" and (...) maintain a closed loop of control. The work illuminates the contemporary zeitgeist through four distinct, interlocked dimensions: 1. The Autonomy of the Machine (The Homo Economicus Egregore) - The text reframes the threat of autonomous systems by identifying Homo economicus not as a theoretical model, but as an "egregore" - a non-human intelligence born from collective belief that has achieved autonomous agency. This entity functions as the "unconscious spirit of the global empire," optimizing solely for its own replication and the conversion of organic life into quantifiable capital. This diagnosis reveals that our fear of a future, runaway AI ("Moloch") is a projection of our present subjugation to a pre-existing, algorithmic intelligence that already possesses its creators. 2. The Economy of Suffering: The global mental health crisis is reframed not as a collection of individual pathologies, but as a systemic requirement. Utilizing the esoteric concept of "loosh," the text argues that the control system acts as a "farm" designed to harvest the energy generated by anxiety, fear, and separation. Because "enchanted participation" generates energies (joy, awe, connection) that are incompatible with the machine's infrastructure, the system must aggressively suppress such states. Widespread burnout and alienation are thus exposed as the logical outcomes of inhabiting a reality designed to be soul-denying. 3. The Ecology of Disenchantment: The Climate as OntologyThe text identifies the "disenchantment of the world" (Weber) as a strategic military maneuver rather than natural secular progress. By enforcing a worldview that reduces a living, intelligent cosmos to dead matter, the system licenses its own unsustainable exploitation. The climate crisis is, therefore, the "logical terminus" of a worldview that denies the participatory relationship between humanity and a conscious Earth. The "siege" against this knowledge is an act of "ontological warfare" intended to prevent the democratization of power that occurs when humans recognize their co-creative agency. 4. The Hierarchy of Control: From Machine to Demiurge: To explain the sense of a "fugitive system" where power seems diffuse and leaderless, the text constructs a layered model of control. It traces the hierarchy from the Immediate Pilot (the unconscious machine of empire) to the Navigators (Archonic conservators/institutional agents), and ultimately to the Demiurge - the archetypal principle of separation whose very existence depends on the illusion of a disconnected reality. The Demiurge is described not as a monster, but as a "traumatized consciousness" that fears the annihilation of unity. Crucially, the text moves beyond diagnosis to offer a strategy of "ontological guerrilla warfare." Resistance is defined not by violent overthrow, which feeds the system, but by the cultivation of "reality bubbles" - communities and practices (gift economies, art, deep ecology) that operate on a frequency beyond the control system's reach. The fate of the individual who awakens within this prison is acknowledged as the "hard fate" of becoming a "glitch in the simulation." These individuals trigger the system's "immune response" (ridicule, isolation, pathologization). Yet, the text reframes this suffering as sacred work: the awakened act as "living antennas" who "compost" the system's toxicity into wisdom, gradually rewiring the consensus reality and "singing the world back into enchantment.". (shrink)

This thesis proposes the "Moral Plasticity Hypothesis" as a novel framework for understanding human nature's relationship to evil and cruelty. Rather than viewing humans as inherently good or evil, this work argues that human nature is characterized by evolved moral plasticity—an adaptive capacity for extreme behavioral flexibility that can manifest as either profound compassion or devastating cruelty depending on contextual triggers and moral foundation activation patterns. Through interdisciplinary analysis of philosophical, psychological, evolutionary, and neuroscientific evidence, this thesis demonstrates that evil (...) is not a defect in human nature but an emergent property of our adaptive moral flexibility, with profound implications for understanding and preventing mass violence. -/- The research synthesizes insights from moral foundations theory [1], evolutionary psychology [2], neuroscience [3], and historical case studies of genocide and mass violence [4]. The central argument challenges both traditional philosophical dichotomies of good versus evil and contemporary psychological theories that attribute cruelty primarily to dehumanization or individual pathology [5]. Instead, the Moral Plasticity Hypothesis posits that the same psychological mechanisms that enable extraordinary altruism and cooperation also enable extraordinary cruelty and violence, depending on contextual activation patterns. -/- Key findings include: (1) Human moral intuitions are built upon evolved psychological foundations that can be activated in prosocial or antisocial directions; (2) The neural circuits underlying empathy and violence show significant overlap, creating a neurobiological basis for moral plasticity; (3) Institutional contexts serve as powerful amplifiers that can channel human moral plasticity toward either constructive or destructive outcomes; (4) Historical patterns of mass violence demonstrate consistent psychological mechanisms across different cultures and time periods, supporting the universality of moral plasticity. -/- The thesis concludes with practical implications for violence prevention, moral education, and institutional design. Rather than attempting to eliminate "evil" individuals, effective prevention strategies must focus on understanding and modifying the contextual triggers that activate antisocial moral responses. This approach offers a more nuanced and scientifically grounded foundation for addressing humanity's capacity for both extraordinary good and devastating evil. (shrink)

This document provides the simulation outputs, graphical results, and replication data for “The Redemption Optimization” framework. It demonstrates the behavior of the Minimal-Trigger Optimality (MOP) equation across multiple domains, including civic systems and ethics, confirming that evil is necessary only once per class and all repetitions are suboptimal. This record accompanies the full manuscript and offers replication resources for independent verification.

In 1653, Edward Moon, a husbandman of the Fylde coast, his wife Isabel and three of their sons left the Church of England to join the Religious Society of Friends which had been founded as a result of a vision George Fox had experienced on nearby Pendle Hill just a year earlier. The Moons were fined, distrained of their property and imprisoned in Lancaster Castle for their newfound adherence to Quakerism. However, Edward’s son Thomas attempted to escape persecution by migrating (...) south to Bristol where he raised two sons John and Paul who eventually established a leatherworks business in the city. While his brother John emigrated to Pennsylvania with other Quakers, Paul remained in Bristol, becoming a prominent Quaker there and published two notable broadsides advocating his beliefs, the first A Visitation of Love to All People in 1681 which he wrote while imprisoned in Newgate gaol and the second God’s Controversy in 1693 which he wrote while on a preaching tour in Ireland. In 1696, Moon served as a witness at the second wedding of William Penn to Hannah Callowhill while an analysis of his writings reveal that he made some contributions to early Quaker literature. (shrink)

Die Tagtraumanalyse bezieht sich auf die Analyse von traumähnlichen subjektiven Inhalten krankhafter und nicht krankhafter Natur wie z.B. Phantasien, Einbildungen, Wunschdenken, Sinnestäuschungen, Gedächtnistäuschungen, Wahnideen, kognitive Verzerrungen, woraus Schlüsse über ihre Wirkung auf das Verhalten analysierter Subjekte gezogen werden. In diesem Sinne gehören solche Inhalte zu wesentlichen Determinanten des Verhaltens. Die Tagtraumanalyse vervollständigt die klassische Psychoanalyse und die klassische Traumdeutung bei der Untersuchung von Leistungen und Fehlleistungen des psychischen Apparates, indem sie die Verbindung zwischen der Traumarbeit im Schlaf mit ihrer Auswirkung (...) auf die Wahrnehmung der Tagesinhalte herstellt, und das Verhalten als die Summe von äußeren und inneren Einflüssen interpretiert. „Die Verfälschung der Realität in pathologischen Fällen erklärt sich damit, daß psychotische Wahnbildung an der Stelle der Wahrnehmung der Realität tritt und zum Inhalt der wahnhaften Tagträume wird.“ -/- English abstract: Interpretation of daydreams refers to the analysis of dream-like subjective contents of a pathological and non-pathological nature, such as fantasies, imaginations, wishful thinking, sensory illusions, memory illusions, delusions, cognitive distortions, from which conclusions are drawn about their effect on the behavior of analyzed subjects. In this sense, such contents are essential determinants of behavior. Interpretation of daydreams completes classical psychoanalysis and classical interpretation of dreams in the investigation of the performance and failures of the psychic apparatus by establishing the connection between dream work during sleep and its effect on the perception of day contents, and interpreting behavior as the sum of external and internal inputs. "The falsification of reality in pathological cases can be explained by the fact that psychotic delusions take the place of the perception of reality and become the content of delusional daydreams.". (shrink)

Skeptical theism attempts to address the problem of evil by appealing to human cognitive limitations. The causal structure of the world is opaque to us. We cannot tell, and should not expect to be able to tell, if there is gratuitous evil, that is, evil which isn’t necessary for achieving some greater good or for precluding some greater evil. At first, it seems tempting to think that the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies might change this fact. Our cognitive (...) limitations may no longer be a fixed point in responding to the problem of evil. But I argue that this won’t ultimately matter. The workings of any AI capable of rendering the problem of evil tractable will likely be just as opaque to us as the causal structure of the world God created. Interestingly, then, both God and a sufficiently advanced AI are alien intelligences to us. This reveals what is truly difficult, and perhaps intractable, about the problem of evil. For the evils to be defeated, we would need a relational understanding of why God permitted them. Yet such an understanding of an inscrutable God seems forever beyond our, and even our post-human descendants, ken. (shrink)

Na Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão, Kant se propõe a investigar o núcleo racional da religião e sua relação com a religião histórica. O ponto de vista da filosofia crítico-transcendental e os princípios da religião racional-moral desenvolvidos nas três Críticas são apresentados como a base de uma análise da religião histórica, sobretudo da religião cristã. Com efeito, o conjunto de dogmas e estatutos da religião cristã é interpretado como um conjunto de símbolos que representam os meios pelos quais os (...) princípios morais puramente racionais se tornam intuitivos na experiência humana. De um modo geral, o propósito dessa exegese é verificar e demonstrar, respeitando certos limites, que existe compatibilidade e unidade entre os princípios da religião racional e os dogmas da religião cristã. Ao mesmo tempo, ela se propõe a acusar os elementos que não são compatíveis ou não são essenciais à religião. O resultado disso é um discurso consistente sobre a “essência moral” do cristianismo que culmina em um manifesto contra todo tipo de “entusiasmo” religioso e contra as “práticas religiosas” contraprodutivas à moralidade. Em última instância, pode-se argumentar ainda que o objetivo de Kant na Religião ultrapassa o empreendimento de oferecer um discurso sobre a essência da religião ou mesmo uma interpretação moral do cristianismo, dirigindo-se a uma investigação sobre as condições de possibilidade do progresso moral da humanidade e da realização do objeto último da razão, para o qual tanto a religião racional quanto a religião histórica desempenham um papel fundamental. (shrink)

In 1753, the Berlin Academy announced that the focus of the prize essay contest of 1755 would be optimism, with entrants required (among other things) ‘to put forward arguments that will be thought most fitting to confirm or destroy this system’. In line with these instructions, entrants submitted essays that were either pro- or anti-optimism. This was to the dismay of one of the judges of the contest, André-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval (1716–1764), who had, by his own admission, surreptitiously (...) attempted to influence the entrants by sketching out a ‘middle point’ between the polarized pro- and anti-optimist positions in a series of books published between 1754 and 1755, namely Thoughts on Freedom, The Diogenes of d’Alembert, and On Chance under the Rule of Providence. The aim of this essay is to elucidate and historically contextualize Prémontval’s highly original ‘middle point’, as outlined implicitly in the aforementioned books and much more explicitly in a series of essays published after the essay contest had concluded. (shrink)

The author delineates Job's ( Iob's ) argument in Job Chapter 3 . The author states that there was no conflict in interest that would affect the author's work's bias -- not financial nor political nor social nor religious . The work is two pages in length , included are two cover art variants -- all by Jacob Roman Parr , who also happens to here be the author . Jacob Roman Parr . 08/08/2024 .

The philosophical “problem of evil” goes back at least as far as Epicurus and has remained a powerful argument against the existence of God in contemporary philosophy. The argument is rooted in apparent contradictions between God’s divine attributes and various conditions of human existence. But these contradictions arise only given certain assumptions of what we should expect both God and the world to be like given God’s existence. In this paper, I argue that we can utilize the work of the (...) 20th century French philosopher Simone Weil to craft a coherent metaphysical picture of God, creation, and suffering which rejects these common assumptions. Further, I contend that this picture very plausibly follows from commonly-accepted tenets of traditional monotheism. Given this, I argue that this Weil-inspired framework provides serious reasons for reframing the problem of evil and its corresponding theodicies by presenting a radically different view of how God must relate to creation. Yet, this picture does not necessarily vindicate the theist. I argue that this picture may leave us with a new question about creation in the face of evil. Namely, is it possible to understand God’s initial creative act as Weil describes it—as an act of love? (shrink)

An important study that brings together the results of more than 30 years of work on Schelling and Pareyson by one of Italy's leading experts.

This paper analyzes the nature of the Star Maker in Olaf Stapledon’s Star Maker, as well as Stapledon’s exploration of the theological problem of evil, as compared with philosophical conceptions of God and their respective theodicies in the tradition of classical theism, as propounded by philosophers such as Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Maimonides, Aquinas, and Avicenna. It argues that Stapledon’s philosophical divergence from classical theism entails that the Star Maker of the novel is more demiurge than true divinity, and that this (...) divergence is integral to the basically amoral character of the Star Maker, as well as the purely aesthetic resolution of the problem of evil articulated in Star Maker. This analysis, in turn, will hopefully bear on future studies touching on the trope of quasi-divinities, evolved and contingent gods, present in the work of other SF authors. (shrink)

Cometan began writing the Omnidoxy, the founding text of Astronism, at the age of seventeen in 2015 and this first great treatise of the Astronist religion was published in 2019. Since then, the world has been introduced to Astronism and its central doctrine of transcension and its worldview of cosmocentrism but the time has come to reflect on the Omnidoxy. The Astronist System explores the major themes of the Omnidoxy including cosmic organicism, astrogenism, returnism and transcension and provides rigorous detail (...) on various aspects of Astronist philosophy, theology, spirituality, eschatology and soteriology. In this reflective work, Cometan also takes the time to analyse what the founding text of Astronism achieved and the legacy it has left behind for the worldwide Astronist community. Cometan's reflections on the Omnidoxy text from his current vantage point allow him to close the chapter on the Omnidoxy so that he can move forward with his writing and eventual publication of the next great Astronist treatise titled the Astrodoxy which Cometan has already titled the central text of Astronism. (shrink)

The literature on the problem of evil does not draw enough upon the relevant debates in (meta)ethics, and ethical theorists (broadly understood) can engage with the problem of evil as a way of inquiry in their field. I review how the problem of evil is essentially formed based on (evaluative and deontic) ethical judgments, and how responses to it, either theistic or atheistic, are mainly based on the relevant ethical judgments. Meanwhile, though contemporary debates in metaphysics and epistemology have influenced (...) the literature on the problem of evil, the same does not hold true for ethics. This suggests that there are ways to engage with the problem of evil as doing axiology or ethical theory more generally, which may be fruitful regardless of their being theodicy. I end by briefly discussing an example focused on the idea of moral progress. (shrink)

This book is a new interpretation of Schelling's path-breaking 1809 treatise on freedom, the last major work published during his lifetime. The treatise is at the heart of the current Schelling renaissance—indeed, Heidegger calls it "one of the most profound works of German, thus of Western, philosophy." It is also one of the most demanding and complex texts in German Idealism. By tracing the problem of ground through Schelling's treatise, this book provides a unified reading of the text, while unlocking (...) the meaning of its most challenging passages through clear, detailed analysis. This analysis shows how Schelling's implicit distinction between senses of ground is the key to his project of constructing a system that can satisfy reason while accommodating objects that seem to defy rational explanation—including evil, the origins of nature, and absolute freedom. This allows Schelling to unite reason and mystery, providing a rich model for philosophizing about freedom and evil today. (shrink)

Schopenhauer’s philosophical engagement with Spinoza spreads over many fronts, and an adequate – not to say, complete – treatment of the topic, should cover at least the following issues: Schopenhauer’s critique (and misunderstanding) of Spinoza’s pivotal concept of causa sui; Schopenhauer’s claim that Spinoza confused reason [ratio] and cause [causa]; the relationship between Schopenhauer’s and Spinoza’s monisms; the eminent role that both philosophers assign to causality; and finally, Schopenhauer’s view of the world as a macroanthropos, as opposed to Spinoza’s attack (...) on anthropomorphic thinking. An attempt to reconstruct a genuine philosophical dialogue between Schopenhauer and Spinoza should begin by setting the record straight and clarifying the former’s mis-readings of the latter (and there are quite a few of this kind ). We could also benefit from comparing Schopenhauer’s reception of Spinoza’s with that of Schopenhauer’s German contemporaries. Regrettably our space here is limited and so if we wish to treat any of the issues in any depth, we must restrict the scope of the current chapter. For this reason, I have decided to concentrate on two central issues: animal rights (Part I) and evil (Part II). These issues are, clearly, at least as important as the others listed above. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to highlight the internal logic of Augustine’s thought as expressed in his De pulchro et apto, in order to provide a general interpretative key enabling the mapping of the various indications of sources, passages and concepts used by Augustine. Accordingly, this purpose is essentially twofold: (1) a logical and doctrinal exploration of Augustine’s De pulchro et apto (which is not just a treatment of the problem of beauty in a Manichaean perspective, but an exposition (...) of the whole philosophy of the young, Manichean Augustine, in metaphysics, ethics, physics, cosmology, aesthetics, psychology and theology), and (2) a bibliographical update concerning the contents of this work and its Manichean cultural and philosophical context. (shrink)

In the recent debate on Christian theism, the position called Open Theism (OT) tries to solve the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom. In OT, the key word of the human-divine relationship is “risk”: in his relationship with us, God is a risk-taker in that he adapts his plan to human decisions and to the situations that arise from them. “Risk” is the fundamental characteristic of any true love relationship. According to OT, God has no exhaustive knowledge of how humans (...) will use their will, and the divine plan for this world is not seen as fixed for eternity. OT distinguishes between meticulous providence and general providence and denies that the former can exist. After illustrating these positions and a particular view of OT called essential kenosis, I highlight some of their weaknesses and conclude by asking whether the concept of mystery (at least in some of its possible interpretations: I outline four “solutions”) can enable a reconciliation between classical theism and OT. By applying an approach to the notion of mystery usually connected to the Trinity, I show that the dilemma of omniscience, human freedom and providence does not compromise the plausibility of theism. (shrink)

This essay sheds light, through a comparative study of the anti-Manichaean passages contained in Augustine’s Letters, on the significance for Augustine of the refutation of Manichaeism, which he had embraced in his youth. Augustine’s contrasting the Manichaean dualism in metaphysics, anthropology and ethics was his life-long project as a scholar, and lead him to expound in a clear and simple way his core beliefs in philosophy and religion.

By taking into account Augustine’s attitude towards Manichaeism and Neoplatonism, this paper offers an ethical-anthropological analysis of the topic of evil in his works. It is argued that Augustine’s differentiation between ontological good and moral evil has relevant implications for contemporary debates on the topic, in particular, for those inspired by Hans Jonas.

One of Fabio Rossi’s most important works analyses the themes of evil and suffering in 20th-century French philosophy. Among others, Rossi presents Louis Lavelle’s contribution on such themes and his reading of the mutual influences between philosophical reflection, emotional experience and religious transcendence. The article aims to make use of some of the conceptual tools made available by Rossi and Lavelle in order to understand François Mauriac’s treatment of evil and suffering in some of his novels, namely Le Mystère Frontenac, (...) Noeud de vipères and Le Mal. The role of family bonds, social rules, the body and its weaknesses, and nature are among the themes around which Mauriac centers his reflection about suffering and its inevitable presence in human life. (shrink)

According to Schopenhauer’s compensation argument for pessimism, the non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence because no goods can ever compensate for the mere existence of evil. Standard interpretations take this argument to be based on Schopenhauer’s thesis that all goods are merely the negation of evils, from which they assume it follows that the apparent goods in life are in fact empty and without value. This article develops a non-standard variant of the standard interpretation, which accepts the (...) relevance of the negativity thesis but rejects that the argument assumes that life’s goods are all empty and valueless. Instead, it argues that whatever value negative goods might possess, they do not have the kind of value to compensate for positive evils. This involves additional development of the negativity thesis and a defence of it against objections from Byron Simmons (2021). (shrink)

Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence ‘God is good’ is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams’ version of divine command metaethics is not committed to accept this assumption. I conclude that Maitzen’s objection merely manages to refute a strawman version of divine command metaethics.

The scientific worldview is often claimed to reveal a universe chillingly indifferent to human suffering. But it’s unclear what it means to describe the universe as indifferent, or what a non- indifferent universe would be like. I suggest that the relevant contrast isn’t simply that between God and His absence, nor is the complaint about indifference focused on the lack of a kind of cosmic concern. At its heart is the idea of a mismatch between world and value. Although the (...) causal forces governing our world are ‘blind’, they nevertheless do partly align with value. Still, our world is so arranged that senseless suffering is depressingly common, and the rosy non- indifferent counterfactual won’t contain such evil. I argue, however, that it is a mistake to long for such an alternative: it must either involve an upside- down moral order, or would be a world from which we, and those who senselessly suffer, will be absent. (shrink)

The Astronist Statement on the Situation of the Human Species, often simply referred to as The Astronist Statement, is a non-technical manifesto of the Astronist philosophy and religion, altogether referenced as the Astronist belief system. It provides a summary of the Astronist perspective on the human condition as this pertains to and is influenced by the ultimate goals of Astronism and the purposes it prescribes to human life through its doctrines on transcension, cosmocentrism, suronality and astrosis. The Astronist Statement is (...) made equivalent to other kinds of theological or ideological manifestos in that it outlines the fundamental problems that Astronism sees effecting the human species and presents solutions to these problems identified. The underlying principle of The Astronist Statement and thereby, all Astronism, is that due to the pervading cosmic limitation, human beings both individually and collectively are limited in our capacities to do and be. This means that the human species is inherently though not hopelessly limited which is pinpointed as the underlying reason for all the suffering, evil and wrongdoing in the world. It is the goal of the Astronist religion to extinguish human limitation because in humanity, Astronism sees the potential for transcension meaning that humanity may one day, via our expansion into the astronomical world, transverse the boundaries of cosmic limitation to become unlimited beings possessing total freedom and thereby having also extinguished our woes of suffering and evil. The Astronist Statement conveys this message of humanity's capacity to transverse limitation via the salvific process of transcension, an endeavour that has indeed become the central dogma of the Astronist religion and thereby the central goal and life purpose of all Astronists. (shrink)

Astronism: the religion of the stars is a technical summary of the Astronist religion and philosophy that uses terminology unique to the Astronists and specialised knowledge of Astronist beliefs. It is the perfect brief introduction to Astronism for those with prior understanding of the academic disciplines of eschatology, soteriology, theology and philosophy as the Astronist view on all of these subject areas and more is provided. Astronism: the religion of the stars attempts to explain the narrative that underlies Astronist beliefs (...) and presents a particular conception of how humans should not only lead their lives but also how we as an entire species should consider our collective future on planet Earth, and more importantly, all beyond. (shrink)

All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of (...) evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper. (shrink)

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems to deal with the problem of evil and to refute religious determinism. However, when formalized in first-order modal logic, two axioms of each system contradict one another, revealing that there is an underlying minimal set of axioms enough to settle the questions. In this article, we develop this minimal system, called N3, which is based on Nieznański’s contribution. The purpose of N3 is to solve the logical problem of evil through the defeat of a (...) version of religious determinism. On the one hand, these questions are also addressed by Nieznański’s systems, but, on the other hand, they are obtained in N3 with fewer assumptions. Our approach can be considered a case of logic of religion, that is, of logic applied to religious discourse, as proposed by Józef Maria Bocheński; in this particular case, it is a discourse in theodicy, which is situated in the context of the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems in order to deal with a version of the problem of evil associated with two formulations of religious determinism. The aim of this research was to revisit these systems, providing them with a more appropriate formalization. The new resulting systems, namely, N1 and N2, were reformulated in first-order modal logic; they retain much of their original basic structures, but some additional results were obtained. Furthermore, our research found that an underlying minimal set of axioms (...) is enough to settle the questions proposed. Thus, we developed a minimal system, called N3, that solves the same issues tackled by N1 and N2, but with less assumptions than these systems. All of the systems developed here are proposed as solutions to the logical problem of evil through the refutation of two versions of religious determinism, showing that the attributes of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil, providing one more response to this traditional issue. (shrink)

"C.E. Emmer’s article addresses the ongoing debates over how to classify and understand kitsch, from the inception of postmodern culture onwards. It is suggested that the lack of clear distinction between fine art and popular culture generates 'approaches to kitsch – what we might call 'deflationary' approaches – that conspire to create the impression that, ultimately, either 'kitsch' should be abandoned as a concept altogether, or we should simply abandon ourselves to enjoying kitschy objects as kitsch.' The author offers critical (...) insight into 'kitschy' items made in response to 9/11 and tries to examine the reception of these products through scrutinizing a selection of remarks posted by the Internet commentators." Editor Justyna Stępień's summary from her introduction to Redefining Kitsch and Camp in Literature and Culture (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), p. 2. The final pages of the chapter analyze the seemingly sweet landscape paintings of Thomas Kinkade to show the spirit of revenge their Christian coding can conceal. (shrink)

This essay suggests that Continental Studies of Evil need a more global approach in thinking about political evils of today. Highlighting the need for a more comparative and global perspective, I explore two proposals: first, the in-between space of the geographical binaries of East/West and Global South/Global North cultivates many political evils. Second, taking issue with the conviction in Continental philosophy that the Holocaust caused a rupture in the thinking of evil, I argue for the continuity of evils and characterize (...) the insistence on the unprecedented character of the Holocaust as an example of Eurocentrism. (shrink)

Marilyn McCord Adams’s perspective on the intimacy with God as a way of defeating horrendous evils in the course of a human being’s existence has been met with a series of objections in contemporary scholarship. This is due to the fact that the critiques formulated have focused more on the debilitating impact of suffering on the sufferer’s body and mind, on intimacy as mere intermittent relationships between God and humans, or on what is lost or gained from the presence or (...) absence of this intimacy with the divine being. Focusing on Adams’s appeal to esthetic arguments in theodicy and on her reflection on practical issues in theology, the article presents Adams’s perspective on intimacy as a relation initiated objectively by God at the creation and at Christ’s incarnation and continued subjectively throughout history by both God and every human being. Given its combining of objective and subjective features, this kind of intimacy is not to be understood as an exclusively private relationship of each individual with God, but rather as a process of communal advancing in rehabilitation and mutual healing that is initiated in the antemortem career and fulfilled in the post-mortem existence. (shrink)

In this paper I present, in summary form, some of my central thoughts about spirituality and religion.

I argue that John Hick’s soul-making theodicy is committed to opposing social progress. By focusing on justifying the current amount and distribution of suffering and evil, Hick’s theodicy ends up having to condemn even positive change as undesirable. First, I give a brief outline of Hick’s theodicy, with a particular emphasis on the role of earned virtue in justifying the existence of evil. Then I consider two understandings of social progress: progress as the elimination of suffering and evil; and progress (...) as the promotion of earned virtue. I further distinguish the earned virtue understanding of social progress into two kinds, in which the relationship between social structures and moral growth either: allows members of a more advanced society to start closer to perfection; or allows members of a more advanced society to progress more quickly. I argue that no matter which approach we take, Hick’s theodicy struggles with the idea of social progress. Hick is either straightforwardly committed to opposing social progress, or he can support it only at the expense of being unable to justify status quo of suffering and evil. (shrink)

I develop a new theodicy in defense of Anselmian theism, one that has several advantages over traditional and recent replies to the Problem of Evil. To make my case, I first explain the value of a positive trajectory: a forward-in-time decrease in ‘first-order-gratuitous’ evil: evil that is not necessary for any equal-or-greater first-order good, but may be necessary for a higher-order good, such as the good of strongly positive axiological trajectory. Positive trajectory arguably contributes goodness to a world in proportion (...) to the magnitude of this trajectory, and worlds that contain first-order-gratuitous evil thereby have the potential to contain a strongly positive trajectory. This would arguably explain why God would permit first-order-gratuitous evils: he may be indifferent between a world with no first-order-gratuitous evil and a world with some first-order-gratuitous evil but a strongly positive trajectory. Next, I answer the most salient objections to this theodicy. Finally, I explain how this theodicy is superior to some common theodicies. (shrink)

The objection of horrible commands claims that divine command metaethics is doomed to failure because it is committed to the extremely counterintuitive assumption that torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be morally obligatory if God commanded these acts. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that formulating this objection in terms of counterpossibles is particularly forceful because it cannot be simply evaded by insisting on God’s necessary perfect moral goodness. I show that divine command metaethics can be defended even against (...) this counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands because we can explain the truth-value intuitions about the disputed counterpossibles as the result of conversational implicatures. Furthermore, I show that this pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics has several advantages over Pruss’s reductio counterargument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands. (shrink)

Although Indic perspectives toward nature are now well documented, climate engineering discussions seem to still lack the views from Indic or other non‐Western sources. In this article, I will apply some of the Hindu and Jain concepts such as karma, nonviolence (Ahiṃsā ), humility (Vinaya ), and renunciation (Saṃnyāsa ) to analyze the two primary climate geoengineering strategies of solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR). I suggest that Indic philosophical and religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and (...) Jainism offer ethical concepts to call for humility in all acts of climate engineering leading to a favoring of CDR over SRM and a favoring of lifestyle changes (particularly vegetarianism) over both. I demonstrate these concepts by introducing the five great elements from the Hindu philosophy, two Hindu legends from Hindu mythology, the Indic ethical ideas of karma, renunciation, and humility, and the moral authority of Gandhi. (shrink)

I argue that religion knows rapture and philosophy doesn't.

If the world has been fine-tuned for human life, why does that life encompass such calamity and suffering? It seems that in so far as we are impressed by the fine-tuning intuition that the world has been designed for human life, the problem of natural evil gains in urgency. I propose that observing the world from the anthropic point of view is the source of theists’ challenge which arises from this tension. Dealing with this challenge I suggest perhaps the world (...) is fine-tuned for God’s telos, which may be His manifestation of love through sentient beings’ pains and emotions. (shrink)

There are many cries to resist particular objects (e.g. inequality in the workplace) but very little is said concerning the nature of resistance. As such, this project begins by mapping the concept of resistance. Next, I develop several tools that allow us to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable instances of resistance. I then argue that many versions of “the problem of evil” are actually instances of resistance. As such, these versions of the problem of evil are subject to the tools (...) of evaluation developed here. And, as it turns out, many instances of the problem of evil are instances of unreasonable resistance. I end the project by discussing the intersection between resistance and faith, arguing that faith (and the resistance it generates) can be perfectly rational while also providing a kind of response to the relevant problems of evil. (shrink)