The imagination seems to enjoy a conceptually unstable double‐life within Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Oscillating between a Kantian use of the term, as a ‘necessary ingredient of perception itself’ and a Sartrean depiction of what appears when say, viewing a painting or visualising an absent friend, as a nothingness that is of an entirely different ‘flesh’ to that of the perceived. If we take the Phenomenology in isolation and try to extract an account of the imagination, we do (...) not emerge with a unified picture that incorporates both accounts. In this paper, I will demonstrate that when we turn to Merleau‐Ponty's later works, specifically his analysis of paintings in Eye and Mind, we see that his view on the imagination is fleshed out and his position with respect to Sartre has been clarified. I will offer an interpretation of Eye and Mind that picks up on implicit themes that connect back to the Phenomenology and argue that, for Merleau‐Ponty, paintings disclose something about how we come to obtain an awareness of ‘things’ in the world, which I will elucidate through appeal to his notion of style and his implicit treatment of Kantian imagination in the Phenomenology. I will argue that, for Merleau‐Ponty, it is only through understanding the role of the imagination in making the world present in perception, that we can make sense of our capacity to imagine (in the more commonsense, Sartrean use of the term) and the quasi‐presence of what appears when we do so. (shrink)

This work investigates the ability of the human visual system to discriminate self-similar Gaussian random textures. The power spectra of such textures are similar to themselves when rescaled by some factor h > 1. As such, these textures provide a natural domain for testing the hypothesis that texture perception is based on a set of spatial-frequency channels characterized by filters of similar shape.

If we think of the objects (as opposed to the facts and properties) we see as the objects we are visually conscious of, the texture of conscious visual experience is given by the number of objects we see. By using an epistemic test for the objects we see (viz, the objects one sees are the objects one has direct perceptual knowledge of) it is argued that the texture of conscious experience is very rich indeed — much richer, in (...) fact, than studies of change blindness and inattention would suggest. We know, by direct visual perception, more than we know we know. We are therefore — often enough anyway — aware of more than we realize. A subjective, first-person, test for consciousness is the wrong test. (shrink)

In a series of articles, Jacob Beck proposed that a variety of texture segmentation phenomena occurs due to emergent features that arise from “links” between elements with appropriate local properties, such as alignment, orientation, and proximity. His findings and ideas guided theoretical and computational models, and some of his demonstrations became textbook knowledge about visual perception. We build on this work in two ways. First, we provide a modern replication of a classic texture segmentation study using a (...) much larger sample size. Overall, the replication agrees with Beck’s original findings, although there are some quantitative differences. Second, we show how to apply a quantitative model of visual cortex to Beck’s experiment and demonstrate that the model can explain many aspects of Beck’s findings. Key to the model’s success is cognitive control of connections between individual elements (akin to Beck’s “links” between elements) and a selection mechanism that makes it easy to identify how well elements within a region connect and how well different regions are disconnected. Overall, the model supports Beck’s claim that local properties can facilitate patterns of connections between stimulus elements and that some connection patterns allow an observer to easily distinguish textures. (shrink)

This study aimed to explore the psychophysical bases of multisensory surface stickiness perception by investigating how sensitively humans perceive different levels of stickiness intensity conveyed by auditory, tactile, and visual cues. First, we sorted five different sticky stimuli by perceived intensity in ascending order for each modality separately and evaluated the discrimination sensitivities of each participant using a fitted psychometric curve. Results showed that perceptual intensity orders were not identical to physical intensity order and that the sequential order of (...) perceived intensities for different modalities was inconsistent. Moreover, estimated perceptual sensitivities to surface stickiness indicated that auditory cues result in better discrimination sensitivity than tactile and visual cues. Second, we calculated the relative perceptual distances of stickiness intensities using multidimensional scaling. A follow-up statistical test demonstrated that the perceptual mapping of vision and touch are similar but that auditory perception is different. These results suggest that the discriminability of stickiness intensity is best served by auditory cues and that texture information processing in the auditory domain is distinctive from that of other modalities. (shrink)

A single case study of a patient, D.M., with a lesion in the region of the right occipito-temporal gyrus is presented. D.M. had well-preserved language and general cognitive abilities. Colour discrimination, contrast sensitivity, gross depth perception, spatial localization, and motion appreciation were within normal limits.On the evaluation of perceptual abilities, he failed to identify two-dimensional shapes from stereoscopic vision, motion, and texture although in all cases he was able to identify the rough area subtended by the shape. These (...) findings are considered in relation to the current anatomical-physiological functional models of vision and it is suggested that D.M. 's deficits provide evidence for the existence in man of a functional pathway involved in the computation of texture and fine aspects of shape, which is distinct from the pathways involved in motion and stereopsis processing on one hand and colour and coarse aspects of form on the other hand. (shrink)

Moral perceptualism is the view that perceptual experience is attuned to pick up on moral features in our environment, just as it is attuned to pick up on mundane features of an environment like textures, shapes, colors, pitches, and timbres. One important family of views that incorporate moral perception are those of virtue theorists and sensibility theorists. On these views, one central ability of the virtuous agent is her sensitivity to morally relevant features of situations, where this sensitivity is (...) often spoken of in perceptual terms. However, sensibility theorists have often not been careful to specify how to understand their claims about moral sensibilities as perceptual. In this paper, we distinguish between what we call Attentional Moral Perception and Contentful Moral Perception. We argue that sensibility theorists should endorse Attentional Moral Perception, because it has very powerful empirical evidence in its favor, and it can play all of the explanatory roles that the sensibility theorist needs in her theory of moral sensibilities. (shrink)

Visual percepts frequently appear chromatically rich, yet their paucity in reportable information has led to widely accepted minimalist models of vision. The discrepancy may be resolved by positing that the richness of natural scenes is reflected in phenomenal consciousness but not in detail in the phenomenal judgments upon which reports about qualia are based. Conceptual awareness (including phenomenal judgments) arises from neural mechanisms that categorize objects, and also from mechanisms that conceptually characterize textural properties of pre-categorically segmented regions in the (...) visual field. Experimental evidence suggests that complex images instigate the generation of so-called ensemble phenomenal judgments. These involve concepts that categorize global attributes of segmented areas but carry no information pertaining to details. It is then argued that there are cogent reasons for believing that phenomenal percepts (i.e. qualia) arising from chromatically complex stimuli cohere in this ensemble sense with both the stimulus and with the resulting ensemble phenomenal judgments. Thus, spatially detailed retinal images are deemed to yield correspondingly detailed phenomenal experiences that are in turn conceptually apprehended via a relatively small number of ensemble phenomenal judgments. Lastly, it is suggested that the bridge locus for chromatically rich phenomenal experiences is most plausibly located early in the cortical visual pathway. (shrink)

Action is a means of acquiring perceptual information about the environment. Turning around, for example, alters your spatial relations to surrounding objects and, hence, which of their properties you visually perceive. Moving your hand over an object’s surface enables you to feel its shape, temperature, and texture. Sniffing and walking around a room enables you to track down the source of an unpleasant smell. Active or passive movements of the body can also generate useful sources of perceptual information (Gibson (...) 1966, 1979). The pattern of optic flow in the retinal image produced by forward locomotion, for example, contains information about the direction in which you are heading, while motion parallax is a “cue” used by the visual system to estimate the relative distances of objects in your field of view. In these uncontroversial ways and others, perception is instrumentally dependent on action. According to an explanatory framework that Susan Hurley (1998) dubs the “Input-Output Picture”, the dependence of perception on action is purely instrumental: "Movement can alter sensory inputs and so result in different perceptions… changes in output are merely a means to changes in input, on which perception depends directly" (1998: 342). The action-based theories of perception, reviewed in this entry, challenge the Input-Output Picture. They maintain that perception can also depend in a noninstrumental or constitutive way on action (or, more generally, on capacities for object-directed motor control). This position has taken many different forms in the history of philosophy and psychology. Most action-based theories of perception in the last 300 years, however, have looked to action in order to explain how vision, in particular, acquires either all or some of its spatial representational content. Accordingly, these are the theories on which we shall focus here. We begin in Section 1 by discussing George Berkeley’s Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), the historical locus classicus of action-based theories of perception, and one of the most influential texts on vision ever written. Berkeley argues that the basic or “proper” deliverance of vision is not an arrangement of voluminous objects in three-dimensional space, but rather a two-dimensional manifold of light and color. We then turn to a discussion of Lotze, Helmholtz, and the local sign doctrine. The “local signs” were felt cues for the mind to know what sort of spatial content to imbue visual experience with. For Lotze, these cues were “inflowing” kinaesthetic feelings that result from actually moving the eyes, while, for Helmholtz, they were “outflowing” motor commands sent to move the eyes. In Section 2, we discuss sensorimotor contingency theories, which became prominent in the 20thcentury. These views maintain that an ability to predict the sensory consequences of self-initiated actions is necessary for perception. Among the motivations for this family of theories is the problem of visual direction constancy—why do objects appear to be stationary even though the locations on the retina to which they reflect light change with every eye movement?—as well as experiments on adaptation to optical rearrangement devices (ORDs) and sensory substitution. Section 3 examines two other important 20th century theories. According to what we shall call the motor component theory, efference copies generated in the oculomotor system and/or proprioceptive feedback from eye-movements are used together with incoming sensory inputs to determine the spatial attributes of perceived objects. Efferent readiness theories, by contrast, look to the particular ways in which perceptual states prepare the observer to move and act in relation to the environment. The modest readiness theory, as we shall call it, claims that the way an object’s spatial attributes are represented in visual experience can be modulated by one or another form of covert action planning. The bold readiness theory argues for the stronger claim that perception just is covert readiness for action. In Section 4, we move to the disposition theory, most influentially articulated by Gareth Evans (1982, 1985), but more recently defended by Rick Grush (2000, 2007). Evans’ theory is, at its core, very similar to the bold efferent readiness theory. There are some notable differences, though. Evans’ account is more finely articulated in some philosophical respects. It also does not posit a reduction of perception to behavioral dispositions, but rather posits that certain complicated relations between perceptual input and behavioral provide spatial content. Grush proposes a very specific theory that is like Evans’ in that it does not posit a reduction, but unlike Evans’ view, does not put behavioral dispositions and sensory input on an undifferentiated footing. (shrink)

This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...) author suggests that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete visual system. When no constraints are put on the visual system, people look around, walk up to something interesting and move around it so as to see it from all sides, and go from one vista to another. That is natural vision—and what this book is about. (shrink)

A classic finding reported in Beck (1966a) is that observers tend to indicate a more natural texture break between a set of T’s and tilted T’s than between a set of T’s and backward L’s. This finding has played a prominent role in discussions about the properties of texture segmentation and in the development of computational theories of texture segmentation. Due to the small sample size of the original study, we replicated the original experiment with a larger (...) sample. Regrettably, we discovered that the description in Beck (1966a) is insufficient to allow us to reproduce the stimuli. For our replication, we created stimuli that seem consistent with the spirit of the original study. The results of the replication study partly matchBeck’s original data (r = .59), but conclusions indicated by these results deviate from some of Beck’s key conclusions.We also further explored the influential claim derived from a second experiment in Beck (1966a) that texture segmentation was not related to the perceived similarity of elements. Contrary to this claim, a re-analysis of Beck’s data indicates the counterintuitive conclusion that observers tend to indicate stronger texture segmentation between regions that are rated as being more similar. In a replication of the second experiment, this relation flipped so that the replication observers indicated stronger texture segmentation for regions with lower similarity ratings. Despite being influential, we conclude that there are substantial problems with the stimuli, analyses, and conclusions in Beck (1966a). (shrink)

SummaryIn opposition to the traditional empiricist understanding of phantasy as a copy of perception and therefore as a weakened form of experience, this paper interprets phantasy as an independent and creative modus of consciousness that is responsible for the individuation of the subject. The article reconstructs Husserl’s approach to phantasy as a specific kind of intentional operation as well as its relationship with mood-intentionality, bodily-kinesthetic expressivity and with hyletic anticipation as a structure of sensibility. In this way, the bi-valence (...) of human experiential orders is claimed and the concept of bodily phantasy is pointed out. This leads the phenomenological analysis closer to the psychoanalytical approach to fantasy. The latter is investigated with reference to Freud’s concept of primary processual thinking and Gaddini’s understanding of bodily phantasy as a specific individuation factor within the personal history of bonding. (shrink)

For philosophical hermeneutics as Hans‐Georg Gadamer conceived it, art plays an essential role. If hermeneutics and aesthetics are as strictly opposed as Gadamer suggests, the “abstraction” performed by aesthetic consciousness must be an abstraction from the truth of art. As the result of such an abstraction, the aesthetic view of art is secondary; it must be conceived of as nonoriginal experience of art, which, derivative as it is supposed to be, is only possible on the basis of original experience, as (...) an abstraction from it. Aesthetic objects are essentially correlated to perception, the word for which in Ancient Greek is ‘aesthesis’. But aesthetic objects cannot be coextensive with everything perceptible; otherwise, the term “aesthetic” could not be used significantly in respect to artworks. Being perceptibly present, artworks present phenomenal structures of meaning, texts in textures, which must not be directly applied to the factual world or identified with its “essence”. (shrink)

Abstract:The haptic sense is an essential component of aesthetic evaluation that is often overlooked in today’s mobile internet age. Unlike hearing and vision, the sense of touch is less widely transmitted. Unfortunately, most aesthetic theories and explanations have focused solely on the visual and auditory senses, with minimal attention given to tactile evaluation. To address this gap in knowledge, we have collected studies on tactile aesthetics within the framework of experimental aesthetics from 2000 to 2022. After statistical generalization, our findings (...) suggest the following: The criteria for evaluating tactile aesthetics were mostly dichotomous, that is, positive (like/appreciation/pleasure) and negative (dislike/disgust/unpleasant). Tactile aesthetics predominantly involved the toucher dimension (synesthesia/need for touch/touch pattern) and the touch sample dimension (shape/type/texture), with the commonly overlooked factors of “need for touch” and “touch pattern.” Some studies did not restrict the shape and material of the touch samples. Based on our findings, we have systematically summarized and concluded what tactile factors influence aesthetic evaluation and have analyzed future research trends. (shrink)

This article reimagines cinematic experience through Henri Bergson’s concept of durée—lived time as qualitative flow—and Gilles Deleuze’s cinematic philosophy, challenging traditional narrative and representational paradigms in film studies. By integrating phenomenological analysis with close readings of The Silence of the Lambs (Jonathan Demme, 1991), The Stanley Parable (Galactic Cafe, 2013), Parasite (Gisaengchung, Bong Joon-ho, 2019), and Memories of Murder (Salinui Chueok, Bong Joon-ho, 2003), we propose "cinematic durée" as a dynamic fusion of filmic constructs and viewer perception, positioning spectators (...) as active co-creators. Qualitative cinematic elements like lighting, interactivity, and pacing, understood as Bergson's (1889) qualitative multiplicities that evoke distinct experiential textures (Deleuze 1966) shape subjective durée, evoking diverse emotional responses, from dread to empowerment, as evidenced by audience reactions spanning decades and media. Extending Vivian Sobchack’s embodied phenomenology and Laura U. Marks’s intercultural senses, this study transcends linear models (e.g., David Bordwell’s narratology), embracing analog, digital, and non-Western contexts. Virtual reality, Carne y Arena (Alejandro González Iñárritu, 2017), further tests participatory durée, blending bodily engagement with temporal synthesis. Methodologically, we employ philosophical inquiry, supplemented by audience insights, and propose future empirical tools—such as eye-tracking and interviews—to explore affective resonance, offering a novel framework for cinema’s temporal and emotional architecture. This interdisciplinary approach—bridging film theory, cognitive psychology, and cultural studies—reveals cinema as a continuous process of becoming, reshaping perceptions of time, space, and identity across global landscapes. (shrink)

Meaning in sensory language is often built through figurative mechanisms, such as synesthetic metaphors, where a sensorial domain is used to talk about perceptions from a different sense, as in sweet[taste] texture[touch]. The motivation of synesthetic transfers of meaning has been studied in general and literary language, resulting in attempts to reveal universal patterns regarding the directionality of meaning transfer and sensorial conceptual preference. However, those universals have not been proven in any sensory Language for Specific Purposes (LSP). We (...) a sensory LSP corpus of olive oil tasing notes in English to explore the nature of these metaphors, test existent models and explanatory accounts and identify tendencies present in synesthetic meaning transfers. The computer-assisted semi-automatic scalable methodology followed consists of the innovative quasi-simultaneous identification of semantic incongruences and the classification of synesthetic expressions in the discourse according to the source and target sensorial domains. Results show the inadequacy of existent models to explain synesthetic behavior in olive oil tasting language. The patterns found are discussed in the light of cognitive constraints and LSP genre analysis to conclude that a multi-causal approach is needed to explain the motivation of synesthetic transfers of meaning. (shrink)

Two experiments were performed to explore the mechanisms of human 3D shape perception. In Experiment 1, the subjects’ performance in a shape constancy task in the presence of several cues (edges, binocular disparity, shading and texture) was tested. The results show that edges and binocular disparity, but not shading or texture, are important in 3D shape perception. Experiment 2 tested the effect of several simplicity constraints, such as symmetry and planarity on subjects’ performance in a shape (...) constancy task. The 3D shapes were represented by edges or vertices only. The results show that performance with or without binocular disparity is at chance level, unless the 3D shape is symmetric and/or its faces are planar. In both experiments, there was a correlation between the subjects’ performance with and without binocular disparity. Our study suggests that simplicity constraints, not depth cues, play the primary role in both monocular and binocular 3D shape perception. These results are consistent with our computational model of 3D shape recovery. (shrink)

The research aimed to gain understanding of the self-perceptions of black professionals in relation to business leadership, and how these self-perceptions influenced their behaviors, aspirations and self-perceived abilities in leadership positions. The study was specifically focused on black South African professionals. Black professionals were found to exhibit signs of deep-rooted pain, anger and general emotional fatigue stemming from workplace-, socio-economic- and political triggers that evoked generational trauma and overall negative black lived experiences. The negative lived experiences could have led to (...) racial identity dissonance and, in extreme cases, complete racial identity disassociation. Moreover, black professionals were found to display symptoms of ‘survivor guilt,’ stemming from the shared history of oppression amongst black people in South Africa. The ‘survivor guilt’ contributed toward a profound sense of shared responsibility and purpose to change the circumstances, experiences and overall perceptions about the capabilities of black professionals. Results showed that upbringing, determination, resilience, black support networks, and black leadership representation within organizational structures were important ingredients that positively contributed to the leadership aspirations and success of black professionals. The research discovered that, in some cases, black professionals leveraged white relationships to propel their careers forward, however, this practice reportedly resulted in the black professionals experiencing feelings of self-doubt in their own abilities. Self-doubt, also found to be a result of historical oppression, could have and have been shown to eventually lead to self-deselection, negatively impacting the aspirations and career advancement prospects of black professionals in organizational leadership. Furthermore, the research found that black leaders believed that their blackness, specifically, its unique texture of experiences and history in South Africa, provided them with superior empathetic leadership abilities toward other black employees. Black leaders frequently highlighted the distinctive values of ubuntu as the cornerstone of their leadership approach. In addition, it was found that black professionals also considered their blackness, particularly the shade of their skin, to detract from their leadership opportunities, as it reduced the odds of being authorized as natural leaders, thus fortifying a skewed self-perception of their own leadership capabilities. (shrink)

According to Leibniz's late metaphysics, sensory perception represents to us as extended, colored, textured, etc., a world which fundamentally consists only of non-spatial, colorless entities, the monads. It is a short step from here to the conclusion that sensory perception radically misleads us about the true nature of reality. In this paper, I argue that this oft-repeated claim is false. Leibniz holds that in typical cases of body perception the bodies perceived really exist and have the qualities, (...) both primary and secondary, they are perceived to have. At the same time, Leibniz holds that our perceptions of these bodies are accurate representations of the monads from which the bodies result. The contrary thesis — that our body perceptions are misrepresentations of the monads — stems from a misunderstanding of Leibniz's theory of confused concepts and his phenomenalist account of the nature of body. Clarifying these issues will have important consequences for our understanding of Leibniz's idealistic metaphysics and the manner in which that metaphysical theory is meant to support mechanistic science. (shrink)

This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins 'the imaginary texture of the real'. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here (...) it will be suggested, following both Kant and Strawson, that there is a more fundamental working of the imagination, present in both perception and the constructions of fictions. What Kant and Strawson failed to make clear, however, was that the workings of the imagination within the perceived world, gives that world, an affective logic. The domain of affect is that of emotions, feelings and desire, and to claim such an affective logic in the world we experience, is to point out that it has salience and significance for us. Such salience suggests and demands the desiring and sometimes fearful responses we make to it; the shape of the perceived world echoed in the shapes our bodies take within it. (shrink)

In this paper, the Internet of Things with intelligent face perception and processing function is used to supervise online English teaching. In the intelligent learning environment, learners mainly learn by watching the information presentation screen of the learning content, i.e., the learning screen, which is the main environment for learners to learn and is the main channel for information interaction between learners and the learning content. The color matching, layout, graphic decoration, and background texture of the learning screen (...) have a significant impact on learners’ emotions, interests, motivation, and effect in the learning process. On the contrary, the accurate identification of learners’ emotions is the basis for building a harmonious emotional interaction in the wisdom learning environment and is an important means to judge learners’ learning status, which is of great significance to promote learners’ wisdom learning. In addition to providing learners with personalized learning contents and learning paths, the learning images presented by the intelligent learning environment should also be compatible with learners’ emotional states and visual emotional preferences and can play a role in regulating and stimulating learners’ learning emotions. The system works well in the testing process, which verifies the feasibility, rationality, and effectiveness of our application of face perception to online teaching effectiveness monitoring, and can be combined with the old result-oriented effectiveness monitoring method for online teaching, with certain theoretical research significance and practical application value. (shrink)

Konrad Lorenz, an ethologist, proposed that certain physical elements are perceived as cute and induce caretaking behavior in other individuals, with the evolutionary function of enhancing offspring survival. He called these features Kindchenschema, baby schema. According to his introspection, these include a large forehead, chubby round features, and chubby cheeks. Previous studies are limited to examining the effects of these facial features on perceived cuteness. However, other morphological factors may be related to perceived cuteness. This study uses Bayesian optimization, one (...) of the global sequential optimization methods for estimating unknown functions, to search for facial morphological features that enhance the perceptions of facial cuteness. We applied Bayesian optimization incorporating Gaussian process ordinal regression, which allows an estimation of the latent cuteness function based on evaluations using the Likert scale. A total of 96 preschool children provided the facial images used in this study. We summarized the facial shape variations using methodologies of geometric morphometrics and principal component analysis up to the third principal component, which we refer to as the face space. A total of 40 participants evaluated the images created by warping the average facial texture of the children's faces with randomly generated parameters in the face space. Facial traits related to perceived cuteness were estimated based on the averaged cuteness function. Perceived cuteness was linked to the relative lower position of facial components and narrower jawline but not to the forehead height. (shrink)

The present studies examined whether implied tactile properties during language comprehension influence subsequent direct tactile perception, and the specificity of any such effects. Participants read sentences that implicitly conveyed information regarding tactile properties (e.g., Grace tried on a pair of thick corduroy pants while shopping) that were either related or unrelated to fabrics and varied in implied texture (smooth, medium, rough). After reading each sentence, participants then performed an unrelated rating task during which they felt and rated the (...) texture of a presented fabric. Results demonstrated that the texture properties implied in sentences influence direct tactile perception. Specifically, after reading about a smooth or rough texture, subsequent fabric ratings became notably smoother or rougher, respectively. However, we also show that there was some specificity to these effects: Fabric-related sentences elicited more specific and interactive effects on subsequent ratings. Together, we demonstrate that under certain circumstances, language comprehension can prime tactile representations and affect direct tactile perception. Results are discussed with regard to the nature and scope of multimodal mental simulation during reading. (shrink)

In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a (...) particular neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience enactiveanimatesubpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world. (shrink)

GistGist perception happens in the first approximately 300 ms. One gets a gistgist of the room before one identifies specific objects; one sees whether an indoor scene is orderly or disordered—i.e., calm or threatening. And whole scene gist takes place in a separate part of the brain than does object-recognition. Why would our bodies have this mechanism and what does it give us? Philosophy has historically focused on object recognitionobject recognition, particularly interpreted as an analysis of how objects become (...) predicable for us. But if we examine the process of gist perception, a different perspective opens up. For gist involves not just passive absorption of the features of the environment, but also an embodied reaction. For example, we experience the first few milliseconds of the fast-moving, charging rhino and feel fear. These affordancesaffordances are functionally related to the gist experience as it allows for the inductiveinductive generalization from low-levellow-level features (i.e. illumination, color, texture, etc.) that lead to the semantic high-levelhigh-level category. I argue that our bodies are so constituted as to separate out the public, potentially proprietary objects from privatized, unnamed experience. It therefore allows us to think of perception as something other than of entirely linguistically defined objects. (shrink)

This chapter argues that when we learn to recognize natural kinds, such as pine trees, this should be understood not in terms of kind properties coming to be represented in our perception, but simply in terms of a shift in our attention, which causes us to represent new low-level properties, such as colors, shapes, and textures. Susanna Siegel has argued that kinds, such as pine trees, can look phenomenally different to someone once that person becomes disposed to recognize them, (...) and that the best explanation for this is that kind properties, such as _being a pine tree_, can become represented in perception. The chapter details an alternative explanation for the different look of the pine tree: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before, but the chapter provides a comprehensive account of the view, drawing on the science of perceptual learning. (shrink)

Experimental aesthetics has shed light on the involvement of pre-motor areas in the perception of abstract art. However, the contribution of texture perception to aesthetic experience is still understudied. We hypothesized that digital screen-based art, despite its immateriality, might suggest potential sensorimotor stimulation. Original born-digital works of art were selected and manipulated by the artist himself. Five behavioral parameters: Beauty, Liking, Touch, Proximity, and Movement, were investigated under four experimental conditions: Resolution (high/low), and Magnitude (Entire image/detail). These (...) were expected to modulate the quantity of material and textural information afforded by the image. While the Detail condition afforded less content-related information, our results show that it augmented the image’s haptic appeal. High Resolution improved the haptic and aesthetic properties of the images. Furthermore, aesthetic ratings positively correlated with sensorimotor ratings. Our results demonstrate a strict relation between the aesthetic and sensorimotor/haptic qualities of the images, empirically establishing a relationship between beholders’ bodily involvement and their aesthetic judgment of visual works of art. In addition, we found that beholders’ oculomotor behavior is selectively modulated by the perceptual manipulations being performed. The eye-tracking results indicate that the observation of the Entire, original images is the only condition in which the latency of the first fixation is shorter when participants gaze to the left side of the images. These results thus demonstrate the existence of a left-side bias during the observation of digital works of art, in particular, while participants are observing their original version. (shrink)

Many disciplines in the arts and social sciences are currently redirecting their attention to surfaces, and ways of treating them, as primary conditions for the generation of meaning. With regard to visual perception, this has entailed a switch from its optical to its haptic modality. How does this switch affect the way surfaces are understood? It is argued that with haptic vision, the emphasis is not on conformation but texture, as revealed in flows of material composition and in (...) patterns of self-shadowing – or in a word, in complexion. This makes the surface, whether of face, skin or landscape, quite distinct from that of a body or an object. Drawing on the ideas of John Ruskin, the haptically perceived surface is compared to a veil that is worn in the double sense of adornment and erosion, of affective expression and weathering. The article concludes that it is in the relations between such surfaces that social life is lived. (shrink)

This book argues that there is a joint in nature between seeing and thinking, perception, and cognition. Perception is constitutively iconic, nonconceptual, and nonpropositional, whereas cognition does not have these properties constitutively. The book does not appeal to “intuitions,” as is common in philosophy, but to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology. The book argues that cognition affects perception, i.e., that perception is cognitively penetrable, but that this does not impugn the joint in nature. (...) A key part of the argument is that we perceive not only low-level properties like colors, shapes, and textures but also high-level properties such as faces and causation. Along the way, the book explains the difference between perception and perceptual memory, the differences between format and content, and whether perception is probabilistic despite our lack of awareness of probabilistic properties. The book argues for perceptual categories that are not concepts, that perception need not be singular, that perceptual attribution and perceptual discrimination are equally fundamental, and that basic features of the mind known as “core cognition” are not a third category in between perception and cognition. The chapter on consciousness leverages these results to argue against some of the most widely accepted theories of consciousness. Although only one chapter is about consciousness, much of the rest of the book repurposes work on consciousness to isolate the scientific basis of perception. (shrink)

This paper reveals the way in which musical pitch works as a peculiar form of cognition that reflects upon the organization of the surrounding world as perceived by majority of music users within a socio-cultural formation.Part-1 of this paper described the origin of tonal organization from verbal speech, its progress from indefinite to definite pitch, and the emergence of two main harmonic orders: heptatonic and pentatonic, each characterized by its own method of handling tension at both domains, of tonal and (...) social organization. Part-2, here, completes the line of historic development from Antiquity to 17th century. Vast archeological data is used to identify the perception of music structures that tells apart the temple/palace music of urban civilizations and the folk music of village cultures. The “mega-pitch-set” (MPS) organization is found to constitute the principal contribution of a math-based music theory to a new diatonic order. All ramifications for psychology of music are discussed in detail. “Non-octave hypermode” is identified as a peculiar homogenous type of MPS, typical for plainchant.The origin of chromaticism is thoroughly examined as an earmark of “art-music” that opposes earlier forms of folk music. The role of aesthetic emotions in formation of chromatic alteration is defined. The development of chromatic system is traced throughout history, highlighting its modern implementation in “hemiolic modes.”The connection between tonal organization in music and spatial organization in pictorial art is established in the Baroque culture, and then tracked back to prehistoric times. Both are shown to present a form of abstraction of environmental topographic schemes, and music is proposed as the primary medium for its cultivation through the concept of pitch. The comparison of stages of tonal organization and typologies of musical texture is used to define the overall course of tonal evolution. Tonal organization of pitch reflects the culture of thinking, adopted as a standard to optimize individual perception of reality within a social group in a way optimal for one’s success, thereby setting the conventions of intellectual and emotional intelligence. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Are the contents of perceptual experience restricted to ‘low-level’ properties such as location, shape and texture, or can ‘high-level’ properties such as being a tomato, being a pine tree or being a watch also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of gist perception on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides qualified support (...) for the claim that certain kinds of high-level properties—such as being a natural scene —can be perceptually represented. (shrink)

The on-going debate over the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that ‘ensemble properties’ should be added to the list of visually admissible (...) properties. Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la perception? Par elle, que nous disent les sens du monde, de l'autre et de nous-mêmes? Rien! Les sens sont muets. Ils n'ont rien à nous dire! Telle est la réponse de Jocelyn Benoist. Il est essentiel, pourtant, que nous puissions en parler. Seulement c'est nous qui parlons, non eux. Et si, voulant faire droit à la réalité de notre expérience sensible. nous commencions par renoncer à la traiter d'abord comme un discours? Le mutisme des sens demeure (...) traversé de bruits. Jocelyn Benoist, envers et contre un certain traitement philosophique de la perception - qui la confond avec la connaissance que nous pouvons en tirer ou le sens que nous pouvons lui donner -, nous invite à écouter en elle le bruissement du sensible. Selon lui, pour rendre celui-ci pleinement audible. il faut congédier ce que la philosophie aujourd'hui appelle le "problème de la perception" et, peut-être, renoncer au concept même de "perception" tel que nous l'héritons de la philosophie moderne, au profit d'une enquête sur la texture réelle et poétique du sensible. (shrink)

Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity-crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object-seeing without object-attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity-crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non-perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity-crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity-crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate (...) about phenomenal experience of an object in the absence of object-attention. Finally, even unconscious object perception in identity-crowding likely involves an attention-like selective process. (shrink)

Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of visual perception has traditionally held that Aristotle had a single, static, conception of light and that he believed that illumination occurred prior to and independent of the actions of colours. I contend that this view precludes the medium from becoming actually transparent, thus making vision impossible. I here offer an alternative to the traditional interpretation, using contemporary conceptual tools to make good philosophical sense of Aristotle’s position. I call my view the ‘ecological’ interpretation. It (...) postulates two conceptions of light: non-visible mobile propagated light and visible static illumination produced by the interaction of propagated light with the environment’s coloured textured surfaces. I argue that these contemporary conceptual tools can find a foothold in and consistently enrich Aristotle’s extant position and that, with their aid, we can restore coherence to his theories of light and vision. (shrink)

The book has three main topics or concerns. (1) The diversity of the senses. Though all perception represents, the similarity between sense modalities ends there. The senses’ respective representational modes, styles, and structures differ very strongly from each other. (2) The Layering thesis. A single sensory representation usually has more than one content; the perceptual state represents one object or property by representing a more primitive or less ambitious one. Though this “layering” is ubiquitous, its structure and range differs (...) dramatically as between sense modalities, and in some modalities it works unexpectedly: for example, nearly all tactual representation derives from representation of conditions of or in the subject’s own skin, meaning that touch represents, e.g., the texture of a physical object by, and only by, representing stress within the skin; also the tactual layering is remarkably fine-grained and rich. (3) Aspect perception. Besides the intrinsic interest of “perceiving as”—even popular appeal, what with joke ambiguous figures such as the duck-rabbit and the old/young woman—it remains especially mysterious. Nearly all work on it has concerned vision only. But it is crucial for understanding auditory representation, which is one thing that distinguishes hearing from the other senses. Further, the auditory case greatly reinforces the idea that perceiving-as depends on expectations, it severely damages what we had thought was the best further approach to understanding aspect perception, in terms of attention. (shrink)

Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...) partisan in this debate, but his position is poorly understood. This dissertation examines how Aristotle’s perceptual psychology responds to ancient challenges to the naïve conception, and so articulates his defense of perceptual knowledge. -/- Aristotle’s defense relies on an ontology of “perceptual qualities"—a core class of perceptible properties—according to which those qualities, despite having a perceiver-independent essence rooted in the physics of causation and affection, nevertheless can be present in experience as they essentially are. Chapter 1 defends this realist and objectivist reading against competing interpretations, which overlook a crucial distinction between perceptual qualities and perceptual objects. Chapter 2 presents Aristotle’s ontology as a physicalism that uncharacteristically allows for perceptual qualities to appear in experience as they essentially are. -/- This ontology informs Aristotle’s account of the psychological conditions under which perceivers actually are presented with the essence of perceptual qualities. The locus of this account is an obscure passage where Aristotle purports to show that the senses “discriminate” perceptual qualities because the senses are “mean states” (An. 2.11, 424a5–7). Chapter 3 develops a comprehensive interpretation of the sensory mean state, which Chapter 4 uses to elucidate Aristotle’s argument for sensory discrimination. Sensory discrimination turns out to be a process in which the essence of a perceptual quality comes to be present in the affection it produces in a perceiver. For Aristotle, this shows that sense perception meets a condition for knowledge that his predecessors, including Plato, thought it could not meet. For in his view, but not in theirs, sense experience shares in both the truth and the essence of the qualities it perceives. (shrink)