Sir John Cass Business School

The purpose of this paper is to do a top down analysis of the asset management and wealth management industries in the United States in particular, also evaluating stocks in the given industries from this perspective. Two periods are taken into consideration: from the beginning of 2001 to the end of 2010 and from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2012. The paper begins with the an economic analysis of the American economy in these two periods, taking into consideration key factors that mostly impacted the financial sector as well as the overall economy such as data about the construction of houses. The asset management and wealth management industries are then analysed for the same period with the perspective of the economy already in place, and then the two industries are briefly compared. A selection of main companies within these industries (most of them within both industries) is then made and these companies are evaluated through a comparison of their ratios. Forecasting techniques for EPS are also used and two recommendations are given for the end of 2010, one buy and one sell. The long-short strategy is then evaluated at the end of the next two years.

Through an inductive study of six corporate venture capital programs, we unravel how new organizational units resolve competing forces from two different institutional environments. The data suggest that the organizational structure of units that enter a new environment depends on whether they "focus their isomorphism" internally toward the parent ("endoisomorphism") or externally toward the industry ("exoisomorphism"). The focus of isomorphism depends on whom the units seek legitimacy with and on the professionalization of their top management teams. We discuss implications of the findings for institutional theory, corporate venture capital, and corporate venturing more generally.

In this paper we scope the relationship between entrepreneurship and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Both entrepreneurship and CSR have attracted increased interest in the early 21st century and been positioned as offering solutions to economic, social and environmental challenges. Previous attempts to determine causal influence between the two concepts have been inconclusive. We explicate the difficult to define concepts of entrepreneurship and CSR by focusing on entrepreneurial process and ...

We study the determinants of mergers and acquisitions around the world by focusing on differences in laws and regulation across countries. We find that the volume of M&A activity is significantly larger in countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder protection. The probability of an all-cash bid decreases with the level of shareholder protection in the acquirer country. In cross-border deals, targets are typically from countries with poorer investor protection than their acquirers' countries, suggesting that cross-border transactions play a governance role by improving the degree of investor protection within target firms. r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G28; G32; G34

This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder base and increases support for shareholder protection. This feedback loop can generate multiple equilibria, with investor protection and stock market size being positively correlated across equilibria. The model's predictions are tested on panel data for 47 countries over 1993-2002, controlling for country and year effects and endogeneity issues. We also document international convergence in shareholder protection to best-practice standards, and show that it is correlated with cross-border M&A activity, consistent with the model. JEL classification: G34, K22, K42.

When firms compete in the managerial labor market, the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects, and is affected by, the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance offer managers more generous compensation packages to incentivize them. This behavior forces firms with good governance to pay their management more than they would otherwise. This externality reduces the value to firms of investing in corporate governance and produces weaker overall governance in the economy. The effect is stronger the greater the competition for managers. The need to raise external capital by firms can improve governance levels not just in the firms that are directly affected by these mechanisms, but also in the competing firms. However, poor governance can also be employed by incumbent firms as a strategic deterrent to entry by new firms. We discuss the implications of this externality view of corporate governance for regulatory standards, ownership structure of firms, and the market for corporate control. JEL classification: G34, J63, K22, K42, L14.