ABSTRACTAnxious individuals report disproportionately negative expectations concerning the future, termed the negative expectancy bias. In contrast, ageing is associated with an inflated expectancy for positive future events. A recent study [Steinman, S. A., Smyth, F. L., Bucks, R. S., MacLeod, C., & Teachman, B. A.. Anxiety-linked expectancy bias across the adult lifespan. Cognition and Emotion, 27, 345–355. doi:10.1080/02699931.2012.711743] found using an interpretation bias task, a negative expectancy bias in young adults and positive expectancy bias in older adults with high trait (...) anxiety. Extending this, the current study examined expectancy bias for positive, negative and ambiguously emotionally toned information in younger and older adults with clinical levels of depression and anxiety to community control groups, thus allowing examination of both disorder status and age on biases. Clinical participants reported a pervasive tendency to expect negative events relative to positive regardless o... (shrink)

There is limited knowledge about sleep in adolescents with elevated levels of anxiety treated within primary health care settings, potentially resulting in sleep problems not being sufficiently addressed by primary health care workers. In the current study self-reported anxiety, insomnia, sleep onset latency, sleep duration, and depressive symptoms were assessed in 313 adolescents referred to treatment for anxiety within primary health care. Results showed that 38.1% of the adolescents met criteria for insomnia, 34.8% reported short sleep duration, and 83.1% reported (...) long sleep onset latency. Total anxiety symptoms were related to all sleep variables after controlling for age and sex. Furthermore, all anxiety symptom sub-types were associated with insomnia and sleep onset latency, whereas most anxiety subtypes were associated with sleep duration. Adolescents’ depressive symptoms accounted for most of the anxiety-sleep associations, emphasizing the importance of depressive symptoms for sleep. However, anxiety was associated with insomnia and sleep onset latency also among youth with low levels of depressive symptoms. The findings suggests that primary health care workers should assess sleep duration, sleep onset latency, and insomnia in help-seeking adolescents with anxiety. (shrink)

This article returns to a philosophical conundrum that has troubled feminist theory since the topic of sexual violence has been taken seriously, what I call the problem of the “heteronormative sexual continuum”: how sexual assault and hegemonic heterosex are conceptually and politically related. I continue my response to the work of Nicola Gavey, who has argued for the existence of a “gray area” of sexual interactions that are ethically questionable without rising to the category of sexual assault, but whose analysis (...) did not explicitly articulate what these two categories share or what distinguishes them from each other. After summarizing Gavey's position, I summarize my previous articulation of the common ground between instances of sexual assault and examples of sexual interactions in the “gray area.” I then develop a theoretical account of how the two categories differ, arguing that the victim's agency plays different roles in the two types of interactions. Both the fact of that distinction—that we are capable of providing a philosophical account of the difference between sexual interactions that fall into the gray area and those that constitute sexual assault—and its particular content are crucial for the development of a tenable feminist sexual ethics. (shrink)

Empirical studies suggest that rape in marriages continues to be treated as a less severe crime than other forms of rape. Although the psychological and legal dimensions of marital rape have received some attention, its epistemic harms remain under-theorised. This article argues that these harms are not exhausted by hermeneutical injustice, where victims lack the conceptual resources to identify or articulate their experience as rape. We introduce the concept of experiential injustice to capture a deeper epistemic (...) harm in which victims, shaped by trauma or internalised oppression, lose evaluative grip on their own experience. Drawing on victims' testimonies, we show how marital rape can erode epistemic self-trust and diminish the capacity to register harm as experientially significant. These harms resist easy remediation and call for a broader framework to understand how epistemic injustice occurs in the contexts of marital rape. Recognising these layered epistemic harms is crucial for legal and social reforms addressing marital rape. (shrink)

This study conceptualizes rape trauma as embedded in the cultural construction of rape and consequently manifested in the psychological process of individual rape survivors. The author conducted indepth interviews with 35 female rape survivors in Taiwan to examine their self-reported traumatic experiences in relation to the cultural meaning of rape in Chinese society. In analyzing the interview accounts, this study identified several kinds of trauma predominantly experienced among the interviewed rape survivors. This study found (...) that the psychological trauma among individual rape survivors in Taiwan, although similar to rape trauma symptoms documented in Western literature, seems to manifest a relatively distinct cultural construction of rape in Chinese society. Study implications for rape-related educational and treatment programs in Taiwan are suggested in the context of Chinese cultural construction of rape. (shrink)

Underlying theories of rape in legal philosophy are assumptions about the relationships between rights and property, self and others, mind and body, public and private domains, subject and object. Philosophers who study sexual assault by focusing almost exclusively on the law of rape often fail to interrogate their implicit ways of conceptualizing subjects and the harm done to them. In particular, these analyses often overlook the impact of rape on the development of personal identity and understanding of (...) self. This project provides an analysis of the wrongness of rape that considers rape not as a moment of nonconsent, but as a stage in an experiential process that includes, but is not limited to, the violation of rights. By integrating the philosophical methods of phenomenology and critical theory with current writings on the philosophy of rape law, rape trauma, and critical race theory, this study develops a descriptively full theory of rape that takes the experience of the survivor as the point of departure. A philosophically rich understanding of the harm of rape emerges when approaching the issue through the lived realities of women who have been subjected to sexual violence along with a critical social theory of how the social, historical, and material conditions inform that experience. (shrink)

We consider the complex interactions between rape culture and epistemology. A central case study is the consideration of a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology (...) of testimony and norms connecting knowledge and action, the harms of tacit idealizations away from important contextual factors, and a contextualist semantics for 'knows' ascriptions. (shrink)

Rape that does not involve life-threatening physical violence, is committed by someone known to the victim, and is not reported to law enforcement (called, here, commonplace rape) raises two questions: “Why didn't she fight back or run away?” and “Why didn't she say anything at the time?” Recently, research on “tonic immobility,” based on animal predation studies, has provided a physiological explanation for experiences of immobilization during sexual assault. The juxtaposition of animal predation with commonplace sexual assault raises (...) the question: How is it that a response reserved, in animals, for lethal, no-way-out scenarios is present in modes of violation where the victim does not report fear of death or extreme physical harm? Neither does this research help explain why women fail to report. This philosophical exploration of the meaning of tonic immobility in sexual assault helps to justify the juxtaposition of life-or-death scenarios with less-than-life-threatening violation, and sheds light on the reason for women's silence after sexual assault. Rape is accompanied by deep historical meanings that can be encapsulated in the notion of “social death,” associated in the U.S. with colonial conquest, enslavement, and impoverishment. The specter of social death haunts commonplace rape, producing life or death responses. (shrink)

Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The (...) argument consists of two premises. The first claims that it can be a proper object of the criminal law to regulate wrongful conduct with no extrinsically harmful effects on others. The second claims that the use of robots that replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse would be wrongful, even if such usage had no extrinsically harmful effects on others. I defend both premises of this argument and consider its implications for the criminal law. I do not offer a conclusive argument for criminalisation, nor would I wish to be interpreted as doing so; instead, I offer a tentative argument and a framework for future debate. This framework may also lead one to question the proposed rationales for criminalisation. (shrink)

Sex robots are likely to play an important role in shaping public understandings of sex and of relations between the sexes in the future. This paper contributes to the larger project of understanding how they will do so by examining the ethics of the “rape” of robots. I argue that the design of realistic female robots that could explicitly refuse consent to sex in order to facilitate rape fantasy would be unethical because sex with robots in these circumstances (...) is a representation of the rape of a woman, which may increase the rate of rape, expresses disrespect for women, and demonstrates a significant character defect. Even when the intention is not to facilitate rape, the design of robots that can explicitly refuse consent is problematic due to the likelihood that some users will experiment with raping them. Designing robots that lack the capacity to explicitly refuse consent may be morally problematic depending on which of two accounts of the representational content of sex with realistic humanoid robots is correct. (shrink)

Social epistemologists use the term hermeneutical injustice to refer to a form of epistemic injustice in which a structural prejudice in the economy of collective interpretive resources results in a person’s inability to understand his/her/their own social experience. This essay argues that the phenomenon of unacknowledged date rapes, that is, when a person experiences sexual assault yet does not conceptualize him/her/their self as a rape victim, should be regarded as a form of hermeneutical injustice. The fact that the concept (...) of date rape has been widely used for at least three decades indicates the intractability of hermeneutical injustices of this sort and the challenges with its overcoming. (shrink)

Rape, claims Ann J. Cahill, affects not only those women who are raped, but all women who experience their bodies as rapable and adjust their actions and self-images accordingly. Rethinking Rape counters legal and feminist definitions of rape as mere assault and decisively emphasizes the centrality of the body and sexuality in a crime which plays a crucial role in the continuing oppression of women.

This article argues that rape myths and domestic abuse myths constitute hermeneutical injustices. Drawing on empirical research, I show that the prevalence of these myths makes victims of rape and of domestic abuse less likely to apply those terms to their experiences. Using Sally Haslanger's distinction between manifest and operative concepts, I argue that in these cases, myths mean that victims hold a problematic operative concept, or working understanding, which prevents them from identifying their experience as one of (...) rape or of domestic abuse. Since victims in this situation lack the conceptual resources needed to render their experience sufficiently intelligible, they are suffering a form of hermeneutical injustice. Attending to this distinctive case sheds new light not only on the functioning of social myths of this kind but on the nature of hermeneutical injustice itself, since the case of the victim who accepts myths is importantly different from other cases of hermeneutical injustice discussed in the literature to date. In practical terms, this analysis supports calls for juries in rape trials to be warned about rape myths at the start of the trial, and may have implications for calls for statutory Sex and Relationships Education in schools. (shrink)

This is the first book-length philosophical examination of rape, which has received ample attention from feminists, legal scholars and social scientists.

There is an undeniable tendency to dismiss women’s sexual assault allegations out of hand. However, this tendency is not monolithic—allegations that black men have raped white women are often met with deadly seriousness. I argue that contemporary rape culture is characterized by the interplay between rape myths that minimize rape, and myths that catastrophize rape. Together, these two sets of rape myths distort the epistemic resources that people use when assessing rape allegations. These distortions (...) result in the unjust exoneration of people we cannot conceive of as monstrous, while making it too easy to believe that some marginalized people could be rapists. I also argue that rape myths enable a novel kind of epistemic injustice. This injustice concerns how our assessments of trustworthiness and our assessments of plausibility interact. I argue that rape myths can result in runaway credibility deflations that can explain both why people fail to believe most women, and also why people may unjustly believe false allegations that white women have been raped by black men. (shrink)

One of the most significant shifts in current thinking on war and gender is the recognition that rape in wartime is not a simple by-product of war, but often a planned and targeted policy. For many feminists ‘rape as a weapon of war’ provides a way to articulate the systematic, pervasive, and orchestrated nature of wartime sexual violence that marks it as integral rather than incidental to war. This recognition of rape as a weapon of war has (...) taken on legal significance at the Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals where rape has been prosecuted as a crime against humanity and genocide. In this paper, I examine how the Rwanda Tribunal’s record of judgments conceives of rape enacted as an instrument of the genocide. I consider in particular how the Tribunal’s conception of ‘rape as a weapon of war’ shapes what can be known about sexual violence and gender in the Rwandan genocide and what cannot, the categories of victims legally recognised and those that are not, and the questions pursued, and those foreclosed, about the patterns of violence before and during the genocide. (shrink)

Argument about changes in the law of rape are logically dependent upon a prior definitional account. For any legal definition of an act, one can sensibly ask if that definition is right. To know whether the law is sound, one must first understand of what it is that the definition is a definition. For many parts of the criminal law, and the law of rape is one, the definitions on which the law moves are concepts perfectly accessible outside (...) and apart from the law. I have two aims for this article. The first is to argue for a particular conception of rape as the best understanding of the constellation of acts we conceptualize as rape. The second, less direct, is to show that traditional methods of conceptual analysis can contribute to legal and social scholarship and reform. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes the oppression endured by “free” women from the oppression suffered by enslaved and colonized women and men to read The Second Sex's question: Why don't women rebel? in terms of the type of personhood offered to women – vassal freedom – the type of violence used to enforce this truncated mode of subjectivity – rape – and the threat to dignity that haunts women's lives – the body of the whore. Following Beauvoir's logic of woman's degradation (...) as the sex, noting that the epitaph whore is flung at women who assert their economic or political independence, and listening to the voices of self‐affirming prostitutes, I find that the fate of the women challenging the glass ceiling and of those who claim their dignity as sex workers are intertwined, for so long as some women are seen and shamed as the sex, all women's status as legitimate subjects is threatened. (shrink)

In an article recently published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the legal scholar Helen Reece argues that the prevalence and effects of rape myths have been overstated and the designation of certain beliefs and attitudes as myths is simply wrong. Feminist researchers, she argues, are engaged ‘in a process of creating myths about myths’ in a way that serves to close down and limit productive debate in this ‘vexed’ area. In this article we argue that Reece’s analysis (...) is methodologically flawed, crudely reductionist and rhetorically unyielding. We locate Reece’s analysis within the wider theoretical field to show how her failure to engage with feminist literature on rape other than in the narrowest, most exclusionary terms, yields an approach which impedes rather than advances public understanding and panders to a kind of simplistic thinking which cannot begin to grapple with the complexity of the phenomenon that is rape. We conclude by emphasizing the continuing commitment of feminist researchers carefully to theorize and map the fraught field of progressive legal strategizing in order to identify and counter the kinds of risks and shortcomings of political activism with which Reece is rightly concerned. (shrink)

Sexual violence has become a topic of intense media scrutiny, thanks to the bravery of survivors coming forward to tell their stories. But, unfortunately, mainstream public spheres too often echo reports in a way that inhibits proper understanding of its causes, placing too much emphasis on individual responsibility or blaming minority cultures. In this powerful and original book, Linda Martín Alcoff aims to correct the misleading language of public debate about rape and sexual violence by showing how complex our (...) experiences of sexual violation can be. Although it is survivors who have galvanized movements like #MeToo, when their words enter the public arena they can be manipulated or interpreted in a way that damages their effectiveness. Rather than assuming that all experiences of sexual violence are universal, we need to be more sensitive to the local and personal contexts – who is speaking and in what circumstances – that affect how activists’ and survivors’ protests will be received and understood. Alcoff has written a book that will revolutionize the way we think about rape, finally putting the survivor center stage. (shrink)

Stephen Schulhofer's book, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law, provides a carefully constructed and powerful case for rape-law reform. His effort is distinctive in three ways: (1) it takes the basic question of reform to be the moral one of determining which sexual interactions ought to be the subject of the criminal law, (2) it takes the right of sexual autonomy to serve as the basis for any successful legal reform, and (3) it makes (...) a philosophically sophisticated case for his own reform proposal. Schulhofer's efforts should be of great interest to philosophers, especially feminist legal philosophers, interested in questions that bear direct relevance to the relationships between autonomy, coercion, and consent as constrained by the requirements of due process. His careful and scrupulously fair discussion of influential reform recommendations set the stage for his own position (discussed in section VII), a critical evaluation thereof (sections VII and VIII), and sympathetic recommendations in VIII and IX. Of special value here is Schulhofer's attempt to extend his analysis of coerced consent to include certain "offers" made in contexts (e.g., the workplace) characterized by significant power differentials between persons. Section IX offers suggestions, generally friendly to Schulhofer's overall reform proposals, for identifying wrongful sexual interactions occurring in certain institutional or professional contexts. (shrink)

Moral responsibility theorists and legal theorists both worry about what negligence is, and how it might be a ground of blameworthiness. In this paper I argue that negligence suitably understood, can be an appropriate grounds for mens rea in rape cases. I am interested in cases where someone continues with sex in the mistaken belief that the other person consents. Such a mistaken belief is often unreasonable: a wilfully blind agent, one who deliberately ignores evidence that there is no (...) consent, is clearly not exculpated by his ignorance. However, there may be circumstances in which a man’s mistaken belief in consent is reasonable in the circumstances, then he is not culpable. Thus it is important to be clear about what we mean by a reasonable mistake. Many critics (e.g. Duff, Baron and others) have argued that it is not possible to make a reasonable mistake about consent, that any such mistake must involve culpable carelessness. Consent is so important that we should always double check. Not to do so is reckless, and in that case there is clearly culpability. In this paper I argue that it is possible to make a mistake that is reasonable, at least in one sense. Someone in the grip of sexist ideology might not understand how important consent is, and not through carelessness, but through sexist ideology that they have non-culpably and non-voluntarily absorbed. In that case it is not obvious that the man is culpable. I go on to argue that so far as the law is concerned, there is good reason to hold that even those who have ‘reasonable’ beliefs culpable. Having a reasonable belief in consent may be, but is not always exculpatory. We usually think a reasonable mistake does not count as negligence because a reasonable mistake is not failing to know something that you should have known. I argue that we should understand negligence—not knowing something you should have known—in a moralized sense, so that people who are ignorant through being ideologically blinded can be held to have the mens rea requisite for rape conviction. -/- . (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether rape-law reform should treat all cases of simple rape—nonconsensual sex that does not involve the use or credible threat of physical force—as a serious crime. Of primary concern here are those sexual interactions, often referred to as “date rape” or “acquaintance rape,” where the coercive element is not physical force as evidenced by reasonable resistance. Should, as some feminist reformers have urged, felony rape include sexual interactions that may (...) not be fully consensual but do not include the use of physical force? If so, can convincing answers be provided for due process questions about what constitutes valid consent to sex and how to tell when it is present. This paper warns of the difficulties in determining what counts as evidence of nonconsent and mens rea in light of the “linkage thesis” which takes valid consent in these cases to be bilateral and interactive, and to imply the absence of mens rea. Given the complexity of norms governing these sexual interactions and the high likelihood of reasonable mistakes about consent, this paper contends that criminalizing these cases of simple rape will often result in the unjust treatment of the relevant parties. (shrink)

This paper shows how the mythology surrounding rape enters into a criterion of reasonableness which operates through the legal system to make women vulnerable to unscrupulous victimization. It explores the possibility for changes in legal procedures and presumptions that would better serve women's interests and leave them less vulnerable to sexual violence. This requires that we reformulate the criterion of consent in terms of what is reasonable from a woman's point of view.

This essay examines how rape of women and girls by male soldiers works as a martial weapon. Continuities with other torture and terrorism and with civilian rape are suggested. The inadequacy of past philosophical treatments of the enslavement of war captives is briefly discussed. Social strategies are suggested for responding and a concluding fantasy offered, not entirely social, of a strategy to change the meanings of rape to undermine its use as a martial weapon.

This article charts a genealogy of marital rape law reform in South Australia in the 1970s, arguing that the new laws were based on constructing the marital rapist as a certain kind of man. South Australia is a significant case study, as it was one of the first Western jurisdictions to attempt to criminalise marital rape. Despite South Australia’s generally progressive politics, the legislation was highly contested, and resulted, in the end, only in a partial criminalization. To overcome (...) the strident opposition to rape law reform, we show that supporters explicitly developed a discourse focusing on concepts of sexual normativity and deviance. The marital rapist, it was argued, had deviated from patriarchal standards of masculine decency: this, not the rape itself, was crucial to determining whether his conduct was unlawful. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to shed some light on what rape myths are and what we can do about them. I start by giving a brief overview of some common rape myths. I then use two philosophical tools to offer a perspective on rape myths. First, I show that we can usefully see rape myths as an example of what Miranda Fricker has termed ‘epistemic injustice’, which is a type of wrong that concerns our role (...) as knowers. Then, I show that it is important to recognise that rape myths are instances of misogyny. This word is of course a more familiar one, but I'll be drawing on a specific philosophical account of what misogyny is, developed by Kate Manne, that I think is useful here. Finally, I briefly consider some upshots of these claims. (shrink)

This book draws on qualitative analysis of transcripts from Australian rape trials to explain why 50 years of ‘progressive’ law reforms have failed to remove rape myths from the courtroom or reduce intense scrutiny of the complainant’s credibility. After analysing tens of thousands of pages of transcripts from NSW and Victorian trials, the authors show that complainants in rape trials are still routinely accused of lying. They are still interrogated about their failure to behave in the manner (...) expected of a ‘genuine’ victim of sexual violence. The problem is not so much one of reform implementation, or imperfect translation to practice, but that statutory reform has never seriously attempted to prevent lawyers from engaging rape myths in the courtroom. Cross-examination continues to pursue traditional rape myth-inspired lines of questioning because the rules allow them to do so. Law-makers have never seriously attempted to eradicate rape myth engagement and victim-survivor character assassination. Favoured tools for ‘modernizing’ rape trials—such as rich and complex statutory definitions of consent and non-consent, and educative jury directions—do not address the practices that cry out for transformation, such as rape-myth inspired lines of cross-examination. The book concludes that if the criminal justice system is to have any hope of providing justice to victim-survivors of sexual violence, the parameters of law reform need to be widened. A key priority is to address the capacious concept of ‘relevant’ evidence, which is the gate through which rape myths flood into the courtroom. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the presence of rape myths and gender stereotypes, and the norms of sexuality they reflect and reinforce, in Croatian rape laws, as exemplified by the recent practice of the Zagreb County Court. I begin with a general discussion of the gendered myths and stereotypes that have shaped the content and application of the criminal law of rape everywhere. I then briefly introduce the definition of rape under the 1997 Croatian Criminal Code (...) which was in force at the time of my research, after which I proceed to the critical analysis and the assessment of the Zagreb County Court practice. Next, I turn to the changes in the new Criminal Code to see how they address the identified problems. I offer a model of an affirmative consent standard, based on a communicative model of sexuality, which values reciprocal responsibility, communication and mutuality of sexual desire. I argue that this standard has greater potential to challenge rape myths and gender stereotypes and to promote sexual freedom and gender equality. (shrink)

What exactly is rape? And how is it embedded in society? -/- Hilkje Charlotte Hänel offers a philosophical exploration of the often misrepresented concept of rape in everyday life, systematically mapping out and elucidating this atrocious phenomenon. Hänel proposes a theory of rape as a social practice facilitated by ubiquitous sexist ideologies. Arguing for a normative cluster model for the concept of rape, this timely intervention improves our understanding of lived experiences of sexual violence and social (...) relations within sexist ideologies. (shrink)

Empirical research has distinguished moral judgments that focus on an act and the actor’s intention or mental states, and those that focus on results of an action and then seek a causal actor. Studies indicate these two types of judgments may result from a “dual-process system” of moral judgment (Cushman 2008, Kneer and Machery 2019). Results-oriented judgements may be subject to the problem of resultant moral luck because different results can arise from the same action and intention. While some argue (...) luck should not bear on persons’ culpability, Victor Kumar has argued that the tendency to hold unlucky agents responsible for harm is justified by consequentialist aims of punishment (Kumar 2019). In contrast, judgments that focus on acts and intentions may be primarily retributive. Kumar claims that judgments focused on results track external, public harm because this increases the reliability of punishment and better achieves instrumental aims, including deterrent effect. In this chapter I examine rape cases using Kumar’s theory of punishment. Rape involves outcomes that are not publicly available. If judgments of punishment depend on outcomes, then we would expect such judgments to be less stable for those instances of wrongdoing that lack public outcomes such as rape, because such judgments would rely instead on often biased and unreliable inferential processes to establish the presence of mental states, which are essentially private. In this way Kumar’s theory actually predicts the way in which we see criminal justice institutions fail with regard to arrest, prosecution, and punishment related to rape; and we might expect similar failures for other crimes that lack publicly available results. In sum, a fundamental problem with institutionalized punishment centered upon results may be that some crimes sit within a moral blindspot. (shrink)

Several prominent theorists have recently advocated reconceptualizing rape as “nonconsensual sex,” omitting the traditional “force” element of the crime. I argue that such a conceptualization fails to capture what is distinctively problematic about rape for women and why rape is pivotal in supporting women’s gender oppression. I argue that conceptualizing rape as coerced sex can replace both the force and nonconsent elements and thereby remedies some of the main difficulties with extant definitions, especially in recognizing “acquaintance” (...) rape as such. I argue that this approach helps explain its distinctive badness both for the individual victims and for women as a group. (shrink)

This book offers a critical feminist perspective on the widely debated topic of transitional justice and forgiveness. Louise Du Toit examines the phenomenon of rape with a feminist philosophical discourse concerning women’s or ‘feminine’ subjectivity and selfhood. She demonstrates how the hierarchical dichotomy of male active versus female passive sexuality – which obscures the true nature of rape – is embedded in the dominant western symbolic frame. Through a Hegelian and phenomenological reading of first-person accounts by rape (...) victims, she excavates an understanding of rape that also starts to open up a way out of the denial and destruction of female sexual subjectivity. (shrink)