Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945

Most of us relate to the Second World War from the Anglo American view of battles fought from Anzio to the Battle of the Bulge and from Midway to Okinawa.

Richard Overy takes us to a place few of us really know of. The Eastern Front remains an enigma to most Americans. Overy sheds light on this rather dark subject. The Author goes into detail as to Stalin's reasoning in appeasement to Germany in the Soviet German Pact of 1939.

Overy begins by giving an explanation of Stalin's great purge of the General Staff of the Soviet Army in the 1930's and its later effect as to the preparedness of its Armed Forces in 1941.

A narrative of the surprise attack of Operation Barbarossa shows us an unprepared Army and most of all an unprepared leader in Joseph Stalin. The fact that Stalin indeed froze at the inception of this invasion gave no confidence to the Allies such as they were at this time, and to America who at this point were mere spectators in this World drama.

Included in Overy's assessment is how Stalin recovers from his initial shock and gathers his General Staff including his brightest star General Georgi K. Zhukov to provide a plan to counterattack the Germans and save Russia. It is the thesis of Mr. Overy that Stalin made a wise choice and let Zhukov and company direct the military efforts and that he not interfere. Indeed Stalin did do this throughout the struggle and it proved successful.

The plight of the siege of Stalingrad and all its related brutalities and suffering are well documented. The great counterattack of Stalingrad onto the great armored battle of Kursk is related and analyzed.

The most eye opening section of Overy's account is his chapter entitled "The Fight From Within". It's here that the real essence of the "Eastern Front" is brought to light. The people that lived in what I call the great buffer zone between Germany and its Prussian borders and the Western edge of Russia were the innocents who suffered the greatest. Overy's narrative of these "Partisan Groups" was tragic and non preventable. These people were treated as mere pawns and fodder in order to attain the objectives and wants of either Germany or Russia.

The last great Russian push, Code Named Operation Bagration was the beginning of the end for Germany. This was the fall of the Swastika and the fall of Berlin.

In all accounts Overy shows the brutality of it all. The Author goes into some of the diplomacy of Stalin, Churchill, FDR and later Truman. The elements of the "Cold War" are set in place. The return of war within Russia after victory is explained. A book on this phase alone is necessary to fully explain these rather odd policies and hostile actions. These all related to Stalin's increased paranoia which manifested itself from 1946 through to his death in 1953.

Altogether this is a succinct and informative history of a long forgotten, hidden and unknown history. What Overy has done is to venture into unchartered territory. Great read!!

This is an excellent, wide ranging, laden packed short summary of history during Stalin's time in power but I couldn't give it five stars for it's not the equal of John Erickson's two volume set. Its also a synthesis from existing works and as far as I could see doesn't present any new information for the well read student.

The first two chapters, which consume a surprising amount of the book, cover the prewar years starting with the Communist Revolution.

The first chapter deals entirely within the country and the ordeals Stalin had in nuturing Communism and consolidating his power. It includes, among many other things, the five year plans to increase industrial and military output as well as food production through the collectivization of farms and the brutal methods Stalin took in achieving these goals. Stalin knew how susceptible his country was to invasion or overthrow and wanted to eliminate that scenario.

The second chapter covers the few years before the war and includes more of the military aspects of Russia and her relations with Europe with added emphasis on France and England as they woo her to join an alliance with them against Germany. When it was discovered that Great Britain didn't have an army to resist Hitler, Stalin decided it was better to align himself with the powerful Germans and proceeded to form an alliance with Hitler. The author covers many of the key aspects in the prewar years that will lead to war; I've just mention couple of them. The coverage is sufficient and varied to give a basic understanding of Stalin, his country and the political environment between the key participants of the war.

Though the book was very engaging and you could learn a lot from it, the coverage of the operational aspects of the war was very limited. There is a high level summary of the results and ramifications for the battles for Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Operation Bagration and Berlin but don't buy this book for comprehensive tactical coverage of the ground war. if that is your main interest you'll be disappointed. For a good all around understanding of the war, buy this book which will cover the political, including profiling Stalin, and the human interest aspects plus David Glantz's book, "When Titans Clashed", for the military summary. Between these two books, a reader will have a good foundation, a good beginning of understanding the war on the eastern front.

It becomes apparent after reading the book that Mr Overy has gained an admiration for Russia and its people. There is much to admire about their fortitude and ingenuity of overcoming the hardships of the first six month of war to defeat the powerful Wehrmacht but I believe the author has lost some of his objectivity while researching and writing his book. He praises Stalin too much and while mentioning his cruel deeds you can tell by his wording that he overlooks them. He claims Stalin was a good commander which is questionable. In some ways he had forsight by instituting a mobilization program, reserve armies, an aggressive tank training program and moving industry to the east out of harm's way. He also converted the country to a total war status quickly which was necessary but his command decisions were too aggressive and missions unrealistic for the condition of his armies that first year. He also ignored the warning signs that invasion was coming despite his itelligence network and his generals warnings. His defense preparations before the invasion were untimely and inadequate. The author also devalues the impact the military purges of the late 30s had on the war effort. He also ignores the British participation in North Africa which pulled Rommel and the DAK away from participating on the eastern front.

It took Zhukov to save Leningrad and Moscow in those early days and Stalingrad the next year. Stalin wanted to start Uranus too soon, before his armies were ready. He wanted to go on the offensive at Kursk before Citadel started. Zhukov stopped Stalin from making these huge errors. Both events would have ended in disaster for Stalin if he had his way. It also took commanders like Konev, Rokossovsky, Chuikov and others who made the smart military decisions. Overy also discounts the fact that Russia had three times the Army as Germany, more and better tanks, more planes, guns, oil and had the advantage of knowing the battlefield better. He also discounts the billions in aid Stalin received from his allies. He also doesn't give much significance to Hitler's errors or the wrangling in the German command structure.

There are also several little quibbles to mention about the numbers mention. The numbers quoted for Russian casualties and prisoners at Kiev are low by 25 pct. The numbers of tanks, especially Russian tanks deployed at Kursk are low and his numbers of tanks destroyed there are a little vague. The number of Germans who escaped from the Korsun Pocket are also low. His coverage of the Warsaw Uprising also favor the Russian interpertation of the event. These and a few other things make me believe the author's objectivity had slipped with this book.

There are 32 photos; some were very good. For me, the photo of a young Stalin in 1924 was worth the price of the book. There are also 11 general purpose maps and three tables. There is also a scholarly Notes section and an impressive Bibliography of secondary sources. The book closes with an Index.

There are many events that are covered in the book that due to space limitations could not be discussed in this review. The overall quality of the book is good and if you're looking for a concise summary that covers the political machinations, human tragedies of the war and a few years past the war with a brief coverage of the military and all from a Russian perspective then this book should be seriously considered.

I am a confirmed fan of Overy's work, especially after reading his tome on "Why the Allies Won", in which he carefully examines the real reasons the Allies succeeded in a war that was much more closely contested than many observers appreciate. Here he concentrates on what has to be considered the most unlikely reversal of fortune in 20th century war history, the catastrophic yet also heroically successful defense, repulsion, and vanquishing of the Wehrmacht along a war front that was literally thousands of miles long. Against all odds, losing army after army in the prosecution of the war, with millions of combatants and non-combatants killed, woundeded, or captured from the moment of the opening salvos in the summer and fall of 1941, the Russians' capacity for absorbing unrelenting and murderous punishment at the hands of the brutal assaults of a supremely confident and well-equipped Nazi army stunned the world.

By every account Hitler made exactly the right move at the right time; he had just whipped the French and British armies in western Europe without raising a sweat. Just months before the invasion the Russians had been stopped successfully and quite unexpectedly by a much smaller and more poorly equipped Finn army. Thus, no one expected the Russian army to be able to stop or stem the smashing successes of the Germans some 200 divisions strong as they literally flooded through Poland into Russia in Operation Barbarossa, destroying everything in sight.

Yet, with unbelievable determination and equally incomprehensible losses, the Russians eventually began to halt the Wehrmacht advance. Finally, with newly established and quickly trained armies raised even as the Nazis drew near Moscow, Stalin and his armies began the long, tortuous, and painstaking turnaround that eventually helped to save the world. That they did so is without question an accurate summation of the situation. Throughout 1941, 1942, and 1943 the rest of the Allies were simply in no position to seriously challenge Hitler's stranglehold in Europe.

It is clear that without the Soviet prosecution of the war along the Eastern front, an Allied invasion of Europe would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. The war would have been extended by years. Yet the story Overy tells here is not a simple story of unexpected Soviet courage and success in the face of unbelievable odds; it is also a tale that details decades of wanton brutality within Russia itself, a nation hampered by its own trail of wave upon wave of murderous progroms and purges. The antiquated Soviet army was so devastated by the systematic extermination of the upper echelons of the Officer core that almost no one with any combat experience remained in leadership positions by the time the German blitzkreig began.

Under such circumstances, the ability of the Russians to stem the tide of battle and turn it to their advantage becomes a much more interesting and complicated phenomenon to watch and understand. This is a carefully crafted and well-documented narrative that deserves your studious attention. For any serious student of the second world war, this book is a must-read. Enjoy!

In the spirit of Alexander Werth's 'Russia at War', but enriched by many more documents available since Werth's book was written, this account achieves its effect by following the different strands of the story - military, economic, and social. It shows the terrible misjudgment and planning for defense by Stalin, the German strategy that nearly succeeded, the desperate struggle of the government to move key industries east to the Urals and beyond, which meant the Russian troops retreated with little defense against air and armour and suffered terrible losses against the Germans, but which made the future victories possible. It looks at the life of the troops, the decisions of the general staff, the incredible demands made on workers. It shows how these things came into focus at Stalingrad, so you understand why the terrible battle over several months was essential for both sides, and why it seemed the Russians were always losing until they were always winning, what the stakes were at Kursk where the German retreat began. This is not primarily a military history - it is a history of the Russian people in a violent desperate time, fighting essentially alone in the early months to stop the Nazi machine, making many mistakes, but surviving, under a leader who was paranoid, to a degree almost fatal, ruthless, brutal, and who continued to be so after the war. The book was basically the text for a British TV series, In the e-book version I have the index does not function. But the defects are small, and it is absolutely compelling and insightful.

About a year ago I read an excellent book by Mr. Overy, entitled "Why The Allies Won." I was very impressed by that book so I decided to take a chance on this one as well. I was not disappointed. Whereas the earlier book stepped back and gave a broader view of the European conflict, "Russia's War" zooms in on the life and death struggle between Germany and Russia. If you have already read a few books on the Eastern Front, this book is probably not for you....it is meant only to provide a general outline of the war in eastern Europe. However, if you haven't read much about WWII, or if your reading up until now has concentrated on the Western Front, you might just find this book to be an eye-opener. I consider myself to be a fairly well-read person, but I am a bit ashamed to admit I didn't know much about the 1941 attack on Leningrad. I knew there was a siege that lasted about 2 1/2 years, but I didn't know much else. Mr. Overy explains Hitler's intent wasn't something as mundane as just getting Leningrad to surrender. He wanted to wipe Leningrad from the face of the Earth. Peter The Great had made it his capital, and so it had great importance to the Russian people and also to Hitler. The start of the siege in 1941 is horrible to read about and not for the squeamish. The city was surrounded and, besides being pounded by German artillery several times a day, for all intents and purposes was cut off from the outside world. What the population of Leningrad went through in the winter of 1941-1942 is unbelievable. Many people starved or froze to death or became so weak that they succumbed to sicknesses that, in normal times, would not have been fatal. But the survivors carried on and finally managed to get supplies thru by finding a gap in the siege lines that involved crossing a large lake. Leningrad managed to hold on until Russian advances in 1944 finally broke the siege. Mr. Overy also tells about how the Russians dismantled entire factories in the western part of the country right after the German invasion in June 1941 and moved everything by rail to the east. Factories were reassembled and workers constructed crude huts to live in, or sometimes just dug holes in the ground and lived in those. With the tradeoff of pretty much not producing any consumer goods, the Russian workers under these conditions managed to outproduce the Germans militarily....numbers of planes, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. As difficult as this was to accomplish, it was essential if the Russians were going to survive as tremendous amounts of military hardware were destroyed during the initial German assault in 1941. The author also gives credit to the lend-lease program. Stalin gave this short shrift in public, but in private he admitted that Russia could not have survived without the large quantities of trucks, jeeps, fuel, telephones and telephone wire, etc. provided by her allies. The Russian military also learned from their early mistakes. They adapted strategy and tactics to fight a modern, mechanized war...with concentrated firepower and improved communications. Mr. Overy also gives the Devil his due. At the beginning of the conflict, Stalin thought he could run the show. He thought he knew more than his military leaders. When he was told in early 1941 that if the Germans attacked the attack would likely be aimed to capture Moscow, Stalin refused to believe it. He was sure the Germans would go for the economic jugular....the southwestern part of Russia where the oil was produced. Russian defenses were therefore skewed to fit Stalin's thinking. Of course, Stalin was wrong......and his error was almost catastrophic. Stalin made other mistakes, such as ordering massive counter-offensives when the Russian army, both organizationally and militarily, was unprepared to undertake such actions. These attacks caused many unneccesary deaths and loss of equipment that the army could ill-afford. But the author shows that Stalin learned from his mistakes. He worked long hours and familiarized himself with all the strategic aspects of the conflict. He was man enough to admit, at least to himself, that he was making mistakes. He listened to advice and criticism and he often let the military men have the final say, once he had people in place that he felt he could trust. Of course, after the war, what he did to these same people is a whole other story! But that's another book... Mr. Overy writes well, and is always evenhanded and judicious in coming to his conclusions. I don't think you could find a better book concerning an introductory history of the war on the Eastern Front.

Once the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and the era of Glasnost arrived it was inevitable that western historians would seek to re-appraise the eastern front in the Second World War. One of the early efforts was Russia's War, written by British historian Richard Overy. He used some of the early released information to re-examine our knowledge of the Russo-German War and to attempt to explain just how the Soviet Union was able to defeat what appeared to be the strongest military power on earth. Readers should be aware that this book is not a blow-by-blow campaign history but rather, a book that uses thematic-based chapters to chart the course of Soviet victory. Furthermore, this book has already been dated by further research into Soviet wartime records by historians such as the prodigious David M. Glantz; for example, there is no mention of the disastrous 1942 Operation `Mars.' Overall, this book is a useful supplement to Glantz's own one-volume summary of the war, When Titans Clash, since it touches on elements affecting Soviet power that Glantz (who is strictly focused on military issues) omits.

Russia's War is divided into ten chapters, consisting of 330 pages of text and 36 pages of endnotes. The author also provides 11 sketch maps and 3 tables, as well as 32 very dark and blurry B/W photos. The author states his hypothesis up front when he says that, "material explanations of Soviet victory are never quite convincing" and opines that one cannot account for Soviet victory without addressing the idea of a Russian soul or spirit. Instead, he seeks to demolish the stereotype that Soviet victory was simply the product of overwhelming numerical superiority.

The first chapter deals with the creation of the Stalinist state in the USSR during the interwar period and Stalin's pre-occupation with building up the Soviet Union against both internal and external attack. Overy notes that Stalin's forced collectivization - always condemned outright in the West - made a huge demographic shift from rural areas to the cities, which made possible the industrial programs of the 1930s. In short order, Stalin transformed Russia from a primarily agrarian economy to a nation of heavy industries, which provided the basis for industrial mobilization in 1941-45. The author concludes that, "without the economic transformation, the Red Army would have been a feeble force in 1941, relying on a vast base of peasant manpower." Although Overy also discusses the impact of Stalinist purges on the Soviet military, he believes that they have been exaggerated and that, the Red Army `had severe weaknesses both before and after the purges," such as very weak command and control due to lack of radios and the interference of political commissars.

The next several chapters are rather disappointing. Chapter two deals with the lead-up to war in 1937-41 but skims over Soviet military modernization efforts as well as Khalkin-Gol and the Russo-Finnish War. Chapters three and four deal with Operation Barbarossa and Soviet efforts to defend Leningrad and Moscow but really don't offer any new material. Overy does conclude that, "it was not the tough winter conditions that halted the German army but the remarkable revival of Soviet military manpower after the terrible maulings of the summer and autumn," but contends that these actions were not decisive. In the fifth chapter, on terror and resistance, Overy crosses over an old `taboo' line by mentioning the active cooperation of thousands of Cossacks with the invading Germans and states that, "an estimated one million Soviet soldiers ended up fighting against their country." These comments are important but exaggerated, since Vlasov's army was not formed until 1945 and most other units formed from eastern volunteers were only battalion or regiment-sized. The author also assails the cherished icon of Soviet partisans, stating that their role was fairly limited and describes them as "the kamikazes of the Soviet war effort."

On a number of issues, Overy seems unable to drag himself out of the morass of Soviet wartime propaganda. For example, he claims that virtually all of the German troops involved in the Korsun Pocket breakout in February 1944 were `massacred' - essentially parotting Soviet wartime claims - while fresh research reveals that 35,000 out of 45,000 Germans escaped the pocket. Similarly, Overy's treatment of Soviet inactivity during the uprising of the Polish Home Army is August 1944 is as insulting as it is faulty.

In the sixth and seventh chapters, the author covers the critical battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, considered the decisive actions. He notes that the combination of Stalin's `not-a-step-backward' order and ferocious Soviet propaganda brought Soviet society "to a fever pitch of hatred and vengeance" in 1942, which contributed to the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad. In the Kursk chapter, he cites Stalin's willingness to gradually give more decision-making authority to his military professionals, which contrasted greatly with Hitler's move in the opposite direction and that this, "created a central team of military managers and thinkers which radically altered Soviet fighting power." With Soviet industry churning out large numbers of modern tanks, artillery and aircraft, a revitalized Soviet military elite was allowed to plan and conduct its campaigns based on military rather than political logic. Overy also cites other factors that contributed to Soviet victory: two thirds of women were drafted to work in factories while most German women stayed at home; Western Lend-Lease provided the Soviets with vital non-combat gear (radios, trucks, boots), allowing Soviet industry to concentrate on weapons production; and the role of slave-labor in the Soviet Gulgag, which produced 15 percent of all ammunition. Overall, Professor Overy concludes that Soviet victory was based on a combination of factors, but the foremost were the series of brutal policies enacted by Stalin that made the Soviet Union a far more militarized state than the old Tsarist Russia. While this book made an important contribution when it first appeared over a decade ago, it is becoming obsolete and should be used with care.

Russia's War by Richard Overy is a history of Russia's role in WWII. To put Russia's WWII role into a proper perspective, the book also covers approximately a decade of Soviet history before and after the war, making the period covered roughly the years of Stalin's rule. It is also the companion book to the 10 part documentary series Russia's War: Blood on the Snow produced by IBP Films in London and shown on many PBS stations in the US. Professor Overy (King's College, London) has done much more than produce a transcript of the video series; he has added a great deal of historical depth that wasn't possible in the video format. For someone seriously interested in learning about this period of Soviet history, I'd recommend both the book and the videos (now available from Amazon in DVD format for $28.99). The videos were produced with the cooperation of the Russian Government during the Yeltsin years and contain fascinating interviews with eye witnesses to Stalin's Great Terror of the 1930s, WWII, and the early Cold War years.

Russia's contribution to the allied victory in WWII is greatly underappreciated in this country. Throughout most of the war, over 70% of the German army was committed to the eastern front. In saying this, I don't mean to slight the US and British contributions; they were also essential to the allied victory. However, the cost of the war to Russia in lives and economic destruction is staggering: Something like 25 million deaths, the industrial and agricultural heartland of Russia occupied and devastated.

Russia was at a tremendous disadvantage in the initial phase of the war. Stalin had executed most of the capable senior officers in the Red Army during the Great Terror, most notably the senior commander Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, replacing them with politically reliable incompetents. Even more amazingly, Stalin apparently trusted Hitler to adhere to the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact despite Hitler's strident anti-communism and repeated pledges to obtain "living space" for Germany in the east. As a result, the first year and a half of the war was a serious Russian route.

Amazingly, Russia recovered. Major factors in the recovery and eventual victory included:

* Stalin backed off from personally determining military strategy and allowed a new generation of officers to advance to command based primarily on military success. Most notable was Marshal Gerogi Zhukov who became the senior field commander.

* Factories were disassembled, moved east of the Urals, and reassembled prior to their capture by the advancing Germans. Production of arms and munitions resumed and eventually exceeded German production.

* American Lend-lease aid supported Russia even before the US entered the war and was instrumental in keeping Russia fighting during the initial setbacks.

* Soviet spy Richard Sorge, working in Tokyo, correctly tipped off Moscow that the Japanese were preparing major attacks on US and British forces in the Pacific in December 1941. This knowledge allowed Stalin to pull dozens of fresh divisions out of the Far East and rush them to the defense of Moscow.

Please note that I have tried to use the terms "Russian" and "Soviet" selectively. The heroic contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany was an effort of the Russian people that succeeded in spite of the inept, brutal Soviet government. The US-British alliance with Stalin was one of absolute necessity, not a reflection of any shared values or common goals beyond victory (George Kennan's words).

A popular historian in search of a home run, Overy landed another bloop single. British historians are some of the finest of the modern period (Evans, Clark, Kershaw, Stone, and on and on). Overy’s work always strikes me as in a lower tier, making me appreciate his jaw-dropping, home-run-hitting colleagues when I read them.

I say all this after reading at least 4 of his books now (including “Why the Allies Won,” “The Battle of Britain,” and “The Bombing War”).

Overy relies a lot on secondary sources here, and owes much to Glantz, Erickson, and others who came before him (which he acknowledges). While his introductory remarks tout a fresh look at the Soviet war effort in light of what was revealed after the fall of Communism, there doesn’t seem to be much archival research. Primary sources, such as they are, are things like Zhukov’s memoirs, Grossman’s work, or letters from soldiers. I’m not sure that any of this was eye-opening or revelatory when this was published.

Nevertheless, Overy does wrap the facts with some fresh perspectives worth considering. For example, he notes that the Stalinist state was born in a war: against the Czars, against the Whites, against Poland, and so on. This helps explain the constant paranoia and totalitarianism of the state, without excusing it by any means (and Overy’s account is quite damning).

World War II in the east was a Soviet triumph. Overy is careful to spread the credit for the Soviet victory to several candidates. The war, he concludes, was as much Stalin’s victory as his people’s; on this, Overy seems to counter Russian accounts that shift the credit from ruler to the ruled (who did suffer a lot).

What Stalin did right was listen to his generals. Hitler, in clear contrast, never learned to do this successfully or consistently. Overy is right to especially applaud the Soviet economic relocation as a massively well-organized undertaking that ranks as one of the war’s many small Allied miracles.

All in all, the book is a lively survey of the Eastern Front told from a Soviet perspective. It’s relatively short for its subject – much too short to be considered a serious study – and readable. Nearly 20 years after its publication, it remains a good starting point for further study, for either newcomers or dabblers. Eastern Front or Soviet-era grognards can skip this one.

The book is great. It's not stocked in the libraries so I was happy to find it and get.

I have read a lot of books on the eastern front in World War Two.Still this book is for people who have read so much the subject is still worthy of reading.It is a clash of two totalitarian systems,time and time again the famous German arrogance flows like a river.All they had to do is was put themselves across as liberators and at least until they won the war treated the Ukraines,Georgians as allies they would have won.These oppressed peoples would have won the war by for the nazis.You look at the barbaric system Stalin enforced not hard to see why I put this opinion forward.But then in this book the war of annihilation the nazis started from day one any wonder the Russians and minorities put up the fight they did and in the end won World War Two.anyway worthy of a read

I

If you are primarily looking for battlefield action look elsewhere. If you want insight into Soviet characters at the top and various military and political situations then this book is for you, even if first published as long ago as 1997 (i.e. 25 years ago as of this review). A short, sharp and concise treatment of Russia's (big part in the) war from start to finish and many of the behind the scenes power plays. Ideally one should read this book first to make sense of the Russian 'stance / mindset' before delving into other books that focus on particular battles throughout the war. However, even if you have read other books on the Eastern Front and the fall of Berlin, this book still contains some 'enlightening' background information. It also contains uncomfortable facts oft left unsaid in other works. An excellent book in my opinion, unless of course one finds the truth hard to stomach. The book is worth the buying simply for the last chapter (10) and the epilogue alone, i.e. The Cult of Personality: Stalin and the Legacy of War: and the epilogue; Russia's War: Myth and Reality.

To really understand the modern russian culture, temperd by wars and sacrifices. The origin of the russian nationalism and proud.

I had started to read this book, borrowed from a friend, in Hardback and was immediately interested in the context, style and detail incorporated by the author. When I purchased this book in paperback I was surprised in the difference in type setting and found it harder to concentrate on the detail and material content of the book. For someone who is interested in this type of historical research I would have liked a better summary of the content because the only reason I had bought it was to continue what I had started when I had shared a friend's book.The summary given by Amazon would not have sold me the book. It did not grab me with a taste of some of the breathaking facts the book contained. The attempted extermination of the Jews by the Nazis is within the knowledge of most people yet the decimation of the Russian and satelite peoples since the Russian revolution and at the hands of Stalin, the enormity of which is almost beyond comprehension, is also not withion the knowledge of many. It is this omision of that impact from the summary that does not sell the book as well as it could.