a cow is that which is not a not-cow
Aug. 28th, 2014 06:28 pmIt is questioned whether ether has qualities
The skimming of History of Indian Logic continues. I tried to actually understand a section on one of the works of Dignaga, of the "mediaeval school" of Buddhist logic, and became utterly baffled. This, despite the author lapsing into symbolic logic.
(Aside: "…according to the doctrine of Apoha (called in Tibetan gshan-sel-wa), an entity is defined as being the negation of its opposite, e.g. a cow is that which is not a not-cow.")
Another section (also on Dignaga), called "Fourteen Fallacies" (pp. 293–), is lighter:
This is excellent: the assumed context is a disputation between two parties. If you are a Mimamsaka, your opponent cannot argue on the basis that sound is produced. A syllogism is valid within a disputation only if both disputants accept the premises.
Subsequent fallacies enumerate various instances of "not(both disputants accept the premises)": fallacy (4), for example, describes when "it is questioned whether the middle term is predicable of the minor term, e.g.
Another "huh" moment was a discussion of "valid theses", such as "the hill is fiery" (because the hill is smoky, etc.). So: "Sound is inaudible" is invalid, because this assertion is "incompatible with perception". "A pot is eternal" is invalid, because it is a product, and all products are non-eternal. Also invalid: "A thesis incompatible with the public opinion":
The skimming of History of Indian Logic continues. I tried to actually understand a section on one of the works of Dignaga, of the "mediaeval school" of Buddhist logic, and became utterly baffled. This, despite the author lapsing into symbolic logic.
(Aside: "…according to the doctrine of Apoha (called in Tibetan gshan-sel-wa), an entity is defined as being the negation of its opposite, e.g. a cow is that which is not a not-cow.")
Another section (also on Dignaga), called "Fourteen Fallacies" (pp. 293–), is lighter:
(1) "When the lack of truth of the middle term* is recognized by both the parties, e.g.* That is, the "middle term" (predicate, e.g. "smoky(–)") applied to the subject: "smoky(the_hill)", or "is_visible(sound)", or "is_a_product(sound)". Sometimes, it seems to refer to the predicate per se. Joy.Sound is non-eternal,(Neither of the parties admits that sound is visible).
Because it is visible.
(2) When the lack of truth of the middle term* is recognized by one party only, e.g.Sound is evolved,(The Mimamsakas do not admit that sound is a product).
Because it is a product.
This is excellent: the assumed context is a disputation between two parties. If you are a Mimamsaka, your opponent cannot argue on the basis that sound is produced. A syllogism is valid within a disputation only if both disputants accept the premises.
Subsequent fallacies enumerate various instances of "not(both disputants accept the premises)": fallacy (4), for example, describes when "it is questioned whether the middle term is predicable of the minor term, e.g.
Well, I suppose it is.Ether is a substance,(It is questioned whether ether has qualities).
Because it has qualities.
Another "huh" moment was a discussion of "valid theses", such as "the hill is fiery" (because the hill is smoky, etc.). So: "Sound is inaudible" is invalid, because this assertion is "incompatible with perception". "A pot is eternal" is invalid, because it is a product, and all products are non-eternal. Also invalid: "A thesis incompatible with the public opinion":
(Or, "money is an abominable thing." I or some men like me may say "money is an abominable thing," but the world does not say so).More invalid theses: those "incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine", "with one's own statement", and "with an unfamiliar term":
The Buddhist speaking to the Samkhya, "Sound is perishable." (Sound is a subject well known to the Mimamsaka, but not to the Samkhya.)But my favourite invalid thesis is described thus:
A thesis universally accepted, such as: "Fire is warm." (This thesis cannot be offered for proof, as it is accepted by all.)Again, the central concern is not truth of the thesis, but whether the thesis can induce a meaningful debate. If both parties already agree, there is no point in examining a proof!