Online Statistical Appendix to ISLAMISM, ARAB SPRING AND DEMOCRACY (Springer, 2018)

Review of Religious Research, 2016

2014

Compared to the older age groups, the younger age groups (1) are more supportive of social individualism; (2) have more favorable attitudes toward gender equality; (3) are more strongly in favor of secular politics only among Lebanese, Pakistanis, Tunisians, but are less so among Turkish; (4) are more strongly in favor of secular politicians among Iraqis, Lebanese, Pakistanis, Saudis, and Tunisians; (5) are more favorable toward secular nationalism in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, but less so in Turkey; (6) are generally more liberal; (7) are less religious, (8) display a higher level of religious tolerance in Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey; and (9) are less supportive of political violence against Americans in Iraq and Pakistan, but more so in Tunisia and Turkey. These findings reveal three interesting patterns. First, these relationships are most significant among the Pakistani respondents. The size of the correlation coefficients between age groups and different values is considerably larger among Pakistanis than it is among respondents from the other six countries, except for interfaith intolerance where it is largest among Tunisians and Lebanese. This is remarkable, as it shows that the gap between younger and older age groups in Pakistan is much wider than it is in other countries, with the younger age group being considerably more in favor of social individualism, gender equality, secular politics, secular politicians, secular nationalism, and liberalism, and less religious, more religiously tolerant, and less supportive of political violence. On the level of mass belief system, we may thus argue that the younger Pakistanis may provide a stronger social basis for the development of secular politics and liberal values in the country. Second, in Egypt, by contrast, there is a much narrower gap between the older and younger age groups than other countries, showing no significant connection between age groups and different components of secularism, interfaith intolerance, and political violence. Finally, among the seven countries, Turkey displayed inconsistent relationships between age groups and value orientations. That is, while younger age groups tend to be more supportive of social individualism, gender equality, and liberalism and are less religious and more religiously tolerant, they are less supportive of secular politics and secular nationalism and more supportive of political violence than the older age groups.

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In the societal and scientific discussions about the support for democracy and gender equality in the Arab Middle East, this study engages the triangular theory, which links Islamic orientations, gender equality attitudes and democracy. I theorize and test if and how Islam is related to the attitudes towards democracy and gender equality, and whether gender equality attitudes partly channel the influence of Islam on democracy support. The different theoretical expectations were tested on Arab Barometer data for seven countries, including three different dimensions of Islamicreligious identity: affiliation, piety, and political-Islamist attitudes. The analyses roughly back the triangular model, but for democratic support only the Islamist values seem important, partly working through economic gender equality attitudes. Attitudes towards women's position in politics and education seem unrelated to democratic support. In addition, this study applies the gender and postcolonial concept of 'othering' to the triangular model. Theoretically it predicts that in the current neo-colonial era, anti-Western feelings might create more Islamic and less democracy and gender equal attitudes simultaneously, making Islam's impact partly spurious. Empirically, this is modestly supported for the Islamist-democracy link only. However, anti-Western feelings do relate to gender equality, democratic support, and religious attitudes, and deserves more attention when studying democracy and gender equality in the Arab Middle East.

Journal of Democracy, 2008

over the course of the last quarter-century, democratic currents have swept across much of the developing and postcommunist worlds. The Arab world, however, has remained largely untouched by this global democratic trend. The first Arab Human Development Report, published by the United Nations Development Programme in 2002, lamented that political systems "have not been opened up to all citizens" and that "political participation is less advanced in the Arab world than in other developing regions." 1 The 2003 report reiterated this assessment, stating that the Arab world's freedom deficit "remains critically pertinent and may have become even graver" since the 2002 report was issued. 2 A series of articles in the January 2004 issue of Comparative Politics described the "resilient and enduring authoritarianism" in the Arab world, and later that same year Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway concluded that in most Arab countries "real progress toward democracy is minimal." 3 Nor has the situation changed very much in the last few years, as the 2005 Arab Human Development Report confirms. Despite-or perhaps because of-the persistence of authoritarianism across the Arab world, popular support for democracy there is widespread. The evidence for this may be gleaned from twenty different surveys carried out in nine different Arab countries between 2000 and 2006. 4 Indeed, cross-regional data from the World Values Survey indicate that support for democracy in the Arab world is as high as or higher than in any other world region. 5 While this might appear anomalous in a region where ordinary citizens have had little experience with democracy, the absence of democracy may be the very factor that leads so

Th is paper explores the nature and determinants of attitudes toward the political role of Islam held by ordinary citizens in the Arab world. Based on results from nationally representative surveys carried out in seven Arab states during 2006-2007, it engages the pervasive debate about Islam and democracy-showing that the signifi cant divide is not between those who favor democracy and those who favor Islam, but between those who favor secular democracy and those who favor a political system that is both democratic and Islamic in some meaningful way. Furthermore, this analysis fi nds that the civic values and predispositions of individuals who favor a political role for Islam are overwhelmingly similar to those of individuals who favor a separation of religion and politics. Th e paper also fi nds little consistency in the factors that incline individuals towards support for political Islam in the diff erent countries surveyed. Most importantly, this analysis concludes that there is little or no incompatibility between Islam and democracy in the public mind and that a proper understanding of the reasons and ways that Muslim Arab publics think about governance and the political role of Islam is possible only if attention is paid to the particular political and societal contexts within which attitudes are formed. Multi-stage area probability sampling was used to select respondents, with quota sampling employed in the fi nal stage in several countries. Face-to-face interviewing was used throughout and only men and women aged eighteen or over were interviewed. See Arab Barometer Project, http://www.arabbarometer.org/.

International Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance Studies, 2025

This paper examines the Islamicity Indices, which aim to measure the alignment of national governance, economic structures, and social policies with Islamic principles. Although developed to provide an objective benchmark for assessing 'Islamic' governance, these indices have drawn criticism for relying heavily on secular, Western-centric metrics such as GDP growth, political liberalism, and legal transparency. Such reliance risks distorting the holistic and value-oriented nature of Islam, which integrates spirituality, ethics, and communal responsibility. For instance, economic openness and individual liberties, as defined in liberal frameworks, may conflict with Islamic norms that emphasize distributive justice, prohibition of riba (interest), and moral accountability. A key concern is the frequent ranking of non-Muslim-majority countries above Muslim-majority ones, suggesting a misalignment between the indices' measurement tools and Islamic epistemology. This paper argues that fragmenting Islam into quantifiable secular metrics undermines its integrative worldview. In response, a revised evaluative paradigm is proposed-one that incorporates core Islamic values such as ethical finance, zakat-based redistribution, governance rooted in amanah and shura, and indicators of social solidarity. By embedding Islamic epistemological foundations into the index construction, researchers can develop a more faithful model of Islamicity. This would not only offer Muslim societies a relevant diagnostic tool but also provide a bridge for cross-cultural understanding. The proposed framework thus sets the groundwork for more meaningful, norm-sensitive measures of Islamic governance and development.