In this essay I examine the relevance of Hume's skepticism for the debate around his death. I argue that as to the official record of Hume's manner of death, `My Own Life' indirectly points to his skepticism, while Adam Smith's `Letter to Strahan' evades the issue altogether. As for the responses, when they address the problem of Hume's skepticism, they are either hostile or, at best, dismissive of it. I claim that William Cullen's letter to John Hunter constitutes the one (...) relation of Hume's death that positively acknowledges his skeptical principles, and acknowledges, in a Humean fashion, their beneficial moral influence. Along with Cullen, I argue that such influence both delivers one from superstitious disquiet and heightens the enjoyment of common life. It thus plays a central role in Hume's tranquil acceptance of death. (shrink)

Although tranquility is a fundamental aspect of human life, the experiential nature of tranquility remains elusive. Traditionally, many philosophical, religious, spiritual, or mystical traditions in East and West have strived to reach tranquil experiences and produced texts serving as manuals to reach them. Yet, no attempt has been made to compare experiences of tranquility and explore what they may have in common. The purpose of this theoretical study is to explore the experiential nature of tranquility. First, (...) we present examples of what we consider some of the most central experiences of tranquility in Eastern and Western traditions. For the sake of simplicity, we sort these examples into four categories based on their experiential focus: the body, emotions, the mind, and mysticism. Second, we offer an exploratory account of tranquility, arguing that the different examples of tranquility seem to share certain experiential features. More specifically, we propose that the shared features pertain both to the content or quality of the tranquil experiences, which involves a sense of presence and inner peace, and to the structure of these experiences, which seems to involve some degree of detachment and absorption. (shrink)

This paper explores how philosophy might be worthwhile on hedonic grounds for the Epicurean Sage who has achieved tranquility, reached the limit of pleasure, and thus for whom there is no further pleasure to pursue. I argue that philosophy might be worthwhile to the Epicurean Sage because it helps her maintain tranquility by preventing a painful boredom that could result without it.

Tranquillity and Insight. An Introduction to the Oldest Form of Buddhist Meditation. Amadeo Solé-Leris. Century Hutchinson, London, and Shambhala, Boston 1986. 176 pp. £6.95 / $7.95.

Despite the near universal desire for happiness, relatively little philosophy has been done to determine what “happiness” means. In this paper I examine happiness (in the long‐term sense), and argue that it is best understood in terms of tranquillity. This is not merely “contentment.” Rather, happiness requires reflection—the kind of reflection characteristic of philosophy. Happiness is the product of correctly assessing its conditions, and like any assessment, one can be mistaken, and thus mistaken about whether one is happy. That is, (...) one needs a correct understanding of happiness in order to be happy. (shrink)

The Epicureans are hedonists who believe that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Since pleasure is the only intrinsic good, other things are only worthwhile for the sake of pleasure. Tranquility is the final Epicurean telos, i.e., all of our actions should aim for freedom from bodily and mental pain. According to the Epicureans, tranquility is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures so that there is no pleasure beyond tranquility. Once we free ourselves from all pain, (...) there are no further pleasures to pursue. This poses the following problem. Since hedonism is true and something is only worthwhile for the sake of pleasure, but there are no further pleasures for those who have achieved tranquility to pursue, then it seems that nothing is worthwhile to the tranquil. This poses a problem for Epicureans because they should reject this consequence and they seem to want to do so, but they cannot without contradicting themselves about the nature and limit of pleasure. I call this the Nothing is Worthwhile to the Tranquil Problem. This paper develops a strategy that Epicureans can adopt to solve NWP. I develop this strategy in three stages. First, I explain NWP: Epicurean claims about the limit and nature of pleasure suggest that nothing can be worthwhile to the tranquil. Second, I show that this problem is analogous to the Problem of Creation, which claims that an impassible God has no reasons to create. Third, I argue that a prominent solution to PoC can also solve NWP. That solution goes as follows. Some activities are worthwhile to the tranquil because these activities express tranquility, just as creating is worthwhile to God because it expresses God’s perfections. In the final section, I raise three objections to this solution. None of them is strong enough to defeat the solution for which I argue, and so I conclude that it merits consideration as a solution to NWP. (shrink)

In this chapter I explore my findings from participant observation with a group who engaged in voluntary fortnightly tasks to tend a local forest. Participants also included those who used a local park for recreation. I begin with a brief look at literature which examines the effect of nature, notably the tranquil altered states of consciousness (ASCs) induced. Theodore Roszak is seen as the founder of the ecopsychology movement and his ideas are briefly explored. Spiritual ASCs from being in Nature (...) are identified. The controversy around the validity of Nature as a spiritual experience is briefly mentioned. I introduce my fieldwork group and explain their ethos and motivation, as well as overall organization of tasks. I explore their ASC experience from being in the forest, mostly daydream states. Collective ASCs at the end of tasks are described. I give examples of how Nature tasks are enmeshed in the lifeworld of the individual. Spiritual experiences in Nature were reported by participants, even those who did not practise any religion. I give examples of therapeutic aspects of being in Nature, which all participants said they experienced. This was often an inner dialogue where negative experience was dispelled with Nature ASCs. I give examples of the wide variety of other ASC inducers used when Nature was not available. These include playing and listening to music and making mosaics. Recordings of steam engine noises were also mentioned as an inducer, and TV experiences where fantasy and reality merged. The experience of touching wood objects was also ASC-inducing. In sum this group is identified as high on imaginative ability which aided their ASC experiences. (shrink)

Explores the role of eliminating fear in Epicurean ethics and physics, focusing on techniques to eliminate the fear of death and the fear of the gods. Includes a taxonomy of types of fear and types of therapy for fear.

This inquiry regarding the ethical parts of the works of Sextus Empiricus is mainly concerned with answering four questions. Firstly, how is one to understand his Pyrrhonian arguments against the claim that there are natural goods and evils? Secondly, how is one to understand the argument with which Sextus purports to show that one is disturbed by having the opinion that there are natural goods and evils, even if there are such things? Thirdly, in what sense is tranquillity the moral (...) end of the sceptics? And fourthly, what is one to make of the claim that the sceptics attain tranquillity? ;In advancing his destructive arguments against the dogmatic thesis that there are natural goods and evils, Sextus employs the same argumentative strategy as in his arguments against all other dogmatic theses. He is concerned with, first, refuting the dogmatists, and then with pitting his negative conclusions against the positive dogmatic theses, in order to induce suspension of assent. He is not concerned with maintaining as his opinion that there are no natural goods and evils. Sextus' argument for the claim that one is disturbed by having the opinion that there are natural goods and evils, even if there are such things, exhibits all the traits of ad hominem arguments: he tries to use assumptions and concessions of the dogmatists in order to force them to admit to his conclusion. Again, he is not committed to the conclusion himself. When Sextus says that the moral end of the sceptic is tranquillity, the question arises whether this claim is dogmatic. It appears, however, that Sextus can avoid charges of dogmatism, by defining the moral end in terms of someone who is not a sceptic, and implying that the sceptic, as a sceptic, has no such end. The final claim that the sceptic attains tranquillity is found to present Sextus with problems of consistency. The claim is presented as a conclusion to a philosophical argument, but Sextus seems clear when he states that insofar as claims are supported by philosophical arguments they are not endorsed by the sceptic. (shrink)

Antipsychotic medications are sometimes imposed on psychiatric patients deemed dangerous to themselves and others. This is based on the assumption that treatment is safe and effective, and that recovery depends on biological adjustment. Under new laws, patients can be required to remain on these medications after leaving hospitals. However, survivors attest that forced treatment used as a restraint can feel like torture, while the consequences of withdrawal can also be severe.

In this paper I would like to examine a conception of happiness that seems to have become popular after the time of Plato and Aristotle: tranquillity or, as one might also say, peace of mind. This conception is interesting for two reasons: first, because it seems to come from outside the tradition that began with Plato or Socrates, second, because it is the only conception of eudaimonia in Greek ethics that identifies happiness with a state of mind and makes it (...) depend entirely on a person’s attitude or beliefs. In this way it may be closer to more recent ideas about happiness, notably those of utilitarians who treat “happiness” as a synonym of “pleasure,” than to the classical Greek conceptions of the good life. For Plato and Aristotle the happy life certainly had to be pleasant or enjoyable, but they did not think that happiness itself consisted in being pleased with one’s life. As the Stoic Seneca puts it, “it is not that virtue is chosen because it pleases, but that, if chosen, it also pleases.” I will argue that tranquillity was in fact not a serious contender for the position of ultimate good in ancient times. Greek theories of happiness from Plato to Epicurus were attempts to spell out what sort of a life one would have to lead in order to have good reasons for feeling tranquil or contented; they were not recipes for reaching a certain state of mind. Looking at the case of tranquillity will show, I think, that modern philosophers interested in questions about the good life might be well advised to follow the lead of their ancient predecessors. (shrink)

The aim of this pilot study was to examine the effects of different videos of an unfamiliar dog (tranquil and active) on subjective mental state measures. All participants watched two videos of an unfamiliar dog (tranquil and active). Subjective measures of stress, anxiety, alertness, attention, likeability, and cuteness were assessed. The results showed that the tranquil dog video significantly decreased anxiety only. Additionally, the active dog video significantly decreased stress and anxiety. Across the videos, the results showed the active dog (...) video significantly improved subjective alertness and attention when compared with the tranquil dog video. Lastly, the active dog video was rated more likeable and cuter relative to the tranquil dog video. The practical implications of these findings could include how to improve various subjective mental states for humans in public settings (e.g., hospital) where nonhuman animals are not always allowed. (shrink)

This paper argues that Seneca’s On the Tranquility of Mind is a valuable ancient resource for thinking about “progress anxiety,” a condition characteristic of contemporary technosociety marked by compulsive self-improvement and chronic dissatisfaction with one’s pace of development. I read the work as a “clinical vignette” centered on Serenus, a reflective progressor whose anxiety is fueled by his perceived slowness in Stoic self-cultivation. In response, Seneca adopts a “mild treatment”: rather than prescribing a cure from a position of authority, (...) he affirms Serenus’s capacity for self-assessment and seeks relief through a gradual reorientation of his underlying assumptions and values. I suggest that this therapeutic posture closely aligns with core commitments of contemporary philosophical counseling, and that bringing Seneca and present-day practice into dialogue can be mutually illuminating. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus tells us that the sceptics conduct investigations. Genuine investigations are commonly taken to have some connection with the aim of discovering truth. Sextus also tells us that the sceptics aim at tranquillity in their investigations. But they do this only by suspending judgement. In what sense, then, are their investigations connected with the aim of discovering truth? This article argues that there is a sense in which Sextus can reasonably take sceptical investigations to be connected with the aim (...) of discovering truth, even though the sceptics only aim at preserving their tranquillity by suspending judgement. (shrink)

The article argues that Schopenhauer seeks to defend art against Plato's critique, but that he does so by adopting two distinct strategies that to some extent conflect: a 'cognitivist strategy' according to which art provides the most objective knowledge of reality, and an 'aesthetic experience' strategy, in which there is a peculiarly aesthetic state of mind which gives our pleasure in art a value of its own. The truly unifying notion in Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory is that of tranquil, will-less contemplation, (...) a state of non-identification with the striving, suffering, bodily individual that one is. The Ideas testify to the endurance of Schopenhauer's early Platonic ambitions, but they do not really produce a convincing theory. At one end of the spectrum, the Ideas are otiose: pleasure is in the tranquility of contemplation, which may well be of an empirical object. At the other end of the spectrum, apprehension of the Ideas serves an all-important cognitive function, but our pleasure cannot stem from our knowing the horrifying Idea of humanity per se. Rather, the key to the satisfaction we take in tragedy is, in Schopenhauer's account, the will-lessness of sublime resignation in face of the Idea. (shrink)

Epicurus posited that the best life involves the greatest pleasures. He also argued that it involves attaining tranquillity. Many commentators have expressed scepticism that these two claims are compatible. For, they argue, Epicurus’ tranquil life is so austere that it is hard to see how it could be maximally pleasurable. Here, I offer an Epicurean account of the pleasures of tranquillity. I also consider different ways of valuing lives from a hedonistic point of view. Benthamite hedonists value lives by the (...) sum of pleasures minus the sum of pains, weighted by intensity and duration. Meanwhile, Binmore proposes that Epicurus valued lives by their worst episode. In contrast, I offer an Epicurean argument for why the best life is one in which a person attains tranquillity and tastes its pleasures until death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on Tranquillizing the Passions John Immerwahr Borrowingafragmentfrom thelyric poetArchilochus, Sir IsaiahBerlin once divided thinkers into two categories: foxes, who know many things; and hedgehogs, who know only one, "one big thing."1 Although Berlin does not include Hume in either list, it is tempting to put him with the foxes. Indeed, Hume's corpus is brilliantly eclectic, ranging with equal facility over an impressive array of seemingly diverse subjects such (...) as epistemology, ethics, political science, religion, psychology, history, criticism, economics, and demography. Many of Hume's admirers have not even attempted to find a unity here, and Hume's less generous critics have attributed this diversity to an incessant hunger for "literary fame" which supposedly led Hume from topic to topic, always searching for popular acclaim and recognition.2 The dazzling diversity of Hume's thinking has obscured some important underlying themes; Hume is more of a hedgehog than he initially appears. At the centre of many of Hume's discussions is a recurring conviction about the nature of human well-being and the means to obtain it. This insistence—which can be found in each stage ofHume's career and in writings on virtually every topic—provides one way of finding an overarching unity to his thought and invites us to rethink some ofthe conventional wisdom about Hume. In this essay I argue that many of Hume's investigations are informed by his early distinction between calm and violent passions. Wherever we turn we find Hume insisting that people arehappiest and governments are most stable when emotional calmness prevails. Hume alsohas astrategy, which Icall "moderation through opposition," which is designedto"tranquillize and soften"the passions.3 This strategy also becomes a stylistic principle which informs Hume's own writing, especially his popular works. This essay begins with a brief discussion of the calm/violent distinction itself. I then sketch out the role ofcalm passions in Hume's treatment of rationality, happiness, morality, politics and religion. Next I turn from Hume's diagnosis to his proposed cure, and discuss the strategy that Hume presents for enhancing the calm passions; indeed, Hume's writing style itselfis often designed to implement this strategy. I then discuss the context of Hume's insight, arguing that while it grows out of a cosmopolitan continental paradigm of using Volume XVIII Number 2 293 JOHN IMMERWAHR passions to oppose passions, Hume's own use ofit is tailored to rather specific features of the political and intellectual life of eighteenth centuryEdinburgh. The essay concludesby discussingthe implications of these findings for reading ofHume's works. Passions: Calm and Violent One characteristic feature of the thinkers of the "Scottish Enlightenment" was a desire tofound moral concepts in a scientific and empirical understanding ofhuman nature, rather than upon abstract conceptions of virtue and justice.4 These thinkers were particularly interestedin non-cognitivistelements ofhuman nature, such as"taste," "sentiment" and the "passions,"5 and they were also interested in discriminatingamongthe feelings and passions to discover those which were most beneficial to the individual or society. One Scottish philosopher who was particularly influential upon Hume in this connection was Francis Hutcheson. In discussing the passions, Hutcheson distinguished between what he called the "calm desire of good" and the "particular passions towards objects immediately presented to the senses." Hutcheson noted that these calm desires were frequently powerful enough to conquer particular passions such as "lust or revenge."6 The calm passions are thus very important to our understanding ofhuman motivation. As in so many other things, Hume also appears to be influenced by Hutcheson on the existence and importance of "calm passions." Early in Treatise 2, Hume expands on Hutcheson's idea that our experience ofan emotion or passion can be described as either "calm" or "violent"7 (also "soft" or "tender," "rough" or "fierce").8 The main difference between calmness and violence has to do with the intensity with which a passion is experienced. When we experience violent passions we feel an "uneasiness" (T 418) and sometimes "disorders and agitations" (E 17).9 Other passions are "calm" in that they cause "no disorder in the soul" and "little emotion in the mind" (T 417).10 Hume's main point is that... (shrink)

Translation at this stage would be premature, but three variants in line 3 deserve notice, Bury writes Natorp, followed by Brochard, suggested, Wachsmuth prints a colon instead of a comma after It is not surprising that line 3 has attracted emendation. As it stands, it lacks a verb and has to modify an understood existential.

David Hume must have experienced poignant emotions on first setting foot in France. The national, cultural, and sentimental ties of many centuries that bound Scotland to France would not have been repudiated by the young Revolutionary Whig, and indeed would rather have been augmented by his admiration for the literature of the period of Louis XIV and by his respect for French philosophy. It is most unlikely that Hume's Protestantism was sufficiently strong for him to have echoed with any sincerity (...) the remark of his countryman, Lord Fountainhall. His love for France, indeed, as expressed in an essay of 1741, was virtually unbounded. During his stay in France, from 1734 to 1737, Hume composed the _Treatise of Human Nature_ and studied _l'Art de Vivre_. (shrink)

This book explains the philosophical and religious issues that captures our attention in everyday life. The book is a collection of wisdom and teachings of great masters which will help uplift readers to a higher state of awareness.

Samkhya Philosophy: The Ancient Wisdom for Attaining Profound Tranquillity and Deep Peace Samkhya philosophy, one of the six orthodox systems of Indian thought, offers a profound framework for achieving tranquillity and deep peace through self-realization and liberation. Rooted in ancient Vedic traditions, Samkhya provides a dualistic metaphysics, distinguishing between Purusha (consciousness) and Prakriti (matter), and elucidates the path to transcend suffering by understanding their interplay. This paper explores Samkhya’s core principles, including the three gunas (sattva, rajas, tamas), the twenty-five tattvas (...) (elements of existence), and the process of discriminative knowledge (viveka). By discerning the eternal Purusha from the transient Prakriti, individuals can attain kaivalya (liberation), a state of profound peace free from material entanglements. The philosophy’s emphasis on introspection, meditation, and self-awareness aligns with modern mindfulness practices, making it relevant for contemporary seekers of inner calm. This study highlights how Samkhya’s timeless wisdom fosters mental clarity, emotional balance, and spiritual freedom, offering practical insights for navigating life’s complexities. By integrating its teachings, individuals can cultivate enduring tranquillity, transcending the fluctuations of the material world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Friedrich Nietzsche offers different opinions of the ancient Skeptics. On certain occasions, he praises them as philosophers of intellectual integrity, because they constantly question dogma and continue to inquire (ζητϵῖν) into the truth. He insists, however, that it is indispensable for every individual to adopt her own perspective in specific conditions, rather than suspend judgment as the Skeptics do. On other occasions, Nietzsche criticizes the ancient Skeptics because they separate their academic investigations from their philosophy of life and only (...) comply with conventions or apparent phenomena observed through sensations. Furthermore, he ridicules their ultimate goal – tranquility of mind (ἀταραξία) – as a product of feeble exhaustion. He himself is ready to embrace torments of life as part of the will to power. Although some similarities can be traced between Nietzsche and the ancient Skeptics, Nietzsche is more consistent in connecting his theoretical investigation and his philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Epicurus posited that the best life involves the greatest pleasures. He also held that it involves attaining tranquillity. Many commentators, including Ken Binmore, have expressed scepticism that these two claims are compatible. For, they argue, Epicurus’ tranquil life is so austere that it is hard to see how it could be maximally pleasurable. Here, I offer an Epicurean account of the pleasures of tranquillity. I also consider different ways of valuing lives from a hedonistic point of view. Benthamite hedonists value (...) lives by the sum of pleasures minus the sum of pains, weighted by intensity and duration. Meanwhile, Binmore proposes that Epicurus valued lives by their worst episode. In contrast, I outline an Epicurean argument for why the best life is one in which a person attains tranquillity and tastes its pleasures until death. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to develop a theory of peace education through an examination of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. It examines why Japan did not avoid this terrible nuclear disaster. This is an educational issue, because one of the major impacts of Fukushima's catastrophe is that it indicates the failure of peace education. In order to reestablish a theory of peace education, the concept of domestic tranquility is discussed. This article questions whether the Japanese public order is (...) consistent with democratic principles. Jane Roland Martin's examination of the concept of domestic tranquility is shown relevant. Martin's language analysis helps to distinguish whether or not Japanese domestic tranquility under nuclear crisis is democratic. I propose that post-Fukushima disaster peace education should be reformed as consistent with two democratic principles: acceptance of the diversity of peace and continuous negotiation among these different narratives. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss the role of Cassius' philosophical beliefs in his decision to assassinate Caesar. I analyse the situation of Cassius and discuss whether or not Epicureanism can justify the assassination, then I use these conclusions to establish the importance of Epicureanism in Cassius’ decision. I take the relevant aspects of Epicurean philosophy separately and make a judgement as to what parts of Epicureanism encourage or discourage the assassination. I bring this together with a discussion of how each (...) of these aspects contributes to the Epicurean goal of tranquillity and thus assess whether the assassination is the correct course of action for an Epicurean. I conclude that, though some aspects of Epicureanism would encourage Cassius to murder Caesar, the assassination is still unjustifiable due to both the personal and political beliefs of Epicureanism. I further conclude that Cassius held Epicureanism as a theoretical ideology, whilst holding his Republican beliefs as more practical in application. Overall this shows that Cassius political beliefs were more important than his philosophical allegiances in these decisions; this gives weight to Griffin’s theory that Greek philosophy’s role in Roman politics was more theoretical than practical. (shrink)

In June 1928, Captain Barnett W. Harris, an amateur naturalist from Indiana, arrived in Zululand to experiment on wild animals with his invention – the mercy bullet. This “bullet”consisted of a hypodermic needle filled with anesthetic drugs that could render an animal unconscious – an early model of what is now known as the tranquilizer gun. The history of this gun typically begins with Colin Murdoch, a New Zealand pharmacist and veterinarian, who patented the invention in 1959. While largely absent (...) in the archives, through tracing popular science publications and press, this article exposes a longer history of animal tranquilizers from an unlikely source. Tracing Harris’s story allows this article to speak to different historical discourses that influenced his rise as a celebrated inventor, and later to his disappearance from the scientific arena. This article argues that debates about pain relief (for both humans and nonhuman animals) and developments in military technology at the turn of the twentieth century resulted in experiments with narcotic bullets, a precursor to this “mercy bullet moment.” While hailed across the press as the man who might transform animal capturing into a humane practice, the workings of Harris’s bullet remained ambiguous. Despite this, he promoted his invention through several lecture series and radio presentations to the American public in the 1930s, where elements of scientific showmanship can be observed. Overall, Harris’s omission from the history of animal tranquilizing demonstrates the multiple contingencies that define a moment of scientific “success” – or, in this case, push some into relative obscurity. (shrink)

This volume examines the influence that Epicureanism and Stoicism, two philosophies of nature and human nature articulated during classical times, exerted on the development of European thought to the Enlightenment. Although the influence of these philosophies has often been noted in certain areas, such as the influence of Stoicism on the development of Christian thought and the influence of Epicureanism on modern materialism, the chapters in this volume forward a new awareness of the degree to which these philosophies and their (...) continued interaction informed European intellectual life well into early modern times. The influence of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies in the areas of literature, philosophy, theology, and science are considered. Many thinkers continue to perceive these philosophies as significant alternatives for understanding the human and natural worlds. Having become incorporated into the canon of philosophical alternatives, Epicureanism and Stoicism continued to exert identifiable influences on scientific and philosphical thought at least until the middle of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

This paper examines a tension in Hume’s philosophy between his epistemic critique of superstition and his naturalistic epistemology. While Hume faults superstition for its epistemic flaws, naturalistic interpretations often claim that he evaluates reasoning by its psychological force, such as liveliness or irresistibility. This raises a challenge: if superstitious reasoning stems from standard psychological processes and exhibits psychological strength, how can it be epistemically discredited? I argue that Hume’s notion of good reasoning involves more than psychological force. He appeals to (...) calm passions as an additional normative standard. Calm passions arise in response to epistemic factors, particularly certainty, whereas superstitious reasoning provokes violent passions through its uncertainty. Importantly, however, calmness does not require absolute certainty, and it marks a moderate and attainable level of epistemic commitment—one that enables inquiry while resisting the violent agitation characteristic of both superstition and radical skepticism. (shrink)

The history of benzodiazepine supply, as negotiated in the GDR following its commercial success in western markets in 1960, demonstrates how patients in East Germany (GDR) influenced drug policies by assuming the role of consumers. This article traces general political discussions on psycho-pharmaceuticals as essential components of a healthcare system that faced grave financial constraints, then focuses on the “Wunschverordnung” concept, that is, a prescription that was filled on request. This concept was ideologically employed to portray the rising demand for (...) tranquilizer drugs as inadequate. The ways in which citizens of the GDR influenced state decisions—import and production alike—on tranquilizer supply through petitions is investigated. The article concludes by discussing the scope and function of the activist role of patients as consumers in a socialist state. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I the possibility of the denial‐of‐the‐will II christian quietism, yogic ecstasy, and buddhist enlightenment III asceticism and spiritual purication Notes Further Reading.

하이데거는 존재를 사유하는 곳곳에서 눈에 크게 띄지 않지만 끊임없이 고요함에 대해 거론한다. 이 글은 하이데거 사유의 최종 귀착지를 고향 또는 ‘또 다른 시원’으로 귀향으로 이해하면서, 고요함의 문제를 고향에서 자유와 안식의 삶과 관련하여 살펴보고자 하는 것이다. 하이데거에게 고요함은 존재가 탈은폐 하는 가운데, 존재자 또는 사물이 그 자체로 자유롭게 해방되고 인간 역시 존재의 진리에 스스로를 내맡김으로써 이윽고 제 본질에 이르는 사태에서 생기한다. 즉 고요함은 모든 것들이 그 안에서, 그것을 통해 고유하게 현전하는 탈은폐의 머묾과 하나로 어우러져 있다. 이는 또한 존재의 탈은폐에서 불어오는 정적의 (...) 울림에 청종하며 그것을 언어로 지키는, 그렇지만 아무 것도 일어나지 않는 것처럼 일어나는 말함의 사건이다. 모든 것이 함께 어울려 제 자신으로 돌아가 고요히 머무는, 존재 진리의 터전이 여전히 있어왔고 그러나 아직 세워지지 않은 고향, ‘또 다른 시원’이다. 그곳으로 들어서는 귀향의 길에는 존재하는 것으로 일별一瞥 또는 존재의 가까움으로 뛰어드는 한 걸음의 도약이 필요할 뿐이다. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I empathy as the foundation of moral awareness II intelligible, empirical, and acquired character III humanity's sublime anguish Notes Further Reading.

『회남자』에는 마음의 평정을 의미하는 허정(虛靜)이 인성 본연의 특성임을 지지하는 글이 있다. 이런 구절은 『회남자』의 일관된 독해에 몇 가지 문제점을 야기한다. 먼저, 『회남자』에 영향을 미친 주요 문헌들에서 허정은 후천적으로 얻어지는 조건일 뿐, 인성의 고유한 특성이 아니다. 둘째, 인성은 어떠한 방향으로 발전할 수 있는 재질이라고 해석할 수 있는데, 허정은 재질이 잘 발현되기 위한 토양에 가깝다. 셋째, 허정에는 철학자의 이념이 들어 있어야 하는데, 도가의 이념은 도이지 허정이 아니다. 본고에서는 이 문제점을 해결하기 위해 다음과 같은 해석을 제안했다. 첫째, 『회남자』의 허정은 마음의 평정과 도를 묘사하는 (...) 허무라는 두 가지 의미를 지니고 있다. 둘째, 전자의 허정은 인성이라는 재질이 발현될 수 있다는 점에서 토양이라고 할 수 있지만, 후자의 허정은 도의 특성이라는 점에서 재질 즉, 도가 구체화된 인성의 특성이라고 할 수 있다. 본고의 해석은 『회남자』가 고유한 이론적 특성을 지니고 있는 도가류의 문헌이라는 평가를 지지한다. (shrink)