This article reevaluates the origins of the First Romano-Parthian War (56/5-50 BCE) to better understand the different perspectives, policies, and objectives of the various Parthian and Roman leaders in the early and middle 50 s that helped forge the great rivalry that emerged between Parthia and Rome. This article breaks from the dominate Rome-centric, anti-Crassus traditions concerning the investigation of the origins of this conflict. Centuries of anti-Crassus propaganda have led most scholars to discount or overlook the critical agency of the Parthians in the conflict and the serious implications of Gabinius' actions in 56-55, while blaming Crassus for indefensible Roman aggression and greed. The propensity of modern scholarship to villainize and criticize Crassus follows ancient propaganda and stems in part from a lack of understanding of the geopolitical realities that Parthia and Rome faced in the middle 50 s. Further, this article challenges the misguided traditions that, first, describe the Parthians as feeble, passive, and duplicitous in their interactions with foreign powers and, second, that blame the incompetence or weakness of the Parthians' enemies to explain their actions and successes. Indeed, the Parthians were important, active, and powerful agents in these events, something often obscured or overlooked because of the inherent Roman focus and bias of the Graeco-Roman literary tradition and modern scholarship.

In this exciting and thought-provoking article, Dr Daryn Graham explores the Late Republic period of the Roman World, to demonstrate that it did not exist in a vacuum. It was surrounded by neighbours, the most powerful being the Parthian Empire, whose political, economic, and military conditions could, and did, influence the Roman World of the Late Republic, and beyond. This unique article is thoroughly argued, and fully referenced. It has been published by the ‘Journal of Historical Studies’.

As history has proven, sometimes the essence of one’s failure becomes best encapsulated in the way he then celebrates his long-awaited retaliation. In the Parthian case, the above law also seems to find its confirmation. In the following article, we research the topic of foreign relations of the Roman Empire with the Arsacid monarchy (Parthian Empire) in the Ist cent. B. C. The paper regards the overall notion of first diplomatic encounters of the two superpowers, as well as the issue of their military struggles in the period. Starting with the circumstances of the first official embassy between L. Cornelius Sulla and the Parthian emissary Orobazos (first decade of the Ist cent. B. C.), through the defeat of M. Crassus’ legions at Carrhae (53 B. C.), Julius Caesar’s own plans for conducting a Parthian campaign (45–44 B. C.), Mark Antony’s eastern expedition (36 B. C.), as far as to emperor Augustus’ success in restitution of the lost legionary ensigns (20 B. C.), the paper focuses on the matter of the possible position, as well as the origins of the then-stereotypical image, that the Parthians could have had well developed in Roman imperial ideology as in result of the above historical events. What impact did Crassus’ defeat possibly have on the Roman military elites and populus Romanus as such from that time? Where did the underpinnings of the entire Roman-Parthian conflict lie?

Roman emperors were influenced by precedent and by the expectations of various groups in the Roman Empire that followed from precedent. Yet, imperial decisions by individual emperors influenced groups of Romans and changed their expectations of later emperors. This article analyses this process through the lens of the emperor Hadrian. It pays particular attention to Hadrian's accession, and to the consequences that the way in which he came to power had for some of his imperial behaviour, noticeable the ways in which the emperor dealt with the provinces. Both the constraints which Hadrian faced in his early reign because of the context in which he came to power, and the ways in which his mode of reign seems to have shifted expectations of later rulers are reflected in the way the emperor was (numismatically) represented.

Tacitus is the only Roman historian who devoted his works to such an extent to Rome's eastern neighbor – the Parthian Empire. Scholars have researched the problem of Taci-tus' attitude towards the Parthians on many occasions. It seems that what is the most important question is not Tacitus' opinion, but the perspective from which he looked at this topic combined with the source he used when describing the Parthians and their history. Another interesting question is also how deep Tacitus' knowledge was of the past of the Parthian Empire and the history of Roman-Parthian relations. The aim of this paper is to verify what Tacitus wrote about the Parthians throughout his works. Without taking into account all this evidence, it is not possible to propose a proper evaluation or balanced observations concerning his presentation of the Roman-Parthian relations and internal history, society and customs of the Arsacid state in the first century CE.

An ancient traveler come to Corinth, and the record of what he saw. We wish we had records from others besides Pausanias and Paul-the two most frequently mentioned ancient travelers to Corinth-since neither of them has left an unproblematic account. Charles Williams and others have amply demonstrated so in regard to Pausanias's descriptions of various parts of the city. 1 Still, he is a valuable source. Paul is another matter, precisely because he himself says so little about the actual city. By contrast, the account that does mention specifi c monuments-namely, the portrayal of Paul's visit in Acts 18 (written roughly forty years or more after the fact)-is beset by numerous historical diffi culties. 2 Nonetheless, the possibility of evaluating