Location of the upper and lower Sierra Tarahumara in Chihuahua, which borders the states of Texas and New Mexico.
On 19 April 2026, a diplomatic conflict between Mexico and the United States arose following the deaths of two CIA agents in an accident in the Sierra Tarahumara[es] of Chihuahua. The agents were traveling in a convoy alongside agents from the Chihuahua State Investigation Agency.
They had been returning from dismantling six sophisticated local narcotics laboratories that had been located through drone surveillance flights in an operation involving around one hundred officials, one of the most significant successes in years for Chihuahua’s prosecutor’s office and police.[1]
The Security Cabinet of Mexico expressed its condolences for the deaths of the four agents following the accident, and clarified that the foreign agents had not been authorized to participate in an operation in Mexico.[2]
One week after the incident, the United States Department of Justice announced that the governor of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, along with other members of his administration, would be extradited to the United States over alleged ties to the Sinaloa Cartel.[3]
Slavery in the Dominican Republic has roots that date to the early 16th century.
Colonists and others on the Spanish mainland were forbidden from trading in slaves, but islands such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic were excepted from this rule. Laborious work in sugarcane and to a lesser extent tobacco necessitated this labor, as well as the lack of indigenous people in the Caribbean. Almost all of the slaves were brought from Africa via the triangular trade. Despite the prevalence of the Spanish slave trade in the Caribbean, Haiti is still the country with the most African-descended people in the Caribbean, although Brazil has about twice as many, albeit located in South America.
Oil wells on Lake MaracaiboPetroluem fields, pipelines, and refineries in Venezuela (1972)
The petroleum industry in Venezuela accounts for 15% of its GDP and 37% of its domestic energy consumption.[4][5]
Venezuela's oil exports also account for 80% of its total export revenue.[5]
By 1950, it had a GDP per capita of $5,550,[a] the third highest in Latin America. This was in comparison to other Latin colonies that were significantly more impoverished, like Brazil ($1,850) or Guatemala ($2,040).[6]
Oil was first discovered in the Maracaibo Basin of Zulia in 1914.[7] The first Venezuelan oil well, Zumaque I, was located in Mene Grande, Zulia.[8]
In 1922, the Barroso II oil well exploded in Zulia state, causing a million barrels of crude oil to burst out of the ground. This was when its promise as an oil-rich country was noticed.[9]
In the first decades after oil began to be exploited, foreign companies controlled production, infrastructure, and commercialization. One of the most important was Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, which came to control a substantial share of national production.
In 1960, Venezuela was one of the five founding countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, along with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. Despite this leadership role, foreign companies continued to dominate the industry until nationalization in 1976.
In August 1971, under the presidency of Rafael Caldera, a law was passed that nationalized the country's natural gas industry, foreshadowing the broader oil nationalization to come.
The announcement occurred at the Mene Grande oilfield in Zulia. The transition to the oil industry being run by the state went well. Large American and other foreign companies invested in the country and were also hired by PDVSA for their expertise. Pérez allowed PDVSA to partner with foreign oil companies as long as it held 60% equity in joint ventures, along with other constraints.
During the 1980s, global oil prices plummeted. As global oil prices plummeted in the 1980s, Venezuela's economy contracted and inflation soared; at the same time, it accrued massive foreign debt by purchasing foreign refineries, such as Citgo in the United States.
Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998 running on a socialist platform. He promised to use the country's oil wealth to reduce poverty in Venezuela, a serious problem at the time.
In 2002, many PDVSA employees went on strike against Chávez, who responsed by firing 19,000 workers from the company. This decision was later criticized, as it removed much of the company's technical expertise.
In 2005, Chávez began to provide subsidized oil to several countries in the region, including Cuba, with Petrocaribe being created later.
In 2007, the government decreed that PDVSA must hold at least a 60% stake in all heavy crude projects in the Orinoco Belt, forcing foreign companies to accept new contractual conditions or leave the country. As a result, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips withdrew from Venezuela.
In mid-2014, global oil prices tumbled and Venezuela's economy went into free fall. Since 2014, oil production in Venezuela has suffered from a poor oil market and Venezuela's insufficient funding of the industry.
In 2016, the oil production reached the lowest it had been in 23 years. The decline continued through subsequent years, with production hitting historic lows during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In January 2026, the Trump administration stated that it would fix Venezuelas oil industry while the U.S. was engaging in Operation Southern Spear. Maduro was captured in Caracas and taken to the U.S. on 3 January 2026.
Venezuela produces over 900,000 barrels of oil per day and has an estimated 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. These reserves account for roughly 17% of the global total, with most concentrated in the Orinoco Belt, where deposits are predominantly heavy crude. There is doubt about the reliability of this figure however, as it is self-reported and not verified by OPEC or another international organization.
At its peak in the 1970s, Venezuela's oil production reached 3.5 million barrels of crude oil per day. By contrast, Venezuela crude oil production was reported at 896,000 barrels per day in December 2025.
Venezuela's oil is abundant but it is known for being more expensive to extract from the ground than oil from the Persian Gulf, which lowers its profitability. The oil being heavy crude means special refineries are needed.
In 1986, PDVSA bought 50% of the United States gasoline brand Citgo from Southland Corporation and in 1990 the remaining half. This gave Venezuela a significant presence in the U.S. market.
PDVSA has not regularly disclosed its financial performance since 2014 and provides extremely limited public information, having not published annual reports or other documentation to improve transparency and corporate governance since 2016.
In 2023, Venezuela's oil exports totaled just $4.05 billion—dwarfed by Saudi Arabia's $181 billion and the U.S.'s $125 billion.
Most of Venezuela's modest oil production goes to China, an ally of the Maduro regime and major investor in the region, with Venezuela currently paying down an estimated $10-billion debt to China, covered in part by oil exports.
The United States bought about 23% of Venezuela's oil in 2023, but data shows that the U.S. didn't buy any in 2020 and 2021.
The United States has been involved in the Venezuelan oil industry.
has been imposing sanctions on Venezuela in some capacity since 2006, although full sanctions against petroleum trade itself did not occur until much later. For almost two decades, Washington has imposed sweeping sanctions against Caracas, the most significant of which have blocked oil imports from PDVSA and prevented the government from accessing the U.S. financial system.
To return Venezuela to its production highs of the early 2000s of around 3 million barrels per day would likely take around $180 billion in extra funding between now and 2040, according to energy intelligence firm Rystad Energy.
Corruption, mismanagement, brain drain, and a lack of repair and upkeep work on critical infrastructure, including throughout Venezuela's flagship Orinoco Heavy Oil Belt, have made operating without significant investment nearly impossible.
12"Venezuela Energy Information". enerdata.com.
Venezuela has the world's largest proven oil reserves at 304 billion barrels, however the country is ranked 18th in petroleum production due to its lower ability to extract it compared to other oil-rich nations.
In 2024, it was producing about 960,000 barrels of crude per day. The state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela corporation (PDVSA) has dominated the sector since it was founded in 1976, with the nationalization of the Venezuelan petroleum industry.
On 27 December 2025, an intercity bus fell into a ravine on the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala, killing 16 and injuring 26 people. The bus was on a route coming from Guatemala City.
Road accidents are common in Guatemala, as the country is mountainous and road infrastructure is less developed than in other places. The Central American volcanic arc specifically the Sierra Madre de Chiapas crosses over much of the central and southern part of the country, and forms the Guatemalan Highlands. As such, it has a high rate of traffic fatalities relative to miles driven. Accidents of this kind tend to be more fatal compared to collisions as well. Totonicapán is located at a very high elevation, at almost 2,500 metres (8,200ft).
The Inter-American Highway is another name for the portion of the Pan-American Highway within Central America. Chicken buses regularly use the highway, as many citizens do not own their own form of motor transportation. The road connects Totonicapán to nearby cities like Quetzaltenango (27km (17mi) away) and Santa Cruz del Quiché. Highways in Guatemala are typically named after a department and a number, for example QUI-4. The Inter-American Highway passes through the center of Totonicapán.
Ismael Zambada Sicairos (born 1982) is a Mexican drug trafficker and high-ranking member of the Sinaloa Cartel. He is the son of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada García, one of the cartel's most powerful leaders. Zambada Sicairos, known as El Mayito Flaco, has been implicated in international drug trafficking operations, particularly in the United States and Mexico. He has remained a key figure within the cartel’s internal power struggles and is wanted by U.S. authorities for his role in large-scale narcotics distribution.
Ismael Zambada Sicairos was born in 1982 in Sinaloa, Mexico, into a family deeply entrenched in the drug trade. His father, El Mayo Zambada, has been a dominant force in the Sinaloa Cartel for decades, working alongside or in competition with figures like Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán.
Growing up in this environment, Zambada Sicairos and his siblings were exposed to cartel operations from an early age. He eventually assumed responsibilities within the organization, playing a role in overseeing drug trafficking logistics, security, and cartel finances. His nickname, El Mayito Flaco ("The Skinny Little Mayo"), distinguishes him from his brother, Ismael Zambada Imperial ("El Mayito Gordo").
Zambada Sicairos is identified as a key player in the "Mayiza" faction, a branch of the Sinaloa Cartel led by his father. His specific responsibilities have included:
Money laundering – Managing cartel financial operations, including money laundering networks operating in Mexico and abroad.
Following the 2016 arrest and extradition of El Chapo Guzmán, tensions grew between factions within the Sinaloa Cartel. Zambada Sicairos has been involved in internal conflicts with Los Chapitos[es] (El Chapo's sons), who have sought to consolidate power.
Zambada Sicairos has been a fugitive wanted by U.S. authorities, particularly the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). He has been indicted in the United States for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.
In 2020, U.S. authorities issued an arrest warrant for Zambada Sicairos on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. He has been linked to cocaine and fentanyl shipments that have entered the U.S. through traditional cartel routes, including through Arizona, Texas, and California.
Despite these charges, Zambada Sicairos has managed to evade capture, often moving between rural Sinaloa, Durango, and Mexico City, where cartel operatives protect him.
In July 2024, Zambada García was arrested at the Doña Ana County International Jetport in Santa Teresa, New Mexico. Reports suggest that Joaquín Guzmán López, one of El Chapo's sons, tricked El Mayo into boarding a plane that led to his capture.
Following his father's arrest, Zambada Sicairos assumed leadership of the Mayo faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. This marked a significant turning point, as he became one of the cartel's top figures. However, this transition fueled ongoing violence, particularly in Culiacán, where Los Chapitos and the Mayiza faction have engaged in violent clashes.
Due to his involvement in organized crime, little is publicly known about Zambada Sicairos’ personal life. He is believed to have several properties across Mexico, particularly in Sinaloa and Baja California. Unlike some other cartel figures, he has maintained a relatively low profile, avoiding public appearances or social media exposure.
José María Guízar Valencia, also known by his alias Z-43, is a convicted Mexican criminal. He was the leader of the Zetas Vieja Escuela, a splinter group of Los Zetas active in Tamaulipas.
He was arrested in Mexico City in 2018, being one of the 122 "priority targets" wanted by the Mexican government. The United States had offered a $5 million reward for his capture.[3][4][5]
José Crispín Salazar Zamorano, also known by his alias Don Adán, is the leader of the Los Salazar faction of the Gente Nueva criminal group in Sonora, also known as the Independent Cartel of Sonora.
Irving Eduardo Solano Vera, also known as El Profe or El Gato, is the founder of Gente Nueva, known as the Cártel Independiente de Sonora ('Sonora Independent Cartel') since 2023.
Los Blancos de Troya ('Trojan Targets') is a Mexican cartel that is one of the factions of the Cárteles Unidos. They are active in the Tierra Caliente of Michoacán as well as in Morelia.
El abatimiento de Oseguera Cervantes fue considerado por el gobierno de Estados Unidos como un "gran avance para el mundo" en la lucha contra el narcotráfico.[41] Funcionarios como el subsecretario de Estado Christopher Landau celebraron la operación, recordando que el gobierno estadounidense ofrecía una recompensa de hasta 15 millones de dólares por información que llevara a su captura[37][44]
Tras la muerte de "El Mencho", analistas en seguridad apuntaron a una posible lucha interna por el control de la organización o un intento de reconfiguración del mando del cártel, aunque las autoridades mexicanas se mantuvieron en alerta ante posibles repuntes de violencia derivados del vacío de poder.[40][43]
El 25 de enero de 2026, un grupo de hombres armados irrumpió en un campo de futbol y disparó contra 23 personas, resultando en 11 muertes y 12 heridos. La gobernadora de Guanajuato, Libia Dennise García Muñoz Ledo, anunció la reforzada seguridad en la región y la activación de un operativo conjunto con la Fiscalía General del Estado y fuerzas federales para atender a las víctimas y avanzar con la investigación. El alcalde de Salamanca, César Prieto, confirmó que 11 personas fallecieron en el lugar y 12 resultaron heridas, incluyendo una mujer y un menor de edad.
Microsoft Designer is an AI based image creation and design app by Microsoft originally released as a Windows 11 app, as well as on iOS and Android[6]. It is now also available as a web app and can use AI to generate images, edit images, make graphic design projects and icons. It is available on the Microsoft Store for desktop users.
↑Most of the fighting took place in rural areas of the country, especially in the north and central highlands. According to records kept by the Contras, the departments with the most deaths were (in descending order): Jinotega, Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Chontales, and Zelaya[7]
↑The Sandinistas won the majority of the combats against the Contras, but the 1990 election disarmed both sides, and ultimately led to a stalemate. This being said, they retook power in 2006 after Daniel Ortega won the election, although this time without hostilities.
The Contra War[a] was an armed conflict that took place from 1981 to 1990 in Nicaragua. The conflict started shortly after the Nicaraguan Revolution that led to the socialist Sandinista government ruling the country, and the various dissenting forces collectively known as the Contras.
ADD ESTELI AND MANAGUA/LEON LOC_MAP
The war took place within the broader context of the Cold War, drawing significant involvement from the United States, wbhich provided financial, logistical, and covert military support to Contra factions. The conflict resulted in substantial military and civilian casualties, widespread displacement, and economic disruption, and concluded after negotiated peace agreements an and national elections in 1990 that brought an opposition government to power.
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) established a revolutionary government that enacted widespread social and economic reforms. Opposition to Sandinista rule developed from former regime supporters, rural conservatives, and indigenous communities. Beginning in the early 1980s, several anti‑government groups coalesced under the umbrella term “Contras” and began armed resistance against the Sandinista government.[1]
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was authorized by President Ronald Reagan to provide funding, training, and logistical support to Contra groups as part of a broader U.S. policy to counter perceived Soviet influence in Central America.[2]
Course of the conflict
The Contra War was primarily fought through guerrilla tactics by rebel forces, including ambushes, sabotage, and raids on government outposts. Sandinista forces responded with conventional military operations, conscripted troops, and militia units to defend territory, infrastructure, and population centers.[1]
Throughout the 1980s, the conflict drew international attention. In 1986, revelations about covert arms transfers from the United States to Contra forces, circumventing congressional restrictions, became central to the Iran–Contra affair.[3]
Tactics and strategy
Contra forces primarily used hit‑and‑run guerrilla tactics, focusing on disrupting Sandinista supply lines, attacking rural installations, and avoiding large‑scale engagements. The Sandinista government deployed conventional forces and militia units to secure towns, roads, and key infrastructure, often responding to rebel incursions with patrols and fortified defenses.[1]
Impact and casualties
Estimates vary widely, but thousands of combatants on both sides were killed or wounded during the conflict. Civilians were also affected through displacement, loss of livelihood, and damage to infrastructure. The war significantly disrupted Nicaragua’s economy and social structures, particularly in rural areas near the Honduran border.[1]
U.S. president Ronald Reagan took interest in the war from the very start, since his administration took office in 1981. Reagan was afraid that Nicaragua would turn into a "second Cuba", which by then was already under a communist government led by Fidel Castro for 16 years.[8]
The agrarian reforms and nationalization of land by the Sandinista government led many plantation owners and farmers to leave the country. The most common countries for emigration were Costa Rica and the United States. The first wave of about 120,000 Nicaraguans entering the U.S. happened in the 1980s during the Sandinista government. Many of these people were middle-class or wealthy before the revolution. The second wave occured in early 1989, after Hurricane Joan caused upheaval in the country.
By the late 1980s, international pressure and war fatigue contributed to negotiations for a peace settlement. Regional leaders, i.ncluding Costa Rican President Óscar Arias, promoted peace plans aimed at ending hostilities in Central America. Although fighting continued sporadically, a negotiated settlement and the 1990 general elections led to the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and the eventual demobilization of Contra
forces.[1]
The Contra War remains a subject of historical debate regarding foreign intervention, human rights, and national reconciliation. The conflict’s effects on Nicaragua’s political landscape persisted into subsequent decades, influencing the country’s democratic and social development.[1]
The Esquipulas Peace Agreement peace agreement was signed by both parties in Esquipulas, Guatemala. The agreement stipulated the demobilization of the Contras, ending the war.
The causes of regional instability in Central America and the Caribbean are hard to ascertain, one proposed reason is that the two regions are split into many different countries; the Caribbean for its islands (the Antilles), and Central America for historical and political reasons that date from when it was a Spanish colony.
The Spanish colonial governments divided regions into captaincy generals and provinces, rather than separate states within one republic. This led to different regions developing identities as separate nations during the 16th-18th centuries. The various countries in South America were formed for similar reasons.
Groups in Mesoamerica & belowNicaragua is part of the 'intermediate area'
The area comprising modern-day Nicaragua has long been inhabited by various Indigenous groups.
The Pacific coast of Nicaragua was inhabited by groups like the Nicarao before the Spanish arrived. The areas further inland such as in Matagalpa Department were inhabited by other groups like the Cacaopera, and the areas in the east are inhabited by the Miskito people.
There are an estimated 450,000 Indigenous people living in Nicaragua today. The true number however is unknown, as the country does not collect ethnicity data in the census.
The Spanish conquest of Nicaragua killed hundreds of thousands of Indigenous people in Nicaragua through violence and disease. Estimated vary from 300,000 to over 2 million people killed during the 16th century.
This region is sometimes considered to be a part of Mesoamerica (along with El Salvador and parts of Honduras because some parts of Nicaragua spoke a Nahua language, as well as the fact that they shared other cultural traits with Mesoamerican groups.
However, one of the traits they lack is the cultivation of maize. As such, Nicaragua is usually not categorized as being in Mesoamerica, and is instead categorized as belonging to a region known as the Intermediate Area., that extends from Nicaragua down to Costa Rica, Panama, the [[Guajira Peninsula, and the the Caribbean region of Colombia and Zulia.
Nicaragua is almost antirely geographically separated from Honduras by the Rio Coco and the groups in Costa Rica by the Rio San Juan. This may have led to Costa Rican groups developing differnet cultures and speaking Chibchan languages over time.
The Cacaopera people are primarily located in the Matagalpa Department. This group spoke a Misumalpan language which is now extinct. The language is unrelated to the other languages spoken in Nicaragua, coming from a different language family.
It has been suggested that the Cacaopera lost their language due to suffering heavy casualties in the first century of Spanish rule. They are still the primary group in Matagalpa today.
From 1954 to 1986, Guatemala was under a series of military leaders.
Eraín Ríos Montt, who was president from 1982 to 1983, is regarded as the most egregious leader. Torture, murder, and other human rights abuses increased significantly during his administration, until he was deposed in a coup.
The Inca expansion was the gradual process by which the Inca empire expanded its territory from Cusco to throughout much of the Andes mountains during the 15th and early 16th centuries. Its territory peaked in 1525, before the Spanish conquest.
Operation Red Christmas was an operation undertaken by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to relocate 42 Indigenous Miskito communities away from the Caribbean coast towards inland towns along the Coco River with Honduras, into new communities known as Tasba Pri (Free Land).
This operation was carried out in early 1982, at the outset of Contra actions against the Sandinista government, which were particularly intense in the northeastern region of the Caribbean (or Atlantic) coast.
Navidad Roja fue la operación de traslado de 42 comunidades de indígenas misquitos de la región nor-oriental de la Costa Caribe de Nicaragua desde la franja fronteriza del Río Coco con Honduras hacia el interior del país, a unas nuevas comunidades conocidas como Tasba Pri (Tierra Libre).[1] Esta operación se realizó a principios de 1982, en los inicios de las acciones de los Contras hacia el gobierno sandinista que fueron especialmente virulentas en la región nor-oriental de la costa caribeña o atlántica.
Severo Martóínez Pérez (1973). La Patria del Criollo: Ensayo de interpretación de la realidad colonial guatemalteca.
Modern Guatemalans have varying levels of Indigenous DNA that can be traced to the ancient Maya that inhabited the region.{{{1}}}
The western and central highlands of Guatemala are heavily Indigenous.
The geographical distribution of the modern Maya population is however very different from that of the height of the Maya civilization. The majority of the almost 8 million Maya in Guatemala live in the Guatemalan highlands a mountainous area in the central and southern part of the country, while only 2 million live in the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico and northern Petén, where most of the major sites such as Tikal and Chichén Itzá have been found. Mayanists have hypothesized that this migration was due to the Spanish conquest and potentially the classic Maya collapse that happened more than 600 years earlier.true? Similar to Andean civilizations such as the Inca, the population gradually grew to be greater in the elevated mountains and highlands compared to the vast lowlands of the Petén, Yucatán and the Pacific coast of Guatemala. The terrain led to the development of different mutually unintelligible languages due to reduced contact between groups, such as the Quiché, Mam, and Kaqchikel languages.
During the regime of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, efforts were made to eliminate Maya languages and 'ladinize' the population (make more mestizo). These were successful in some departments, which are almost entirely Ladino and monolingual in Spanish today, despite having significant Indigenous ancestry.
Alta Verapaz is heavily indigenous and primarily populated by the Qʼeqchiʼ Mayan people. The 2018 census recorded 93% of the department's population as belonging to an indigenous group and 80% as belonging to the Qʼeqchiʼ Maya.
HelloTalk has been criticized for its use as a dating app. This has attracted controversy both within the community and in other online forums. Although its gial is to facilitate language learning. the app is ptimarily centered on its chat feature. Some people claim they started romantic relationships through using the app, usually long-distance relationships.
The company has been criticized for encouraging ita use in this way. through prominently featuring lartners of the opposite gender more often, as well as notifications in this vein. Peoplr have critized that HelloTalk no longer primarily focuses on improving language skills.
Reports that users of the app quickly ask language partners for their WhatsApp account raizes further concern over it being abused as a dating app. While HelloTalk aims to connect casual language partners{REF!
}from different countries, WhatsApp focuses on being an instant messaging app primarily used for communication between friends and family. Users who ask their partners to switch to WhatsApp rather than practice second language acquisition have been targeted by criticism as well. HelloTlak has not released any data about the gender of its users as of December 2025{check)
The previous edition of the 2025 Viña del Mar Festival was one of the most controversial in its several decades of history, since it was marked by various controversies of all kinds.[13] Several of them pointed to its organizing channel Mega[14] –a channel that returned to produce the contest after 26 years–, in addition to those directed at the production company Bizarro, which has co-produced the contest since 2019 (until 2024, together with TVN and Canal 13),[15] due to various decisions that affected the festival,[13] The numerous controversies would have administrative consequences within the channel Mega, where it was reported in the media about the dissatisfaction or even anger of Carlos Heller Solari,[16] chairman of the board of the channel's parent company,[17], who allegedly demanded explanations from the executive team due to the negative impact the controversies had on the network’s image and the festival brand.[16]
Among the most criticized aspects were the **limited availability of performances on digital platforms**, since the organizing channel restricted the upload of full shows to platforms such as YouTube.[14] This generated complaints from viewers accustomed to accessing presentations online shortly after their broadcast. In addition, there were **technical problems during several nights**, which affected both the television broadcast and the experience of the audience present at the Quinta Vergara Amphitheater.[13]
Another point of controversy was the **selection of artists and the programming order**, which was questioned by critics and viewers who considered that some nights lacked balance between musical acts and comedy performances. The criticism particularly focused on the limited presence of certain musical genres traditionally represented at the festival.[13]
There were also organizational criticisms directed at the production company Bizarro, mainly related to logistical issues and decisions regarding staging and the timing of certain performances. These criticisms revived the debate about the production model implemented since 2019, in which the festival organization is carried out jointly between the television network holding the broadcasting rights and a private production company.[18]
Despite the controversies of the previous year, the organization confirmed the realization of the **2026 edition of the festival**, maintaining Mega as the broadcasting channel and Bizarro Live Entertainment as the production company.[19]
The festival maintained its **traditional six-night format**, with a combination of international music artists, comedians, and the traditional **International and Folk Competitions**, whose performances are evaluated by a jury and the audience.
The **International Competition** of the festival featured representatives from different countries, each presenting an original song competing for the **Silver and Gold Gaviota awards**.
The festival broadcast in Chile was handled by the television channels of Mega Media: Mega, Mega 2, its streaming service Mega Go, and the group's radio stations, Radio Carolina and Romántica FM.[21]
Regarding the international broadcast, the 65th edition of the festival was the second to be aired almost exclusively internationally, through the streaming service Disney+ and on radio via the local international stations of the Radio Disney network.
Additionally, the Guatemalan channel TV Azteca Guate aired the event on free-to-air television, as it did for the 2024 and 2025 editions.[22]
In contrast to the previous 2025 edition, the 2026 edition was significantly less controversial, producing only isolated disputes rather than widespread public backlash. Notable points of debate included:
Religious offence stemming from comedic routines by performers such as Stefan Kramer, which drew criticism from Chilean Catholic leaders for references to ecclesiastical abuse, and the satirical “Pastor Rocha” persona, which was denounced by some evangelical circles as mocking sacred subjects.
The abrupt cutting of Asskha Sumathra’s performance, provoking extended boos from the audience known as the “Monstruo”.
Accusations of censorship and homophobia, evidenced by hundreds of reports filed with the National Television Council (CNTV).
Public rejection by musician A.B. Quintanilla of a tribute performance to his late sister Selena.
Complaints about late performance slots and technical issues with Matteo Bocelli’s appearance.
Minor controversies including comments by media personality Vasco Moulian directed at the Korean pop group NMIXX and humor by Rodrigo Villegas.
The 2026 edition did address and improve areas that had been heavily criticized in the previous year, particularly in the selection and management of international comedians. After a poorly received performance in 2025, the festival booked Venezuelan comedian Esteban Düch for 2026, who tailored his routine to Chilean cultural references (including topics such as migration and local programming like 31 minutos), establishing rapport with the audience, winning positive responses from the “Monstruo”, and earning both Silver and Gold Seagull awards.
Additionally, in response to criticism from 2025 over the limited availability of full comedy routines and show footage, the organizers made the 2026 festival content available online within hours, instead of restricting access solely to paid platforms for a limited period.
The religious controversy regarding the participation of “Pastor Rocha” in the 2026 Viña del Mar Festival emerged in early February and intensified toward the end of the month, becoming one of the most visible debates prior to the event.[23] The controversy began after his participation was confirmed and was amplified in morning shows and print media. Evangelical leaders criticized the show for being a direct mockery of sacred elements. Chilean pastor Hugo Albornoz, in an interview on the morning magazine program Contigo en la Mañana on Chilevisión on 5 February 2026, stated that Rocha’s humor included “jokes about sacred things,” displayed “contempt for the pastoral ministry,” and “mocked God,” ridiculing religion in general.[24] Journalistic analyses described these reactions as coming from conservative sectors who perceive satire as a liberal attack or disrespect toward evangelical churches, which represent around 18% of the Chilean population.[25]
In addition to Albornoz’s criticism, several young Chilean evangelicals expressed strong opposition to the comedian’s performance at the festival. In interviews on programs such as Hay que decirlo on Canal 13, they stated they were “against” it and requested that sacred matters not be mocked, accusing him of ridiculing the gospel and the pastoral ministry by using the title of "pastor" for his comedic character. They considered it shocking and offensive that he demeaned single women with phrases such as “where are the single mothers” and that he played with sacred elements of Christian faith, which they regarded as disrespect toward God and the biblical word.[26]
Ecuadorian comedian Santiago Endara, 35, known for his satirical character Pastor Rocha, was confirmed as part of the comedy lineup for the festival’s final night on Friday, 27 February 2026, which sparked criticism mainly from Chilean evangelical leaders accusing him of ridiculing the Christian faith, mocking sacred matters, and showing contempt for the pastoral ministry.[27] Endara, born in Ecuador (son of an Ecuadorian father and a Chilean mother), has lived in Chile for approximately seven years. He studied theology for four years, obtaining academic training that includes bachelor’s degrees, licentiates, and diplomas. He currently leads the Christian community La Casa, a church formed during the COVID-19 pandemic combining in-person and digital meetings, catering to both practicing believers and those distant from faith.[27]
Endara has performed stand-up in Chile for seven years. His character Pastor Rocha became a digital phenomenon through viral social media clips, using irony, exaggeration, and sarcasm to address practices and dynamics observed in certain evangelical circles.[24] Recurring satirical themes include: the insistence on tithing as a mandatory financial contribution, extreme biblical literalism, strict dress codes in congregations, expanded notions of “sin” in daily life, idolatry of religious leaders, emotional manipulation in cults (including promises of “rain of gold” or political speeches from the pulpit), and doctrinal rigidity that inhibits dialogue. Endara has repeatedly emphasized that his humor does not attack God or people of faith, but rather human inconsistencies, questionable customs, and potential abuses within religious institutions.[28]
The participation of Italian singer Matteo Bocelli generated criticism directed at the organizing channel, Mega, and the event production, with accusations of disrespect toward the artist due to several situations. The first occurred in the hours prior to his performance, when Bocelli appeared on Mega’s satellite program Only Viña. Much of the episode focused on commenting about the boos received by Daniela Aranguiz, a panelist on the show, during her appearance at the festival gala. Bocelli, who had limited understanding of Spanish and little familiarity with the context of the discussion, appeared visibly confused and uncomfortable at times, which prompted criticism on social media toward the channel and the program panel, including complaints that insufficient attention was given to the guest because of the extensive time devoted to the conversation.[29][30]
Bocelli’s performance, which took place on the first night of the festival, reignited criticisms of the organization stemming from previous editions, particularly regarding time management during each night and the scheduling of performers. Bocelli performed between 02:52 and 03:47 local time (Chile time), when part of the audience at the Quinta Vergara had already begun to leave. Additional criticism was directed at the event production after Bocelli’s microphone ran out of battery during the performance, although the issue was quickly resolved.[31][32][33]
↑The term is especially used in Guatemala in place of mestizo, possibly because mixed-race people in Guatemala have more indigenous ancestry than in other parts of the Americas.[10]
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