This paper presents a framework for ethical and responsible standardisation by adapting Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) principles to standard-setting. While standardisation is sometimes viewed as technical and neutral, it has profound social and political effects. We identify relevant potential shortcomings in standardisation: overlooked social impacts, short-run market capture, and loss of expertise during certification. Further, we emphasise the distinct context of standardisation: its commercial roots, and the distinct way it serves as a sphere of knowledge-creation. Taking these points (...) together, we land on a four-part framework: Inclusivity, Anticipation, Stewardship, and Leadership. The paper reviews institutional measures to embed the framework in committee processes. (shrink)

Este artículo ofrece una reflexión crítica sobre la práctica filosófica con niños, niñas y jóvenes en Puerto Rico, basada en experiencias personales, comunitarias e institucionales. A través de proyectos como Guailimanai, Filosofía para Niños Puerto Rico (FpNPR) y ZONA-FILO, se explora cómo la filosofía puede ser una herramienta pedagógica transformadora desde edades tempranas. Se enfatiza la importancia del diálogo filosófico, la participación familiar y el pensamiento crítico enraizado en contextos de opresión. Inspirado en el trabajo de Walter Omar Kohan (2018), (...) el artículo establece un diálogo entre las propuestas de Matthew Lipman y Paulo Freire. Mientras Lipman buscaba desarrollar habilidades cognitivas mediante el razonamiento lógico, Freire abogaba por una educación orientada a la conciencia crítica y la transformación social. El artículo amplía la discusión de Kohan al abordar la noción de neutralidad educativa, argumentando que la neutralidad es una ilusión en contextos marcados por desigualdades estructurales. Desde una perspectiva de pedagogía crítica, se afirma que la educación es inherentemente política. La neutralidad, lejos de garantizar igualdad, puede convertirse en aliada del poder opresor. Por ello, el artículo propone una práctica filosófica comprometida, donde educadores y aprendices asuman posturas éticas ante temas como el colonialismo, la gentrificación, el feminicidio, el racismo y el adultocentrismo. En este marco, la filosofía no busca imponer puntos de vista, sino fomentar el diálogo sincero, el cuestionamiento profundo y la acción transformadora. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es examinar la intervención de Carl Schmitt en la asamblea “Coraje para actuar” [Mut zum Handeln] de la Langnamverein, celebrada en noviembre de 1930 –dos años antes de la popularizada conferencia “Estado fuerte y economía sana”–, en la que sugirió que el gobierno del Reich debía hacer uso de todos los medios legales que tenía a disposición. A estos efectos, se dedica un apartado a cada uno de los tópicos que la estructuran y que permiten (...) comprender su propuesta política: 1) el pluralismo; 2) la reforma constitucional; 3) la neutralidad política interna. Finalmente, se dedica un apartado de reflexiones finales, donde se destacan los aportes y la actualidad de la intervención de Schmitt. (shrink)

Este libro de Heidi Morefield ofrece una revisión histórica crítica del concepto de “tecnología apropiada” en la salud global, mostrando cómo, lejos de ser neutral, ha estado profundamente atravesado por relaciones de poder, género y desigualdad. A partir de una investigación archivística exhaustiva y entrevistas en varios países, la autora desplaza el foco de las grandes instituciones hacia las personas que tomaron decisiones clave, revelando las ideologías y los intereses detrás de muchas intervenciones sanitarias. El libro demuestra cómo (...) la tecnología apropiada fue reinterpretada y utilizada de formas contradictorias, en ocasiones para justificar prácticas poco éticas sobre poblaciones vulnerables, especialmente mujeres. Aunque sólido y revelador, el libro deja abiertas preguntas actuales, como el papel de la inteligencia artificial en la salud global contemporánea. (shrink)

National and regional peasant movements during the 1970s and the 1980s struggling to créate a legal and productive space for peasant carved out by State intervention did provide a space within which communities as San Juan Nuevo could organize and regain same control over their forest resources. State policies and dramatic forestry subsequent reforms during the 90s were deadened by implementing forest supporting programs, such as the National Reforestation Program within the National Solidarity Program, which presumed to reshape both productive (...) and political relations in Mexico's forest dependent communities. Ultimately however, state institutions as well as International supporting agencies as the World Bank, despite the rhetorical commitment to peasant production and environmental issues, largely articúlate with private industrial interests and act as mechanisms that secured control over forest resources by external interests. San Juan forestry model, preferentially supported, provides a window for understanding how industrial interests, state practices and community strategies intersect. In fact it illuminates new clientelistic strategies embedded in forest policy and neo-liberal discourse more generally, ones in direct contradiction to the solidarity's democratic, neutral international agencies and state rhetoric. (shrink)

Analizamos dos momentos constitucionales en la obra de Juan Bautista Alberdi a partir de sus lecturas de Théodore Jouffroy y Benjamin Constant. En el primer caso, ponemos en relieve la concepción filosófico- moral del derecho así como el modelo de publicista que fue Jouffroy para el “joven” Alberdi de 1837. En el segundo, analizamos el modo en que, en 1852, adoptó la postura de Constant para pensar la autoridad política a partir de las diversas teorizaciones del “poder neutral” (...) plasmado en la figura presidencial de la Constitución Nacional de la República Argentina sancionada en 1853. (shrink)

Grosfoguel habla acerca de la colonialidad del poder y de la posibilidad de una política radical más allá de las políticas de la identidad y de la articulación de un discurso crítico que supere el nacionalismo y el colonialismo. Propone superar los paradigmas de la economía política y los estudios culturales. Parte del criterio que colonialidad y modernidad son dos caras de la misma moneda y sintetiza la crítica a la epistemología eurocéntrica hegemónica, que asume un punto de vista (...) universalista, neutral y objetivo. La solución a las desigualdades sociales globales requiere imaginar alternativas utópicas más allá del colonialismo y el nacionalismo, y de las formas de pensar binarias de los fundamentalismos eurocéntricos primermundistas y tercermundistas. Propone con Quijano la socialización del poder, y su aporte remite a un lenguaje crítico común descolonizador. (shrink)

Resumen Las tecnologías actuales no son neutrales. Reflejan las necesidades, perspectivas y experiencias de quienes las desarrollan. Estos sesgos han dado lugar a la creación de armas digitales como los deepfakes, una tecnología que, de manera desproporcionada, se utiliza en mujeres para crear contenido sexual. El presente estudio analiza el auge de aplicaciones deepfake en América Latina y el Caribe (ALAC), enfocándose en su disponibilidad, facilidad de uso y los riesgos que representan en contextos de desigualdad estructural y violencia digital (...) de género. Para ello, se realizó una recolección automatizada de datos mediante una API, identificando 105 aplicaciones deepfake disponibles a diciembre de 2024 en Google Play Store. Posteriormente, se llevó a cabo una evaluación fundamentada en dimensiones como año, alcance, diseño, accesibilidad, modelos de negocio y funcionalidades. Finalmente, se realizó un análisis crítico para comprender cómo estas herramientas configuran dinámicas de poder, perpetúan narrativas de cosificación y amplifican la violencia digital contra las mujeres. Los hallazgos evidencian un diseño intencionado que facilita la adopción de estas aplicaciones, eliminando barreras técnicas y normalizando la cosificación de los cuerpos de las mujeres, siendo el 89.5% de estas herramientas un potencial peligro para ellas. La investigación enfatiza la urgencia de cuestionar la supuesta neutralidad de estas tecnologías y la necesidad de repensar su desarrollo desde una perspectiva que contribuya a construir entornos digitales más seguros y respetuosos para todas las personas. Abstract Current technologies are not neutral; they reflect the needs, perspectives, and experiences of their developers. These biases have led to the creation of digital weapons like deepfakes, a technology that is disproportionately used against women to create sexual content. This study examines the rise of deepfake applications in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), focusing on their availability, ease of use, and the risks they pose in contexts of structural inequality and digital gender-based violence. To that end, an automated data collection was carried out using an API, identifying 105 deepfake applications available on the Google Play Store as of December 2024. Subsequently, an evaluation was conducted based on criteria such as year, scope, design, accessibility, business models, and functionalities. Finally, a critical analysis was performed to understand how these tools shape power dynamics, perpetuate objectification narratives, and amplify digital violence against women. The findings reveal an intentional design that facilitates the adoption of these applications, removing technical barriers and normalizing the objectification of women's bodies, with 89.5% of these tools posing a potential danger to them. The research emphasizes the urgency of questioning the supposed neutrality of these technologies and the need to rethink their development from a perspective that contributes to building safer and more respectful digital environments for everyone. (shrink)

Resumen: Este estudio refleja la necesidad de formar a los jóvenes universitarios de manera integral para responder a los nuevos retos que con la inteligencia artificial y las tecnologías se derivan. Es necesario un pensamiento crítico para su uso ético. El universitario debe buscar la verdad y hacerlo desde una razón ampliada con los distintos saberes. Los tres últimos papas han reflexionado sobre la necesidad de recuperar la auténtica misión de la Universidad y el Papa Francisco reflexiona sobre el uso (...) de la inteligencia artificial en la educación. Toda ciencia implícita o explícitamente ofrece un posicionamiento antropológico, epistemológico, de sentido y ético no neutral, la Universidad debe formar para respetar siempre la dignidad humana. Consideramos que la lectura de obras que provoquen, partiendo de lo cotidiano, abrirse al misterio es clave en el momento que estamos viviendo. Flannery O’Connor es una escritora que reúne un potencial extraordinario para formar a los jóvenes en valores, dotarles de un sólido pensamiento crítico y poder comprender que las tecnologías son herramientas al servicio del ser humano y no al revés. La necesidad de integrar, investigar y utilizar las TICs es todo un reto de nuestro tiempo al que la Universidad debe dar respuesta. Abstract: This study reflects the need to train young university students in a comprehensive manner to respond to the new challenges that arise from artificial intelligence and technologies. Critical thinking is necessary for their ethical use. The university student must search for the truth and do it from a reason expanded with different knowledge. The last three Popes have reflected on the need to recover the authentic mission of the University and Pope Francis reflects on the use of artificial intelligence in education. Every science implicitly or explicitly offers a non-neutral anthropological, epistemological, meaning and ethical positioning, the University must form to always respect human dignity. We consider that the reading of works that provoke, starting from the everyday, to open up to the mystery is key in the moment we are living. Flannery O'Connor is a writer who has an extraordinary potential to educate young people in values, to provide them with a solid critical thinking and to be able to understand that technologies are tools at the service of human beings and not the other way around. The need to integrate, research and use ICTs is a challenge of our time to which the University must respond. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo trata da análise crítica de Jürgen Habermas a respeito das consequências do modelo neoliberal de integração global via mercado, em especial o desequilíbrio entre política e mercado, o fim do compromisso com o Estado social e o déficit democrático no nível transnacional. Para o filósofo alemão, a concepção neoliberal de sociedade desestatizada do capitalismo global atinge o nexo entre Estado nacional, democracia e justiça social, marginalizando o Estado e a política, em favor da privatização dos serviços públicos (...) e sendo insensível às questões de justiça social, aos custos sociais do crescente aumento da pobreza, desigualdade e exclusão social, mesmo em países abastados da Europa e América do Norte. Ao deslocar o fiador da integração social para além das fronteiras nacionais, o capitalismo global foge ao controle estatal e esvazia o poder dos Estados nacionais, em termos de substância democrática e de política social, e gera um déficit de legitimação, ao transferir competências nacionais para agências ou organismos transnacionais, cuja legitimação não deriva da sociedade civil ou de uma esfera pública politicamente constituída. Em contrapartida, Habermas defende um poder democrático capaz de domesticar politicamente o mercado globalizado, reconstruir a democracia estatal-social num nível transnacional, em vista de uma ordem socialmente mais equilibrada, e compensar o déficit social e de legitimação democrática, no âmbito transnacional. Depois de recapitular alguns problemas que se solucionaram nas formas de Estado nacional, o artigo descreve como a globalização econômica afeta a soberania cultural, econômica, administrativa e jurídica, política, social e trabalhista dos Estados nacionais, e quais as possibilidades de reenquadrar politicamente os mercados, estendendo a democracia estatal para além das fronteiras nacionais. Com isso, quer-se mostrar que a obra de Habermas não é cega para a relação democracia-capitalismo, para os efeitos colaterais da “colonização da política pela economia”, para a influência corrosiva da economia capitalista na despolitização da esfera pública e da política.The article presents Jürgen Habermas critical analysis of the consequences of the neoliberal model of global market integration, in particular the imbalance between politics and market, the end of the commitment to the welfare state and the democratic deficit at the transnational level. For the German philosopher, the neoliberal conception of the privatized society of global capitalism undermine the nexus between national state, democracy and social justice, marginalizing the state and politics in favour of privatization of public services and being insensitive to questions of social justice, the costs increasing poverty, inequality and social exclusion, even in wealthy countries in Europe and North America. Moving the guarantor of social integration across national borders, global capitalism is beyond the state control and exhaust the power of national states in terms of democratic substance and social policy and creates a legitimacy deficit by transferring national powers to agencies or transnational corporations whose legitimacy does not derive from civil society or from a politically constituted public sphere. In contrast, Habermas advocates a democratic power able to politically neutralize the global market, rebuild the welfare-state democracy in a transnational level in view of a more socially balanced order, and compensate the social deficit and democratic legitimacy in the transnational order. After reviewing some problems that have been solved in national state forms, the article describes how economic globalization affects the cultural, economic, administrative, juridical, political, social and labor sovereignty of the national states, and what are the possibilities of politically reframing markets, extending welfare-estate democracy beyond national borders. In this way, we want to show that Habermas’ work is not blind to the relation between democracy and capitalism, to the collateral effects of the “colonization of politics by the economy”, to the corrosive influence of the capitalist economy on the depoliticization of the public sphere and politics. (shrink)

Resumen: Este trabajo muestra que el discurso fotográfico está en estrecha conexión con la historia e ideología jurídicas. Las cuestiones que atañen a qué es una imagen, la relación entre imagen fotográfica, verdad y objetividad, o el poder de construcción narrativa de la imagen atañen directamente al concepto de Derecho. Como una fotografía, el Derecho moderno nació con el mismo afán de verdad y fe absoluta en la ciencia. Bajo el velo de la neutralidad y objetividad, buscaba la seguridad (...) y control de las relaciones humanas, con la misma aspiración de poseer, cosificar y comercializar la naturaleza y lo humano. Como sucede con las primeras fotografías, el Estado y el Derecho modernos consiguieron acercarse supuestamente a la verdad al fundarse en lo empírico y también en lo espiritual, si bien una vez asentado el discurso narrativo burgués, con promesa de duración y permanencia, se olvidó el fundamento moral. Sin embargo, la otra faceta de la fotografía es subjetiva y creativa, y también lo es la del Derecho. Por eso, el Derecho no puede ser neutral. Muestra y genera un determinado discurso ideológico verosímil acerca de la forma de organización justa. Hablar del poder narrativo del Derecho, pone de manifiesto la capacidad jurídica de inventar la Justicia y, por tanto, sus peligros ideológicos y sus posibilidades emancipadoras. Abstract: This work shows that the photographic discourse is in close connection with the legal history and ideology. Questions that concern on what an image is, the relationship between photographic image, truth and objectivity, or the power of narrative construction of the image directly concern the concept of Law. Like a photograph, the Modern Law was born with the same zeal for truth and absolute faith in science. Under the veil of neutrality and objectivity, he sought the security and control of human relationships, with the same aspiration to possess, reify and commercialize Nature and Humanity. As it happens with the first photographs, the Modern State and Law managed to approach the truth by basing themselves on the empirical facts as well as on the spiritual ideas, although once the bourgeois narrative discourse was established, with promise of duration and permanence, the moral foundation was forgotten. However, the other facet of photography is subjective and creative, and so is that of Law. Therefore, the Law cannot be neutral. It shows and generates a certain credible ideological discourse about the form of just organization. Speaking of the narrative power of Law shows the legal capacity to invent Justice and, therefore, its ideological dangers and its emancipatory possibilities. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza algunos de los dilemas definitorios más relevantes del campo de la educación inclusiva. Sus desarrollos cognitivos actuales no son más que un peculiar sistema de ignorancia sancionada que opera con gran fuerza a través de la metáfora del engañador-engañado, es decir, una espacialidad argumentativa que nace engañada y que produce múltiples formas de engaño. Lo que conocemos como educación inclusiva no es más que una racionalidad que trabaja sin referencias objetivas sobre sí mismas. Lo cierto es (...) que la inclusión es un fenómeno dinámico y variable, cuyos significantes cambian, mutan y se transforman sistemáticamente de acuerdo con el contexto que dialoga. Es esto lo que permite sostener que la inclusión es un concepto maleta –esta metáfora nos informa cómo algo puede servir para múltiples cosas–, con usos y aplicaciones diferentes. Es un fenómeno y un cuerpo de conocimiento no fijo que, a partir de él, permite leer una multiplicidad de categorías teóricas y prácticas sociales. De ello se infiere que no estamos tratando con un cuerpo de conocimientos fijos. El conocimiento auténtico de la educación inclusiva ni su repertorio metodológico pueden escaparse de las relaciones de poder. Ambos están profundamente arraigados en aquello que se proponen comprender. Su conocimiento nunca es políticamente neutral. El trabajo concluye observando que una de las tensiones más relevantes que enfrenta la construcción epistemológica de la educación inclusiva consiste en aprender a utilizar en el trabajo empírico sus fundamentos cognitivos para evitar que su práctica no pueda defender las desigualdades sociales –estructurales y relaciones– que pretende comprender. Tomar la educación inclusiva como cualquier enfoque teórico que analiza problemas sociales puede incurrir en una praxis laxa que conduzca a la producción de más errores que respuestas. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se aborda el estudio del concepto de ‘sujeto constituyente’ y, más precisamente, la identificación y análisis de sus tres propiedades definitorias: la propia condición ‘constituyente’ y no ‘constituida’ del sujeto; la no-sujeción a deberes ni a límites jurídicos; y la autoatribución de una competencia normativa ‘originaria’. Partiendo de la premisa de que este concepto mantiene una relación necesaria con el concepto de ‘poder constituyente’, cada una de esas propiedades es estudiada bajo una perspectiva de análisis (...) centrada en el fenómeno de producción normativa ocasionado por la manifestación de dicho poder. Asimismo, en relación con cada propiedad analizada se identifican posibles argumentos en sentido contrario que problematizarían su postulación, y se ofrecen las correspondientes respuestas de cara a una labor de clarificación conceptual. Finalmente, se indican las razones que dan cuenta del carácter políticamente no comprometido de este presupuesto subjetivo del poder constituyente, bajo un punto de vista valorativamente neutral. (shrink)

El artículo se centra en los probables trasfondos socráticos de la teoría de la acción aristotélica. El autor argumenta que Aristóteles incorporó a su propia teoría de la acción los siguientes ingredientes, que son de carácter “socrático”: la tesis de que un agente siempre lleva a cabo una acción en vista del bien o, más bien, de lo que considera que es bueno; la opinión de que hay un momento cognitivo que es previo a la búsqueda de lo que uno (...) considera que es bueno, y la idea de que, para neutralizar “el poder de la apariencia” al intentar distinguir apropiadamente el bien aparente del real, el agente debe fortalecer o refinar sus capacidades cognitivas tanto como sus estados de carácter. This paper focuses on the probable Socratic backgrounds to Aristotle's theory of action. The author argues that Aristotle incorporated into his own theory of action the following ingredients, which are “Socratic” in character: the thesis that an agent always performs an action for the sake of the good or rather of what he or she considers to be good; the view that there is a cognitive moment which is previous to the search for what one regards to be good, and the idea that, in order to neutralize “the power of appearance” when attempting to properly distinguish the apparent from the real good, the agent should strengthen or refine his cognitive abilities as well as his states of character. (shrink)

From the traditional point of view, power and truth are not related. Since 20th century there has been a social and historical breach in conventional assumptions about the relationship between power and truth. On one hand, it is generally accepted that scientific facts are considered artificial, in the sense of being constructed. This assumption neither implied any kind of fraud nor did it mean that they could be created ex-nihilo. But the interpretation of Kuhn as well as the subsequent developments (...) of the Strong Programme, successfully postulates that truth is merely a social issue. Since then, it has been increasingly suspected that any objective or neutral description of society is too difficult, rendering it completely illusory. That is why it is necessary to ask again for the relation between the structures of truth and the social structures of power and what kind of impact they have on contemporary sociological theory. In this paper, it is given two examples of that kind of enterprise related to two major leading sociologists: Bourdieu and Giddens. Desde el punto de vista tradicional, no hay asociación entre poder y verdad. Pero desde el Siglo XX existió un quiebre social e histórico en las presuposiciones convencionales acerca de la relación entre poder y verdad. De un lado, en general se acepta que los hechos científicos son artificiales en el sentido que son construidos y se asume que esto no implica algún tipo de fraude ni significa que ellos son creados ex-nihilo. Pero la interpretación de Kuhn, así como también los desarrollos posteriores del Programa Fuerte, permite postular que la verdad es un asunto puramente social. Desde entonces, se ha sospechado cada vez más que cualquier descripción neutral u objetiva de la sociedad es tan difícil que llega a ser completamente ilusoria. Por eso, es necesario preguntarse nuevamente por la relación entre las estructuras de la verdad y las estructuras sociales del poder y qué tipo de impacto ellas tienen en la teoría sociológica contemporánea. En este trabajo, se discuten dos ejemplos de ese tipo de empeño, relacionado con las obras de los sociólogos Bourdieu y Giddens. (shrink)

Resumen (ES): El artículo rastrea las genealogías modernas de los conceptos de sonido, musicología y archivo para evaluar los fundamentos y límites de un posible catálogo de arte sonoro. Examina la definición científica del sonido desde el siglo XVIII, la institucionalización positivista de la musicología en torno a la partitura y la concepción del archivo como lugar de autoridad, memoria y poder a partir de Jacques Derrida. Al confrontar esas categorías con la fonografía, la improvisación, la performatividad y la (...) auralidad, sostiene que ningún catálogo puede ser neutral: debe hacer visibles sus condiciones ideológicas e institucionales, garantizar un acceso democrático y asumir su posible fracaso como forma de conocimiento orientada hacia el porvenir. -/- Abstract (EN): This article traces the modern genealogies of sound, musicology, and the archive in order to assess the foundations and limits of a possible sound-art catalogue. It examines the scientific definition of sound from the eighteenth century onwards, the positivist institutionalisation of musicology around the score, and the archive as a site of authority, memory, and power through Jacques Derrida. By confronting these categories with phonography, improvisation, performativity, and aurality, it argues that no catalogue can be neutral: it must expose its ideological and institutional conditions, secure democratic access, and accept its possible failure as a form of knowledge directed towards the future. (shrink)

Em conformidade com a questão do "sentido" ou da "abertura do ser", Heidegger reconheceu que a consciência moral abre ao Dasein o seu próprio ser, a "existência". Ela é um fenómeno "existencial", pois pertence às estruturas constitutivas da abertura ekstática do Dasein ao seu próprio ser. Fazendo irrupção no Dasein perdido no "ser impróprio (uneigentliches Sein)" da "gente", o apelo da consciência abre ao Dasein o seu próprio poder ser-no-mundo (a sua existência) como investido, também ele, de facticidade. Por (...) outras palavras, a dimensão da "gente" abre ao ser humano a partir da impotência do seu ser-lançado – o qual constitui o seu "estar-em-falta (Schuldigsein)" fundamental – o inevitável estar-em-falta do projecto do seu poder-estar-no-mundo. É aí que aparece o conceito existencial do ser-em-falta do Dasein, que ultrapassa todo o conceito ôntico-metafísico de "falta (Schuld)", reduzindo esta ao agir carente de realizar um valor. Na medida em que o Dasein está à escuta deste apelo e, libertando-se da esfera da "gente", projecta-se sobre o seu próprio poder-ser, a "abertura (Erschlossenheit)" do ser do Dasein modaliza-se em "resolução (Entschlossenheit)". E na medida em que ele se projecta mesmo até ao seu poder ser mais próprio (a morte), esta modaliza-se em "resolução anticipante (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit)". Esta última é então a abertura ou a "verdade (alétheia)" mais original do ser do Dasein. Deste modo, para a autora do artigo, a interpretação existencial do apelo da consciência constitui um prelúdio ao pensamento do ser como Ereignis do Heidegger tardio, segundo a qual a linguagem é constitutiva da abertura ou da "verdade (aletheia)" do próprio ser. /// In accordance with his question about the "sense," or "openness," of being, Heidegger acknowledged that moral conscience opens Dasein to its own being, i.e., "existence." Moral conscience is an "existential" phenomenon, belonging to the constitutive structures of Dasein's ecstatic openness to its very being. Breaking into Dasein, lost in "improper being-in-the-word (uneigenliches Sein)" of the neutral "one," the appeal, or call, of the conscience opens Dasein to what is indeed proper to it (eigenliches being-in-the-world)". It comes about from what Dasein has factually always been; it opens to its very power to be-in-the-world as also invested with facticity. Otherwise said, its openness stems from the non-power of its being-thrown, constituting its "being-in-fault (Schuldigsein)." It is precisely in this existential concept of Dasein's "being-in-fault" that surpasses all ontico-metaphysical concepts of "fault (Schuld)" which is finally reduced to an action incapable of realizing a value. To the extent that Dasein is attentively hearing this appeal, it frees itself from the "one," projecting itself onto its power-to-be, i.e., its openness to being (Erschlossenheit). Thus, Dasein adopts the mode of "resolution (Entschlossenheit)," which coincides with its most proper powerto-be, or death. The latter in turn adopts the mode of anticipatory resolution (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). This last is then the openness, or truth (aletheia), the most original of Dasein's being. So, the existential interpretation of the appeal of the conscience constitutes a prelude to the thought of being as Ereignis of the latter Heidegger, according to whom language is constitutive of the very opening, or truth, of being. (shrink)

Legitimidad política y neutralidad estatal puede ser considerado como un intento de responder a la pregunta que un defensor de una doctrina comprehensiva religiosa, filosófica o de la buena vida, podría realizarle a un Estado liberal: ¿por qué debo aceptar que las decisiones sobre políticas públicas se justifiquen por valores neutrales y no por los de la doctrina a la cual adhiero, los cuales considero como verdaderos y correctos? La importancia de una respuesta adecuada radica en que, de acuerdo con (...) Garreta Leclercq, uno de los principales objetivos del liberalismo contemporáneo, surgido a partir de la obra de John Rawls, consiste en brindar una conexión coherente entre tres ideas básicas: la de legitimidad política -según la cual los principios que guían el accionar estatal no deberían poder ser rechazados razonablemente por los ciudadanos razonables-, la de neutralidad de justificación -de acuerdo con la cual el Estado no debe apelar a la verdad de doctrinas comprehensivas para fundamentar su ejercicio del poder político - y la de persona razonable, es decir, un individuo que, por un lado, renuncia a usar el poder estatal para imponer su doctrina como verdadera y, por el otro, participa del esfuerzo cooperativo para alcanzar fundamentos políticos que sean independientes de la aceptación de una determinada doctrina comprehensiva. (shrink)

_English summary:_ The ethics of Knud E. Logstrup (1905-1981), the Danish theologian and philosopher, are among the most important ethical approaches of the 20th century. In the manner of H. Jonas and E. Levinas, his universalistic justification of ethics is embedded in the horizon of the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. Johann-Christian Poder explains the basic elements of Logstrup's ethical thinking and shows that Logstrup assumes that there is evidence of the ethical which constitutes humankind's relationship to himself and (...) the world. For him, the ethical is part of the ethical-ontological structure of human beings as homo moralis. From a theological perspective, this is the imperative and indicative presence of the creature-like destiny of human beings which is God's work. Logstrup's ethics are an impressive and provocative invitation to take the irreducible alienness of the ethical experience seriously._ German description:_ Die Ethik des danischen Theologen und Philosophen Knud E. Logstrup (1905-1981) gehort zu den grossen ethischen Ansatzen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Seine universalistische Ethikbegrundung steht - ahnlich H. Jonas und E. Levinas - im Horizont der von Husserl und Heidegger initiierten Phanomenologie. Johann-Christian Poder erschliesst die Grundelemente von Logstrups ethischem Denken und zeigt, wie Logstrup von einer das menschliche Selbst- und Weltverhaltnis konstitutiv charakterisierenden Evidenz des Ethischen ausgeht. Das Ethische gehort fur ihn zur ethisch-ontologischen Struktur des Menschen als _homo moralis_. In theologischer Perspektive handelt es sich dabei um die von Gott gewirkte imperative und indikative Prasenz der schopfungsmassigen Bestimmung des Menschen. Logstrups Ethik ist eine eindruckliche und denkerisch provokative Einladung, die nicht-reduzierbare Fremdheit der ethischen Erfahrung ernstzunehmen. (shrink)

Philosophical studies of complex scientific concepts are predominantly “adaptationist,” arguing that conceptual complexity serves important purposes. This is a historical artifact. Having had to defend their views against a monist presumption favoring simpler concepts, pluralists and patchwork theorists felt compelled to show that complexity can be beneficial. This neglects an alternative possibility: Conceptual complexity is largely neutral, persisting simply because it does little harm. This article defends the neutral theory of conceptual complexity in two forms: (a) as a (...) plausible theory in its own right and (b) as a useful foil for adaptationist arguments. (shrink)

Slurs have been standardly assumed to bear a very direct, very distinctive semantic relationship to what philosophers have called “neutral counterpart” terms. I argue that this is mistaken: the general relationship between paradigmatic slurs and their “neutral counterparts” should be assumed to be the same one that obtains between ‘chick flick’ and ‘romantic comedy’, as well a huge number of other more prosaic pairs of derogatory and “less derogatory” expressions. The most plausible general relationship between these latter expressions (...) — and thus, I argue, between paradigmatic slurs and “neutral counterpart” terms — is one of overlap in presumed extension, grounded in overlap in associated stereotypes. The resulting framework has the advantages of being simple, unified, and, unlike its orthodox rivals, neatly accommodating of a much wider range of data than has previously been considered. More importantly, it positions us to better understand, identify, and confront the insidious mechanisms of ordinary bigotry. (shrink)

It is commonly held that all deontological moral theories are agent-relative in the sense that they give each agent a special concern that she does not perform acts of a certain type rather than a general concern with the actions of all agents. Recently, Tom Dougherty has challenged this orthodoxy by arguing that agent-neutral deontology is possible. In this article I counter Dougherty's arguments and show that agent-neutral deontology is not possible.

Scientists often avoid theories that are not clearly superior to existing ones. We suggest instead that exploring a wide range of empirically indistinguishable (or even less empirically adequate) theories can support long-term scientific progress. This claim is inspired by an analogy with biological evolution, where many genetic changes are neutral, meaning they produce no observable differences in an organism’s phenotype and fitness. Such neutral variation arises because biological systems are robust to genetic change and it in turn enhances (...) a population’s capacity for innovation. Similar to how genetic changes that produce no observable phenotypic differences and no change in organism’s fitness can be central to the ability of a biological population to evolve, theories that produce no noticeable improvement at a given time may increase the innovative potential of science and improve scientists’ preparedness for future evidence. (shrink)

Free logics are a family of first-order logics which came about as a result of examining the existence assumptions of classical logic (Hintikka _The Journal of Philosophy_, _56_, 125–137 1959 ; Lambert _Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic_, _8_, 133–144 1967, 1997, 2001 ). What those assumptions are varies, but the central ones are that (i) the domain of interpretation is not empty, (ii) every name denotes exactly one object in the domain and (iii) the quantifiers have existential import. Free (...) logics reject the claim that names need to denote in (ii). _Positive_ free logic concedes that some atomic formulas containing non-denoting names (including self-identity) are true, _negative_ free logic treats them as uniformly false, and _neutral_ free logic as taking a third value. There has been a renewed interest in analyzing proof theory of free logic in recent years, based on intuitionistic logic in Maffezioli and Orlandelli (_Bulletin of the Section of Logic_, _48_(2), 137–158 2019 ) as well as classical logic in Pavlović and Gratzl (_Journal of Philosophical Logic_, _50_, 117–148 2021 ), there for the positive and negative variants. While the latter streamlines the presentation of free logics and offers a more unified approach to the variants under consideration, it does not cover neutral free logic, since there is some lack of both clear formal intuitions on the semantic status of formulas with empty names, as well as a satisfying account of the conditional in this context. We discuss extending the results to this third major variant of free logics. We present a series of G3 sequent calculi adapted from Fjellstad (_Studia Logica_, _105_(1), 93–119 2017, _Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics_, _30_(3), 272–289 2020 ), which possess all the desired structural properties of a good proof system, including admissibility of contraction and all versions of the cut rule. At the same time, we maintain the unified approach to free logics and moreover argue that greater clarity of intuitions is achieved once neutral free logic is conceptualized as consisting of two sub-varieties. (shrink)

While it is important to learn what is good and bad, can people learn what is neither? The answer to this question is not readily apparent, but it has important implications for how people learn affective responses. Six experiments examined whether evaluative conditioning (EC) can instill neutral affect. They tested four hypotheses: EC, in which novel conditioned stimuli (CSs) are paired with neutral unconditioned stimuli (USs) (1) creates neutral affect, (2) forms stronger experiences of neutrality when the (...) number of contingent CS-US pairings is high rather than low, (3) creates positive affect, due to mere exposure, and (4) forms responses that are distinct from no US pairings. Respondents rated how positive, negative, and neutral they felt about a CS before and after an EC task in which CSs were paired with USs (positive, negative, neutral, or no stimuli). The positive/negative US conditions increased/decreased positivity, decreased/increased negativity, and decreased neutrality ratings, respectively. Supporting hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, the neutral US, but not the no US, condition increased neutral evaluations when respondents experienced a high (vs. low) number of CS-US pairings. Hypothesis 3 was not supported. The results reveal that people learn not only valenced, but also neutral, preferences. (shrink)

Semantic externalism in the style of McDowell and Evans faces a puzzle formulated by Pryor: to explain that a sentence such as ‘Jack exists’ is only a posteriori knowable, despite being logically entailed by the seemingly logical truth ‘Jack is self-identical’, and hence being itself a logical truth and therefore a priori knowable. Free logics can dissolve the puzzle. Moreover, Pryor has argued that the existentially hedged ‘If Jack exists, then Jack is self-identical’, when properly formalised, is a logical truth (...) in a system of neutral free logic and therefore a priori knowable, while it does not entail that Jack exists. The latter holds also for negative free logic. In response, Yeakel has argued that on any system of neutral free logic existence hedges will either entail some unwanted existence claims or they will not entail some wanted existence claims. The dilemma also holds for any non-positive free logic. It will be shown that the extension of one of the systems of neutral free logic with a truth operator escapes Yeakel's dilemma, whereas no other non-positive free logic when extended with the truth operator does the same (or it breaks quantifier exchangeability). (shrink)

Recently, constructive neutral evolution has been touted as an important concept for the understanding of the emergence of cellular complexity. It has been invoked to help explain the development and retention of, amongst others, RNA splicing, RNA editing and ribosomal and mitochondrial respiratory chain complexity. The theory originated as a welcome explanation of isolated small scale cellular idiosyncrasies and as a reaction to ‘overselectionism’. Here I contend, that in its extended form, it has major conceptual problems, can not explain (...) observed patterns of complex processes, is too easily dismissive of alternative selectionist models, underestimates the creative force of complexity as such, and – if seen as a major evolutionary mechanism for all organisms – could stifle further thought regarding the evolution of highly complex biological processes. (shrink)

Back in 1982, when I started studying with Samuel Scheffler, a major subject of debate was whether – and, if so, exactly why and how – the existence of agent-relative reasons for action justifies making fundamental changes to consequentialist moral theory. How dramatically the tables have turned in the years since! Now the question tends to be whether – and, if so, exactly why and how – agent-neutral reasons for action can have a significant role to play in contractualist (...) moral theory. In the first half of this paper, I offer some arguments for thinking that agent-neutral reasons do exist and that they are more basic than reasons of other sorts. In the second half of the paper, I offer some arguments for thinking that such reasons, being more basic, must have a central role to play in contractualist moral theory. (shrink)

Metaphysics seeks an account of fundamental reality as it is independent of any observer or point of view. As such, one problem it faces is that any such account is necessarily created by some observer from some point of view. Does this mean that metaphysics is thereby inherently impossible? Or inherently incomplete? I argue that it is possible and it can aim at completeness, but it must acknowledge the contributions made by the human perspective on reality, human cognition, and features (...) of the conceptual and linguistic representations in which it is couched. The idea that we can discover metaphysical insights by investigating concepts and language has had a remarkably tenacious grip on the field of metaphysics. I offer a diagnosis of how this grip took hold and an argument that it should be loosened. I also propose a means of pursuing metaphysical investigation that does not rely on an enquiry into language and that can yield fruitful results. (shrink)

Previous studies on the effects of emotional context on memory for centrally presented neutral items have obtained inconsistent results. And in most of those studies subjects were asked to either make a connection between the item and the context at study or retrieve both the item and the context. When no response for the contexts is required, how emotional contexts influence memory for neutral items is still unclear. Thus, the present study attempted to investigate the influences of four (...) types of emotional picture contexts on recognition memory of neutral words using both behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) measurements. During study, words were superimposed centrally onto emotional contexts, and subjects were asked to just remember the words. During test, both studied and new words were presented without the emotional contexts and subjects had to make “old/new” judgments for those words. The results revealed that, compared with the neutral context, the negative contexts and positive high-arousing context impaired recognition of words. ERP results at encoding demonstrated that, compared with items presented in the neutral context, items in the positive and negative high-arousing contexts elicited more positive ERPs, which probably reflects an automatic process of attention capturing of high-arousing context as well as a conscious and effortful process of overcoming the interference of high-arousing context. During retrieval, significant FN400 old/new effects occurred in conditions of the negative low-arousing, positive, and neutral contexts but not in the negative high-arousing condition. Significant LPC old/new effects occurred in all conditions of context. However, the LPC old/new effect in the negative high-arousing condition was smaller than that in the positive high-arousing and low-arousing conditions. These results suggest that emotional context might influence both the familiarity and recollection processes. (shrink)

In 1945, the International Right regrouped, both internationally and within Europe. On the European level, two eminent Catholics—Archduke Otto von Habsburg, claimant to the Imperial throne of Austro-Hungary and Opus Dei’s candidate to rule over a united Catholic Europe, and future Franco minister and senior Opus Dei member Alfredo Sánchez Bella—founded CEDI (Centre Européen de Documentation et d’Information—European Documentation and Information Centre), a Madrid-based think tank which aimed to unite European conservative and Catholic political organizations and break the diplomatic isolation (...) of General Franco’s Spain. In 1952–1953, the Cercle Pinay was founded as a clandestine forum of European leaders who aimed to oppose the threat of communism and promote the vision of a Catholic and conservative Europe. In the 1960s, the neo-Fascist ‘Strategy of Tension’ emerged. In Britain, various individuals associated with the Conservative Monday Club were associate with sustained efforts to undermine Harold Wilson’s Labour Government (1974–1976), to discredit Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe (1967–1976), and to have Conservative leader Edward Heath (1965–1975) replaced by someone of a ‘more resolute approach.’ This chapter examines the role of (what was presented as) ‘neutral academic data’ on behalf of the ‘International Right.’. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Haoying Liu’s recent challenge to Russellian monism (RM), often understood as the view that (1) physics describes natural phenomena entirely in structural terms; (2) such phenomena possess intrinsic characters, or quiddities, that constitute or ground what physics describes structurally; and (3) phenomenal consciousness is constituted, at least in part, by such quiddities. Liu argues that RM’s appeal is undermined by the epistemic inaccessibility of quiddities and their combinatory principles, rendering it liable to a historical decline akin (...) to Thomistic hylomorphism. I contend that this critique overstates the degree of mystery inherent in RM. First, drawing on work by Torin Alter and Derk Pereboom (2023), I question whether RM is committed to the claim that physics captures only structural features of reality, thereby reopening the possibility that quiddities may be accessible to empirical or conceptual inquiry. Second, I situate RM within the neutral monist tradition that inspired it, showing how similar views in Ernst Mach and William James treat the fundamental constituents of reality as epistemically accessible. Finally, I revisit Bertrand Russell’s own formulation of neutral monism, arguing that it was intended primarily as a theoretical framework for situating mind and matter in nature rather than a discovery-oriented research program. These considerations suggest that Liu’s objection, while illuminating, does not decisively undermine RM’s philosophical viability. (shrink)

We examine the impact of Suzumura’s (Economica 43:381–390, 1976) consistency property when applied in the context of collective choice rules that are independent of irrelevant alternatives, neutral, and monotonic. An earlier contribution by Blau and Deb (Econometrica 45:871–879, 1977) establishes the existence of a vetoer if the collective relation is required to be complete and acyclical. The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibilities that result if completeness and acyclicity are dropped and Suzumura consistency is imposed instead. (...) A conceptually similar but logically independent version of the combined axiom that requires the collective decision mechanism to be independent, neutral, and monotonic is employed. In the case of a finite population, we obtain an alternative impossibility theorem if a collective choice rule is assumed to be non-degenerate and a modified no veto requirement is imposed instead of Blau and Deb’s (1977) condition. If the population is countably infinite, the impossibility can be avoided but it resurfaces if our new no veto property is extended to a coalitional variant. (shrink)

The racial wealth gap in the United States remains a persistent issue; white individuals possess six times more wealth than Black individuals. Leading scholars and public figures have pointed to slavery and post-slavery discrimination as root cause factors and called for reparations. Yet the institutionalization of race-neutral ideologies in policies and practices hinders a reparative approach to closing the racial wealth gap. This study models the use of algorithmic methods in the service of reparations to Black Americans in the (...) domain of housing, where most American wealth is built. We examine a hypothetical scenario for measuring the effectiveness of race-conscious Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCPs) in reducing the housing racial wealth gap compared to race-neutral SPCPs. We use a predictive model to show that race-conscious, people-based lending programs, if they were nationally available, would be two to three times more effective in closing the racial housing wealth gap than other, existing forms of SPCPs. In doing so, we also demonstrate the potential for using algorithms and computational methods to support outcomes aligned with movements for reparations, another possible meaning for the emerging discourse on “algorithmic reparations.”. (shrink)

The racial wealth gap in the United States remains a persistent issue; white individuals possess six times more wealth than Black individuals. Leading scholars and public figures have pointed to slavery and post-slavery discrimination as root cause factors and called for reparations. Yet the institutionalization of race-neutral ideologies in policies and practices hinders a reparative approach to closing the racial wealth gap. This study models the use of algorithmic methods in the service of reparations to Black Americans in the (...) domain of housing, where most American wealth is built. We examine a hypothetical scenario for measuring the effectiveness of race-conscious Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCPs) in reducing the housing racial wealth gap compared to race-neutral SPCPs. We use a predictive model to show that race-conscious, people-based lending programs, if they were nationally available, would be two to three times more effective in closing the racial housing wealth gap than other, existing forms of SPCPs. In doing so, we also demonstrate the potential for using algorithms and computational methods to support outcomes aligned with movements for reparations, another possible meaning for the emerging discourse on “algorithmic reparations.”. (shrink)

Ethics teachers are regularly confronted with disturbing cases brought in by medical students in class. These classes are considered confidential, so that everyone can speak freely about their experiences. But what should ethics teachers do when they hear about a situation they consider to be outright alarming, for example where patients/students’ safety is at stake or where systematic power abuse seems to be at hand? Should they remain neutral or should they step in and intervene? In the Netherlands, as (...) in many other countries, there are no clear guidelines for ethics teachers on how to respond. To get more insight into what teachers themselves think a proper response would be, we interviewed 18 Dutch medical ethics teachers. We found that Dutch ethics teachers will address the issue in class, but that they are overall reluctant to intervene; take action outside the scope of class. This reluctance is partly rooted in the conviction that ethicists should stay neutral and facilitate reflection, instead of telling students or physicians what to do. At the same time, this neutral position seems a difficult place to leave for those teachers who would want to or feel they need to. This has to do with various organizational and institutional constraints tied up with their position. The study invites medical ethics teachers to reflect on these constraints together and think about how to proceed from there. This study seeks to contribute to research on cultural change in medicine and medical students’ experiences of moral distress. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s writings on neutral monism continue to exercise a profound influence on much work on panpsychism. In fact, many interpret his neutral monism as ultimately constituting, entailing, or strongly suggesting some form of panpsychism. But the relationship between Russell’s theory and contemporary panpsychism is complicated. On one hand, his analysis of matter has a number of features that are congenial to panpsychism. On the other hand, his naturalistic analysis of mind is largely at odds with panpsychism. Though (...) Russell agrees that mental phenomena are likely present to some degree wherever there is biological life, he takes the overall evidence to suggest that mind and experience are neither ubiquitous nor fundamental features of the natural world. (shrink)

When translating phantasia as ‘imagination’, one commits a dangerous anachronism: interpreting the Greek concept from the vantage point of a modern, post-Kantian framework which sees imagination as a faculty mediating between sensibility and reasoning. A close reading of the Aristotelian sources shows why phantasia cannot be identifi ed as a distinct faculty, but rather designates a transversal power common to all psychic acts. The article argues that a more adequate translation of phantasia would be ‘visualization’.