"International and domestic laws commonly hold states responsible for their wrongdoings. States pay compensation for their unjust wars, and reparations for their historical wrongdoings. Some argue that states should incur punitive damages for their international crimes. But there is a troubling aspect to these practices: States are corporate agents, comprised of flesh and blood citizens. When the state uses the public purse to finance its corporate liabilities, the burden falls on these citizens, even if they protested against the (...) class='Hi'>state's policies, did not know about them, or entirely lacked channels of political influence. How can this "distributive effect" of state-level responsibly be justified? The book develops an answer to this question, which revolves around citizens' participation in their state. It argues that citizenship can be a type of massive collective action, where citizens willingly orient themselves around the authority of their state, and where state policies are the product of this collective action. While most ordinary citizens are not to blame for their participation in their state, they nevertheless ought to accept a share of the remedial obligations that flow from their state's wrongful policies. However, the distributive effect cannot be justified in all states. Specifically, in non-democratic states most citizens are not participating in their state in the full sense, and should not pay for their state's wrongdoings. This finding calls then for a revision of the way we hold states responsible in both the domestic and international levels"--. (shrink)

Liberal political theory typically holds that injustice can corrupt legitimacy. Realists critique such views as ‘moralist,’ arguing that justice and legitimacy are not the same thing. For realists, even profoundly unjust states can satisfy basic legitimation criteria. While realism may appear hostile to the thesis that injustice corrupts legitimacy, this paper demonstrates that realist theory is more hospitable to that claim than one might expect.

States act wrongly. Sometimes, they are held responsible, or take responsibility of their own accord, to remediate their wrongdoing: they cease to act wron.

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Most business ethicists maintain that corporate actors are subject to a variety of moral obligations. However, there is a persistent and underappreciated concern that the competitive pressures of the market somehow provide corporate actors with a far-reaching excuse from meeting these obligations. Here, we assess this concern. Blending resources from the history of philosophy and strategic management, we demonstrate the assumptions required for and limits of this excuse. Applying the idea of ‘the state of nature’ from Thomas Hobbes, we (...) suggest that corporate actors would be excused from duties if complying with them threatened their vital interests. We show how this excuse is not available for most individuals within firms; instead, it is an excuse perhaps available to firms themselves, but only given substantive assumptions about corporate personhood. For those willing to make these assumptions, we apply the competitive advantage construct to delimit the scope of this excuse. We suggest that firms are excused from fulfilling an obligation when complying leads to a competitive disadvantage, as this imperils the firm’s vital interests. After revealing why this excuse does not generalize, we conclude by considering when we should reform the market to avoid the legitimacy of this excuse. (shrink)

Some believe that the mere beneficiaries of wrongdoing of others ought to disgorge their tainted benefits. Others deny that claim. Both sides of this debate concentrate on unavoidable beneficiaries of the wrongdoing of others, who are presumed themselves to be innocent by virtue of the fact they have neither contributed to the wrong nor could they have avoided receiving the benefit. But as we show, this presumption is mistaken for unavoidable beneficiaries who intend in certain ways to benefit (...) from wrongdoing, and who have therefore done something wrong in forming and acting on such an intention. (shrink)

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt (...) that explains guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increasing concern about unethical conduct within corporate business, not least because of the scandalous behavior of former chief executives at top blue chip companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, and Volkswagen. These scandals have not only threatened the privileged position of senior corporate employees but also the solvency of the companies they manage and lead. The high profile cases of corporate crime and corruption that occurred in the early 2000s together with the 2008 Wall (...) Street bailouts and the growth in criminal prosecutions since have raised the profile of business ethics to an unprecedented level. Greater public sensitivity toward and awareness about the unlawful and immoral conduct of firms in the United States and elsewhere, has created demand for organizations to become more accountable and socially responsible and prompted greater regulatory scrutiny. It has also served to highlight the embryonic and delimited state of research and scholarship on business ethics, where the focus has tended to remain on leadership. A neglected, though important, line of ethical enquiry concerns followership. Corporate wrongdoing would be less formidable and extensive if it was not aided and abetted. Two key questions arise. First, what prompts followers to support rather than oppose bad leaders? Second, what can be done to stem or at least curtail their allegiance to bad leaders? (shrink)

One of the biggest challenges of the study and practice of ethics is that of the moral dilemma, e.g. how should a compassionate person deal with injustice? This paper attempts to resolve this thorny issue from the perspective of Buddhist philosophy. I firstly introduce the 14th Dalai Lama’s distinction between act and actor and suggest a way to denounce wrongful acts without harboring hatred towards the perpetrator. Secondly, I argue that the philosophical grounds of this distinction can be traced back (...) to ancient Buddhist texts on Non-Self and Emptiness, which take all things as being in a constant state of change. Thirdly, I point out that a unique feature of the ‘empty ethics’ of Buddhism is that it inspires a middle way approach which allows for congruity between justice and compassion, between the realistic and the idealistic, and between rationality and sentimentality. Based on this, I suggest that it has much to contribute to contemporary ethics. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThere are two distinct types of legal wrongdoing: civil and criminal. This article demonstrates in three ways that Immanuel Kant's Universal Principle of Right, properly interpreted, offers a plausible and resilient account of this important distinction. First, Kant's principle correctly identifies attempted crimes as crimes themselves even when they do not violate the rights of any individual. Second, it justifies our treatment of reckless endangerment as a crime by distinguishing it from ordinary negligence, traditionally thought to be only civilly (...) wrong. Third, it explains and justifies differences between the features of traditional criminal punishments and the features of civil remedies. Moreover, the Universal Principle of Right yields a Kantian standard for criminal wrongdoing that is compelling enough to inform future philosophical inquiries into the nature and limits of the state's criminal lawmaking authority. (shrink)

Harmless Wrongdoing is the final volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that examines the kinds of harm that a state legitimately may make criminal. Of the four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles that Feinberg examines, he accepts only the harm principle and the offense principle as morally relevant reasons for establishing criminal prohibitions. In this fourth volume, Feinberg considers and opposes the principle of legal moralism, according to which legal coercion is legitimate (...) to prevent immoral conduct whether or not that conduct harms anyone. Feinberg examines various forms of legal moralism: including: (1) moral conservatism, which endorses legal coercion that may prevent drastic change to a group's way of life; (2) strict moralism, which supports legal coercion against nongrievance evils that are inherently immoral; (3) the exploitative principle, which recommends criminal prohibitions against substantial, unjustly exploitive, free‐floating evils; and (4) legal perfectionism, which combines moralism with paternalism in approving legal coercion that benefits an individual's character. In his defense of liberalism, Feinberg makes some concessions to legal moralism, but maintains that only harm to others and offense to others have sufficient weight to legitimize legal coercion. (shrink)

Some normative theorists believe that there is a principled moral reason not to retain benefits realized by injustice or wrongdoing. However, critics have argued that this idea is implausible. One purported problem is that the idea lacks an obvious rationale and that attempts to provide one have been unconvincing. This paper articulates and defends the idea that the principled reason in question has an expressive quality: it gets its reason-giving force from the symbolic aptness of such an act as (...) an expressive response to wrongdoing. The paper thus argues that at least in a certain subset of cases, renouncing benefits realized by injustice amounts to a powerful and uniquely apt expression of protest against the disrespect for the victim that is implied by the wrongdoer’s actions. The paper shows how this idea can inform the question of reparations for slavery and its aftermath in the United States. Lastly it develops an important objection to the argument presented and gives an account of how this objection can be met. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Intention and Wrongdoing: A Defense of the Principle of Double Effect by Joshua StuchlikMichael J. DegnanSTUCHLIK, Joshua. Intention and Wrongdoing: A Defense of the Principle of Double Effect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. xvi + 220 pp. Cloth, $99.99In this book Joshua Stuchlik vigorously defends the principle of double effect (PDE), which states, "There is a strict moral constraint against bringing about serious evil (harm) to (...) an innocent person intentionally, but it is permissible in a wider range of circumstances to act in a way that brings about serious evil incidentally, as a foreseen but non-intended side effect." After defining the terms of the principle and considering an intuitive case-based defense, he supports its truth based on a standard of solidarity. Since the PDE requires the distinction between intended consequences and nonintended side effects, he explains Elizabeth Anscombe's theory of intention, which supports the distinction's moral significance. He uses her theory to treat the closeness problem, the irrelevance of intention critique, and a challenge from Joshua Greene's empirical moral psychology that purports to undermine deontological constraints on causing harm.I present Stuchlik's grounding for the PDE followed by an uncontroversial example of its application. After this I consider two important objections to the PDE that Stuchlik critiques: the closeness problem and James Rachels's argument that intentions are irrelevant to judging the moral permissibility of actions. I conclude by examining Stuchlik's treatment of these challenges.Stuchlik interprets the PDE's very strict constraint against intentional killing or seriously harming the innocent as a near absolute prohibition, for he believes innocent persons are not suitable recipients of intentional harm. He grounds this constraint on the principle of solidarity. Being in solidarity with another is possessing concern for that other's sake. The ground for this concern is a shared human nature that enables members to think of themselves as making a "we." Human nature consists in the structured potentialities for knowing and freely choosing. Evidence of these rational potentialities is the human orientation toward the transcendent values of truth and goodness. Such embodied potentialities have inviolable worth.The scenarios of the precision bomber and the terror bomber illustrate the moral significance of the intended harm versus the nonintended but foreseen harm that Stuchlik adopts from Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory. Each bombers' goal is to help his country win a just war. The precision bomber pursues that goal by targeting a munitions factory. Though he foresees that many noncombatants will be killed or seriously [End Page 367] injured from the bomb, he does not necessarily intend these harms. By contrast, the terror bomber targets a civilian center necessarily intending harm for noncombatants. The PDE rules out his conduct.Anscombe's account of intention can lead to the problem of closeness in which the content of an intention is sufficiently fine-grained that an agent need not intend harm in almost any situation. Stuchlik illustrates the problem with Alexander Pruss's zookeeper scenario.An eccentric literalistic but always truthful magnate tells Sam he will donate to famine relief saving a hundred lives if and only if Sam follows his directions to the iota. Sam is to purchase a gun, sneak at night into a zoo owned by the magnate and kill the first mammal he sees. Sam sneaks into the zoo, sees a mammal in the distance, and forms the intention to shoot it. Then he notices that the mammal is human but shoots nonetheless on utilitarian grounds.In this case applying the PDE shows that Sam is simply intending that a mammal be killed. The fact that the mammal is a human is irrelevant, according to Anscombe's action theory.Stuchlik's response clarifies the scope of intention in the PDE. As stated above, the intention's content includes seriously harming an innocent human. However, if the intention ranges only over an intention to bring about an effect, E, and it turns out that E is a serious harm for an innocent human being, then applying the principle shows that Sam's action is wrong. The intended effect of killing the mammal is, as a matter of fact, an... (shrink)

Victims of wrongdoing sometimes forgive to repair relationships with the wrongdoer. But how does forgiveness do this? Some have argued that forgiveness changes the way the wrongdoing is remembered. We empirically adjudicate two competing accounts of how forgiveness is related to memory. The episodic fading account states that forgiveness alters both the episodic and the affective characteristics of autobiographical memories of being wronged. By contrast, the emotional fading account states that forgiveness mainly alters the affective characteristics of autobiographical (...) memories of being wronged. While the episodic fading account predicts that forgiveness is associated with less vivid and detailed memories of being wronged, the emotional fading account predicts that forgiveness need not be associated with diminished episodic characteristics. Across four studies (N = 1,479, after exclusions), we found consistent support for the emotional fading account but not for the episodic fading account. In a pilot study and in Study 1, we found that forgiven wrongs were rated as less affectively intense and less negatively valenced compared to unforgiven wrongs, while there was no difference in the episodic characteristics of the memories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 and additionally found that the valence and intensity of forgiven wrongs are different for the victims of wrongdoings compared to perpetrators. Finally, in Study 3, we found once again different ratings of intensity and valence for forgiven relative to not forgiven wrongs and, additionally, we found that the affective characteristics of remembered forgiven wrongs were associated with diminished tendencies toward seeking revenge and avoiding the wrongdoer along with amplified benevolence toward the wrongdoer. In sum, memories of forgiven wrongs consistently differed in their affective, but not their episodic, characteristics relative to memories of wrongdoings that were not forgiven. (shrink)

Much government and personal conduct is premised on the idea that a person made thereby to suffer deserves that suffering thanks to prior wrongdoing by him. Further, it often appears that one kind of suffering is more deserved than another and, in light of that, conduct inflicting the first is superior, or closer to being justified than conduct inflicting the second. Yet desert is mysterious. It is far from obvious what, exactly, it is. This paper offers and argues for (...) a theory of comparative desert. It offers an account of the conditions under which one harm is more deserved for past wrongdoing than another. The theory offered here can be stated, roughly, like so: One harm is more deserved for a wrongful act than another if, in light of it more than the other, the act is supported by reasons for the agent in a way similar to the way it ought to have been supported by reasons for him. The central task of the paper is to explain, elaborate and offer an argument for this theory. The paper also shows that, under the theory, differences in culpability—as between, for instance, intentionally rather than knowingly bringing about a harm—make a difference to desert. And the paper shows that under the proposed theory it is easier for the state to justify inflicting a punishment that is more deserved than it is to justify inflicting a punishment that is less deserved. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of criminalisation address, with varying emphasis, themes concerning the harmfulness and the wrongfulness of the conduct. In his article for the present issue, Antony Duff relies chiefly on notions of wrongfulness as the basis for his proposed criminalisation doctrines; whereas in their 2011 volume on criminalisation, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch invoke both wrongfulness and harmfulness as prerequisites for prohibiting conduct. The present article assesses the comparative merits of these approaches, and argues in favour of the latter, (...) two-element perspective. In this article, the author puts forward a number of reasons suggesting why the two-element approach is preferable. These reasons include, firstly, an inductive argument—that the kinds of wrongful conduct for which criminalisation seems a plausible response are those that include an element of harm or risk of harm. Secondly, a defining role for the state is one of resource-protection: of safeguarding the means and resources through which citizens can live good lives. Thus the concept of citizens’ living resources—and the related conception of harm—should be made a constitutive and explicit element of criminalisation theory, rather than subsuming resource-protection under a general rubric of wrongfulness. Thirdly, a two-element approach provides reciprocal limiting principles concerning the scope of criminalisation. One can, for example, employ wrongfulness requirements to limit the criminalisation of conduct that has remote harmful consequences; and, conversely, use a harmfulness requirement as means for restricting the criminalisation of wrongful acts. (shrink)

There are two main and quite distinct contractual interests or rights constitutive of a contract. First, the interest in securing the contracted-for performance; secondly, the interest in ensuring, if that performance is not completely (but substantially) secured or not secured at all, that one is not left worse off as a result thereof. The claimant can bring a claim to give effect to his performance interest and/or can bring a claim to give effect to his compensation interest. It can be (...) argued, however, that in some cases both the claimant’s performance interest and his compensation interest cannot be protected, and the defendant has obtained a profit from his wrongful breach of contract. This article suggests that in such cases a secondary right does not always mean that the defendant who infringes a primary duty has to make good the claimant’s pecuniary loss. It may require the defendant to surrender to the claimant the profits made from his wrongful breach. In such a case, it is a secondary right to restitution rather than compensation. The claimant’s compensation interest is here replaced with a restitution interest. This article explains why the defendant in such cases should surrender to the claimant, rather than the state (or anyone else), the benefit obtained through his wrongful breach of contract. Three additional scenarios will also be envisaged to capture the wide range of possible outcomes that may result from the defendant’s breach of his primary duty to perform and how they should be tackled. First, the claimant’s primary performance interest can no longer be protected and the defendant has caused a financial loss to the claimant and obtained a profit from his breach of contract. Second, a specific performance or cost of cure award addresses substantially the claimant’s primary performance interest, but despite that, the defendant has obtained a benefit from the breach without causing the former any financial loss. Third, a specific performance or cost of cure award addresses substantially the claimant’s primary performance interest, but despite that, the defendant has caused a loss to the claimant and obtained a profit from his breach of contract. (shrink)

When addressing the burdens borne by victims of police wrongdoing, we often overlook moral harms in focusing on the physical and psychological harms that they suffer. These moral harms undermine the moral status of the victim, her ability to consistently pursue the values she endorses, and her character. Victimhood is a morally significant social role. Victimhood imposes normative standards that measure the moral or political status of victim. Conforming to these standards affects our assessment of the conduct of the (...) victim and her moral standing. Considering the victims’ role provides important insights into contemporary practices of policing in the United States. The physical and verbal acts of the police often force race-based degradation upon racially subordinated groups. There is often no morally good way out of racially discriminatory encounters when the choice is to degrade oneself or suffer violence or even death. Worse, how we respond to the threat of police violence morally undermines our relationships with those we would keep safe from police violence. (shrink)

In terms of reversal theory, both dominant and alternative explanations of the initiation of organizational wrongdoing assume that its perpetrators act in a telic state of mind. This leaves us with explanations of organizational wrongdoing that are insufficiently appreciative of the agent’s experience. The human mind can be creative and imaginative, too, and people can fully immerse in their activity. We suggest that the paratelic state of mind is relevant for the phenomenological understanding of the initiation (...) of original, creative, daring courses of action, and that the paratelic state of mind may originate courses of action that social control agents, at a later moment in time, may label as organizational wrongdoing. Our proposal is especially relevant when organizational agents are on a course of exploration, facing uncertainty, complexity, and unavailability of information. (shrink)

Chapter 3 argues that Socrates’ claim ‘no one does wrong willingly’ is based not on psychological eudaemonism, but on the thesis that human nature seeks, and so we engage in purposive action in order to secure, our real good. Plato’s arguments for this thesis adopt and develop two sophistic ideas: (i) it is our nature to desire and pursue our real good, and (ii) that which we do or undergo contrary to our natural desires and pursuits we do or undergo (...) unwillingly (_akôn_). The _Gorgias_ uses (ii) to distinguish willingness and unwillingness in the case of instrumental actions; Socrates maintains that wrongdoing is unwilling because we undertake unjust actions for the sake of the happiness we naturally desire, but doing unjust things makes us unhappy. Across the dialogues, contrariety to our conative pro-attitude towards our actual good is what makes something (action, experience, character-state) unwilling. (shrink)

Research on organizational epistemic vice alleges that some organizations are epistemically malevolent, i.e. they habitually harm others by deceiving them. Yet, there is a lack of empirical research on epistemic malevolence. We connect the discussion of epistemic malevolence to the empirical literature on organizational deception. The existing empirical literature does not pay sufficient attention to the impact of an organization’s ability to control compromising information on its deception strategy. We address this gap by studying eighty high-penalty corporate misconduct cases between (...) 2000 and 2020 in the United States. We find that organizations use two different strategies to deceive: Organizations ‘sow doubt’ when they contest information about them or their impacts that others have access to. By contrast, organizations ‘exploit trust’ when they deceive others by obfuscating, concealing, or falsifying information that they themselves control. While previous research has focused on cases of ‘sowing doubt’, we find that organizations ‘exploit trust’ in the majority of cases that we studied. This has important policy implications because the strategy of ‘exploiting trust’ calls for a different response from regulators and organizations than the strategy of ‘sowing doubt’. (shrink)

In this chapter, the key defence to failure-to-prevent offences is examined. It involve showing that a company which failed to prevent wrongdoing nonetheless had in place at the time proper safeguards to prevent that type of wrongdoing. The importance of the defence is that it symbolizes the way in which the state takes a liberal-welfarist approach to using the criminal law to drive up or harmonize business standards. It is willing to encourage and reward offending companies that (...) nonetheless tried hard enough to meet applicable standards. It is argued that the way such a defence is formulated must ensure the institution not just of proper crime-prevention procedures, but of a commitment to the values at stake in safeguarding against wrongdoing. The chapter considers what such a commitment might involve, where different kinds of business are in focus: medium-to-large sized, or smaller lifestyle and subsistence entrepreneurs. (shrink)

Whistleblowers have significantly shaped the state of contemporary society; in this context, this research sheds light on a persistently neglected research area: what are the key determinants of whistleblowing within government agencies? Taking a unique methodological approach, we combine evidence from two pieces of fieldwork, conducted using both primary and secondary data from the US and Indonesia. In Study 1, we use a large-scale survey conducted by the US Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Additional tests are conducted in Study (...) 1, making comparisons between those who have and those who do not have whistleblowing experience. In Study 2, we replicate the survey conducted by the MSPB, using empirical data collected in Indonesia. We find a mixture of corroboration of previous results and unexpected findings between the two samples (US and Indonesia). The most relevant result is that perceived organizational protection has a significant positive effect on whistleblowing intention in the US sample, but a similar result was not found in the Indonesian sample. We argue that this difference is potentially due to the weakness of whistleblowing protection in Indonesia, which opens avenues for further understanding the role of societal cultures in protecting whistleblowers around the globe. (shrink)

State Medical Boards (SMBs) can take severe disciplinary actions (e.g., license revocation or suspension) against physicians who commit egregious wrongdoing in order to protect the public. However, there is noteworthy variability in the extent to which SMBs impose severe disciplinary action. In this manuscript, we present and synthesize a subset of 11 recommendations based on findings from our team’s larger consensus-building project that identified a list of 56 policies and legal provisions SMBs can use to better protect patients (...) from egregious wrongdoing by physicians. (shrink)

In this article, I ask whether the state, as opposed to its individual members, can intelligibly and legitimately be criminalized, with a focus on the possibility of its domestic criminalization. I proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to such criminalization, and then investigate ways in which they can be challenged. First, I address the claim that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly perpetrate domestic criminal wrongs. I argue against (...) it by building upon an account of the modern state as a moral agent proper, capable of both culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then consider objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of subjecting states to domestic criminal processes, which primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I then move on to reject the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in aspiring liberal jurisdictions, treating the state as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it should not have. Finally, I discuss three central objections to punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual members stands in the way of its justification. Lastly, that whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a distinct possibility. I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the criminalization of states, and by contending that my analysis leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of state criminalization on the table as a justifiable response to state wrongdoing. (shrink)

In this chapter, the justification for punishing (or taking other measures) against guilty companies is considered. The chapter defends the view that, especially in serious cases, the ideal approach is one in which state authorities secure an integrated penitential response from the corporate wrongdoer, rehabilitating it as a responsible corporate citizen. First, this involves a change in corporate attitudes to compliance (attitude impact). Secondly, it involves the company in creative engagement in developing a value-generating common good (activity impact). The (...) suggested approach is particularly contrasted, as a punishment, with the practice of imposing fines. Whilst justifiably imposed in less serious cases, fines are characterized as a second-best, morally ‘passive’ penal option in corporate cases. Further, the imposition of huge fines unjustly enriches the corporate offender’s home jurisdiction, whilst—in international cases—providing no legal basis to engage the offender in atoning reparation in the jurisdiction in which the offending took place. (shrink)

In this introduction, I provide a brief overview of the main arguments defended by Avia Pasternak in her book, ‘Responsible Citizens, Non-Responsible States’ and summarise the critics she will confront from four political and legal theorists who work in the area of individual citizens’ responsibility for state wrongdoings.

This chapter connects the accounts of punishment and blame from the preceding two chapters. Section 7.1 explains why punishment is an appropriate response to blameworthiness. It is not because it can induce guilt, but because it reinforces censure; provides an occasion for a wrongdoer to engage in serious reflection about her guilt; helps to ensure that she is not happy about her wrongdoing; and collects the amends that she owes either as material compensation or in the form of contribution (...) to deterrence. All of these functions help address the need for reconciliation between wrongdoer and the political community. Section 7.2 then explores utilitarian accounts of punishment and explains why deterrence and rehabilitation fit my account of punishment as responding to blameworthiness, but incapacitation does not, except in some secondary ways. Section 7.3 discusses the special problem of punishing those who do not accept their guilt, and especially those who predictably will never accept their guilt. And Section 7.4 concludes by reexamining the sense in which punishments are deserved but penalties are not. (shrink)

Are the state’s obligations to victims of its own wrongdoing greater than to persons who have suffered from bad luck? Many people endorse an affirmative answer to this question. Call this the Difference View. This view can seem arbitrary from the perspective of the victims in question; why should a victim of bad luck, who is just as badly off through no fault of her own, be entitled to less assistance from the state than a victim of (...) state-caused wrongful harm? This paper defends a qualified version of the Difference View, the Threshold Version of the Difference View. According to this view, all disadvantaged persons, no matter what the cause of their disadvantage, must be compensated until they reach a minimum threshold of wellbeing; however, among disadvantaged persons above this threshold, full compensation is owed for those who are victims of state wrongdoing, whereas full compensation is not necessarily owed to those who are disadvantaged due to bad luck. (shrink)

When states perpetrate injustices, do their individual citizens develop liabilities to repair such wrongdoings? Most existing accounts of citizens’ liabilities for state-perpetrated injustices, whilst applicable across certain democratic contexts, struggle to provide robust accounts of the grounds and nature of liabilities for citizens in non-democratic contexts. This problematically leaves a lacuna when it comes to the responsibilities and appropriate responses of citizens in these states. This article advances a distinctive two-pronged authorisation-based account applicable to non-democracies. Objective authorisers are individuals (...) who derive presumptive benefits, are comparably better-off under, and can reliably influence the decision-making processes over the injustice perpetrated by the state. Subjective authorisers are citizens who autonomously endorse their state as credible interpreters and upholders of their aims in relation to the injustices in question. Both objective and subjective authorisers of the state in relation to particular injustices perpetrated, are liable to compensate, actively oppose, and commemorate the victims of state-perpetrated injustices. This account will be shown to be empirically applicable to a large number of minimally decent non-democratic states, where the political elite enjoy moderate popular support over their incorporation and reflection of citizen interests and preferences in their governance, despite the absence of formal democratic electoral mechanisms. This authorisation-based view differs from existing accounts oriented around complicity and participatory intentions, in better accounting for non-participants who are nevertheless intuitively liable for the actions of their authorised state, as well as circumventing structural shortcomings affecting complicity-centric accounts. (shrink)

Chapter 5 contrasts the intentional participation framework with other accounts, builds on the normative and empirical findings of the previous chapters, and develops a viable model for the distribution of remedial responsibility within the state. It examines five alternative principles that could justify a nonproportional distribution: “national responsibility,” democratic authorization, benefiting from state wrongdoing, having a special _capacity_ to address it, and having special _associative obligations_ to the victims of the wrongdoing. While each of these principles (...) has important limitations, under some circumstances they can play a role in explaining citizens’ obligations with respect to their state’s wrongdoings. The chapter then outlines a context-sensitive process for determining how a state’s responsibility should be distributed between its citizens in specific cases. Typically, this process will conclude that in democratic states, a nonproportional distribution is overall justified, while in many authoritarian states it is not. (shrink)

This chapter presents the problem of the distributive effect and its treatment in existing literature. Starting with the idea that states are corporate moral agents, it suggests that states are morally responsible for their wrongdoings in two distinct senses: they can be blameworthy when they act wrongly, and they incur remedial responsibilities to address the wrong, including paying compensation to its victims. The chapter then contrasts two core views on how the state’s remedial responsibilities should be distributed among its (...) members. The first view supports a proportional distribution, which tracks the state’s members’ blameworthy contributions to their state’s wrongdoings. While this approach caters to individualist intuitions about fairness, it is hard to implement in real-world states. The second approach is nonproportional, and lets the burden fall on the population at large. While easier to implement, it seems to lack a solid normative justification. (shrink)

Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by invoking excuses (as opposed to justifications)? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? While a number of theorists have denied it in passing, the question remains radically underexplored. -/- In this article (in its penultimate draft version), I seek to identify the main metaphysical and moral objections to (...) class='Hi'>state excuses, and begin to investigate their strength. I work from the ecumenical assumption that general understandings of modern states as group moral agents proper or as mere fictional points of imputation for individual behaviour are both plausible, and that the question of state excuses should be asked in terms of both paradigms. Issues addressed include: the lack of state consciousness/affect, the nature and relevance of developmental and executive defects in group agents, the value of state interests and how interests relate to plausible claims of excuses, the shortfall of responsibility argument for group responsibility and its interface with state excuses, the symbolic and consequential (dis)value that state excuses may have, as well as concerns that states are entities that should live up to outstandingly high virtuous standards of impartiality and equanimity. -/- I conclude that even if the range of excuses available to states does not overlap neatly with excuses available to ordinary individuals, some excuses may still be morally available to states. More generally, I emphasize the need for a systematic discussion of group excuses writ large, and of their relationship with the wider question of when group entities may legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences for wrongdoing. (shrink)

According to Avia Pasternak, citizens can be held responsible for their state’s wrongdoing if and only if they contribute to maintaining it by acting as intentional participants in its activities. I examine two specific aspects of this general claim. First, I ask whether intentional participation requires that the citizen should accept the state, in the sense of not viewing her membership as unwillingly forced upon her, and conclude that it does not. Second I explore how the claim (...) applies in the case where there has been a discontinuity in the form of the state. I argue that it is not a condition of collective liability today that the predecessor state’s subjects should have been intentional participants at the time at which the wrongdoing occurred. (shrink)

The devastating toll of gun violence has given rise to hundreds of lawsuits seeking justice on behalf of victims and their families. A significant number of challenges against gun companies, however, are blocked by courts' broad reading of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act — a federal statute often interpreted to shield the gun industry from civil liability. This article reexamines PLCAA in light of the Supreme Court's recent federalism caselaw, which counsels courts to narrowly construe federal laws (...) that could otherwise upset the balance of power between states and the federal government. Since PLCAA infringes on traditional areas of state authority, the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence requires lower courts to interpret PLCAA narrowly, to not bar states from imposing negligence, nuisance, product liability, or other common law liability on gun companies. Reading PLCAA in line with federalism principles would preserve states' traditional authority over their civil justice laws, and enable gun violence victims, and their families, to hold gun companies responsible for wrongdoing. (shrink)

States commit wrongs that demand redress. In her recent book, Avia Pasternak considers the circumstances under which it is legitimate to impose the cost of redress upon the state’s citizens at large. Her answer is that it is legitimate to impose reparative burdens on citizens only when they participate in their state intentionally, specifically, when they intend to play their part in maintaining state institutions. The book thus has revisionary implications for current international legal practice, given reparative (...) burdens are currently imposed upon states no matter their internal relations. The book’s persuasive argument will be of interest not only to scholars of normative political theory and social ontology, but also international legal theorists. That said, its core claim that citizen participation must be ‘genuine’ would benefit from further specification through future scholarship. (shrink)

Why you have the right to resist unjust government The economist Albert O. Hirschman famously argued that citizens of democracies have only three possible responses to injustice or wrongdoing by their governments: we may leave, complain, or comply. But in When All Else Fails, Jason Brennan argues that there is a fourth option. When governments violate our rights, we may resist. We may even have a moral duty to do so. For centuries, almost everyone has believed that we must (...) allow the government and its representatives to act without interference, no matter how they behave. We may complain, protest, sue, or vote officials out, but we can’t fight back. But Brennan makes the case that we have no duty to allow the state or its agents to commit injustice. We have every right to react with acts of “uncivil disobedience.” We may resist arrest for violation of unjust laws. We may disobey orders, sabotage government property, or reveal classified information. We may deceive ignorant, irrational, or malicious voters. We may even use force in self-defense or to defend others. The result is a provocative challenge to long-held beliefs about how citizens may respond when government officials behave unjustly or abuse their power. (shrink)

In the context of state educational institutions, young white males are owed a duty to respect their interest or desert tokens. Not all white males have waived this duty since many white males have not performed the relevant types of culpable wrongdoing. Merely having benefitted from an unjust injury act or being a member of a community that owe a debt of compensation to racial minorities and women are not sufficient grounds to override the duty owed to the (...) white male. Since the three most plausible attempts to provide a compensatory justice justification for strong affirmative action programs at state educational institutions fail, I conclude that the following is false. (1) Other things being equal, a state educational institution may choose to hire a less qualified candidate over a more qualified candidate because the weight given to the race or gender of the less qualified candidate relates to the elimination of a debt of compensatory justice. Hence, unless strong affirmative action programs at state educational institutions can be justified by reference to some other value, such as the value of diversity, the state ought to eliminate such programs. (shrink)

Aristotle thought we are by nature political animals, but the state-of-nature tradition sees political society not as natural but as an artifice. For this tradition, political society can usefully be conceived as emerging from a pre-political state of nature by the exercise of innate normative powers. Those powers, together with the rest of our native normative endowment, both make possible the construction of the state, and place sharp limits on the state's just powers and prerogatives. A (...) state-of-nature theory has three components. One is an account of the native normative endowment, or “NNE.” Two is an account of how the state is constructed using the tools included in the NNE. Three is an account of the state's resulting normative endowment, which includes a (purported) moral power to impose duties of obedience. State-of-nature theories disagree about the NNE. For Locke, it included a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Recent social scientific findings suggest a quite different NNE. Contrary to Locke, people do not behave in experimental settings as one would predict if they possessed a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Moral reproof is subject to standing norms. These norms limit the range of eligible reprovers. The social science can support two claims. One, is that the NNE is (as Aristotle held) already political. The other is that political authority can be re-conceived as a matter of standing—that is, as the state's unique moral permission coercively to enforce moral norms, rather than as a moral power to impose freestanding duties of obedience. (shrink)

Cécile Fabre's monumental work Cosmopolitan Peace offers a thorough investigation of the responsibilities that agents incur through their involvement in armed conflict. However, her analysis fails to acknowledge the central role that states play in initiating and orchestrating acts of war. I argue that states are corporate moral agents, who are morally responsible for their own wrongdoings during an unjust war, and that this argument is compatible with Fabre's cosmopolitan premises. I then suggest that a systematic account of criminal liability (...) in the aftermath of a war should acknowledge the role that states play in orchestrating wars and committing war crimes. (shrink)

Avia Pasternak’s admirably clearly and tightly argued book defends four broad theses. First, it argues that contemporary states are appropriately regarded as corporate moral agents, entities that can act, consistently over time, on the basis of reasons of their own that can be distinct from the reasons of their constituent members, and at least some of which are moral reasons. This is the corporate moral agency of states thesis. Second, it argues that under certain circumstances that are frequently satisfied by (...) contemporary states, including most democracies but also some non-democratic states, ‘members’ (roughly, citizens and long-term residents) are appropriately regarded as ‘inclusive authors’ of their state’s actions even when they are not aware of them or when they strenuously disagree with them. The conditions include, crucially, that members actually understand and accept themselves, in a manner not coerced against their will, to be members, and some of their actions as contributing to the maintenance of the state. Call this the inclusive authorship thesis. Third, it argues that inclusive authorship makes members morally liable to bear the burdens of remedial duties for the wrongful actions of the state, provided that a distribution of remedial duties that tracks the level of blameworthiness of different members is not feasible or would be prohibitively costly. Call this the moral liability thesis (recall that inclusive membership does not imply direct involvement in, support for, or even agreement with, the actions of the state that incur the remedial obligations, and therefore it does not entail blameworthiness). And finally, it argues that when the conditions stated in the second and third theses obtain, it is morally justified not only to distribute the burdens of remedial obligations to all inclusive authors of the state’s wrongful actions, but to distribute them in a nonproportional manner that does not track members’ level of ‘intentional citizenship’, the latter referring to the necessary conditions of inclusive authorship. Call this the nonproportionality thesis. (shrink)

In his new book Beyond the Law’s Reach? Shmuel Nili shows how affluent democracies have become entangled with violent autocratic regimes and brutal international cartels, and have thereby become complicit in serious global injustices. This essay asks who bears responsibility for this complicity. It argues that citizens of affluent democratic societies often share responsibility for their own government’s unjust entanglements and explores the conditions under which this holds true. It focuses in particular on the challenge posed by relatively “obscure” injustices, (...) which even well-informed citizens cannot be expected to know about. In addressing these cases, this essay outlines a theory of civic obligation that can help explain when citizens have a duty to take action against government injustice and clarify how much they can be expected to know about their representatives’ wrongdoing. (shrink)

What is it that makes us as citizens liable for the actions – including the wrongdoings – of our state? Answering this question is part of the larger debate on the nature of complicity and collective action. When are we connected to joint endeavours and collective outcomes in a way that makes us (on some level) responsible for them? -/- Of particular interest within this debate is the normative relationship of citizens to their state. For instance, when states (...) pay reparations for past crimes the costs are – one way or another – borne by their citizens. In Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States (OUP 2021), Avia Pasternak examines with admirable clarity and circumspection if states are justified in imposing the cost of their past wrongdoings on all of their citizens, including those who played no obvious part in those crimes. (shrink)

Serious ethical violations in medicine, such as sexual abuse, criminal prescribing of opioids, and unnecessary surgeries, directly harm patients and undermine trust in the profession of medicine. We review the literature on violations in medicine and present an analysis of 280 cases. Nearly all cases involved repeated instances (97%) of intentional wrongdoing (99%), by males (95%) in nonacademic medical settings (95%), with oversight problems (89%) and a selfish motive such as financial gain or sex (90%). More than half of (...) cases involved a wrongdoer with a suspected personality disorder or substance use disorder (51%). Despite clear patterns, no factors provide readily observable red flags, making prevention difficult. Early identification and intervention in cases requires significant policy shifts that prioritize the safety of patients over physician interests in privacy, fair processes, and proportionate disciplinary actions. We explore a series of 10 questions regarding policy, oversight, discipline, and education options. Satisfactory answers to these questions will require input from diverse stakeholders to help society negotiate effective and ethically balanced solutions. (shrink)

This chapter puts my fair play argument into conversation with several recent accounts of reparative justice. I argue that while each of them makes valuable and important contributions to the theoretical discussion, they also exhibit certain disadvantages which my fair play account is well-positioned to avoid. I begin with Avia Pasternak’s argument that the costs of repairing state wrongdoing may appropriately be passed along to citizens who intentionally participate in political life (Pasternak, Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States: Should Citizens (...) Pay for Their States’ Wrongdoings? Oxford University Press, 2021). I argue that since her account relies on a forward-looking conception of reparative justice, it fails to meet the moral standard set in the preceding chapter. Next, I consider an important challenge to backward-looking approaches that has moved many reparations theorists to embrace forward-looking accounts grounded in the idea of structural injustice, and consider two further views—Olúfẹmi O. Táíwò (Reconsidering Reparations, Oxford University Press, 2022) and Alasia Nuti (Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress, Cambridge University Press, 2019)—that have grown out of this “structural turn.” I observe that Táíwò’s account is also essentially forward-looking, and argue that while Nuti’s account is more complex and aligns with my own view in some important ways, it (along with both Táíwò and Pasternak’s accounts) fails to take seriously the enduring political challenges associated with the problem of whiteness. (shrink)