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fix(rules): Tune false positives#660

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tune-rule-false-positives
Open

fix(rules): Tune false positives#660
rabbitstack wants to merge 1 commit into
masterfrom
tune-rule-false-positives

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What is the purpose of this PR / why it is needed?

False positives reduction for the following rules:

  • Suspicious access to Windows Credential Manager files: Add ?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe exception
  • Suspicious protected process execution: Rewrite the rule to consider child spawning from a non-protected process, and where the SID is not SYSTEM, or the process token integrity level is not SYSTEM
  • Suspicious access to the hosts file: Add callstack exceptions for ?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\*\\msedge.dll!* and ?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\*\\msedge.dll!*

What type of change does this PR introduce?


Uncomment one or more /kind <> lines:

/kind feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)

/kind bug-fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

/kind refactor (non-breaking change that restructures the code, while not changing the original functionality)

/kind breaking (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to not work as expected

/kind cleanup

/kind improvement

/kind design

/kind documentation

/kind other (change that doesn't pertain to any of the above categories)

Any specific area of the project related to this PR?


Uncomment one or more /area <> lines:

/area instrumentation

/area telemetry

/area rule-engine

/area filters

/area yara

/area event

/area captures

/area alertsenders

/area outputs

/area rules

/area filaments

/area config

/area cli

/area tests

/area ci

/area build

/area docs

/area deps

/area evasion

/area other

Special notes for the reviewer


Does this PR introduce a user-facing change?


- Suspicious access to Windows Credential Manager files: Add ?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe exception
- Suspicious protected process execution: Rewrite the rule to consider child spawning from non-protected process and where the SID is not SYSTEM or process token integrity level is not SYSTEM
- Suspicious access to the hosts file: Add callstack exceptions for ?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\*\\msedge.dll!* and ?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\*\\msedge.dll!*
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