Discrimination

According to the causal account of algorithmic fairness, disparities in error rates across socially salient groups are unfair only if they are causally explained by group membership. This paper argues that the causal account of algorithmic fairness fails to correctly label cases of algorithmic redlining as instances of algorithmic unfairness. Because these are canonical cases of algorithmic unfairness, the causal account should be rejected. We suggest that the fundamental error made by proponents of the causal account is to conflate algorithmic (...) unfairness and algorithmic discrimination. Algorithmic unfairness can manifest as direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, or evidentiary unfairness. The causal accounts errs in recognizing only the first category. (shrink)

In _Identity Politics: Left and Right_, Nils Holtug brings remarkable clarity to a “particularly slippery” set of phenomena. Whether you embrace the banner of identity politics or reject it, you’ll find much to excite and challenge you in this wonderful work. With chapters dedicated to the demarcation, justification, and downstream consequences of identity politics (chaps. 1, 2, 3, and 9) and to specific topics including affirmative action (chap. 4), cultural appropriation (chap. 5), cancel culture (chap. 6), deplatforming and statue removal (...) (chap. 7), and even white supremacy (chap. 8), this comprehensive, careful, and insightful text should be required reading for anyone hoping to learn more about, or weigh in on, this vexed collection of issues. (shrink)

On the standard definition of discrimination, someone is discriminated against when two conditions are satisfied: a comparative one – being treated worse than a comparable individual – and a causal one – being treated worse because of a protected characteristic such as race or gender. I argue that the comparative condition is unnecessary. On any reasonable interpretation, the standard definition of discrimination is nearly coextensive with a purely causal definition that involves no interpersonal comparison. Where the two concepts diverge, the (...) cases in question are rare and morally ambiguous. I further argue that the causal concept should replace the standard concept on pragmatic grounds: it is easier to measure empirically, simpler in its application, and less burdensome for claimants in court. (shrink)

This paper examines how recent anti-discrimination trends foster discrimination. The identification of discrimination, which inherently should be accompanied by clear evidence, is being done easily. Because of this, instances where it leads to social sanctions decrease, causing a situation where serious discrimination persists. The concept of a "discriminator (racist/sexist, etc.)" is also used all too lightly. "Non-debate" is unjust as a methodology, and it has turned into an excuse for those who have identified something as discrimination but cannot counterargue. The (...) concept of coming out is also neglected. Discrimination is a serious concept and should not be treated lightly. For the realization of anti-discrimination, understanding of the concept and logical thinking skills are indispensable. For the realization of sustainable anti-discrimination rather than dependent on specific individuals, unjust anti-discrimination must be thoroughly criticized, and if necessary, excluded. (shrink)

This paper examines the importance of redundancy in a community, and ethical issues about its exploitation and restriction. Redundancy acts not only as a buffer against damage but also relates to value creation. On the other hand, if redundancy is restricted, it becomes more prone to further restriction. Excessive redundancy in the present generation can cause restrictions for future generations. This is exploitation and must possess a valid basis. The failures in the youth of the young are a symbol of (...) redundancy that will be restricted first of all. Serious failures damage redundancy. Similar to future restrictions, restrictions in the present require a valid basis. (shrink)

This paper argues that a structural critique developed in disability ethics generalizes beyond reproductive selection. The wrong is not forecasting as such, but projectedvalue authorization (PVA): the conditioning of basic standing on a forecast of future contribution. The paper distinguishes PVA from legitimate competence-based selection, places PVA on a configurativeness scale across institutional domains, and examines immigration, hiring, welfare eligibility, university admissions, and platform governance. It then develops a presumption-and-protect alternative grounded in disability-rights legal architecture: standing is presumed, support is (...) calibrated, and defeasance is narrow, decision-specific, and revisable. The central claim is that institutions may forecast, but forecasts must not determine basic standing. (shrink)

This report introduces the concept of Systemic Immunity, defined as the structural capacity of institutions to absorb challenge while preserving organisational continuity through the neutralisation of accountability mechanisms. Drawing on evidence across education, healthcare, and public administration, the analysis demonstrates that institutional failure does not necessarily generate correction or reform. Instead, systems remain stable because failure is rendered structurally non disruptive at the organisational level. Harm remains visible and often severe at the individual level, yet the institution itself is insulated (...) from the forms of consequence that would otherwise compel adaptation. -/- The report argues that systemic immunity emerges through the combined operation of procedural thresholds, risk transfer, liability without accountability, administrative fragmentation, and institutional delay. Together, these mechanisms allow challenge to be absorbed, responsibility to be diffused, and consequence to be deferred, thereby preserving systemic stability even under sustained evidence of dysfunction. -/- This paper extends the Equilibrium Ledger research programme by identifying the persistence mechanism that explains why institutional systems remain stable despite repeated evidence of exclusion, harm production, and operational failure. It situates systemic immunity as a central explanatory structure within a wider analytical framework concerned with institutional governance, disability law, neurodivergent cognition, procedural exclusion, and access to rights. -/- Related works within the Equilibrium Ledger Programme include The Grassini Grimaldi Model of Institutional Filtering (Revised and Expanded Edition); Procedural Gatekeeping and Disability in Doctoral Admissions; Competence Standards versus Methods of Demonstrating Competence in Doctoral Admissions; The Collapse of Enforcement under the Equality Act in Education; The Missing Minds: Spike Profiles, Cognitive Exclusion, and the Societal Cost of Filtering Neurodivergent Intelligence from Higher Education; Two Systems, One Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Doctoral Admissions Responses to a Disabled Applicant with a Spike Profile; and The Architecture Confirmed: How the Sector’s Own Documents Prove Every Mechanism of the Grassini Grimaldi Model. Collectively, these works develop a unified analytical framework for understanding structural exclusion, institutional persistence, and the systemic management of cognitive difference within contemporary governance systems. (shrink)

Many North American and British universities have recently prohibited all sexual and romantic relationships between students and teachers, even when they are consensual. This paper shows that such strict prohibitions are difficult to justify. While some aspects of the relationships they target may be troubling, they are usually sufficiently mitigated by standard anti-harassment policies. Common objections to such relationships, based on anti-discrimination or fiduciary law also fail to show that they are impermissible, as they rely on unwarranted empirical assumptions or (...) on an unjustified petition of principle regarding the students’ interests. (shrink)

This paper develops the concept of Eigenzeit as an analytical instrument for investigating neurodivergent life realities. Eigenzeit is neither a concept generated by nor specific to neurodivergence, but arises from prior boundary work on the ontology of decision, responsibility, and world-binding. Eigenzeit denotes the non-delegable instantiation of world-time in action: that form of time in which world is bound at all, carried, and irreversibly co-enacted. Time is not understood here as an ordering category or a logic of deadlines, but as (...) the temporal dimension of enacted world-binding—as the structural context of world-capability. On the basis of this general conception, the paper shows why autistic and ADHD biographies in particular are systematically pushed into overload, breakdown, and dependency within modern institutions. Central societal systems—administration, labour markets, education, social law—operate in time- and structure-administrative regimes that presuppose world-binding while simultaneously undermining it: through standardisation, fragmentation, the simulation of responsibility, and the replacement of real binding by procedures. Deadlines, pacing, and file-based formality are not the core problem here, but symptoms of a deeper deficit of world-capability. Neurodivergence is thus not treated as a deficit, but as a different cost and binding structure of world-relation, in which this structural inoperability becomes visible early and with particular sharpness. Autistic integrity is often characterised by high binding strictness and low capacity for simulation vis-à-vis externally imposed world-regimes; ADHD frequently exhibits a dynamic in which fragmented, externally steered contexts do not allow for stable world-binding. Many phenomena commonly read as “symptoms”—exhaustion, breakdown, avoidance, dysfunctional adaptation—can therefore be reconstructed as Eigenzeit collapse: as the temporal-structural consequence of a prior withdrawal of world-binding. In continuity with They Cannot Understand, Eigenzeit is understood as a specification of the concepts of incommensurability, inoperability, and non-translatability. The paper shifts the focus away from temporal adaptation and therapeutic normalisation toward the question of under what conditions world remains bindable at all—and why the systematic withdrawal of this capacity destabilises not only neurodivergent existences, but the ontological viability of social reality itself. (shrink)

People working on the ethics of discrimination have struggled with accounting for a kind of moral wrongdoing that is thought to be present in all instances of wrongful discrimination. So far, any moral wrong claimed to be characteristic of wrongful discrimination in this way has failed to generalize to all cases of wrongful discrimination, moving many to abandon the idea that wrongful discrimination is normatively distinct at all. Motivated by this situation, we propose to abandon the assumption that the common (...) moral wrong of wrongful discrimination must be a first-order moral wrong. Instead, we argue that the common wrong of discrimination is a normative mistake in a more general sense, namely the flaw of being biased. Drawing on Thomas Kelly’s (2022) recent work on bias, we show that this account provides a unified and plausible answer to the question of what makes wrongful discrimination characteristically morally wrong, while being able to accommodate the plurality of moral considerations at play in wrongful discrimination. (shrink)

Sometimes I am with a group of people but feel socially distant because their activities make me think, ‘I don't belong here!’ However, the distance between me and them is not created by intentional acts of exclusion. It stems from my non-participation in their chosen activities—the things other members of the in-group do for fun—for personal reasons. Although we share a lot in common, such as being supporters of the same football club, staff at the same institution, students at the (...) same university or having shared religious beliefs, we differ in the things we do for fun; not all of us are smokers, not all of us drink beer/alcohol, and not all of us speak the same languages. The feeling of social distance that one experiences when excluded from activities enjoyed by members of one's in-group is a form of discrimination. In this perspective paper, I expose this type of discrimination as acceptable within in-groups for two reasons: (1) the general lack of discriminatory intentions towards victims and (2) the spatial situatedness of the discriminatory activities. I call this acceptable type of discrimination ‘Groupcism’. I argue that groupcism is regarded as an acceptable form of discrimination not primarily because of the two reasons stated above, but because of another two: (1) other activities that the victims of groupcism share with the members of their in-group; and (2) the agency to opt in and out of the sub-group activities that engender groupcism. (shrink)

Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that (...) is more liberal and egalitarian across ages than the status quo. More specifically, I show that granting storable pensions in all life stages - youth, middle and old age - promotes liberty and reduces lifetime inequality. Writers on age group and longevity justice often overlook the extent to which liberal lifetime equality can supply insightful arguments against inequality across ages. These call for a policy that gives each age group the freedom to draw a storable pension. I call that policy "freetirement". (shrink)

The Rashomon set of equally-good models promises less discriminatory algorithms, reduced outcome homogenization, and fairer decisions through model ensembles or reconciliation. However, we argue from the perspective of allocation multiplicity that these promises may remain unfulfilled. When there are more qualified candidates than resources available, many different allocations of scarce resources can achieve the same utility. This space of equal-utility allocations may not be faithfully reflected by the Rashomon set, as we show in a case study of healthcare allocations. We (...) attribute these unfulfilled promises to several factors: limitations in empirical methods for sampling from the Rashomon set, the standard practice of deterministically selecting individuals with the lowest risk, and structural biases that cause all equally-good models to view some qualified individuals as inherently risky. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, and this obligation can be defeated only when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

According to typical accounts of prejudice, somebody holding a prejudiced belief is epistemically culpable for doing so (Fricker 2007, 36). However, a prejudice is usually also understood as being more than just a prejudgement. A prejudgement only becomes a prejudice if it is retained in the face of “new knowledge… that would unseat it” (Allport 1954, 9; see also Fricker 2007, 33-4). In his recent book, Prejudice, Endre Begby as argued that the standard view of prejudice just outlined is false (...) (Begby 2023a, 5). According to Bebgy the ordinary way of thinking about prejudice equivocates between an extensional characterisation of prejudice (defining it through prototypical exemplars) and an intensional one (defining prejudice in terms of characteristic errors of reasoning) (Begby2021, 61-2) and these two ways of characterising prejudice are in tension with one another. If we characterise prejudice in extensional terms then we find that somebody can be perfectly justified in holding a prejudiced belief (Begby 2021, 76). Moreover, they might be justified in retaining their prejudiced belief when presented with contrary evidence after they have acquired their belief (Begby 2021, 77-94). In this paper, I will argue that although it is true that classic accounts of prejudice sometimes illuminate the notion by presenting examples of beliefs without saying anything about how they were acquired or maintained, the standard account is nonetheless not committed to any inconsistency and is the correct account of prejudice. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of discrimination distinguish the question of what discrimination is from the question of its wrongfulness. This article addresses these two questions in the context of anti-homeless hostile design of public spaces. Regarding the first question, all forms of anti-homeless hostile design amount to discrimination, with typical cases (e.g., anti-homeless spikes or benches) being direct discrimination, but with some cases (e.g., CCTV not intended to target the homeless) being indirect discrimination. Regarding the second question, it is argued that all (...) major accounts of the wrongness of discrimination identify the usual, directly discriminatory hostile design as wrongful on account of its harmful or disrespectful character. Most accounts also consider the less common indirectly discriminatory hostile design to be possibly wrongful, especially given the severe disadvantages faced by the homeless in contemporary cities. (shrink)

I consider statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness from the perspective of the ideals of fairness to which these criteria are committed. I distinguish and describe three theoretical roles such ideals might play. The usefulness of this program is illustrated by taking Base Rate Tracking and its ratio variant as a case study. I identify and compare the ideals of these two criteria, then consider them in each of the aforementioned three roles for ideals. This ideals program may present a way (...) forward in the normative evaluation of candidate statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness. (shrink)

One prominent criticism of luck egalitarianism is that it requires either shameful revelations or otherwise problematic declarations by the state toward those who have had bad brute luck. Relational egalitarianism, by contrast, is portrayed as an alternative that requires no such revelations or declarations. I argue that this is false. Relational equality requires the state to draft anti-discrimination laws for both state and private action. The ideal of relational egalitarianism requires these laws to be asymmetric, that is to allow affirmative (...) action for disadvantaged groups while prohibiting affirmative action for advantaged groups. Hence, the state needs to make a public declaration on which groups are privileged and which are underprivileged; and individuals need to reveal whether they belong to groups officially declared underprivileged. These declarations are no more problematic in this case than in the case of luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

In this paper, we draw on Alfred Schutz’s theoretical framework to better understand how oppression is enacted through discriminatory acts. By closely examining the role of typifications and relevances in our experience of others, and by supplementing this analysis with contemporary social scientific resources, we argue that a Schutzian perspective on oppression yields important phenomenological insights. We do this in three key steps. Firstly, we contextualise _Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World_ within Schutz’s broader body of work, (...) elucidating his central conditions of discrimination. Secondly, we highlight the limitations of Schutz’s account, in how it fails to capture more peripheral, subtle, and implicit oppressive practices. Finally, we introduce two underexplored insights derived from Schutz’s framework: the role of relevances in understanding the motivational underpinnings of implicit biases, and the connection between self-typification and stereotype threat. With this multidimensional approach, we hope to enhance our understanding of oppression whilst bridging gaps in Schutz’s original conceptualization. (shrink)

Gender studies has produced various analyses around issues such as social “roles,”coexistence and power relations; seeing language as a central aspect, especially since the development of performativity theory produced by philosopher Judith Butler. In this paper, so, I would like to focus on the existing relationship between language and gender relations, particularly in the workplace; pointing out how some possibilities and structures are dense with unequal and sexist modalities. The analysis will consist of a first theoretical section, in which the (...) specific relationship between the gendered “male”subject and language will be emphasized, and a second in which these considerations will be portrayed in the corporate context. The purpose is to show how specific aspects of masculinity have generated specific power relations, delineating, and defining stereotypes and categorizing views. Attributes that have then flowed into the different social dynamics of our society, establishing different job roles and possibilities. To give more profundity, I adopted a methodology that fuses the logical-linguistic theoretical perspective, to the analysis of empirical data collected through interviews, questionnaires, and training meetings at two partner companies. (shrink)

We reply to Eva's comment on our "New Possibilities for Fair Algorithms," comparing and contrasting our Spanning criterion with his suggested Spacing criterion.

When selecting between applicants for a job, when and how should we take into account the reactions that they elicit from others? On one hand, applicants’ “reaction qualifications” often speak to their merit, in which case we seem required to consider them. On the other hand, others’ reactions are often rooted in prejudicial attitudes, in which case considering reaction qualifications can make the hiring process prejudicial. According to a popular view, we should refrain from considering reaction qualifications just in case (...) there are weighty moral reasons against doing so. I argue that this morality-based approach fails. Instead, we should refrain from considering reaction qualifications just in case considering them would render a selection procedure non-transparent or discriminatory. If consideration of a reaction qualification would have either effect, the reaction qualification does not confer merit and so should not be considered by selectors. (shrink)

This essay looks at the history of confrontations between trans people and non-trans philosophers. It argues that trans contentions within philosophy should be considered alongside the intersection of transness with social class, patterns of anti-trans employment discrimination, affective injustice against trans employees, and the discipline of philosophy as an exclusive prestige-driven workplace. It concludes that philosophy should better study cis philosophers and the ways that they encounter trans people in the world, as colleagues, and as objects of inquiry.

We introduce a fairness criterion that we call Spanning. Spanning i) is implied by Calibration, ii) retains interesting properties of Calibration that some other ways of relaxing that criterion do not, and iii) unlike Calibration and other prominent ways of weakening it, is consistent with Equalized Odds outside of trivial cases.

Discrimination laws usually prohibit discrimination based on some traits, like race, caste, and sex, and not on others, like sports team allegiance. Should socioeconomic class be included among the protected traits? We examine an argument for the view that it should which leads to the conclusion that both direct and indirect socioeconomic discrimination should be prohibited by the state. The argument has three premises: (1) direct paradigmatic discrimination should be prohibited by law; (2) if direct paradigmatic discrimination should be prohibited (...) by law, then so should direct socioeconomic discrimination; and (3) where direct discrimination based on a certain trait should be prohibited by law, so should indirect discrimination on the basis of the same trait. Since we assume most readers will accept (1), the paper is largely devoted to the defense of (2) and (3). The outlawing of direct socioeconomic discrimination would involve an adjustment of the political and legal status quo, but we argue that it should nevertheless be implemented. By contrast, a prohibition on indirect socioeconomic discrimination would require a radical change to the way in which our societies are structured, because many of our laws, policies, and practices systematically (re)produce inequality to the disproportionate detriment of the poor. Our main aim, therefore, is not to defend the prohibition of indirect socioeconomic discrimination, but to show that most people’s views about discrimination are in deep tension with their attitude to current law. Resolving this tension would require for most of us to revise our beliefs either about whether indirect socioeconomic discrimination should be prohibited or about (1)–(3). One might reject the view that law should prohibit socioeconomic discrimination and still accept this claim about a deep tension in most people’s views on discrimination. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine whether it is morally wrong to ban only male citizens from leaving a country in wartime, and if it is, why it is the case. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared martial law and ordered general mobilization, at the same time prohibiting male citizens aged 18 to 60 from crossing the border. The justifiability of the ban is in dispute, and opponents have made a case in both legal and (...) moral dimensions. In the moral dimension, there are arguments based on consequentialism, individual freedom, and fairness or non-discrimination. In this paper, I focus on the third argument and argue that the ban unfairly and morally wrongfully discriminates against male Ukraine citizens on the basis of their gender. First, I define discrimination and apply it to our case. Second, moving from the descriptive definition of discrimination to its moral wrongness, I argue that the male-only ban is unfair and morally unjustified. Third, I argue that the ban can also be deemed morally wrong from one of the prominent views in the field of the ethics of discrimination, namely the deliberative freedom view. (shrink)

The victims of severe injustice are allowed to employ disruption and violence to seek political change. This article argues for this conclusion from within Rawlsian political liberalism, which, however, has been criticised for allegedly imposing public reason’s suffocating norms of civility on the oppressed. It develops a novel view of the applicability of public reason in non-ideal circumstances – the “no self-sacrifice view” – that focuses on the excessive costs of following public reason when suffering from severe injustice. On this (...) view, those treated in what Rawls describes as less than a reasonably just way are relieved of the duty of public reason and therefore entitled to employ disruption and violence. In contrast, their privileged fellow citizens must still obey public reason’s civility unless they have been authorised by the oppressed to join their fight. This article also starts exploring from within political liberalism the normative principles governing disruptive and violent protest. (shrink)

In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including Dale Smith, Pablo (...) Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke. (shrink)

An issue about the privacy of the clustered groups designed by algorithms arises when attempts are made to access certain pieces of information about those groups that would likely be used to harm them. Therefore, limitations must be imposed regarding accessing such information about clustered groups. In the discourse on group privacy, it is argued that the right to privacy of such groups should be recognised to respect group privacy, protecting clustered groups against discrimination. According to this viewpoint, this right (...) places a duty on others, for example, private companies, institutions, and governments, to refrain from accessing such information. To defend the idea that the right to privacy should be recognised for clustered groups, at least two requirements must be satisfied. First, clustered group privacy must be conceived of as either a collective good or a participatory good. Since these forms of good are of the type from which no member of a group can be excluded from benefiting, the right to them is defined as a group right. Second, there must be group interests on which to base a group right. Group interests can be either the interests of those members that are a result of their being in the group or the interests of the group as a whole that transcend the interests of its members. However, this paper argues that clustered group privacy cannot be conceived of as either a collective or a participatory good because it is possible for some individuals to be excluded from benefiting from it. Furthermore, due to the lack of awareness among individuals that they are members of a clustered group and the nature of a clustered group itself, such groups cannot have the group interests necessary to establish a group right. Hence, the group right to privacy cannot be recognised for these groups, implying that the group right cannot be considered a means to protect clustered groups against discrimination. Instead, this paper suggests that moral principles need to be articulated within an ethics of vulnerability to identify the moral obligations of protecting vulnerable clustered groups. The duty owed to the vulnerable should involve refraining from accessing certain information about clustered groups in specific contexts. This duty is not engendered by the right to privacy of such groups; it is the duty owed to the vulnerable. The findings highlight the need to articulate moral principles regarding privacy and data protection to protect clustered groups in contexts in which accessing information about them could constitute a reason for discriminatory targeting. (shrink)

Discriminatory attitudes towards Muslim refugees are common in liberal democracies, and Muslim citizens of these countries experience high rates of discrimination and social exclusion. Uniting these two facts is the well-known phenomenon of Islamophobia. But the implications of overlapping discrimination against citizens and non-citizens have not been given sustained attention in the ethics of immigration literature. In this paper, I argue that liberal societies have not only duties to discontinue refugee policies that discriminate against social groups like Muslims, but remedial (...) duties to citizens who are in these social groups to adopt a more welcoming stance towards the groups that they are in. Further, I argue that a fitting way of adopting this more welcoming stance is to give refugees in these groups preferential treatment in asylum and resettlement. (shrink)

This essay meditates on the short film American Reflexxx and the violent laughter directed at a non-trans woman in public space when she was assumed to be trans. Drawing from work on the ideological and institutional dimensions of transphobia by Talia Bettcher and Viviane Namaste, alongside Sara Ahmed's writing on the cultural politics of disgust, I reverse engineer this specific instance of laughter into a meditation on the social meaning of transphobic laughter in public space. I then look at racialized (...) transphobic laughter directed against Tyra Hunter and Miriam Rivera to emphasize transmisogynist laughter as a denial of contact, intimacy, and care. Building on Kate Manne's work on misogyny, I conclude that a key aspect of transmisogyny is the use of transfeminine people as a source of dehumanized, disavowed, and disposable care and intimacy. Laughter and accompanying violence against trans women serves to reinforce this dynamic. (shrink)

Recent philosophical accounts of discrimination face challenges in accommodating robust intuitions about the particular way in which it is wrongful—most prominently, the intuition that discriminatory actions intrinsically violate equality irrespective of their contingent consequences. The paper suggests that we understand the normative structure of discrimination in a way that is different from the one implicitly assumed by these accounts. It argues that core discriminatory wrongs—such as segregation in Apartheid South Africa—divide into two types, corresponding to violations of relational and distributive (...) equality; and that a pluralistic view of the internal structure of each type should be adopted. This normative structure serves to appropriately vindicate the mentioned intuitions; it also contributes to clarifying the normative underpinnings of legal concepts associated with discrimination (including the distinctions between direct and indirect, or ‘disparate treatment/impact’ discrimination, and intentional vs. unintentional discrimination), and developing a more productive public discourse around allegations of discrimination. (shrink)

Willpower is a metaphor that is widespread in both common usage and expert literature across disciplines. This paper looks into willpower as a ‘metaphor we live by’, analyzing and exploring the consequences of the tacit information content of the willpower metaphor for agentive self-understanding and efficacy. In addition to contributing to stigma associated with self-control failures, the metaphor causally contributes to self-control failures by obscuring available self-control strategies and instructing agents to superfluous self-control efforts.

Algorithmic discrimination has rapidly become a topic of intense public and academic interest. This article explores three issues raised by algorithmic discrimination: 1) the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, 2) the notion of disadvantageous treatment, and 3) the moral badness of discriminatory automated decision-making. It argues that some conventional distinctions between direct and indirect discrimination appear not to apply to algorithmic discrimination, that algorithmic discrimination may often be discrimination between groups, as opposed to against groups, and that it is (...) not necessarily the case that morally bad algorithmic discrimination gives us reason to not use automated decision-making. For each of the three issues, the article explores implications for algorithmic discrimination, suggests some alternative answers, and clarifies how we may want to think of discrimination more broadly in light of lessons drawn from the context of algorithmic discrimination. (shrink)

Over the years, phenomenology has provided illuminating descriptions of discrimination, with its mechanisms and effects being thematised at the most basic levels of embodiment, (dis)orientation, selfhood, and belonging. What remains somewhat understudied is the lived experience of the discriminator. In this paper I draw on Husserl's phenomenological account of normality to reflect on the ways in which we discriminate at the prereflective levels of perceptual experience and bodily being. By critically reflecting on the intentional structures undergirding discriminatory practices, I argue (...) that discrimination is characteristic of a naïve normalising attitude which is habitually interested in securing a familiar experience of a static normality. I first demonstrate how this attitude problematically tends to reproduce, enforce, and further sediment discriminatory and exclusionary norms. Further, I provide an internal critique which problematises discrimination—without recourse to external normative standards—on three fronts: as epistemically unproductive, experientially obscuring, and normatively non-instantiating. In discriminatory acts we see an abnormal refusal to enrich, revise, and genetically establish new normative commitments, new ways of seeing, and a new normality. (shrink)

Some philosophers and segments of the public think age is relevant to healthcare priority-setting. One argument for this is based in equity: “Old” patients have had either more of a relevant good than “young” patients or enough of that good and so have weaker claims to treatment. This article first notes that some discussions of age-based priority that focus in this way on old and young patients exhibit an ambiguity between two claims: that patients classified as old should have a (...) low priority, and that patients classified as young should have high priority. The author next argues, drawing on a problem raised by Christine Overall, that equity cannot justify giving “old” patients low priority, since there is wide variety in the total lifetime experiences of older people, partly influenced by gender, race, class, and disability injustice. Finally, the author suggests that there might be a limited role for age-based prioritization in the context of infant and childhood death, since those who die in childhood are always and uncontroversially among the worst-off. (shrink)

In her recent book, Faces of Inequality (2020), Moreau aims at developing a normative account of discrimination that is guided by the main features of anti-discrimination law. The critical comment argues against this methodology, indicating that due to indeterminacy relative to their underlying normative principles, central anti-discrimination norms cannot fulfill this guiding role. Further, using the content of such norms to guide ethical discussions is likely to be misleading, as it reflects evidentiary considerations that are unique to the legal context. (...) The critical comment’s claims are developed based on a close examination of indirect discrimination (or disparate impact) norms, and, as such, have wider implications for ongoing moral and political debates that are heavily influenced by the content of these norms. (shrink)

Discrimination is an important real-life issue that affects many individuals and groups. It is also a fruitful field of study that intersects several disciplines and methods. This Special Section brings together papers on discrimination and prioritization in healthcare from leading scholars in bioethics and closely related fields.

In recent years, much public attention has been devoted to the existence of pay discrepancies between men and women at the upper end of the income scale. For example, there has been considerable discussion of the ‘Hollywood gender pay gap’. We can refer to such discrepancies as cases of millionaire inequality. These cases generate conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, the unequal remuneration involved looks like a troubling case of gender injustice. On the other, it’s natural to feel uneasy when (...) confronted with the suggestion that multi-millionaires are somehow being paid inadequately. In this paper, we consider two arguments for rectifying millionaire inequality, clarifying their appeal but also identifying the obstacles that each will have to surmount in order to succeed. (shrink)

Mary Kate McGowan’s Just Words offers an interesting account of exercitives. On McGowan’s view, one of the things we do with words is change what’s permitted, and we do this ubiquitously, without any special authority or specific intention. McGowan’s account of exercitives is meant to identify a mechanism by which ordinary speech is harmful, and which justifies the regulation of such speech. It is here that I part ways. I make three main arguments. First, McGowan’s focus on harm is misguided; (...) that ordinary speech is harmful is harder to support, and in turn does not less to support conclusions about whether it is wrong and warrants regulation, than Just Words suggests. Second, if the speech is harmful, McGowan’s account of exercitives is ill-suited to explain why; the relevant instances of ordinary speech seem to express speakers’ views about moral norms, not change social norms. Third, McGowan’s argument for why ordinary speech should be regulated because it is a form of discrimination presupposes a great deal that is controversial about what makes discrimination wrong and legally actionable, and even if it is right it may license the regulation of more speech than many, including McGowan, would deem acceptable. (shrink)

Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...) The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

In this essay, we describe practices developed by the philosophy department at the University of Oklahoma to promote fair and inclusive recruitment, application review, and hiring for faculty positions.

Twice in the 2020 term, in Bostock and Comcast, the Supreme Court doubled down on the reasoning of “but-for causation” to interpret antidiscrimination statutes. According to this reasoning, an outcome is discriminatory because of some status—say, sex or race—just in case the outcome would not have occurred “but-for” the plaintiff’s status. We think this reasoning embeds profound conceptual errors that render the decisions deeply confused. Furthermore, those conceptual errors tend to limit the reach of antidiscrimination law. In this essay, we (...) first unpack the ambiguity of this but-for causal reasoning. We then show that this reasoning arises from a misapplication of tort law principles within antidiscrimination law, and that, as a result, it is both conceptually and normatively indeterminate. (shrink)

Comment on Beeghly, Erin. 2021. “Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.” Social Epistemology 35 (6): 547–63. -/- Beeghly’s “Stereotyping as Discrimination” is—characteristically—clear, thorough, and persuasive, rich with incisive arguments and thought-provoking case studies. In defending the view that stereotyping often constitutes discrimination, she makes a powerful case that, “Living ethically means cultivating a certain kind of ‘inner’ life and avoiding pernicious habits of thought, no matter how culturally pervasive” (Beeghly 2021b, 13). Support for such claims is traced back (...) not just to Aristotle and the Ten Commandments (Beeghly 2021b, 10), but also to critical social traditions. “As feminists and theorists of race have long noted, the most intimate aspects of our selves, including our ways of thinking, agency, and modes of embodiment, are among the mechanisms of group oppression” (Beeghly 2021b, 13). I offer, first, a tiny friendly amendment to one brief passage, followed by invitations to explore some of the further potential implications of Beeghly’s central theses. (shrink)

If whatever counts as merit for some purpose is unevenly distributed, a decision procedure that accurately sorts people on that basis will “pick up” and reproduce the pre-existing pattern in ways that more random, less merit-tracking procedures would not. This dynamic is an important cause for concern about the use of predictive models to allocate goods and opportunities. In this article, I distinguish two different objections that give voice to that concern in different ways. First, decision procedures may contribute to (...) future social injustice and other social ills by sustaining or aggravating patterns that undermine equality of status and opportunity. Second, the same decision procedures may wrong particular individuals by compounding prior injustices that explain those persons’ predicted or actual characteristics. I argue for the importance of the first idea and raise doubts about the second. In normative assessments and legal regulation of algorithmic decisionmaking, as in our thinking about anti-discrimination norms more broadly, a central concern ought to be the prospect of entrenching harmful and unjust patterns—quite apart from any personal wrong done to the individuals about whom predictions are made. (shrink)

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

This article, part of a special issue on 'Expressing Hatred', seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in (...) favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages. (shrink)

This article develops an intuitive idea of proportionality as a placeholder for a substantive conception of equality, and contrasts it with Ripstein’s ideas, as presented in an annual guest lecture to the Society of Applied Philosophy in 2016. It uses a discussion of racial profiling to illustrate the conceptual and normative differences between the two. The brief conclusion spells out my concern that talk of ‘proportionality’, though often helpful and, sometimes, necessary for moral reasoning, can end up concealing, rather than (...) illuminating, people’s claims to be treated as equals. (shrink)

Evânia Reich presents the argument that the veil laws in France—the banning of the full-face coverings in public and the banning of the headscarf in public schools—are consistent with the emancipatory project of French Laïcité. According to this argument, the veils that Muslim women wear are symbols of their oppression, whereas French education seeks to liberate each individual and Laïcité serves as a bulwark against the creeping oppressive influence of religion. Unveiling Muslim women, then, is an act of emancipation. In (...) this essay, I argue that the view of French secularism as an emancipatory project to free women of the oppressive mechanism of the veil is an example of what Marilyn Frye calls the “arrogant eye.” In this essay, I offer an alternative approach on the veil following Frye’s notion of the “loving eye.”. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, Page 384-418, Fall 2018.