Risk in Decision Theory

Economists routinely measure individual welfare by (von-Neumann-Morgenstern) utility, for instance when analysing welfare intensity, social welfare, or welfare inequality. Is this welfare measure justified? Natural working hypotheses turn out to imply a different measure. It overcomes familiar problems of utility, by faithfully capturing non-ordinal welfare features, such as welfare intensity -- despite still resting on purely ordinal evidence, such as revealed preferences or self-reported welfare comparisons. Social welfare analysis changes when based on this new individual welfare measure rather than utility. (...) For instance, Harsanyi's `utilitarian theorem' now supports prioritarianism. We compare the standard utility-based versions of utilitarianism and prioritarianism with new versions based on our welfare measure. We show that utility is a hybrid object, determined by two rival influences: welfare, and the attitude to intrinsic risk, i.e., to risk in welfare. A new version of Harsanyi's theorem shows that Harsanyi implicitly makes the questionable assumption that society is neutral to intrinsic risk, even when all individuals are averse to intrinsic risk. (shrink)

This paper aims to address the question of how one ought to choose when one is uncertain about what outcomes will result from one’s choices, but when one can nevertheless assign probabilities to the different possible outcomes. These choices are commonly referred to as choices under risk. In this paper, I develop and motivate a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. Roughly, for any agent, S, faced with any choice under risk, ECU (...) theory says that S ought to measure and rank her options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their ECU and S ought to choose whichever option carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several options are tied). The ECU of an option is a probability‐weighted sum of each of its possible comparative utilities. For any option, a, and for any possible state of the world, G, the comparative utility of a in G is the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative(s) to a carry the greatest utility in G. In this paper, I show that in some commonplace decisions under risk, ECU theory gives different recommendations from those of expected utility theory—the standard normative theory of rational choice under risk. (shrink)

Risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory holds that there are many rational ways to relate the utilities of prospects to the utilities of outcomes they comprise, since there are many rational ways to take risk into account. This naturally raises the question of how the goodness of risky prospects relates to the goodness of outcomes they comprise. We canvas several possible answers to this question, and argue that REU theorists should take one prospect to be better than another for an individual (...) only if it is better according to all reasonable ways of taking risk into account. We show that our preferred answer has the resources to respond to a number of problems recently raised for REU in the context of social choice. Our discussion also has lessons for dilemmas in social choice beyond those faced by REU, including dilemmas for prioritarians and population ethicists. (shrink)

According to Stochastic Dominance, it is rationally obligatory to prefer one gamble to another if it gives you the same chances of getting final outcomes you prefer. According to Statewise Maximality, it is rationally permissible not to disprefer a gamble if it is guaranteed not to result in a final outcome you disprefer. These principles conflict in cases involving incomplete preferences, known as Opaque Sweetening cases. In this paper, we argue for Stochastic Dominance and against Statewise Maximality in Opaque Sweetening (...) cases. First, we rebut two standard arguments for statewise maximality, which we call the Argument from Full Information and the Argument from the Primacy of Final Outcomes. We then provide an argument for the verdict of Stochastic Dominance in Opaque Sweetening cases. This argument appeals to the principle of Transitivity, the Sure-Thing Principle, and the claim that stochastic reasoning is appropriate at least for choices which do not involve incomparability. (shrink)

Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I'll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage's Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it.

According to the modal account, risk is a function of modal closeness. A puzzling consequence of this account is that all truths are maximally risky. I defend this puzzling claim against several objections found in the literature, by drawing connections between axiom T for safety and risk and between counterfactual reasoning and risk. I conclude by briefly explaining why we find the conclusion puzzling and by advocating for a pluralist notion of risk where modal risk is a legitimate notion alongside (...) the probabilistic one. (shrink)

A novel theory of comparative risk is developed and defended. Extant theories are criticized for failing the tests of extensional and formal adequacy. A unified diagnosis is proposed: extant theories consider risk to be a univariable function, but risk is a multivariate function. According to the theory proposed, which we call the unified theory of risk, the riskiness of a proposition is a function of both the proportion and the modal closeness of the possible worlds at which the proposition holds. (...) It is argued the theory passes the tests of extensional and formal adequacy. (shrink)

I present a new puzzle about choice under uncertainty for agents whose preferences are sensitive to multiple dimensions of outcomes in such a way as to be incomplete. In response, I develop a new theory of choice under uncertainty for incomplete preferences. I connect the puzzle to central questions in epistemology about the nature of rational requirements, and ask whether it shows that preferences are rationally required to be complete.

Decision theories give guidance about what to do when you face a particular decision. But they also give higher-level advice—depending on how likely you think it is that you’ll face various decision problems, decision theories give advice about the best strategy for picking what to do. For some ways of being uncertain over possible decisions, decision theories that accommodate risk undermine themselves. They simultaneously provide specific advice about what to pick whilst also deeming that very picking strategy to be impermissible. (...) Savage-style expected utility theory does not have this flaw; it always deems its own picking strategies to be the rational ones. Popular decision rules for imprecise probabilities never straightforwardly undermine themselves but they often require adopting strategies that pick in accordance with expected utility theory, thereby coordinating how to pick across different potential decision problems. Some strategies that always pick an option that the decision theory does not reject are deemed impermissible. In particular, randomising amongst non-rejected options is often impermissible. This raises questions about how to use the guidance of an imprecise decision theory when it leaves different options non-rejected. (shrink)

Various decision theories share a troubling implication. They imply that, for any finite amount of value, it would be better to wager it all for a vanishingly small probability of some greater value. Counterintuitive as it might be, this _fanaticism_ has seemingly compelling independent arguments in its favour. In this paper, I consider perhaps the most _prima facie_ compelling such argument: an _Egyptology argument_ (an analogue of the Egyptology argument from population ethics). I show that, despite recent objections from Russell (...) (Noûs, 2023) and Goodsell (Analysis 81(3):420–426, 2021), the argument’s premises can be justified and defended, and the argument itself remains compelling. (shrink)

There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a Pareto principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a statewise dominance principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the problem is faced by many theories (...) of interpersonal aggregation besides utilitarianism, and by many decision theories besides expected value theory. Considering the range of consistent responses, we find all of them to be quite radical. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (Gen AI) has revolutionized various domains, including financial analytics. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the applications, challenges, and future directions of Gen Al in financial analytics. We explore its role in risk management, credit scoring, feature engineering, and macroeconomic simulations, while addressing limitations such as data quality, interpretability, and ethical concerns. By synthesizing insights from recent literature, we highlight the transformative potential of Gen AI and propose frameworks for its effective integration (...) into financial workflows. This paper presents a systematic examination of generative artificial intelligence (Gen AI) applications in financial risk management, focusing on architectural frameworks and implementation methodologies. We analyze the integration of large language models (LLMs) with traditional quantitative finance pipelines, addressing key challenges in feature engineering, risk modeling, and regulatory compliance. The study demonstrates how transformer-based architectures enhance financial analytics through automated data processing, risk factor extraction, and scenario generation. Technical implementations leverage hybrid cloud platforms and specialized Python libraries for model deployment, achieving measurable improvements in accuracy and efficiency. Our findings reveal critical considerations for production systems, including computational optimization, model interpretability, and governance protocols. The proposed architecture combines LLM capabilities with domain-specific modules for credit scoring, value-at-risk calculation, and macroeconomic simulation. Empirical results highlight trade-offs between model complexity and operational constraints, providing actionable insights for financial institutions adopting Gen Al solutions. The paper concludes with recommendations for future research directions in financial Al systems. (shrink)

The rapid adoption of generative AI in various sectors, particularly in finance, has introduced new challenges and opportunities for model risk management (MRM). This paper provides a comprehensive review of the current state of MRM in the context of generative AI, focusing on the risks, regulatory frameworks, and mitigation strategies. We explore the implications of generative AI on financial institutions, the evolving regulatory landscape, and the role of advanced MRM frameworks in ensuring compliance and mitigating risks. By synthesizing insights from (...) over 50 recent articles, this paper aims to provide a roadmap for future research and practical applications of MRM in the generative AI era. It examines the key risks associated with these models, including bias, lack of transparency, and potential for misuse, and explores the regulatory frameworks and best practices being developed to mitigate these risks. We delve into the specific challenges faced by financial institutions in adapting their MRM strategies to encompass generative AI and highlight the emerging tools and technologies that can support effective risk management. This paper also discusses quantitative methods for risk quantification, such as probabilistic frameworks, Monte Carlo simulations, and adversarial risk metrics, which are essential for assessing the reliability and robustness of generative AI models. Foundational metrics, including fairness measures like demographic parity and equalized odds, are explored to address bias and ensure ethical AI deployment. Additionally, the paper presents pseudocode for key algorithms, such as risk quantification and adversarial risk calculation, to provide a practical understanding of these methods. A detailed gap analysis identifies critical shortcomings in current MRM frameworks, such as the lack of standardized validation methods and inadequate handling of adversarial robustness. Based on these gaps, the paper proposes solutions, including the development of advanced validation frameworks, integration of fairness metrics, and alignment with regulatory standards. These findings and proposals aim to guide financial institutions in adopting generative AI responsibly while addressing the unique risks it poses. This paper serves as a valuable resource for professionals and researchers seeking to understand and navigate the complexities of MRM in the age of generative AI. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson (2025) present three objections to normic de minimis expected utility theory (NDEUT) – a decision theoretic framework defended in Smith (2024). In this paper, I respond to these objections and outline some possible ways in which NDEUT might be modified or further developed. Like any de minimis framework, NDEUT employs a risk threshold to sort possibilities into those that must be considered when making a decision, and those that can be (...) legitimately ignored – the so-called ‘de minimis risks’. While this threshold would usually take the form of a probability value, in NDEUT the de minimis risks are identified instead on the basis of their abnormality. In the first section I will set up some of the formalism used in NDEUT and consider Lundgren and Stefánsson’s first objection – which is essentially formal in nature. In the second section I will delve further into the interpretation of NDEUT and consider the second and third objections, which turn on particular examples. (shrink)

A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2—no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems—a fact which is sometimes spun as a (...) “decision theoretic critique” of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of modelling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk. (shrink)

A social planner who evaluates risky public policies in light of the other risks with which their society will be faced should judge favourably some such policies even though they would deem them too risky when considered in isolation. I suggest that a longtermist would—or at least should—evaluate risky polices in light of their prediction about future risks; hence, longtermism supports social risk-taking. I consider two formal versions of this argument, discuss the conditions needed for the argument to be valid, (...) and briefly compare these conditions to some risky policy options with which actual public decision-makers are faced. (shrink)

Expected value maximization gives plausible guidance for moral decision‐making under uncertainty in many situations. But it has unappetizing implications in ‘Pascalian’ situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes. This paper shows, first, that under realistic levels of ‘background uncertainty’ about sources of value independent of one's present choice, a widely accepted and apparently innocuous principle—stochastic dominance—requires that prospects be ranked by the expected value of their consequences in most ordinary choice situations. But second, this implication does not hold when differences (...) in expected value are driven by tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes. Stochastic dominance therefore lets us draw a surprisingly principled line between ‘ordinary’ and ‘Pascalian’ situations, providing a powerful justification for de facto expected value maximization in the former context while permitting deviations in the latter. Drawing this distinction is incompatible with an in‐principle commitment to maximizing expected value, but does not require too much departure from decision‐theoretic orthodoxy: it is compatible, for instance, with the view that moral agents must maximize the expectation of a utility function that is an increasing function of moral value. (shrink)

Should you be willing to forego any sure good for a tiny probability of a vastly greater good? Fanatics say you should, anti‐fanatics say you should not. Anti‐fanaticism has great intuitive appeal. But, I argue, these intuitions are untenable, because satisfying them in their full generality is incompatible with three very plausible principles: acyclicity, a minimal dominance principle, and the principle that any outcome can be made better or worse. This argument against anti‐fanaticism can be turned into a positive argument (...) for a weak version of fanaticism, but only from significantly more contentious premises. In combination, these facts suggest that those who find fanaticism counterintuitive should favor not anti‐fanaticism, but an intermediate position that permits agents to have incomplete preferences that are neither fanatical nor anti‐fanatical. (shrink)

Cost-effectiveness analysis for health interventions is traditionally conducted in a risk-neutral way, insensitive to risk attitudes in the population, which are potentially non-neutral. While the standard outcome metric of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) aims to be deferential to people's valuations of health states, cost-effectiveness analysis of risky interventions using the QALY metric is not similarly deferential to people's risk attitudes. I argue that there is no good justification for this practice. Non-neutral attitudes to risk, especially where they concern individually life-changing (...) interventions need not be irrational, and so imposing neutrality is not justifiable as a way of debiasing preferences. Many common justifications for deference to health state preferences extend to risk attitudes. But even if reasons for deference do not extend, imposition of risk neutrality as opposed to any other rationally permissible risk attitude is under-motivated as default practice. Thus, either methods for measuring risk attitudes separately and incorporating them into cost-effectiveness analysis should be used more widely or a richer set of information should be presented to political decision-makers and the public to enable them to decide how to take into account the individual risks faced by members of the population, on top of aggregate effects on population health. (shrink)

Since the 1970’s there has been a major increase in adventure sports participation but it seems that engagement in such sports comes with a stigma: adventure sports participants are often regarded as reckless ‘daredevils’. We approach the questions about people’s perception of risk and recklessness in adventure sports by combining empirical research with philosophical analysis. First, we provide empirical evidence that suggests that laypeople tend to assess the danger of adventure sports as greater than more mundane sports and judge adventure (...) sports participants as more reckless than participants in non-adventure sports. We contextualise these findings within existing psychological risk perception paradigms and outline new philosophical explanations of the identified pattern in laypeople’s risk perception. (shrink)

Recent claims that artificial intelligence (AI) systems demonstrate “emergent abilities” have fueled excitement but also fear grounded in the prospect that such systems may enable a wider range of parties to make unprecedented advances in areas that include the development of chemical or biological weapons. Ambiguity surrounding the term “emergent abilities” has added avoidable uncertainty to a topic that has the potential to destabilize the strategic landscape, including the perception of key parties about the viability of nonproliferation efforts. To avert (...) these problems in the future, scientists, developers, policymakers, and other parties should take credible steps to strengthen the health of the scientific ecosystem around AI. (shrink)

A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling (...) of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk. (shrink)

Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199(3–4):8701–8740, 2021) and Steel and Bartha (Risk Analysis 43(2):260–268, 2023) argue that we should understand the precautionary principle as the injunction to maximise lexical utilities. They show that the lexical utility model has important pragmatic advantages. Moreover, the model has the theoretical advantage of satisfying all axioms of expected utility theory except continuity. In this paper I raise a trilemma for any attempt at modelling the precautionary principle with lexical utilities: it permits choice cycles or leads (...) to paralysis or implies that the smallest value difference that is possible in a context has extreme axiological implications. (shrink)

Suppose an agent is choosing between rescuing more people with a lower probability of success, and rescuing fewer with a higher probability of success. How should they choose? Our moral judgments about such cases are not well-studied, unlike the closely analogous non-moral preferences over monetary gambles. In this paper, I present an empirical study which aims to elicit the moral analogues of our risk preferences, and to assess whether one kind of evidence—concerning how they depend on outcome probabilities—can debunk them. (...) I find significant heterogeneity in our moral risk preferences—in particular, moral risk-seeking and risk-neutrality are surprisingly popular. I also find that subjects’ judgments aren't probability-dependent, thus providing an empirical defense against debunking arguments from probability dependence. (shrink)

According to a common judgement, a social planner should often use a lottery to decide which of two people should receive a good. This judgement undermines one of the best-known arguments for utilitarianism, due to John C. Harsanyi, and more generally undermines axiomatic arguments for utilitarianism and similar views. In this paper we ask which combinations of views about (a) the social planner’s attitude to risk and inequality, and (b) the subjects’ attitudes to risk are consistent with the aforementioned judgement. (...) We find that the class of combinations of views that can plausibly accommodate this judgement is quite limited. But one theory does better than others: the theory of chance-sensitive utility. (shrink)

When you are indifferent between two options, it’s rationally permissible to take either. One way to decide between two such options is to flip a fair coin, taking one option if it lands heads and the other if it lands tails. Is it rationally permissible to employ such a tie-breaking procedure? Intuitively, yes. However, if you are genuinely risk-averse—in particular, if you adhere to risk-weighted expected utility theory (Buchak in Risk and rationality, Oxford University Press, 2013) and have a strictly (...) convex risk-function—the answer will often be no: the REU of deciding by coin-flip will be lower than the REU of choosing one of the options outright (so long as at least one of the options is a nondegenerate gamble). This turns out to be a significant worry for risk-weighted expected utility theory. I argue that it adds real bite to established worries about diachronic consistency afflicting views, like risk-weighted expected utility theory, that violate Independence. And that, while these worries might be surmountable, surmounting them comes at a price. (shrink)

All ordinary decisions involve some risk. If I go outside for a walk, I may trip and injure myself. But if I don’t go for a walk, I slightly increase my chances of cardiovascular disease. Typically, we disregard most small risks. When, for practical purposes, is it appropriate for one to ignore risk? This issue looms large because many activities performed by those in wealthy societies, such as driving a car, in some way risk contributing to climate harms. Are these (...) activities morally appropriate? -/- In this paper, I first summarize and respond to some arguments that purport to show that it is appropriate to ignore or discount very small risks. I argue that because our rationality is bounded, it is impossible for us to include every small risk in our decision-making process, and so we may reasonably use heuristics to guide many decisions. However, contrary to some thinkers, I argue that this does not violate the spirit of expected value theory; it merely shows that we should adopt a so-called "two-level" view. Our use of heuristics allows for the reasonable ignoring of some risks, and this perhaps explains why one might be inclined to think that individual climate-related risks are negligible. However, virtually all greenhouse-gas emitting activities in fact have some climate risk on the negative side of the ledger, and the use of heuristics does not permit the general ignoring of climate-change-related risk by individuals on grounds of expediency of judgment and decision-making. (shrink)

Underscoring the economic significance of the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, Don Katzner forcefully challenges the continued dominance of the expected utility model based on subjective probability in macroeconomic analysis and offers in its place a simple yet elegant model of decision making inspired by the pioneering work of G.L.S. Shackle. In doing so, Katzner lends support to a research program to identify a more coherent and empirically grounded theory of decision making under uncertainty. Our paper makes three contributions (...) to this program. First, we argue that the appropriate choice of a model of individual behavior under uncertainty cannot be adjudicated merely on logical, a priori grounds, but must ultimately be based on consistency with observed behavior. There are many internally consistent models and their external conditions of validity hardly ever rely on inconceivable scenarios. Second, while Katzner’s model certainly provides a plausible foundation for understanding choice under uncertainty, we suggest that it is somewhat underdetermined. It requires further theoretical articulation to yield testable predictions which differentiate it from competing approaches. Third, we discuss recent experimental findings that may need to be addressed by any satisfactory theoretical account of decision making under uncertainty. (shrink)

This paper aims to scrutinize how the notion of risk should be understood and applied to possibly catastrophic cases. I begin with clarifying the standard usage of the notion of risk, particularly emphasizing the conceptual relation between risk and probability. Then, I investigate how to make decisions in the case of seemingly catastrophic disasters by contrasting the precautionary principle with the preventive (prevention) principle. Finally, I examine what kind of causal thinking tends to be actually adopted when we make decisions (...) on emergent cases. My arguments are mainly based on Japan's 2011 massive earthquake and nuclear power station accident. Masaki Ichinose. (shrink)

What is risk? How do we assess risk? What are the ethical implications of risk? The concept of risk is important – sometimes even crucial – for many philosophical domains, from philosophy of science and technology to ethics and sustainability. Philosophy and Science of Risk is a clear, wide-ranging introduction to this urgent and fast-growing subject. It covers the following key topics: -/- • The philosophical and historical background to understanding and interpreting risk -/- • The meaning of risk and (...) how it differs from closely related concepts, such as uncertainty or dangers -/- • The social construction of risk -/- • Risk perception and risk as an object of scientific study -/- • The measurement of risk, its probability and severity -/- • Risk and scientific modeling -/- • Risk, value judgments, and expertise -/- • Risk management, including cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary approach -/- • Risk communication, including deliberative models -/- • Ethics of risk, including duties toward nonhuman animals and future generations -/- • Risk and sustainability -/- • Decision-making under risk -/- Including helpful additional features such as text boxes, chapter summaries, review, and discussion questions, Philosophy and Science of Risk: An Introduction is an ideal textbook for students of the philosophy of risk. It is also suitable for students studying the conceptual questions surrounding risk in related subjects, such as sociology, psychology, economics, politics, geography, sustainability, and environmental studies. (shrink)

Incommensurability is the impossibility to determine how two options relate to each other in terms of conventional comparative relations. This book features new research on incommensurability from philosophers who have shaped the field into what it is today, including John Broome, Ruth Chang and Wlodek Rabinowicz. The book covers four aspects relating to incommensurability. In the first part, the contributors synthesize research on the competing views of how to best explain incommensurability. Part II illustrates how incommensurability can help us deal (...) with seemingly insurmountable problems in ethical theory and population ethics. The contributors address the Repugnant Conclusion, the Mere Addition Paradox and so-called Spectrum Arguments. The chapters in Part III outline and summarize problems caused by incommensurability for decision theory. Finally, Part IV tackles topics related to risk, uncertainty and incommensurability. Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk, and Decision-Making will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethical theory, decision theory, action theory, and philosophy of economics. (shrink)

How should you evaluate your choices when you’re unsure what their outcomes will be? One popular answer is to rank your options in terms of their expected utilities. But what should you do when you think that the value of their respective outcomes might be incommensurable? In the face of incommensurable values, it no longer makes sense to speak of ranking your options according to expected utility. Are there any general principles to guide us when facing decisions of this kind? (...) If only! This chapter develops an impossibility result: it holds that there are a handful of independently plausible constraints that no such decision theory can jointly satisfy. The result, while depressing, can be used to helpfully classify extant approaches based on which of the constraints they violate. (shrink)

As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, governments have turned to various discretionary measures such as cash transfers to consumers and businesses with mixed results. Universal Basic Income (UBI) is back on the agenda as well. One of the main advantages of UBI, as scholars like F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James M. Buchanan have argued, is that it does not depend upon competent and benevolent government discretion—which is often in short supply—but upon pre-established rules. This paper argues that the (...) UBI scheme holds tentative promise from the point of view of improving the institutional crisis preparedness of a complex socioeconomic order. The pre-established rules of UBI buttress the rule of law framework that improves the ability of economic agents to spontaneously coordinate their actions in times of crisis characterized by radical uncertainty, disequilibrium shocks, and institutional instability. Furthermore, UBI combines the distribution of fungible resources with the delegation of independent decision-making power to millions of crisis-struck individuals and communities. Compared to discretionary tax-and-transfer schemes, the rules of UBI therefore appear more compatible with the polycentric discovery of novel solutions from the bottom-up. In times of crisis, UBI may be relied upon as one cornerstone of what I shall call the permanent crisis management framework. Having such a permanent scheme may minimize - although it does not altogether eliminate - the need for discretionary transfers, targeted intervention, and technocratic management in times of crisis. However, this theoretical model of UBI as a facilitator of polycentric crisis preparedness faces several practical challenges that need to be addressed in further research. (shrink)

Do unknown and unrealized risks of harm diminish an individual’s well-being? The traditional answer is no: that the security of prudential goods benefits an individual only instrumentally or by virtue of their subjective sense of security. Recent work has argued, however, that the security of prudential goods non-instrumentally benefits an individual regardless of whether or not they enjoy subjective security. In this paper, I critically examine three claims about the way in which unknown and unrealized risks of harm might diminish (...) individual well-being: it frustrates a desire to be secure, it frustrates the enjoyment of modally-robust goods, and it undermines the ability to make reasonable plans. Ultimately, I argue that all three of these hypotheses are mistaken, but that they deepen our understanding of the ways in which subjective security is an important constituent of individual well-being. (shrink)

For the purpose of this analysis, risk assessment becomes the primary term and risk management the secondary term. The concept of risk management as a primary term is based upon a false ontology. Risk management implies that risk is already there, not created by the decision, but lies already inherent in the situation that the decision sets into motion. The risk that already exists in the objective situation simply needs to be “managed”. By considering risk assessment as the primary term, (...) the ethics of responsibility for risking the lives of others, the environment and future generations in the first place comes into the forefront. The issue of risk heeding is especially important as it highlights the need to pay attention to warnings of danger and to take action to redress problems before disasters occur. In this paper, the decision making that led to the choice of technology utilized and the implementation of such technology in the case of the space shuttle Challenger disaster will be used as a model to illustrate the need to take ethical factors into account when making decisions regarding the safety of technological systems and the heeding of danger warnings. While twenty-five years separates the decision to launch the Challenger and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster, the lessons of the Challenger disaster are still to be learned. (shrink)

This is a technical supplement for our paper Risk attitudes when choosing for others.