Morality can be painfully demanding so much so that we sometimes question the wisdom of complying with it. Indeed, according to H. A. Prichard, making this argument work is the central preoccupation of moral philosophy. But Prichard also believes that to the extent this is true, the whole subject of moral philosophy rests on a mistake. Moreover, the consensus is not only that we should call these things moral but also that we should be these things, which gives us a (...) clue to the word's meaning. When a person refers to an act by saying, “That's immoral” listeners normally understand the speaker to be saying there is reason not to do the act. This way of understanding the term's use may not fully capture the term's meaning, any more than a set of injunctions to be kind, honest, and peaceful fully covers morality's extension. (shrink)

Confucius, Plato, and Aristotle would agree on three propositions: genuine virtue represents a kind of second nature, a result of education such that patterns of choice become natural and predictable that would not be natural and predictable for the average person; there are patterns of gratification attendant on genuine virtue, that involve deeper values than most of the things that people pursue in life; and because of these, genuine virtue is always in a person's self-interest. The word “gratification” here is (...) deliberately broad. There can be brief periods of satisfaction, with performances that enjoyably are going well; these would amount to refined pleasures. But there also can be an agreeable sense of having come to terms with oneself, with no sense of self-disapproval or keen regret. This can be an important element in happiness. (shrink)

How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to error. However, we argue that the methodologies espoused by Anderson and (...) Kitcher implicitly appeal to the substantive principle of “moral universalism.” This sets up the positive project of the paper: an attempt to vindicate moral universalism with a pragmatic genealogy. Using resources from cultural evolutionary theory and the history of ideas we argue that the universalistic norms widely committed to in many societies today have the function of maintaining cooperation in large anonymous groups. Furthermore, while universalistic norms play this instrumental role, their functional benefits are best secured when people following such norms do so for intrinsic rather than instrumental reasons. Finally, having elaborated our pragmatic genealogy, we close by considering how this genealogy should affect our commitment to moral universalism and how it can complement the methods of Anderson and Kitcher. (shrink)

Universalism – the view that it would be impossible for anyone to be punished eternally in hell –is controversial, given that it appears incompatible with Scriptural teaching that there will be eternal punishment for sinners, as well as being incompatible with a long-standing consensus of Christian theologians (including Church Fathers East and West, such as Augustine and Chrysostom) who reject universalism as heretical. Independent of scriptural or patristic interpretation, or other similar theological loci, Catholic and Orthodox Christians have (...) reasons to reject universalism as heretical which arise merely from the solemn and definitive dogmatic judgments of ecclesial authorities. I review outstanding instances from the vast quantity of ‘magisterial’ evidence of a consensus against universalism, showing that this consensus condemnation is definitive and solemn. Then, I respond to typical apologetic strategies which aim to exempt universalism from these condemnations and show that none of these are satisfactory. I conclude that Christians who accept the binding character of these ecclesial judgments on matters of dogma have definitive reason to judge that universalism is heretical, a denial of a de fide dogma. Universalism is thus shown to be view that Catholic or Orthodox believers cannot licitly hold, even as a theological opinion. (shrink)

We present a new notion of mereological sum that is inequivalent to extant ones in the literature and does not fall prey to reasonable complaints that can be raised against some such notions. In light of this notion, we then revisit the relation between mereological universalism and extensionalism. In particular we argue that Varzi’s claim to the point that universalism entails extensionalism is justified only insofar as one sticks to Varzi’s notion of sum. In effect, we distinguish different (...) versions of extensionalism and argue that universalism—when cashed out in terms of our new notion of sum—entails some versions but not others. Most significantly it does not entail extensionality of proper parthood. In the light of the above we set forth a new mereological system, Universalist Quasi-Supplemented Mereology, that can be considered a worthy alternative to different mereological systems in the literature. (shrink)

Moral universalism refers to the idea of a (absolute) moral truth and a single pattern (a.k.a. universal rule) of action acknowledged as good or right by all and applied to all. It dominated moral history until the nineteenth century when the moral universals it founded lost their consistency as a result of the decline of metaphysics.

Does a commitment to mereological universalism automatically bring along a commitment to the controversial doctrine of mereologicalextensionalism—the view that objects with the same proper parts are identical? A recent argument suggests the answer is ‘yes’. This paper attempts a systematic response to the argument, considering nearly every available line of reply. It argues that only one approach—themutual partsview—can yield a viable mereology where universalism does not entail extensionalism.

This paper defends Mereological Universalism(the thesis that, for any set S of disjoint objects, there is an object that the members of S compose. Universalism is unpalatable to many philosophers because it entails that if there are such things as my left tennis shoe, W. V. Quine, and the Taj Mahal, then there is another object that those three things compose. This paper presents and criticizes Peter van Inwagen's argument against Universalism and then presents a new argument (...) in favor of Universalism. It turns out that the most reasonable way to resist the argument for Universalism is to deny the existence of artifacts; thus, if we believe in artifacts, we have no real choice other than to embrace Universalism. (shrink)

In Kant’s Universalism and the Concept of Race, Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou provides an account of Kant’s views on universalism regarding the claim that they are enough to absolve Kant from racist allegations. In this book, Shorter-Bourhanou embraces both sides of the traditional debate regarding Kant and his racism. That is, Shorter-Bourhanou agrees with philosophers such as Pauline Kleingeld and Allen W. Wood that there is a universalist theory in Kant’s moral, social, and political philosophies worth preserving. Shorter-Bourhanou also (...) agrees with philosophers Robert Bernasconi and Charles W. Mills, who argue that Kant has racist ideas that impact his moral, social, and political philosophies. Shorter-Bourhanou seeks a middle ground between these two interpretations in order to account for Kant’s racism while also generating a discussion about universalism that would, in fact, reflect a truly inclusive ideology. Shorter-Bourhanou thus focuses on what Kant said about race, and the impact of these claims on his universalist views present in his moral, historical, social, and political philosophies with a particular focus on Kantian interpretations of these areas. Shorter-Bourhanou embraces Kant’s racism in order to discover the possibility for a concept of a Kant inspired universalism that will in fact include everyone. (shrink)

Anyone who endorses Universalism and Four Dimensionalism owes us an argument for those controversial mereological theses. One may put forth David Lewis’s and Ted Sider’s arguments from vagueness. However, the success of those arguments depends on the rejection of the epistemic view of vagueness, and thus opens the door to a fatal confrontation with one particularly troubling version of The Problem of the Many. The alternative for friends of Universalism and Four Dimensionalism is to abandon those currently fashionable (...) arguments in favor of others which are consistent with the epistemic view of vagueness and with the elegant solution it furnishes to that problem. (shrink)

This paper does three interrelated things. First, it argues that the universalism that forms the target of criticism and attack by decolonial theorists from the Global South is a debased form of universalism, what might be termed “ethnocentric universalism.” Second, equipped with a conceptual grip on ethnocentric universalism, it shows that the picture on which ethnocentric universalism confers some innocuous epistemic privilege to members of dominant groups is not quite accurate—ethnocentric universalism is incompatible with (...) the epistemic flourishing of members of dominant groups. And third, based on that claim, and the additional consideration that ethnocentric universalism equally undermines the epistemic flourishing of members of historically marginalized groups, it proposes an emancipatory framework for engaging with it. (shrink)

This paper discusses the presence of potentially racist statements in Kant’s philosophical work and the complexity of interpreting their implications for his philosophical system. The goal is to correct a common misunderstanding about the apparent conflict between Kant’s moral universalism and these seemingly racist statements. In addition, the problems arising from Kant’s universalist framework that can lead to pejorative judgments about non-white or non-European cultures are illuminated. In conclusion, it is emphasized that there is an urgent need to examine (...) whether these judgments qualify as a form of racism and how they relate to Kant’s critical systematics. (shrink)

Many philosophers have claimed that the folk endorse moral universalism. Some have taken the folk view to support moral universalism; others have taken the folk view to reflect a deep confusion. And while some empirical evidence supports the claim that the folk endorse moral universalism, this work has uncovered intra-domain differences in folk judgments of moral universalism. In light of all this, our question is: why do the folk endorse moral universalism? Our hypothesis is that (...) folk judgments of moral universalism are generated in part by a desire to punish. We present evidence supporting this across three studies. On the basis of this, we argue for a debunking explanation of folk judgments of moral universalism. Our results not only further our understanding of the psychological processes underpinning folk judgments of moral universalism. They also bear on philosophical discussions of folk meta-ethics. (shrink)

While universalism is rooted in the very ideology of Islam and is grounded in the Qur’an, especially through the concepts of fiṭra, amr and rūḥ, cosmopolitanism is an essential characteristic of classical Muslim empires: both the Caliphate-Imamate and empires, like the Ottoman or the Mughal ones, were a melting pot of races, languages and customs. The Caliphate-Imamate was by nature supranational and for centuries there was no idea of the nation in Islam. Contemporary nationalism, local or global, have represented (...) a disrupting more than a unifying force and have produced many failed states. In the present situation of crisis of the Muslim world, Puritanism and blind adherence to past tradition have paved the way for the revival of intolerance. Conservative or even extremist Islamist movements have assumed the deformed perspective of retrospective utopia, convinced that it is sufficient to reproduce the conditions of the Prophet’s time to solve all problems of Muslim societies. Hence, the Islamic state and Caliphate’s issues must be re-discussed from new perspectives, by recovering the potentials of universalism and cosmopolitanism in the tradition. It is central today the role of civil society, wherein Islamic universalism and cosmopolitanism could find their natural space, and the same goes for the role of citizenship. Reform requires a re-consideration of classical Islamic juridical and political thought patterns, which this chapter aims to do by, first, focalizing certain paradigms and concepts, and by, second, problematizing the modern meanings given to these paradigms and concepts. At the closure, I contend that it is in civil society that traditional meanings of universalism and cosmopolitanism can flourish again for functional political thought and praxis. (shrink)

Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of (...) Sider's argument (§V). I conclude with some brief comments on why this is not simply an ad hominem against Sider, and why this incompatibility of supersubstantivalism with the argument from vagueness is of broader interest (§VI). (shrink)

I make four points about Rooney’s (2026) reply to Hill (2025). First, Rooney worries that universalists cannot ground the claim that necessarily God beatifies every creature He makes. I explain how universalists can ground the relevant claim in a claim Rooney endorses in his book. Second, Rooney’s argument depends on the principle that if a property is not essential to a creature, then God cannot ensure that necessarily that creature eventually gets that property. I point out that Rooney offers no (...) motivation for this principle and so it may be costlessly rejected by the universalist. I further explain that if atheism is true Rooney’s principle might be plausible. But, if God exists, it is easy to construct counterexamples to the principle. Third, Rooney’s argument depends on a specific, contentious interpretation of Aquinas’ understanding of the Beatific Vision. Rooney says this is acceptable because his universalist opponents also accept this understanding of the Beatific Vision. But I point out that many paradigm examples of universalists, as well as non-universalist Classical Theists, explicitly reject not only Rooney’s specific formulation but also the Thomistic understanding of the Beatific Vision more generally. This confirms that even if Rooney’s argument were not unsound for the other reasons I have identified, it would nevertheless depend on Rooney’s specific, contentious understanding of deliverances of Revelation. But the main purpose of Rooney’s argument was to convince Classical Theists who are not moved by appeals to Revelation. So Rooney’s argument doesn’t do the main thing it is advertised as doing. Fourth, Rooney claims that Hill was nonchalant about the possibility of abandoning Classical Theism. I point out that this is a misreading of Hill. Nowhere does Hill advocate abandoning Classical Theism. Instead, Hill maintains that Rooney’s argument gives the Classical Theist no reason to reject universalism. (shrink)

This paper defends “Animal Universalism,” the thesis that all sentient non-human animals will be brought into Heaven and remain there for eternity. It assumes that God exists and is all-powerful, perfectly loving, and perfectly just. From these background theses, the authors argue that Animal Universalism follows. If God is perfectly loving, then God is concerned about the well-being of non-human animals, and God chooses to maximize the well-being of each individual animal when doing so does not harm other (...) individual creatures or violate creaturely freedom. If God is perfectly just, then God does not arbitrarily discriminate against non-human animals by offering humans an opportunity to enter Heaven but not offering the same to each animal. Each of these conclusions implies Animal Universalism. (shrink)

Recent work in folk metaethics finds a correlation between perceived consensus about a moral claim and meta-ethical judgments about whether the claim is universally or only relatively true. We argue that consensus can provide evidence for meta-normative claims, such as whether a claim is universally true. We then report several experiments indicating that people use consensus to make inferences about whether a claim is universally true. This suggests that people's beliefs about relativism and universalism are partly guided by evidence-based (...) reasoning. In a final study, we show that the rejection of universalism does not generate a simple subjectivism but is associated with a more moderate relativism on which highly atypical positions are regarded as mistaken. (shrink)

In this article, I illustrate the universalism of logic using the example of Stephen Langton’s ($$\dagger $$ † 1228) exegesis presented in his theological question 103. This text refers to the biblical story of Isaac blessing his son Jacob, who pretended to be his brother, Esau. I present the universalism of logic understood as its broad applicability and effectiveness. I argue that logic is very useful even in analyzing biblical exegesis. Langton’s exegesis benefits from logical knowledge on different (...) levels. One of them is the application of a semiotic theory to formulate a solution to the problem of the validity of Isaac’s blessing. Above all, Langton distinguishes between a discrete and a vague (or simple) use of the pronoun “you.” Notably, Langton’s analysis of various speech acts in terms of his semiotic (or pragmatic) theory is also a basis to formulate the conditions of felicity of the act of blessing (understood in the theological context), which shows that logic can be not only broadly applicable, but also effective. Finally, question 103 proves that logic is universal also in a different way, namely: it can provide solutions which are acceptable for representatives of different traditions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:This Universalism Which Is Not OneLinda M. G. Zerilli (bio)Ernesto Laclau. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 1996.Judging from the recent spate of publications devoted to the question of the universal, it appears that, in the view of some critics, we are witnessing a reevaluation of its dismantling in twentieth-century thought. One of the many oddities about this “return of the universal” 1 is the idea that contemporary engagements with it (...) are more or less of a piece, and that they reflect a growing consensus that poststructuralist political theories are incapable of generating a viable alternative to the collective fragmentation that characterizes late modernity. 2 The putative return to the universal marks, on this view, both a homecoming to Enlightenment ideals—purified of their more poisonous elements, of course—and a reconciliation of sorts between those who refuted these ideals and those who sought to realize them. Now that “we” all know and agree that poststructuralism is critically valuable but politically bankrupt; now that we all know and agree that the “old universal” was indeed a “pseudo-universal,” so the homecoming narrative goes; we can get on with the project of constructing a “new universal.” 3 This authentic universal would really be inclusive of all people, regardless of race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, and whatever else attaches to the “embarrassing etcetera” that, as Judith [End Page 3] Butler reminds us, inevitably accompanies such gestures of acknowledging human diversity.Before signing on to this felicitous agreement about “the necessity of universalism,” we may wish to know whether we have anything like a minimal agreement in language, that is, whether we who speak of this universal are even speaking about the same thing. Apart from the not insignificant problem of translating from a philosophical to a political idiom, the whole question of this agreement is virtually occluded by the rush to rescue politics from the virulent particularisms that admit no common ground or sense of collective belonging. Presented in terms of the familiar binary couple, the choice between universalism and particularism seems settled by merely pointing to global and domestic political realities. Universalism is the only alternative to social fragmentation, wild child of the collapse of communism, the rise of deadly nationalisms, and the multiculturalist romance with particularism. To invoke the name of the universal in any affirmative sense is already to sign on to the political diagnosis and its solution.One of the many virtues of Ernesto Laclau’s Emancipation(s) is that it offers both an alternative to the binarisms spawned by the “return” to the universal (for example, false universalism/true universalism) and a trenchant critique of the original binary couple itself (universalism/ particularism). Demonstrating the imbrication of the universal and the particular, Laclau shows why it is a matter not of choosing one over the other but of articulating, in a scrupulously political sense, the relation between the two. He thus explicitly rejects the notion that this relation is one of mutual exclusion, and shows that the tendency to see it as just that has led to the impasse of the contemporary debate, an impasse that is glossed over in some highly visible academic cases by proclaiming the necessary return to the universal. Although the language of universalism as spoken by Laclau searches for some common ground between particularists and universalists, it is more by way of articulating their mutual contamination, that is, how each is rendered impure by the irreducible presence of the other.The Problem of UniversalsLaclau situates his collection of essays in the context of the increasingly polarized debate over multiculturalism, a debate in which the classical universalism of the philosophical tradition has come under serious question. Reading his essays, one comes to see the deep dependence of the entire contemporary discussion on this tradition, even when its metaphysical assumptions are explicitly rejected (as, say, in the work of Seyla Benhabib) or insufficiently comprehended (as in most of the popularized political discourse). Laclau’s book can help us to see that the political question of universalism cannot be posed properly as long as it remains tethered to the classical philosophical “problem of universals.” At stake in sorting out the affinities and... (shrink)

How did the idea of monarchy develop in Giovanni Botero’s thinking? How did he use it in his largest work, Relazioni universali (1st edition 1591)? How did he redefine it at the beginning of the seventeenth century? Botero developed his idea of monarchy by reading the classics and traditional literature on the subject, as well as by travelling and observing different models of government: his diplomatic experience in France (1585) and his three years in Spain as tutor of the princes (...) of Savoy (1603-1606) led to theories on the features of the ‘best form of government’. Starting from Botero’s first thinking on the subject (De regia sapientia, 1583), this chapter will focus on Relazioni universali as a kind of catalogue of comparative monarchy case studies from all over the world and pay particular attention to Discorso dell’eccellenza della monarchia (Discourse about the Excellence of Monarchy) published in Turin in 1607. Discorso has been translated into English in the Appendix. (shrink)

Green and Shapiro's critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science. The central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science. However, “universalism” in social science may be partial, in that the independence hypothesis—that the causal mechanism governing action is context independent—may hold only locally in certain classes of choice domains.

I show that the combination of unrestricted composition and composition as identity is formally analogous to Frege’s second-order theory of objects and properties, including a commitment to an exact analogue of Basic Law V. I argue that although the view manages to avert a corresponding version of Russell’s paradox, it nonetheless remains in conflict with the Cantorian insight about cardinality underlying the paradox. I argue that such a conflict can be dissipated by thinking about the view in terms of fundamentality.

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense – thus meeting the demands of universalism – but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations – thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern (...) here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance. (shrink)

This essay argues that universalism is the high road to dialogue between cultures and civilizations. Universalism is not an ideology, a philosophical system, or a world view. It is an intellectual attempt to comprehend the totality of contemporaniety and the history of civilization in a universal outlook. It seeks to articulate a universal conceptual framework in which different cultures, religions, ideologies, and philosophies can thrive and contribute to a deeper understanding of human values, aspirations, and the conditions under (...) which these values and aspirations can be realized. Universalism holds that Dialogue is the method by which humankind can be transformed from an agglomeration of states loosely related to each other to a global community. Dialogue is a rational conversation. Its conditions are: recognition for the authority of reason, freedom, equality, concentration, cooperation, belief in the existence of truth, and the promotion of cultural awareness. (shrink)

The rejection of liberal universalism originally arose from the political right. Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre and other conservatives poured their scorn on the “Rights of Man” that the Enlighten...

This article reexamines the apparent opposition between universalism and pluriversalism. We argue that pluriversalism does not reject universalism but presupposes a specific form of it - “bottom-up universalism.” Our aim is to clarify and systematize this normative core. We critique “top-down universalism,” a Eurocentric model that imposes homogenizing norms and marginalizes non-Western epistemologies and instead advance the pluriverse as a framework recognizing diverse ontologies as coeval and valid. Bottom-up universalism operates through two moments. First, a (...) critical moment universalizes the recognition of human finitude and rejects any a priori claim to epistemic or moral superiority. Second, a procedural moment universalizes not substantive values but the right to participate in dialogue across unequal historical conditions and expressive forms. Ethical commitments - such as dignity or opposition to gender violence - emerge from this process as provisional, revisable outcomes rather than imposed norms. This framework avoids both relativism and imposed universalism. Through examples including Islamic feminist reinterpretations of religious texts, we show how shared ethical horizons can arise through dialogue rather than decree, bridging theory and practice while grounding plurality in epistemic humility. (shrink)

In “Three Versions of Universalism,” Michael Murray asks what purpose our earthly life might serve if universalism is true; and in this brief response, I suggesta possible answer.

Both nihilism and universalism are historical products of Western speculative philosophy. The failure of this philosophy to discover universally valid laws resulted in widespread despair, which at times created a suicidal atmosphere. The other worldly promises offered by dualistic world models made an escape into an alternate world attractive. This paper investigates whether Nietzsche’s proposal to rekindle the fire of life by recovering the Dionysian spirit in creative work is a feasible alternative to nihilistic despair. It goes on to (...) investigate whether a new sense of community and collaborative ethics can be distilled from a renewed engagement with nature. Recent scientific discoveries and experiential evidence could lead to a reformulation of virtue ethics based on naturalistic sources. (shrink)

Swami Vivekananda formulated religious universalism for solving various issues of society. Religion, for him was realization. He gave a wide definition of religion in the form of humanism. Religion does not just teach man to refrain from evils but it is doing well for others. If religion is understood in correct sense, much of our social evils in the society would be solved. It did not consist of doctrines or dogmas. For him being religious did not mean being Hindu, (...) Christian, Muslim, Buddhist etc. and following a set of rituals of that particulars religion. On the other hand, being religious meant that a man is on his quest towards realizing God. If such a notion of religion is accepted then there is undoubtedly no difference between any two religions. Vivekanand stressed that each religion lays down the path to be followed in order to attain the ultimate. For him various religions are but different paths leading to the same goal. Swamiji’s teachings underlined unity, accepting all possible diversity. Talking of the multiplicity of religions he says, that society is richer which has greater number of occupations in it, so the world of thought also gets enriched as the number of religions increases.He proclaimed that in Vedanta lies the basis of all religions. The Vedanta applied to the various ethnic customs and creeds of India is Hinduism. He gave equal significance to physical as well as spiritual planes. Vivekananda’s Advaitic philosophy was aimed at making people religious in real sense of the term. In his manner he spread the Vedantic gospel all his life. This timely speaks of the two greatest influences on Vivekananda, that of Upanishads and his Guru Ramakrishna Paramhansa, who not only taught but ‘lived’ religion.As Vedanta could harmonise the divergent trends of various religions, Vivekananda found it to be the most suitable philosophy on which he could found the concept of universal religion. By universal religion, he did not mean any one set of myths, rituals and philosophical tenets. It only means acceptance of variety and harmony of all variations. Different religions should be looked upon as the different stages of growth. (shrink)

This paper gives two complete and elementary proofs that if the speed of light over closed paths has a universal value c, then it is possible to synchronize clocks in such a way that the one-way speed of light is c. The first proof is an elementary version of a recent proof. The second provides high precision experimental evidence that it is possible to synchronize clocks in such a way that the one-way speed of light has a universal value. We (...) also discuss an old incomplete proof by Weyl which is important from an historical perspective. (shrink)

This article addresses questions concerning Enlightenment universalism and cultural diversity by focusing on the views of China held by Pierre Bayle and the Baron de Montesquieu. In contrast to the characterizations of Enlightenment thought as insufficiently attentive to cultural diversity and as providing pretexts for imposing European values on non-European cultures, recent scholarship has sought to uncouple Enlightenment thought from imperialism and colonialism. An examination of the perspectives, positive and negative, of Bayle and Montesquieu on China suggests that Enlightenment (...) thinkers attempted to reconcile ethical universalism and cultural diversity, but also shows the limitations of such attempts. Thus, while dismissals of Enlightenment thought as universalistic and even imperialistic fail to consider Bayle’s and Montesquieu’s subtle engagements with Chinese culture, their accounts of China arguably fall short of being robust cross-cultural or anti-colonial perspectives. (shrink)