Modality

Nothingness is the most abused word in the human vocabulary. We use it casually, as if nothingness were simply a thin, delicate version of the world. We imagine an empty room, a quiet moment, or a blank canvas. In daily speech, nothingness is just the absence of some particular thing, but the philosophical question of “nothingness” demands something radically different. It demands the absence of all things; all structure, all laws, all time, all possibility, all conditions that could give anything (...) the capacity to exist. True nothingness is not emptiness; it is the collapse of the very framework within which emptiness could be meaningful. Once carried to its proper conclusion, it reveals itself to be an incoherent concept. Something that cannot exist, cannot persist, and cannot even be meaningfully conceived. The task, then, is not to explain why something emerged from nothing, but to understand why nothingness was never a viable alternative in the first place. (shrink)

This version of Colour Dynamism argues a structured chromatic ontology grounded in latent material potential. It presents a working formulation of colour as a condition-sensitive, materially embedded field of chromatic potentials whose manifestation is governed by constraint dynamics. -/- This release serves to establish a public authorship record and conceptual lineage for the SNAP architecture (Structured Network for Activation of Potentials). It is issued as a working draft, not as a finalized publication. This preprint is not peer-reviewed and is not (...) intended to function as a finished scholarly product; it provides a timestamped reference documenting theoretical origin. (shrink)

Ka-Theory develops a transcendental framework for understanding the conditions that make emergence, connection, and structural formation possible. Whereas Anti-Semantics interrogates the institutional and semiotic mechanisms that sustain meaning, Ka-Theory turns to a more primordial stratum: the field in which generation, interruption, and re-generation occur before meaning becomes operative. -/- The theory introduces four foundational operators — Ka (potentialization), Fuka (non-generation), Dansei (rupture), and Saisei (re-connection) — and demonstrates that these operators form the minimal dynamical system underlying any possible structure. Ka (...) is not a metaphysical substance but the pre-structural capacity through which any determination may arise; Fuka marks the zero-phase in which neither existence nor negation is allowed to appear; Dansei describes the non-continuous transition induced when Ka reaches its operative boundary; and Saisei captures the recursive, often unstable, tendency of structures to reconstitute themselves after rupture. -/- The theory further proposes a three-layer model—latent, decoupled, and collapsed strata—describing how potentiality becomes activated, inhibited, or extinguished within structural dynamics. These layers explain how continuity, causality, mass, energy, and even spacetime can be recast not as ontological givens but as configurations of Ka’s operation. -/- Rather than offering a cosmological hypothesis, Ka-Theory provides a formal vocabulary for describing the generative background in which both meaning and non-meaning arise. It articulates the conditions under which a structure can begin, cease, or exceed itself, and thus functions as a foundational counterpart to Anti-Semantics: a theory of possibility where Anti-Semantics is a theory of semantic cessation. (shrink)

Kasei-Theory develops a transcendental framework for describing the pre-structural dynamics from which number, space, time, and meaning become possible. It identifies three primordial phases—Fuka (non-generation), Ka (potential substrate), and Danzetsu (structural rupture)—that collectively constitute the minimal ontological strata prior to any mathematical, physical, or semantic determination. Within this system, Ka denotes the pre-geometric field of potentialization, while Ka-trace refers to the stabilized, readable configurations that emerge only within restricted regions of structural coherence. -/- A central contribution of the theory is (...) the replacement of the classical real/imaginary decomposition with a dual pre-structural architecture: Ka-density and Ka-phase. Rather than treating complex numbers as numerical dualities, Kasei-Theory interprets them as the two operational modes through which Ka stabilizes or rotates: difference-update (real-time stabilization) and phase-update (imaginary-time rotation). The imaginary unit i is thereby redefined not as an “unreal number,” but as the minimal directional marker for reading Ka-phase—an invariant of pre-structural orientation rather than an algebraic artifact. -/- Building on this shift, the theory introduces the latent → dec → col hierarchy of density states, which governs the activation, stabilization, and collapse of all structures. -/- latent-density: pre-formal potential without readable difference -/- Kasei-Theory proposes a foundational revision of how mathematical, physical, and semantic structures arise. It identifies three pre-structural phases—Fuka (non-generation), Ka (potential substrate), and Danzetsu (rupture)—from which number, space, time, and meaning first become possible. These phases form the ontological strata beneath any existing formal system. -/- The theory’s core breakthrough is the replacement of the real/imaginary decomposition with the dual architecture of Ka-density and Ka-phase. In this reformulation, complex numbers cease to represent two numerical types; they encode the two fundamental operational modes—difference-update and phase-update—through which structure stabilizes or collapses. The imaginary unit i is reinterpreted as the minimal directional operator of phase-reading, not a number. -/- From this shift follows a three-tiered hierarchy—latent, dec, col—describing how structure activates, stabilizes, and fails. This single mechanism unifies phenomena previously treated as unrelated: continuity, singularities, imaginary time, confinement, mass gaps, phase inversion, and non-perturbative breakdowns. Each arises where dec-density loses stability and Ka-phase or col-density becomes exposed. -/- The theory introduces the Ka-map, a pre-geometric distribution of density and phase from which continuity, metric structure, and temporal flow emerge. From this view, real numbers, spatial manifolds, and physical laws are not fundamental; they are localized readout regimes of dec-density. When this regime fails, imaginary time, collapse dynamics, and non-classical phases appear naturally. -/- As the constructive counterpart to Anti-Semantics, Kasei-Theory provides the generative half of a unified framework for genesis and breakdown across mathematics, physics, and meaning. Together they show that continuity, law, and sense are not primitives but thin, contingent stabilizations between latent and collapsed strata. -/- Key Contributions (2025 Update) -/- Establishes a transcendental ontology of Fuka / Ka / Danzetsu as pre-structural phases. -/- Replaces the real/imaginary distinction with Ka-density / Ka-phase as fundamental operative modes. -/- Reinterprets i as a directional marker of phase-reading, not a numerical entity. -/- Introduces the latent–dec–col hierarchy, providing a unified mechanism for continuity, collapse, and singular behavior. -/- Reconstructs number, space, time, and physical law as localized readout regimes of dec-density. -/- Defines the Ka-map as the global substrate from which geometry and temporality emerge. -/- Provides a common generative model for mathematical continuity, physical law, quantum breakdown, and semantic genesis. -/- Version Note (2025): This manuscript is part of an actively developing theoretical framework. Terminology and structural formulations are periodically refined as the theory advances. (shrink)

This thesis presents a comprehensive critical analysis of Liu Cixin's Dark Forest Theory, one of the most influential proposed solutions to the Fermi Paradox in contemporary science fiction and theoretical astrobiology. Through extensive literature review, mathematical analysis, and empirical evaluation, we identify fundamental limitations in the Dark Forest hypothesis, including technological determinism, static equilibrium assumptions, and oversimplified resource competition models. To address these shortcomings, we propose the Adaptive Equilibrium Theory (AET), a novel theoretical framework that incorporates dynamic game theory, technological (...) transcendence pathways, and spatial heterogeneity to provide a more sophisticated and empirically consistent model of galactic civilization dynamics. -/- Our analysis reveals that while the Dark Forest Theory offers compelling narrative explanations for the apparent absence of detectable alien civilizations, it fails to account for the complex, multi-dimensional nature of technological development, strategic evolution, and resource utilization that would characterize advanced interstellar civilizations. The Adaptive Equilibrium Theory addresses these limitations by proposing that galactic civilizations exist in a dynamic, multi-dimensional strategy space where multiple coexistence mechanisms enable diverse civilization types to survive and thrive without resorting to universal mutual destruction. -/- The implications of this research extend beyond theoretical astrobiology to practical considerations for human civilization's long-term survival strategies, SETI research methodologies, and our understanding of intelligence and cooperation in complex systems. We conclude that the universe, while potentially dangerous, is not necessarily the uniformly hostile "dark forest" envisioned by Liu Cixin, but rather a complex ecosystem where strategic adaptation and niche differentiation may enable peaceful coexistence among diverse forms of intelligence. (shrink)

Alberic of Paris was one of the leading philosophers of the 12th century. He was the main rival to Peter Abelard and, according to John of Salisbury, “a most fierce opponent of the nominalist school.” But although he was an important figure in his time, Alberic is almost completely unknown today. -/- This collection of essays is the first ever dedicated to exploring and contextualizing the views of Alberic and his followers, the Albricani. It discusses topics such as universals, time, (...) mereology, divine foreknowledge, fallacies, and modal logic, and shows that Alberic was an original thinker in a vibrant intellectual milieu. -/- Contributors are Andrew W. Arlig, Enrico Donato, Sten Ebbesen, Charles Girard, Heine Hansen, Peter King, John Marenbon, Sofia Orsino, Boaz Faraday Schuman, Caterina Tarlazzi, Paul Thom, and Wojciech Wciórka. (shrink)

On Aristotle’s view, science is centrally concerned with two sorts of facts: indemonstrable principles and the facts demonstrable from them. Indemonstrable definitions (or accounts of the essences of things) have an important role to play in this explanatory project, as they are one of the three kinds of principles Aristotle discusses. This article examines Aristotle’s ideas about how we can best identify and come to know such definitions. Three prominent kinds of interpretations of Aristotle’s position are addressed: the Intuitionist (or (...) Rationalist) interpretations favored by authors such as Ross, Irwin, and Frede, the Explanationist interpretations proposed by authors such as Bolton, Charles, and Lennox, and the Socratic interpretation recently articulated and defended by David Bronstein. This article argues for an Explanationist interpretation, showing why it is well-supported by key methodological passages and how it can be reconciled with the texts that have motivated the aforementioned rival accounts of Aristotle’s position. (shrink)

We explore the view that knowledge of grounding is based on knowledge of essence. We assess different existing accounts of the relation between essence and grounding and identify some of their shortcomings. In response, we propose a novel account that we argue is better suited to explain this relation and show how this can further explain knowledge of grounding. Finally, we examine how one can transition from knowledge of essence to knowledge of grounding. We maintain that, at least in some (...) cases, it is possible to know what grounds what—non-circularly and inferentially—on the basis of knowledge of essence. (shrink)

Several philosophers contend that a theistic multiverse (TM), a collective of all possible universes worthy of divine creation, is the best possible world, and that this fact proves helpful to theism in the face of various objections. Almeida (2017), however, argues that proposed theories of TM are incoherent. After presenting TM, I distinguish three objections Almeida raises against it: God cannot create universes corresponding to other possible worlds, we cannot know whether TM includes only worthwhile universes, and TM violates the (...) principle of plenitude. I show that none of these undermine TM’s potential to address various objections to theism. (shrink)

Can we, in keeping with Fine’s celebrated distinction between essential and merely-necessary properties, account for essence in terms of necessity plus something else? One appealing idea is that essence can be accounted for in terms of necessity plus intrinsicality. However, as brought out recently by Zylstra, if intrinsicality is treated as a feature which properties and relations possess tout court, a necessity-plus-intrinsicality account will not deliver the goods on Fine’s celebrated example of Socrates and the set containing him. I argue (...) that, if we have available a notion of intrinsicality which applies to relations in a place-relative way, we avoid the problem. I give independent motivation for the idea that intrinsicality is place-relative, and discuss the philosophical options for understanding place-relative intrinsicality in a way that is suitable for a necessity-plus-intrinsicality account of essence. (shrink)

Improvisações para MENINA RODAMOINHO com pedaços do seu corpo: rodando o braço direito com a mão esquerda, o coração saindo pela boca, os cabelos enrolados aos intestinos, o útero escorrendo pela orelha...”. Este é o trecho que abre Parque – um texto que faz parte do conjunto dos objetos que não necessariamente são mas têm sido chamados de “poesia” e que foi escrito quando Felipe G. A. Moreira tinha vinte e três anos. Hoje com quarenta anos, o autor também assina (...) o texto filosófico de abertura deste livro, desenvolvendo uma interpretação segundo a qual Parque é traduzível para os termos de um argumento: se são imagináveis seres humanos – isto é, animais lógicos – que não têm nem a restrição animal e nem a restrição lógica, ter tais restrições não é uma propriedade necessária desses animais. Uma restrição animal é ilustrada por aquela de não poder viver por milênios. Um exemplo de restrição lógica é a de não se poder carecer de logos sem arcar com certas consequências como a de ser internado numa instituição psiquiátrica. (shrink)

The Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is beset by two rival interpretations: the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation and the counterfactual might interpretation. In a 2023 paper Waldrop argued that the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation conflicts with certain principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. In this paper, I show that Waldrop’s argument can be adapted to prove that the counterfactual might interpretation also conflicts with the same principles. So the problem Waldrop pointed out is not peculiar to the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation.

This paper expounds A. G. Baumgarten’s innovative account of contingent existents. It will be shown that Baumgarten’s contribution consists in accounting for the difference between merely possible and actual beings in terms of determinacy. The resulting account is attractive: it does not require a distinct property that sets actual beings apart, and it provides a promising metaphysical backdrop for explaining thought about possibilia.

Modern science—and most theories of laws—are built around regularity (i.e., patterns that repeat or persist). Yet much of what we meet looks irregular. Irregularity Theory (IT) starts there. It asks what irregularity is, and what must be true of a world in which irregularities can appear at all. The answer is strict: even irregularity presupposes persisting order—a minimal structure that endures across neighbouring instants so that we can re-identify items through change and make sense of interactions across moments. From this, (...) a conditional follows wherever anything exists in our universe (or, more generally, in any domain), some persisting order must obtain. In that sense Absolute Irregularity—the total absence of any persisting order—is incompatible with existence. The result is not a theory of law; it is a pre-nomic constraint that any account of laws must respect. It clarifies how widespread irregular appearances can coexist with minimal order, and it sets the groundwork for further papers on Descartes’ cogito, reducing Foundationalism to physics, explaining why anything exists, and comparisons across law-theories (Humean Best-System: Lewis 1986; anti-Humean constraint/governing views: Maudlin 2007; for irregularity context: Miller 2014a). (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic overview of the contemporary debate on the notion of essence, highlighting important connections to classical interpretations. We begin by presenting the modal approach, which understands essence primarily through possible worlds semantics, critically assessing its limitations in capturing the full complexity of the notion. We then turn to the currently dominant primitivist approach, exploring its underlying intuitions and the possibility it opens for defining modalities in terms of essence. Finally, we propose an alternative framework that introduces (...) essence through the notion of numerical identity. By comparing these approaches, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of essence that bridges historical and contemporary philosophical thought, ultimately contributing to ongoing discussions in metaphysics. (shrink)

This thesis addresses a fundamental question in contemporary philosophy: Does ontological instability render intentional action futile, or does it reveal a deeper layer of ethical urgency grounded in participatory becoming? Traditional philosophical frameworks have assumed that effective intentional action requires a stable ontological foundation, leading to the apparent dilemma that either reality is stable enough to ground action or unstable enough to render action futile. This work challenges this binary through the development of Participatory Urgency Theory (PUT), a novel theoretical (...) framework that demonstrates how ontological instability enhances rather than undermines moral agency. -/- Through rigorous philosophical analysis, theoretical synthesis, and empirical modeling, this thesis argues that ontological instability creates the very conditions that make ethical action both possible and urgent. The research integrates insights from contemporary work on fluctuational metaphysics [1], process philosophy [2], intentional action theory [3], and emergency ethics [4] to develop a comprehensive framework that reconceptualizes the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. -/- The key findings demonstrate that: (1) ontological instability generates spaces of possibility where agency can emerge and intervene; (2) participatory becoming provides the foundation for distributed rather than individual agency; (3) ethical urgency arises from our role as co-creators of reality rather than external observers; and (4) fluctuational ethics offers a more responsive and creative approach to moral reasoning than traditional rule-based systems. -/- The thesis contributes to philosophy through the introduction of Participatory Urgency Theory, which bridges metaphysics and ethics in a novel way, provides empirical predictions for testing philosophical claims, and offers practical implications for addressing contemporary global challenges. The work concludes that ontological instability, far from rendering action futile, reveals the fundamental ethical imperative of participating in reality's continuous becoming. (shrink)

Die Philosophie wurde von so unterschiedlichen Philosophen wie Wolff und Russell als Moglichkeitswissenschaft bezeichnet. Doch erwiesen sich die modalen Konzepte von Moglichkeit und Notwendigkeit als sperrig und vieldeutig, und ihr Verhaltnis zum Wirklichkeitsbegriff bleibt problematisch. Die vorliegende Sammlung beleuchtet die Metaphysik und Logik von Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit aufs Neue und betrachtet sie aus unterschiedlichsten Perspektiven jenseits der Dichotomie von analytischer und kontinentaler Philosophie. Die Philosophiegeschichte (von der griechischen Antike bis zu David Lewis) kommt ebenso zu Wort wie die Semantik moglicher (...) Welten; Logik, Mathematik und Computerwissenschaft ebenso wie Literatur und Neue Medien; Formen des wissenschaftlichen ebenso wie des fiktionalen Diskurses. Philosophy has been called the science of the possible by philosophers as diverse as Christian Wolff and Bertrand Russell. The modal concepts of possibility and necessity, however, have proved to be ambiguous and recalcitrant to analysis, and their relation to the concept of reality have remained problematic up to the present day. Transcending the worn-out dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy, this collection of papers takes a fresh look at the metaphysics and logic of possibility and reality, and illuminates them from a great variety of perspectives. Topics include the history of philosophy (from Greek antiquity to David Lewis) as well as the semantics of possible worlds; logic, mathematics and computer science as well as literature and the new media; forms of scientific as well as fictional discourse.". (shrink)

As the name suggests, Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) entails the claim that structure is all there is. However, several critics have argued that OSR’s ontology is incomplete. There must be something ontologically significant beyond structure. I will suggest an ontology for these critics, one that invokes what Ladyman and Ross call “Kantian residue”. In doing so, I modify Rae Langton’s Kantian humility thesis to incorporate some extra-structural noumenal “something=x” (as Kant puts it). This involves positing (a) that a mysterious something=x (...) exists and (b) that something=x is responsible for structure (specifically structure’s non-arbitrary properties). Responsibility is a modal relation that is potentially equivalent to some asymmetric relation (causation, explanation, determination, grounding, or the like). Regarding the nature of something=x, I argue in deflationary spirit that we can only know that it is that which is responsible for structure. (shrink)

I argue that John Norton’s notions of empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility can be successfully used to analyze counterintuitive examples of physical possibility and align better with modal intuitions of practicing physicists. First, I clarify the relationship between Norton’s possibility notions and the received view of logical and physical possibility. In particular, I argue that Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility cannot coincide with the received view of physical possibility; instead, the received view of physical possibility is a special case (...) of Norton’s logical possibility. I illustrate my claims using examples from Classical Mechanics, General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. I then arrive at my conclusions by subsuming Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities under a single concept of conditional inductive possibility and by analyzing the types and degrees of strengths that can be associated with it. (shrink)

The idea that abilities should be understood as a modal tie between one's motivational states and one's actions is at the core of the most prominent views of abilities. I develop a novel challenge against such views of ability arguing that all these accounts cannot properly account for inabilities and compulsions.

The modal ontological argument for God’s existence faces a symmetry problem: a seemingly equally plausible reverse modal ontological argument can be given for God’s non-existence. Here we argue that there are significant asymmetries between the modal ontological argument and its reverse that render the latter more compelling than the former. Specifically, the latter requires a weaker logic than the former and, unlike the former, avoids the symmetry problem. We also explore to what extent these observations represent a new pathway to (...) atheism. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper critically examines Saul Kripke’s theory of rigid designation and a posteriori necessity through the lens of Karl Popper’s falsificationist methodology. The analysis reveals that Kripke’s arguments conflate nomological impossibility (contingent scientific laws) with metaphysical necessity, committing a modal scope fallacy. By dissecting Kripke’s examples—such as rigid designators for singular terms ( this table, Elizabeth’s parents ) and universal terms ( heat is molecular motion, water is H₂O )—we demonstrate that his claims of necessary truths rely on implicit empirical (...) generalizations rather than essentialist metaphysics. Key objections include: 1. The Nomological Fallacy: Kripke mistakes contingent biological/physical laws (e.g., "humans have exactly two parents") for necessary truths, ignoring Popper’s distinction between falsifiable laws and metaphysical necessity. 2. Verbalism in Essentialism: Questions like "What is heat?" are definitional, not ontological; Kripke’s "necessary a posteriori truths" collapse into tautologies when stripped of redundant terminology. 3. Misapplied Modal Logic: Kripke’s inference from "law L prohibits X " to " X is metaphysically impossible" is invalid—a confusion of empirical regularity with logical necessity. The paper concludes that rigid designation, divorced from essentialism, reduces to trivial indexicality (e.g., "water" means H₂O on Earth but H₂SO₄ on Twin Earth), rendering the theory empirically vacuous. Kripke’s framework, while influential, ultimately rests on a category error corrected by Popper’s emphasis on contingent, falsifiable laws over metaphysical finality. (shrink)

Modeling cuts across sundry scientific practices, contributing to theorizing, experimentation, prediction, measurement, scientific instrumentation, and science education. Beyond the sciences, modeling plays a crucial role in citizen engagement with science and public policy decision-making. It plays a major role in the efforts to address the huge challenges of the 21st century, including but not limited to climate change, shortage of natural resources, loss of biodiversity, and economic forecasting in increasingly unforeseeable situations. The diversity of scientific models is astounding; side-by-side mathematical (...) and scale models, technological advances such as rapidly expanding big data, computational and synthetic approaches, and generative AI are pushing modeling toward new frontiers, redefining the epistemic agency between humans and scientific instruments. A discussion of what we can achieve through modeling, and how we should manage model-based practices, is critical for ensuring a good and responsible use of this epistemic resource. The chapters of The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Scientific Modeling, written by experts in various areas of the philosophy of science, seek to provide enduring philosophical insights and useful analyses for understanding modeling in its multiplicity. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I set out a new argument for the coherence of indeterministic building and defend its premises. The argument hinges on the underexplored notion of indeterministic supervenience. First, I argue that the logical possibility of an indeterministic supervenience relation entails the coherence of indeterministic building. Second, I argue that indeterministic supervenience is indeed logically possible. I conclude that there is a straightforward argument for the coherence of indeterministic building that has so far gone unnoticed.

This is the final draft of the SEP entry "Branching time" by me and the great Alberto Zanardo. See external links for the published version.

Este trabalho apresenta, em linhas gerais, uma visão esquemática da arquitetura filosófica de um novo Sistema fundada sobre três pilares principais: (1) a formulação de uma condição lógico-metafísica absolutamente necessária — S(Ⓣ(φ)) — que estabelece o Ser como condição universal e intranscendível de toda proposição e fato verdadeiros; (2) a demonstração metafísica, por via de um argumento alético-modal, da impossibilidade do nada absoluto e, por conseguinte, da necessidade de um Ser absoluto, identificado como Deus em sentido estritamente filosófico; (3) a (...) construção de uma ontologia estrutural estratificada unida a uma teoria da verdade, em que Deus é concebido como ultraestrutura da Verdade Transcendente (Verdade Absoluta ⇄ Vida Absoluta ⇄ Vontade Absoluta), fundamento superior da hiperestrutura axial imanente (Verdadeiridade ⇄ Belezidade ⇄ Bonidade), por sua vez fundamento da superestrutura fático-proposicional (T(p) ⇄ F). A tridimensão é unificada por um princípio dialético-ontoeinailógico radical — o da identidade autocontraditada —, pelo qual o sistema propõe uma filosofia do Ser como Verdade, em que o pensamento reencontra a possibilidade de afirmar o absoluto por meio da razão. Trata-se de uma proposta original que reabilita a ambição sistemática e restitui à filosofia a tarefa fundamental de pensar, de forma rigorosa e afirmativa, aquilo que “necessariamente é”, o objeto próprio da einailogia. (shrink)

This work presents, in general terms, a schematic view of the philosophical architecture of a new System based on three main pillars: (1) the formulation of an absolutely necessary logical-metaphysical condition — S((T)(φ)) — which establishes Being as a universal and untranscendable condition of every true proposition and fact; (2) the metaphysical demonstration, by means of an alethical-modal argument, of the impossibility of absolute nothingness and, consequently, of the need for an absolute Being, identified as God in a strictly philosophical (...) sense; (3) the construction of a stratified structural ontology united to a theory of truth, in which God is conceived as the ultrastructure of Transcendent Truth (Absolute Truth ⇄ Absolute Life ⇄ Absolute Will), the superior foundation of the immanent axial hyperstructure (Truthfulness ⇄ Beauty ⇄ Goodness), in turn the foundation of the factual-propositional superstructure (T(p) ⇄ F). The three-dimension is unified by a radical dialectical-ontoeinailogical principle — that of self-contradicted identity — by which the system proposes a philosophy of Being as Truth, in which thought rediscovers the possibility of affirming the absolute by means of reason. It is an original proposal that rehabilitates systematic ambition and restores to philosophy the fundamental task of thinking, in a rigorous and affirmative way, what "necessarily is", the proper object of einailogy. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta o argumento alético-modal como uma demonstração filosófico-conceitual rigorosa da necessidade do Ser Absoluto. Argumenta-se que, se tudo fosse contingente, o nada absoluto seria possível; no entanto, tal hipótese revela-se logicamente e metafisicamente incoerente, pois contradiz as condições de inteligibilidade e de verdade. Conclui-se, portanto, que uma necessidade absoluta deve ser afirmada. O argumento defende que a necessidade, enquanto modalidade alética, pressupõe um fundamento no Ser e não pode ser reduzida à pura formalidade lógica. Assim, a necessidade afirmada (...) não é meramente epistêmica ou formal, mas metafísica - o que justifica a identificação de Deus como o Ser Absoluto e Necessário no passo final decisivo. (shrink)

This paper presents the alethic-modal argument as a rigorous philosophicalconceptual demonstration of the necessity of the Absolute Being. It is argued that if everything were contingent, absolute nothingness would be possible; however, such a hypothesis proves to be logically and metaphysically incoherent, as it contradicts the conditions of intelligibility and truth. It is concluded, therefore, that an absolute necessity must be affirmed. The argument maintains that necessity, as an alethic modality, presupposes a foundation in Being and cannot be reduced to (...) mere logical formality. Thus, the affirmed necessity is not merely epistemic or formal, but metaphysicalwhich justifies identifying God as the Absolute and Necessary Being in the final decisive step. (shrink)

The modal theory of luck, according to one influential version of it, holds that an event is lucky if and only if it actually obtains but fails to obtain in some close possible worlds, holding fixed certain initial conditions for the event. There have been some notable critiques of the theory. But they are not fully satisfactory, for they succumb to two typical and compelling strategies of defending the modal theory. By invoking a special fair lottery case, adapted from the (...) well-known Frankfurt cases on free will, this article presents a novel attack on the modal theory. As to be shown, there are cases where someone wins a fair lottery as a matter of good luck, yet there are no close possible worlds where he fails to win it. I also argue that the two typical and compelling strategies of defending the modal theory do not meet our challenge. (shrink)

Two approaches to elevating certain laws of nature over others have come to prominence recently. On the one hand, according to the meta-laws approach, there are meta-laws, laws which relate to laws as those laws relate to particular facts. On the other hand, according to the modal, or non-absolutist, approach, some laws are necessary in a stricter sense than others. Both approaches play an important role in current research, questioning the ‘orthodoxy’ represented by the leading philosophical theories of natural laws—Humeanism, (...) the DTA view, dispositional essentialism and primitivism. This paper clarifies the relations between these two emerging approaches, as well as their applicability to physical laws and the status of the challenges they pose for standard theories of laws of nature. We first argue that, despite some significant similarities between the two approaches (especially in the context of Lange’s counterfactual account of laws), they are in general distinct and largely independent of each other. Then, we argue that the support for meta-laws from physical theory and practice is more questionable than usually presented. (shrink)

Quantum theory might make the cosmos more certain than classical physics ever did.

Conventionalism about necessity was deemed hopeless for a long time. The philosophical landscape, however, is shifting now with recent work in modal metaphysics locating the source of necessity in some kind of convention, albeit non-linguistic. Modal neo-conventionalists claim that a proposition is necessary just when it is true and is classified as such as a matter of convention. But what is the function of adopting a convention about necessity? And what are these conventions that distinguish what is possible from what (...) is impossible, anyway? In this paper, I first offer an elucidation of the two accounts of neo-conventionalism, which I call ‘worlds-based neo-conventionalism’ and ‘axiom-based neo-conventionalism’. Then, I discuss a number of pressing questions that modal neo-conventionalism faces. The moral is that neo-conventionalists have some work to do in order for the account to be explanatorily satisfactory. (shrink)

Two definitions of deduction are offered. The first is that deduction is an inference type that is both possibly valid and possibly invalid. No inference can satisfy this definition, because valid inferences are not possibly invalid and invalid inferences are not possibly valid. In the second definition, deduction is understood as an inference that aims for validity. This definition also has unwanted consequences, including the fact that invalid inferences are only deductive when they are thought to be possibly valid. If (...) the only genuine deductions are the valid ones, then our talk about deduction is an indirect and thoughtless way of referring to valid inferences rather than to an inference type. There is simply no deduction to speak off. Only valid inferences. (shrink)

In relation to inferences, there is a tendency to conflate metaphysical with epistemic modalities. Concerning deductive inferences, necessity is conflated with certainty, but deductive inferences can be just likely based on the available evidence. Non-deductive inferences are defined by their uncertainty, but their epistemic status is insufficient to distinguish them from deductive inferences.

This volume draws connections between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the work of Saul Kripke, especially his Naming and Necessity. Saul Kripke is regarded as one of the foremost representatives of contemporary analytic philosophy. His most important contributions include the strict distinction between metaphysical and epistemological questions, the introduction of the notions of contingent a priori truth and necessary a posteriori truth and original accounts of names, descriptions, identity, necessity and realism. The chapters in this book elucidate the relevant connections between Kripke's (...) work and Wittgenstein, specifically concerning the standard meter, contingent apriori and rule-following. The contributions shed light on how Kripke's philosophical outlook was influenced by Wittgenstein, and how mainstream analytic philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy can fruitfully engage with one another. Kripke and Wittgenstein will be of interest to philosophers working on Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This paper responds to Friend’s (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science and the structure of modal space.

Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from (...) dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these are not the kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. (shrink)

Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this paper, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We (...) should regard possibility with at least as much suspicion, that is to say as incurring at least as much of an explanatory demand, as necessity. In fact, I suggest that we might even be justified in reversing the burden of proof asymmetry and adopting a necessity bias. This has quite radical implications for philosophical methodology and hence for many first-order philosophical concerns. (shrink)

Current orthodoxy in modal logic and metaphysics has it that actuality is non-contingent in the following sense: for all p, if actually, p, then necessarily, actually, p. Call this thesis (Actuality) Necessitism and its negation (Actuality) Contingentism. Thus, according to Contingentism, there is at least one proposition p which is actually true but which could have been actually false. In another paper, one of us (Glazier 2023) has recently defended Contingentism. The present paper explores the logic of actuality under Contingentism. (...) After informally introducing Contingentism and outlining what we take to be the main motivations for accepting it, we consider how contingent actuality should be taken to be. We argue that the nature, or essence, of actuality imposes certain limits on the extent to which actuality could have been different, and these then inform our view of the logic of actuality. Turning to the formal study of the logic of contingent actuality, we specify a formal language and a possible world semantics for that language and distinguish a number of natural notions of validity and consequence to which it gives rise. We present axiomatizations of the different resulting logics and examine the variety of iterated modalities in our systems. We establish soundness and completeness results. (shrink)

Thought experiments feature prominently in both scientific and philosophical methods. In this paper, I investigate two questions surrounding knowledge in the thought experiment process. First, on what implicit knowledge do thought experiments rely? Second, what provides epistemic justification for beliefs acquired through the process? I draw upon neo-Aristotelian metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology to argue that essence is the object of implicit knowledge that anchors the imagined possibilities involved in thought experiments to the actual world, and that this essentialist knowledge enables (...) the possibility of prima facie justification being conferred by the phenomenological givenness of thought experiment scenarios. (shrink)

Šis straipsnis padalintas į tris dalis. Pirmojoje ir antrojoje dalyse pristatau žinomą Ištroškusio keliautojo mintinį eksperimentą ir analizuoju, kaip Carolina Sartorio aiškina jo kauzalinę struktūrą. Teigiu, kad kruopštesnis nagrinėjimas atveria šio aiškinimo spragas. Trečiojoje dalyje nagrinėju Sartorio siūlomą naują moralinės sėkmės rūšį, kurią, jos manymu, Ištroškusio keliautojo atvejis atskleidžia. Toliau išplečiu argumentacijos lauką apžvelgdamas kitas šiuolaikines moralinės sėkmės kategorijas ir darau išvadą, kad visos jos nepakankamai apgalvotos.

This essay defends two theses regarding the explanation, or ground, of modality in the early modern period. First, for philosophers in the period, essences ground a range of important modal facts. Second, as the period progresses, we witness increased skepticism about certain modal facts, due to a growing skepticism about the scope or existence of essences. These theses are supported by examination of three case studies: Descartes’ treatment of substance and mode (which forms the core of his ontology); Malebranche’s treatment (...) of causation (which bears on his defense of occasionalism); and Locke’s treatment of necessary connections among properties (which is related to his accounts of individuals and kinds). It is shown that in each case, claims about necessity and possibility take center stage, and that in each case, the status of these claims hinges on the status of claims about essences. (shrink)

Rozwiązanie paradoksów Rossa i Priora okazało się trudnym zadaniem. Jego pierwsze dwa etapy, obejmujące identyfikację prawdziwych natur implikacji i wartości logicznych, zostały opisane w artykułach "Rozwiązanie paradoksu implikacji materialnej – 2024" i "Rozwiązanie dylematu Jörgensena – 2024". Ten artykuł opisuje trzeci etap, obejmujący odkrycie brakujących funktorów modalnych i Klasycznego Rachunku Modalności. Na zakończenie zostają podane procedury rozwiązania obu paradoksów.

Priority monism is the doctrine that there is only one basic object: the entire cosmos. Priority monists often take this to be a metaphysically necessary thesis. I explore the consequences of modalizing the priority monist thesis. I argue that, modulo some assumptions, the modalized thesis entails the necessary existence of the actual cosmos. I further argue that, if the modalized thesis is true, and the actual cosmos necessarily exists, then the only possible concrete objects are the actually existing ones.