Confirmation

This paper defines an empirical standard for testing the Structured Resonance Dynamics (SRD) corpus. Six gates map SRD invariants to measurable observables under deterministic replay with fixed-point Q32 numerics. Proof bundles (header.json, steps.jsonl, graph.json) are hashed (SHA256) and Ed25519-signed to ensure bit-identical reproduction. The protocol provides preregistration schemas, regression targets (R² ≥ 0.95), confidence-interval routines, and an explicit kill-switch table that suspends claims upon replicated failure. Gates cover drift-volume scaling, an E_eff-based floor postulate, chirality collapse, fine-structure stability, cosmological lensing parity, (...) and computational parity via RIC replay. The goal is to move SRD from theoretical closure to externally auditable empirical law via independent laboratory and observatory execution. (shrink)

According to the standard account, early analytic philosophy clashed with Pragmatism when Moore and Russell attacked the James-Schiller theory of truth from 1908 onwards. While recent scholarship has focussed on revising this account of the relation between the two traditions, one significant piece of the puzzle has remained overlooked: Stebbing’s debate with Schiller. The debate commences with Schiller’s attempt to answer Moore’s critique of the Pragmatist theory of truth. Stebbing enters the debate in 1912 by demonstrating Schiller’s answer to be (...) inadequate, which Schiller addresses in two sets of replies. Contesting the received view of Stebbing’s later conversion to analytic philosophy, this paper will demonstrate that she defends a variant of Moore’s position, even as – far from being Moore’s ‘disciple’ – she advances beyond it. In the course of the debate, Stebbing raises a number of hitherto underestimated objections against any Pragmatist theory of truth that eschews the attempt to define truth. Stebbing centrally argues that, without espousing a definition of truth, any effort to set up criteria for truth, or to distinguish truths from truth-claims that work without being true, must inevitably falter. While Stebbing’s challenges push Schiller towards articulating a fallibilist form of confirmationism, this paper shows that he fails to adequately answer Stebbing’s main objection. (shrink)

Recent epistemological literature features compelling and novel arguments for thinking that an agent can rationally believe each member of a set of propositions while knowing that one of the members is false. Perhaps more provocatively, these proponents of "Rational Inconsistency," as it were, claim that it’s also possible to know each true member of the set while knowing that one of the members is false. Call this "Knowledgeable Inconsistency." In this article, I explain why, if Knowledgeable Inconsistency is true, then, (...) on pain of an absurd implication about how confirmation works, we should reject non-skeptical Infallibilism about knowledge. For that same reason, the recent proponents of Rational Inconsistency should also reject non-skeptical Infallibilism. (shrink)

Modal Empiricism in philosophy of science proposes to understand the possibility of modal knowledge from experience by replacing talk of possible worlds with talk of possible situations, which are coarse-grained, bounded and relative to background conditions. This allows for an induction towards objective necessity, assuming that actual situations are representative of possible ones. The main limitation of this epistemology is that it does not account for probabilistic knowledge. In this paper, we propose to extend Modal Empiricism to the probabilistic case, (...) thus providing an inductivist epistemology for probabilistic knowledge. The key idea is that extreme probabilities, close to 1 and 0, serve as proxies for testing mild probabilities, using a principle of model combination. (shrink)

Scientific principles can undergo various developments. While philosophers of science have acknowledged that such changes occur, there is no systematic account of the development of scientific principles. Here we propose a template for analyzing the development of scientific principles called the ‘life cycle’ of principles. It includes a series of processes that principles can go through: prehistory, elevation, formalization, generalization, and challenge. The life cycle, we argue, is a useful heuristic for the analysis of the development of scientific principles. We (...) illustrate this by discussing examples from foundational physics including Lorentz invariance, Mach’s principle, the naturalness principle, and the perfect cosmological principle. We also explore two applications of the template. First, we propose that the template can be employed to diagnose the quality of scientific principles. Second, we discuss the ramifications of the life cycle’s processes for the empirical testability of principles. (shrink)

The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented reasoning error on which people rate a conjunction A∧B as more probable than one of its conjuncts, A. Many explanations appeal to the fact that B has a high probability in the given scenarios, but Katya Tentori and collaborators have challenged such approaches. They report experiments suggesting that degree of confirmation—rather than probability—is the central determinant of the conjunction fallacy. In this paper, we have two goals. First, we address a confound in Tentori et (...) al.’s experiments: they failed to control for the fact that in their stimuli where B is confirmed, it is also conversationally relevant in the sense that it fits with the topic or question under discussion. Conversely, when B has a high probability but is not confirmed, it is conversationally irrelevant. Consequently, it is possible that conversational relevance, rather than confirmation, is responsible for the differences they found between confirmed and probable hypotheses. Second, inspired by recent theoretical work, we aim to give the first empirical investigation of the hypothesis that this type of conversational relevance on its own—independently of degree of confirmation—can be an important factor in the conjunction fallacy. We report on two experiments that vary Tentori et al.’s design by making B relevant without changing its degree of probability or confirmation. We found that doing so increases the rate of the conjunction fallacy, suggesting that relevance plays an important role in the conjunction fallacy. (shrink)

Suppose a theory T entails hypotheses H and $$H'$$, neither of which entails the other. A number of authors have argued that a piece of evidence E “indirectly confirms” H when E confirms either T or $$H'$$. But there has been a protracted and unsettled debate about whether indirect confirmation is a sound inference procedure. Skeptics argue that the procedure employs conditions of confirmation that jointly lead to absurdity. Proponents argue that this criticism is unfounded or that its import is (...) exaggerated. I will argue that no side has the story quite right, and some have the story quite wrong. Indirect confirmation, as characterized above, is unsound, and a good chunk of this paper will be concerned with showing why most extant defenses of the procedure err. On the other hand, when certain probabilistic (in)dependence relations hold between T, H, and $$H'$$, indirect confirmation can work, for reasons that trace back to Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause. I illustrate these matters with some contemporary and historical examples, with a particular focus on Kepler’s use of data about mars’s elliptical orbit to justify a claim about earth’s. (shrink)

The principle of total evidence says that all relevant information should be considered when making an inference about a hypothesis. In this article, we argue that the criminalist’s paradox from the literature on the methodology of forensic science constitutes a counterexample against the principle of total evidence. The paradox arises, for example, when a forensic scientist uses the results from other forensic procedures to inform their own analysis. In such cases, their results can become more reliable, but at the same (...) time also dependent on those other forensic results and therefore less useful for decisions in court cases. Consequently, such influences are generally avoided in forensic science. We argue that structurally similar problems plague also other scientific disciplines, anticipate an objection to the counterexample, and propose two new versions of the principle of total evidence that do not fall prey to the criminalist’s paradox. (shrink)

Review of David Lewis's Philosophical Manuscripts, edited by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride.

In 2021, the Bigelow Institute for Consciousness Studies (hereafter, BICS) sponsored an essay competition (hereafter, the Contest) designed to solicit the best evidence for the hypothesis that human consciousness survives bodily death, and more specifically, evidence that would prove this hypothesis beyond a reasonable doubt. The summer 2022 issue of the Journal of Scientific Exploration featured a special subsection on the BICS contest and its winning essays. Robert Bigelow and Colm Kelleher outlined the motivation, design, and judging criteria for the (...) competition. Keith Augustine provided an extensive critical commentary on the contest design and eight of its prominent winning essays. Stephen Braude and several coauthors responded to Augustine’s criticisms, and Augustine provided a reply to Braude and his collaborators. Finally, the subsection concluded with a collaborative paper in which Etienne LeBel, Adam Rock, and Augustine proposed a more rigorous experimental design for testing the survival hypothesis. Augustine presented important criticisms of the Contest and several of its prominent winning essays. Moreover, many of his criticisms apply to survival literature in general and so are instructive for the wider survival debate. And Braude, one of the most important contributors to the survival debate since C.D. Broad and C.J. Ducasse, was at the helm of the reply to Augustine. Although the response to Augustine raised important concerns about skeptical assessments of the evidence for survival, it was hamstrung with several defects. 1. Preliminaries 2. Problematic Aspects of the Reply to Augustine 3. What is the Question? Honing in on the Actual Disagreement 4. Inference to Best Explanation 5. Confirmation Approaches to Evidential Support -- 5.1 Evidential Justification -- 5.2 When Does an Observation Favor One Hypothesis Over Another Hypothesis? The Law of Likelihood -- 5.3 When Should We Up Our Confidence in a Hypothesis? Incremental Confirmation -- 5.4 How Can We Determine the Net Plausibility of a Hypothesis? Bayes’ Theorem and Posterior Probabilities -- 5.5 Which of Two Hypotheses is More Probable than the Other? Principle of Contrastive Posterior Probabilities -- 5.6 When Does Evidence Justify Believing a Hypothesis? Principle of Absolute Confirmation -- 5.7 Survivalist Confusions about Bayesian Analyses -- 5.8 The Washing Out of Priors -- 5.9 The Subjectivism Objection -- 5.10 Summing Up Insights from Confirmation Theory -- 6. Back to Braude 7. Varieties of Skepticism 8. Neurophysiological Evidence and the Survival Hypothesis 9. The Data from Mediumship 10. The Alleged Improbability of Fraud and Other Counterexplanations 11. Mediumship and the Logic of Confirmation 12. The Significance of Failed Tests 13. Survivalist Rescues and Contrastive Confirmation 14. Evidential Support without Predictions -- 15. The Testability Problem -- Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

Verschwörungstheorien (VTn) sind in der erkenntnistheoretischen Literatur wiederholt mit skeptischen Hypothesen verglichen worden: Beide entzögen sich der empirischen Überprüfung, indem sie sich gegen Gegenbelege immunisierten. Im Falle von VTn bestehe die Immunisierung darin, dass vermeintliche Gegenbelege ungeprüft auf Vertuschungs- oder Täuschungshandlungen der Verschwörer zurückgeführt würden. Eine genauere Rekonstruktion der Täuschungsthese und ein genauerer Blick auf die Immunisierungsthese fördern aber eine Reihe von Disanalogien zutage: Im Unterschied zu skeptischen Hypothesen behaupten VTn das eigene Szenario als real und schreiben die Täuschung nur (...) der Fremdgruppe zu. Damit besteht bei VTn auch nicht die für skeptische Hypothesen typische Symmetrie der Beleglage: Keine Partei diagnostiziert ein Patt, jede weist vielmehr die angeführten Belege der Gegenseite zurück. VTn entziehen die Täuschungsthese auch nicht jeder möglichen Überprüfung, wie es das Szenario des bösen Dämons tut, sondern kommen in unterschiedlichen Graden der Selbstimmunisierung vor. Die epistemischen Defizite von VTn und die Untugenden ihrer Verfechter treten deutlicher hervor, wenn man den Fokus von der Verschwörungsthese auf die Dynamik ihrer Verteidigung und ihre Ähnlichkeiten zu degenerierenden Forschungsprogrammen verschiebt. -/- In the epistemological literature, conspiracy theories (CTs) are often compared with skeptical hypotheses: Both are said to resist empirical refutation by immunising themselves against counterevidence. In the case of CTs, the trick is to explain away alleged counterevidence by cover-ups or deceptive acts on the part of the conspirators. However, a more precise reconstruction of the deception thesis and a closer look at the immunization thesis reveal a number of disanalogies: Unlike skeptical hypotheses, CTs claim their own scenario to be real, while attributing deception only to the outgroup. Correspondingly, CTs do not exhibit the balance of evidence typical of skeptical hypotheses: Neither party considers the evidence to be symmetrical, each rejects the evidence adduced by the opposing party. Unlike the evil demon scenario, the deception thesis in CTs is not entirely uncheckable. Rather, different CTs exhibit varying degrees of self-immunisation. The epistemic deficiencies of CTs and the epistemic vices of their proponents can be better brought out by shifting the focus from a CT’s claim to the dynamics of defending it and the similarities to degenerating research programmes. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a multiverse hypothesis, but (...) it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead. (shrink)

The epistemological problem of scientific confirmation is about determining or comparing the degree of confirmation of scientific hypotheses (i.e., the level of epistemical value we can give them) with respect to empirical evidence. This problem is mainly discussed from an inductivist and probabilistic point of view, particularly by the means of Bayesian theories of confirmation. In this paper we suggest that Popper’s theory of corroboration should be considered as an alternative theory of scientific confirmation, which would reject both induction and (...) probabilities. More specifically, in opposition to some interpretations of Popper, this paper will support the idea that Popper’s concept of corroboration can be understood as a form of confirmation. We will try to establish what could be the rules of this kind of Popperian theory of confirmation. We hope to be able to compare Bayesian and Popperian approaches to the problem of scientific confirmation, and highlight their different methodological contributions to scientific research. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. The article is devoted to the study of confirmatory distortion as a cognitive bias within the framework of the modern theory of argumentation. In the context of this study, the effectiveness of the critical questioning technique as an argumentation strategy aimed at reducing the negative impact of confirmatory bias is considered. M e t h o d s. To achieve the goals of the research, the method of critical questions is (...) used, which is based on the traditional principles of logic, dialectics and rhetoric. Specific lists of critical questions are developed for each argumentative scheme. R e s u l t s. The article demonstrates that standard critical questions for schemes of practical reasoning, developed by eminent specialists, are able to minimize the negative impact of confirmation bias. This is achieved by taking into account information that may conflict with the agent's action plan. C o n c l u s i o n s. The study highlights the importance of using critical questions as a tool to minimize confirmation bias. Such an approach not only contributes to the substantiation of arguments, but also stimulates self-control and the search for information that may cause doubts about one's own views. The final part of the article examines propaganda as the deliberate use of confirmatory distortion and points to the need for attention to language patterns where it occurs rather unintentionally. In connection with the specificity of the studied phenomenon, the term "confirmation bias" is proposed as a translation of the English "confirmation bias". (shrink)

In an influential paper, Wendy Parker argues that agreement across climate models isn’t a reliable marker of confirmation in the context of cutting-edge climate science. In this paper, I argue that while Parker’s conclusion is generally correct, there is an important class of exceptions. Broadly speaking, agreement is not a reliable marker of confirmation when the hypotheses under consideration are mutually consistent—when, e.g., we’re concerned with overlapping ranges. Since many cutting-edge questions in climate modeling require making distinctions between mutually consistent (...) hypotheses, agreement across models will be generally unreliable in this domain. In cases where we are only concerned with mutually exclusive hypotheses, by contrast, agreement across climate models is plausibly a reliable marker of confirmation. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, among the foundational schools of mathematics appeared ‘intuitionism’ by Dutchman L. E. J. Brouwer, who based arithmetic on the intuition of time and all mental constructions that could be made out of it. His pupil Arend Heyting was the first populariser of intuitionism, and he repeatedly emphasised that no philosophy was required to practise intuitionism so that such mathematics could be shared by anyone. Still, stimulated by invitations to humanistic conferences, he wrote a (...) series of notes, preserved in the State Archives, Haarlem, about solipsism. In them, he operated a series of theoretical reflections consisting of the stripping away of the patterns that are part of our consciousness and their subsequent progressive re-introduction, in order to understand the formation of our Self as distinct from the natural world and other humans. In 1996, following a stroke, neuroscientist Jill Bolte Taylor experienced the deprivation of certain abilities in her brain and their successive regaining. In her experience there are remarkable similarities with what Heyting had hypothesised about the formation of the self. The purpose of this article is to highlight them and point out how Heyting's theoretical construct was found to be embodied in the brain. (shrink)

I present arguments giving us reason to reconsider whether confirmation bias is really such a significant explanandum theories of reasoning need to make sense of and, by extension, whether any advantage the argumentative theory has over its rivals here, is the weightily explanatory virtue it has often been supposed to be. More generally, the extent to which accounting for ‘confirmation bias’ is an important desideratum for theories of reasoning has been overstated. Theory choice between them should (to say the least) (...) not focus on their capacity to make sense of supposed cognitive deficits like the alleged confirmation bias. (shrink)

I discuss a contemporary solution to the dynamic problem of old evidence (POE), as proposed by Sprenger. Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does (...) not resolve the problem. I consider several potential responses. (shrink)

There is an interesting problem concerning component causes posed by Cartwright (1983) in her book How the Laws of Physics Lie, which is easily explained in terms of a simple example. Consider a cup sitting on the table. Why doesn’t it move? The explanation given by Newtonian mechanics is that the cup is experiencing two forces-the downward force of gravity and the upward ‘elastic’ force of the table-and these two forces exactly cancel to produce a zero resultant force. This zero (...) resultant force then produces a zero acceleration, which ‘explains’ why the cup doesn’t move. This rather simple, yet typical, example of theoretical explanation raises a surprisingly deep puzzle: What justification is there for believing in the existence of the component forces if they are redundant to the explanation? For it does not really matter what size the component forces are so long as their resultant is zero. (shrink)

According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all inductive inferences are justified by local facts, rather than their formal features or some grand principles of nature's uniformity. Recently, Richard Dawid (Found Phys 45(9):1101–1109, 2015) has offered a challenge to this theory: in an adaptation of Norton's own celebrated "Dome" thought experiment, it seems that there are certain inductions that are intuitively reasonable, but which do not have any local facts that could serve to justify them in accordance with (...) Norton's requirements. Dawid's suggestion is that “raw induction” might have a limited but important role for such inferences. I argue that the Material Theory can accommodate such inductions, because there are local facts concerning the combinatoric features of the induction’s target populations that can licence the inferences in an analogous way to existing examples of material induction. Since my arguments are largely independent of the details of the Dome, Norton's theory emerges as surprisingly robust against criticisms of excessive narrowness. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, our theories of fundamental physics have become increasingly detached from empirical data. Recently, Richard Dawid has argued that the progressive separation of theory from experiment is concomitant with a number of changes in the methodology of the discipline. More precisely, Dawid has argued that the new methods of fundamental physics amount to a form of non-empirical confirmation, and that physical theories may therefore be confirmed even in the absence of empirical data. In this paper, I (...) critically engage with Dawid's views on non-empirical physics. My main target is the excessively central role that, in my view, the notion of non-empirical confirmation plays on Dawid's analysis. I will therefore argue that, while non-empirical methods may legitimately be employed in physics, those are not always deployed with the purpose of confirming scientific theories. Non-empirical arguments may also be used in order to ground pragmatic choices regarding what theories deserve to be further developed—and this is an aspect of the work that non-empirical methods perform that cannot be solely understood in terms of Dawid's notion of non-empirical confirmation. I support these claims by making use of a case-study from the early history of particle physics. The case-study concerns a theory of the strong force that J. J. Sakurai introduced in 1960. As we shall see, both the genesis of Sakurai's theory as well as the arguments that he used to defend it provide direct support for my own views on the role that non-empirical methods play in physics. Finally, I conclude the paper by introducing a notion that I believe is useful in making sense of the manner in which the pragmatic and the epistemic dimensions of non-empirical reasoning relate to each other, namely the notion of a cognitive attitude. -/- . (shrink)

Reasoning from inconclusive evidence, or 'induction', is central to science and any applications we make of it. For that reason alone it demands the attention of philosophers of science. This element explores the prospects of using probability theory to provide an inductive logic: a framework for representing evidential support. Constraints on the ideal evaluation of hypotheses suggest that the overall standing of a hypothesis is represented by its probability in light of the total evidence, and incremental support, or confirmation, indicated (...) by the hypothesis having a higher probability conditional on some evidence than it does unconditionally. This proposal is shown to have the capacity to reconstruct many canons of the scientific method and inductive inference. Along the way, significant objections are discussed, such as the challenge of inductive scepticism, and the objection that the probabilistic approach makes evidential support arbitrary. (shrink)

In natural language, conditionals are frequently used for giving explanations. Thus the antecedent of a conditional is typically understood as being connected to, being relevant for, or providing evidential support for the conditional's consequent. This aspect has not been adequately mirrored by the logics that are usually offered for the reasoning with conditionals: neither in the logic of the material conditional or the strict conditional, nor in the plethora of logics for suppositional conditionals that have been produced over the past (...) 50 years. In this paper I survey some recent attempts to come to terms with the problem of encoding evidential support or relevance in the logic of conditionals. I present models in a qualitative-modal and in a quantitative-probabilistic setting. Focussing on some particular examples, I show that no perfect match between the two kinds of settings has been achieved yet. (shrink)

Theory unification is a central aim of scientific investigation. In this paper, I lay down the sketch of a Bayesian analysis of the virtue of unification that entails that the unification of a theory has direct implications for the confirmation of the theory’s logical consequences and for its prior probability. This shows that scientists do have epistemic, and not just pragmatic, reasons to prefer unified theories to non-unified ones.

Any successful interpretation of quantum mechanics must explain how our empirical evidence allows us to come to know about quantum mechanics. In this article, we argue that this vital criterion is not met by the class of ‘orthodox interpretations,’ which includes QBism, neo-Copenhagen interpretations, and some versions of relational quantum mechanics. We demonstrate that intersubjectivity fails in radical ways in these approaches, and we explain why intersubjectivity matters for empirical confirmation. We take a detailed look at the way in which (...) belief-updating might work in the kind of universe postulated by an orthodox interpretation, and argue that observers in such a universe are unable to escape their own perspective in order to learn about the structure of the set of perspectives that is supposed to make up reality according to these interpretations. We also argue that in some versions of these interpretations it is not even possible to use one’s own relative frequencies for empirical confirmation. Ultimately we conclude that it cannot be rational to believe these sorts of interpretations unless they are supplemented with some observer-independent structure which underwrites intersubjective agreement in at least certain sorts of cases. (shrink)

In this bold work, of broad scope and rich erudition, Richard Miller sets out to reorient the philosophy of science. By questioning both positivism and its leading critics, he develops new solutions to the most urgent problems about justification, explanation, and truth. Using a wealth of examples from both the natural and the social sciences, Fact and Method applies the new account of scientific reason to specific questions of method in virtually every field of inquiry, including biology, physics, history, sociology, (...) anthropology, economics, psychology, and literary theory. Explicit and up-to-date analysis of leading alternative views and a wealth of examples make it an ideal introduction to the philosophy of science, as well as a powerful attempt to change the field. Like the works of Hempel, Reichenbach, and Nagel in an earlier generation, it will challenge, instruct, and help anyone with an interest in science and its limits. For the past quarter-century, the philosophy of science has been in a crisis brought on by the failure of the positivist project of resolving all basic methodological questions by applying absolutely general rules, valid for all fields at all times. Professor Miller presents a new view in which what counts as an explanation, a cause, a confirming test, or a compelling case for the existence of an unobservable is determined by frameworks of specific substantive principles, rationally adopted in the light of the actual history of inquiry. While the history of science has usually been the material for relativism, Professor Miller uses arguments of Darwin, Newton, Einstein, Galileo, and others both to undermine positivist conceptions of rationality and to support the positivists' optimism that important theoretical findings are often justifiable from all reasonable perspectives. (shrink)

Can heritability estimates provide causal information? This paper argues for an affirmative answer: since a non-nil heritability estimate satisfies certain characteristic properties of causation (i.e., association, manipulability, and counterfactual dependence), it increases the probability that the relation between genotypic variance and phenotypic variance is (at least partly) causal. Contrary to earlier proposals in the literature, the argument does not assume the correctness of any particular conception of the nature of causation, rather focusing on properties that are characteristic of causal relationships. (...) The argument is defended against Lewontin's (1974) locality objection and Kaplan and Turkheimer's (2021) recent critique of Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS). (shrink)

In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing, and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary “anthropological” insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims (...) that deserve careful scrutiny. In this essay I focus on one such claim: namely that confirmation bias can be plausibly explained as a design feature that promotes postulated functions of interactive reasoning. And I argue that each of three extant proposals fails to make the claim good. (shrink)

Astrophysicist Abraham Loeb suggests that the interstellar interloper 1I/2017 ‘Oumuamua, detected in our solar system in 2017, is alien space debris or even an alien operational probe. Does this conjecture have significant epistemic support, such that it can be justified as a viable hypothesis? In this paper, I propose that the meta-empirical confirmation approach, developed and defended by philosopher and physicist Dawid, provides an appropriate framework to answer this question. I defend this proposal by elucidating how meta-empirical confirmation applies to (...) the ‘Oumuamua case and what specific meta-empirical arguments could support Loeb’s hypothesis. Even though Loeb would not himself endorse meta-empirical confirmation, because it is not traditional empiricism, this case shows that meta-empirical confirmation is not in fact a threat to empiricism. (shrink)

Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. In the first section, disadvantages of existing Bayesian solution proposals to this problem are pointed out and an alternative solution proposal is presented: that of genuine confirmation. In the second section, the notion of GC is briefly recapitulated and three versions of GC are distinguished: full GC, partial GC and quantitative GC. In the third section, the application of partial GC to pure post-facto speculations is explained. In the fourth (...) section it is demonstrated that full GC is a necessary condition for Bayesian convergence to certainty based on the accumulation of conditionally independent pieces of evidence. It is found that whenever a hypothesis is equivalent to a disjunction of more fine-grained hypotheses conveying different probabilities to the evidence, then conditional independence of the evidence fails. This failure occurs typically for unspecific negations of hypotheses. A refined version of the convergence to certainty theorem that overcomes this difficulty is developed in the final section. (shrink)

Confirmation bias has been widely studied for its role in failures of reasoning. Individuals exhibiting confirmation bias fail to engage with information that contradicts their current beliefs, and, as a result, can fail to abandon inaccurate beliefs. But although most investigations of confirmation bias focus on individual learning, human knowledge is typically developed within a social structure. We use network models to show that moderate confirmation bias often improves group learning. However, a downside is that a stronger form of confirmation (...) bias can hurt the knowledge producing capacity of the community. (shrink)

Introduction It is a goal in nursing education to promote students’ dignity and facilitate this core value. Students’ experience of dignity is shaped by the student–supervisor relationship. Literature shows limited knowledge about how nursing students experience their own dignity during education. Research aim The aim of the study is to develop an understanding of how nursing students experience their own dignity in relation to supervisors, and what significance these experiences have in education. Research design Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was chosen as (...) the approach, and narratives and qualitative interviews were conducted. The interpretation process was inspired by Fleming, Gaidys and Robbs. Participants and research context Nineteen nursing students in the final year of their education were included in the study. They represented six different campuses at three different educational institutions. The qualitative interviews took place at the educational institutions. Ethical considerations The research recommendations of the Declaration of Helsinki were followed. Access to the students was given by the educational institutions. All interested students signed a continuous informed consent. Findings Students’ dignity was at stake in encounters with supervisors during education. Decisive for experience of dignity was the supervisor’s ability to confirm the student through acknowledgment, reassurance and seeing them as individuals. Experienced dignity had a crucial impact on students’ life courage and their ability to be present. Discussion The discussion emphasizes the vulnerable dignity of students, the importance of confirmation and the significance perceived dignity has. Conclusion Students’ experiences tilted between perceived dignity and offense, and placed students’ dignity in a vulnerable position. Crucial for perceived dignity was the confirmation the students received from their supervisors. Perceived dignity gave the students courage and increased their ability to be present, which provided better opportunities for learning and development. (shrink)

The central aim of astrobiology is to study origins, evolution and distribution of life in the universe, combining data from various disciplines. However, I will argue that from a philosophical standpoint, astrobiology requires the affirmation of astrophilosophy. Fry (2015) claims that philosophical presuppositions guiding science are general, for example, we hold the notion that natural laws necessarily hold at the whole universe at large, and on the basis of the universal applicability of natural laws, the astrobiological research is conducted. Jakosky (...) (2000) mentions that finding any life elsewhere that had an origin independent of that on Earth would be philosophically profound. Kolb (2005) covers various definitions of life and establishes thought experiments about the survival of life in the Solar System. Most of the (scarce) research has dealt with specific philosophical topics in astrobiology, instead of seeing it as a new philosophical discipline or perhaps a new subdiscipline for each of the classical philosophical disciplines. -/- Persson (2013) has made a step towards this by systematizing the most important philosophical questions in astrobiology, along with Dunér (2013) emphasizing its importance for ethics, epistemology, semiotics and linguistics, and cognition. Persson mentions that the justification of resources is a question of ethics, but I would also like to add political philosophy, since not only is there a question of preference over "earthly manners" but also fair distribution of costs and the concept of ownership of the new worlds. The question of a new definition of life is another one, that I would argue holds one of the central places in metaphysics. Persson mentions various definitions of life and that such a discussion is important for both biology and philosophy, a notion I would like to add to by stating that the question of finding another life is also an ontological question, giving us either categorical similarity or dissimilarity, and establishing a new kind, which is of metaphysical importance. Persson also establishes the importance of is it possible to know whether we are alone or not, a question I would like to tie to the modern epistemological questions of possibility of knowledge (cf. Cassam, 2007). Persson also connects astrobiology with ethical questions such as biocentrism or colonization, which also might be tied to philosophy of mind, and philosophy of politics and culture respectively. -/- One major step forward was established recently by Dick (2020), focusing on a new discipline combining astronomy, cosmology, and astrobiology, in which there is a focus on the nature of reasoning, the problematic nature of evidence, the influence of metaphysical preconceptions, the epistemological status of these disciplines, the role of technology, and the mutual interaction between these disciplines. The purpose of this paper is to see how the creation of astrophilosophy could better emphasize the role of philosophy today, and would it behave as a side-by-side major philosophical discipline or a complement to the current philosophical disciplines, for example, bringing new light into metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, or philosophy of mind. In the first case, we would make a metaphysical difference between human-related problems and other possible kinds, and in the second case, we would have to incorporate current astrobiological questions into modern philosophical dialogue, establishing, for example, metaphysics and epistemology of life, or, a possibility to incorporate non-human life into epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of biology. This goes hand to hand with Dunér's (2013) points of seeing the philosophy of astrobiology as both a type of individual and collective self-understanding, and conceptual analysis. That way, using astrophilosophical novelties, we can improve not only our current philosophical intuitions, but also expand the territory of philosophical subdisciplines to become more universal. -/- . (shrink)

In analogical reasoning, observations about one or more source domains provide varying degrees of support for a conjecture about a target domain. Norton (2021) challenges the usefulness of formal models of analogical inference. Other philosophers (Dardashti et al. 2019) develop just such formal models in order to show how analogue experiments can confirm a hypothesis, even when the target domain is inaccessible. This paper defends the value of quasi-formal models of analogical reasoning. Such models are broadly compatible with Norton’s position, (...) but help to clarify the structure of analogical reasoning and to identify basic requirements for a good analogical inference. (shrink)

Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal (...) models for hypothesis confirmation. We illustrate our argument by reference to a case study from macroeconomics. At the same time, we also show that there are cases in which robustness analysis is detrimental to confirmation. We characterize these cases and link them to recent investigations on evidential variety (Landes, 2020b, 2021; Osimani and Landes, forthcoming). We conclude that robustness analysis over minimal models can confirm, but its confirmatory value depends on concrete circumstances. (shrink)

Confirmation bias is often used as an umbrella term for many related phenomena. Information searches, evidence interpretation, and memory recall are the three main components of the thinking proces...

On appelle « biais de confirmation » la tendance supposée des humains à sélectionner les informations qui vont dans le sens de ce qu’ils croient (ou veulent croire) et à interpréter celles dont ils disposent en faveur de leurs hypothèses favorites. Cet article vise à porter un regard critique sur certains usages de cette notion, et plus généralement sur le recours aux « biais cognitifs » pour expliquer tout un ensemble de phénomènes sociaux interprétés comme les marques d’une forme d’irrationalité. (...) Remettant en question le caractère probant des résultats expérimentaux destinés à mettre en évidence une déviation qui nous conduirait systématiquement à des représentations inexactes, je suggère que l’approche bayésienne en psychologie du raisonnement permet de rendre compte de certains de ces résultats en faisant l’hypothèse que nos inférences se conforment à une telle norme. (shrink)

Historical inductions, that is, the pessimistic metainduction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as noncogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic metainduction, for example, in the context of some medical studies.

This paper proposes a framework for representing in Bayesian terms the idea that analogical arguments of various degrees of strength may provide inductive support to yet untested scientific hypotheses. On this account, contextual information plays a crucial role in determining whether, and to what extent, a given similarity or dissimilarity between source and target may confirm an empirical hypothesis over a rival one. In addition to showing confirmation by analogy compatible with the adoption of a Bayesian standpoint, the proposal outlined (...) in this paper reveals a close agreement between the fulfillment of Hesse’s (Models and analogies in science, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963) criteria for analogical arguments capable of inductive support and the attribution of confirmatory power by the lights of Bayesian confirmation theory. In this sense, the Bayesian representation not only enriches a framework, Hesse’s, of enduring relevance for understanding scientific activity, but may offer something akin to a proof of concept of it. (shrink)