Hi folks.
What sorts of reading groups are you involved in at your schools? I attend the "Analysis Reading Group" at the University of Rochester. We read papers out of the journal Analysis and then discuss them. Lately we've been exploring Phil Studies and a few other journals, but the basic idea is to read short papers so that it's easy for everyone to get familiar with the material quickly.
David Braun was a regular at this biweeklyish event and has continued to participate through the summer. But now that he's relocating to SUNY Buffalo, I'm not really sure whether he'll attend this fall. Nevertheless, the group usually features Alyssa Ney, Brad Weslake, John Bennett, Debra Modrak, and Earl Conee. It's an outstanding group.
What is a reason?
One issue that needs to be resolved is what kind of thing reasons are. A good way to figure that out is to look at what kinds of properties reasons have and what relations they enter into. Here are two observations. First, one's beliefs can be reasons. Second, reasons provide, or purport to provide, evidential support for propositions.
Bearing the first observation in mind, one might be led to endorse the view that reasons are identical to beliefs. This is an internalist notion of reasons. It has the virtue of keeping reasons ontologically uniform, since they are all merely beliefs. It also explains how reasons can provide evidential support by exploiting propositional justification relationships between the the content of one's reasons and the proposition one is seeking reasons for.
Bearing the second observation in mind, one might be led to endorse the view that reasons include beliefs, but are not limited to them. In addition to beliefs, perceptual experiences, memory experiences, the deliverances of a priori reflection, and perhaps other things can be reasons. These things need not have propositional content, but, on this second view, they can provide evidential support for propositions. This is an externalist notion of reasons. It has the virtue of including in the class of reasons what foundationalists have often regarded as essential--something that can justify but does not itself require justification. The nature of reasons on this view is far more prosaic.
These two views will differ on the following claim:
C) S has a memorially justified belief that p, but is not in possession of any positive reason for p.
According to the internalist, C is possibly true and often actually applies to individuals. According to the externalist, C is impossible since the first conjunct entails what the second conjunct denies. So we can use our linguistic intuitions about C to make a judgment about the nature of reasons.
My own view is that the externalist position is correct.
Here's a quote from Brian Leiter's blog:
"Philosophical excellence is not a natural kind; to the extent it exists, it emerges from the consensus of philosophers."
Is this true? Does (or would) its truth undermine any important philosophical goal?
I'm presently undecided on the issue.
I passed my dissertation defense today. So now I have a PhD in philosophy from Rutgers.
I'll post the dissertation itself soon (and behind links and cuts and whatnot).
The title? "The Importance of Knowledge Per Se"
-
- Current Mood
-
chipper
There's a principle about testimony that goes like this:
(T) For any speaker S and hearer H, if S testifies (or asserts, if you like) that p and H comes to know that p on the basis of S's testimony, then S knows that p.
Basically it says that when S tells H that p, H can't come to know p from being told so by S unless S already knows that p. There's no way that a hearer can take a speaker's word for something and come to know that thing on that basis if the speaker didn't know it to begin with.
It's fairly plausible. I won't go into the positive argument for it here.
Peter Graham has proposed a counterexample to (T). It goes like this:
Susan sees Judy break a vase. Susan forms the belief on the basis of her experience that Judy broke the vase. In the next room, Trudy is seated comfortably. Trudy is Judy's identical twin. They are very similar looking. Susan lacks the ability to distinguish Judy from Trudy. In fact, Susan doesn't know that Trudy exists. Had Trudy broken the vase, Susan would have formed the belief that Judy had broken the vase. Since Susan is not sensitive to this difference and since Trudy is in the area, Susan doesn't know that Judy broke the vase.
Now Jim comes along and asks Susan who broke the vase. Susan says, "Judy broke the vase." Since Susan is a trustworthy person, Jim trusts her and accepts her claim on its face. Jim happens to be able to distinguish between Judy and Trudy since he knows them both well. Since he can distinguish between the two, it is no defeater for him that Trudy was in the vicinity. When Susan tells Jim that Judy broke the vase and Jim accepts that on Susan's word, Jim comes to know that Judy broke the vase while Susan doesn't. That's a failure of (T).
I think that's a mistake.
Consider an analogy. CB is colorblind. He cannot discern red from green with any reliability, though as a matter of fact he has never seen anything red. Ten green balls and ten red balls are placed in a sack. CB reaches in and retrieves a green ball. NCB is not colorblind. NCB calls CB on the phone and asks him what color the ball is. CB says, "The ball is green." Since CB is a trustworthy person, NCB accepts CB's claim on its face. Clearly CB does not know what color the ball is, though he has a true belief. But does NCB know what color the ball is? I don't think he does. Since this case matches the reasoning in the Graham case, I conclude that something is wrong with Graham's counterexample. (The next step is to uncover what precisely is the mistake.)
What do you make of my objection to Graham's counterexample to (T)?
I'm doing an independent study to get a (hopefully) pretty solid background in probability. The proff is starting me on skyrm's "choice and chance." The book looks good, if pretty basic and not really containing much that is new (to me). After I do that, I'm planning on doing Carnap's "the logical foundations of probability," review popper's "the logic of scientific discovery," review howson and urbach's "scientific reasoning" and maybe do some other big book on probability before going into some more contemporary arguments and papers. So anyways, does anyone recommend any other "foundational" book in probability? I've had stats and probability as a course as a math undergrad, so I'm looking specifically for advanced, interesting books on probability by philosophers. Has anyone read "Bayes or Bust" by John Earman? I've heard good things, and I thinking of maybe picking that book, but also I very much don't have a comprehensive familiarity with the literature, so if there is a famous classic that I am forgetting, I probably should do that classic first. Anyways, any recommendations would be very appreciated.
(sort of originally posted to my own journal, sorry to those of you who are both here and there).
I am interested to know what this community thinks about the following post from Brian Leiter's blog.
A senior philosopher wrote with the following interesting observations about "the changing sociology of the field," with particular regard to philosophy of language:
When I was in graduate school [in the 1960s], papers delivered to philosophy departments were almost always read out by the speaker from a typescript. This practice reflected a conception of the field in which it was judged important never to make a mistake—even if this was accomplished by saying little and saying it unintelligibly. This is changing of course, and some prominent younger philosophers are overturning this and other established practices and established ideas of philosophy. This generation is likely to see creativity and provocativeness as more important than being anal about every little detail, and this goes with publishing more and more flamboyantly rather than publishing little and conservatively. Another interesting generational change: the older generation had a myth of the brilliant loner producing insights out of the blue, whereas the younger generation is more communitarian, focusing more about projects that emerge out of group discussions. Another change in philosophy of language in particular is that the younger generation in philosophy of language thinks that philosophical mileage can be gotten out of linguistic facts in a way alien to many older philosophers. And in philosophy of mind and even ethics, there is much more emphasis on empirical work. These developments are not unconnected since practices in linguistics and psychology are much more communitarian than has been the case in philosophy.
I think I'm presently experiencing a surprise exam scenario. Here are the facts I'm using as premises:
1. Two weeks ago I knew that by the conclusion of Friday, December 22nd I would have more than one job interview.
2. Two weeks ago I knew that by the conclusion of Friday, December 22nd the relevant portion of the requests for interview calls would already have been made.
3. Today, Thursday, December 21st, I have only one interview scheduled (University of Tennessee at Knoxville, a job which is easily in my top five favorites).
4. I have heard testimony from a number of generally trustworthy people to the effect that many universities make their calls on the last Friday before the APA meetings (which in this case coincides with Friday, December 22nd.
5. Today, Thursday, December 21st, I have good reason to bring my belief that I will have more than one interview into question.
6. I have in fact brought it into question and am now unsure whether it is true.
Therefore, today I don't know whether or not I will have more than one interview.
Any thoughts? Any polishes? Any objections?
The new Philosophical Gourmet Report will be online on November 9th. What are your opinions of the report? Is it a good or bad thing? Does it help or hinder the application process?
