The COVID-19 pandemic has spread to the whole world, including Indonesia. People have made various efforts to overcome this outbreak. One of them is through local wisdom, such as in Cirebon-Indonesia. Cirebon people carry out the Azan Pitu ritual to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic that has spread in Cirebon. This study aims to explore the local knowledge system or local wisdom regarding Azan Pitu in overcoming the COVID-19 outbreak. The method used in this research is a qualitative method with observation (...) and in-depth interviews for collecting data. In the analysis process, this study uses Victor Turner’s ritual theory and Bronislaw Malinowski’s functional analysis theory. The study’s results found that people first performed the Azan Pitu ritual to overcome the outbreak of menjangan wulung during the Sunan Gunung Djati era. However, Cirebon people maintain it as a tradition to prevent disease outbreaks, including during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Azan Pitu ritual to ward off COVID-19 has changed form and function, but it does not diminish its essential meaning: the community’s efforts to expel COVID-19. Contribution: This study contributes to broadening insights into ritual studies, especially those related to epidemics and disasters. (shrink)

Cet article propose une contribution théorique afin de penser la paix dans le champ de l’économie. Nous mettons en exergue que les conditions de pacification des relations socio-économiques demeurent en partie impensée par la discipline économique qui a pourtant consacré une part de ses analyses à la question de l’harmonie sociale. Codes JEL : A1, B13, B15, N01.

Au cours des quatre derniers siècles, les projets de pacification permanente de l’Europe, ou du monde entier, ont constitué un véritable genre littéraire. À un premier niveau, le plus superficiel, le livre offre une vue panoramique de ces projets, depuis le « Grand Dessein » attribué à Henri IV jusqu’à la Charte de l’ONU, en passant par les propositions de William Penn, de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre, d’Emmanuel Kant, du comte de Saint-Simon et de tant d’autres, célèbres, moins connus ou (...) oubliés. De règle, ces auteurs sont qualifiés, non sans condescendance, d’utopistes : à un deuxième niveau, le livre est une critique de cet usage paresseux, et les traite comme membres de la famille des réformateurs radicaux. Ayant dressé, chacun à son époque, un réquisitoire sans indulgence contre l’état existant des rapports entre les nations, ils en proposent une réorganisation profonde. Ennemis de l’ordre international établi - un désordre intolérable à leurs yeux -, ils se font les architectes d’un monde nouveau, le meilleur des mondes possibles, dont ils précisent le mode de construction. Si différents soient-ils, leurs écrits se prêtent à être classifiés en un petit nombre de catégories : à un troisième niveau, le livre est un essai typologique. Il suggère une conceptualisation du « système international parfait » qui comporte cinq grands modèles et permet donc de répartir l’ensemble des auteurs passés en revue dans cinq traditions intellectuelles, dont la plus récente est longue de deux siècles et la plus ancienne de sept. (shrink)

The Complexo do Alemão, a group of 12 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, attracted the attention of Brazilian and International corporate media when the police and the army ‘pacified’ the favelas in 2010. Part of a broader political and economic project to make Rio de Janeiro ‘safe for large-scale events, pacification consists of seizing back territories from the control of drug dealers by installing permanent police units. This paper focuses on how different discourses on the ‘pacification’ of the (...) Alemão simultaneously entextualized and projected trajectories of reception, interpellation and agency. It also delineates different and competing communicable maps of these trajectories of signs. While looking at ethnographic evidence from local reception of mediatized signs and people’s own communicable maps, it draws attention to major gaps in communicable constructions of pacification, thus attempting to accentuate some complexities of Rio’s mainstream pragmatics of circulation. (shrink)

In a world riven with conflict, violence and war, this book proposes a philosophical defense of pacifism. It argues that there is a moral presumption against war and unless that presumption is defeated, war is unjustified. Leading philosopher of non-violence Robert Holmes contends that neither just war theory nor the rationales for recent wars defeat that presumption, hence that war in the modern world is morally unjustified. A detailed, comprehensive and elegantly argued text which guides both students and scholars through (...) the main debates clearly but without oversimplifying the complexities of the issues or historical examples. (shrink)

This essay distinguishes two main forms of pacifism, personal pacifism and political pacifism. It then contrasts the views on self-defense of political pacifism and just war theory, paying special attention to notions of the state and sovereignty.

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but rather often about factual questions as well—as seen when looking at the controversy surrounding the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not surprising since the pacifist,legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of an alternative value system, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters (...) never ceases, as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue.In my view, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality implicitly obeys three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from the other point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Hone your senses to the uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly to the danger of military escalation leading to another world war"). Objective reality has no way of telling us how far we should go in following these imperatives. Rather, we have to make the decision about how far we are going to take them ourselves. In this way, the pacifist's epistemic imperatives are comparable to Kant's regulative principles. (shrink)

There is a nonabsolute or “contingent” form of pacifism that claims that war in contemporary conditions inevitably involves the killing of innocent people on a scale that is too great to be justified. Some contingent pacifists argue that war always involves a risk that virtually everyone that one might kill is innocent – either because one can never be sure that one’s cause is just or because even most of those who fight in wars that lack a just cause are (...) nevertheless not culpable and are therefore innocent in the relevant sense. Others argue that there is no just cause for war that is sufficiently important to justify the large-scale killing of innocent civilians that is unavoidable in war. I seek to refute contingent pacifism by arguing that its theoretical presuppositions are untenable. (shrink)

Conditional pacifism is the view that war is morally justified if and only if it satisfies the condition of not causing serious harm or death to innocent persons. Modern war cannot satisfy this condition, and is thus always unjustified. The main response to this position is that the moral presumption against harming or killing innocents is overridden in certain cases by the moral presumption against allowing innocents to be harmed or killed. That is, as harmful as modern war is, it (...) can be morally justified as a lesser evil when it alone can prevent great harm to innocents. This paper proposes that extreme cases in which only war can prevent great harm to innocents may be morally tragic. In some cases it may be both wrong to wage war to prevent great harm and wrong to fail to prevent that great harm. (shrink)

In this paper, I counter arguments to the effect that pacifism must be irrational which cite hypothetical situations in which violence is necessary to prevent a far greater evil. I argue that for persons similar to myself, for whom such scenarios are extremely unlikely, promoting in oneself the disposition to avoid violence in any circumstances is more likely to lead to better results than not cultivating such a disposition just for the sake of such unlikely eventualities.

In this, the first major philosophical study of contingent pacifism, Larry May offers a new account of pacifism from within the Just War tradition. Written in a non-technical style, the book features real-life examples from contemporary wars and applies a variety of approaches ranging from traditional pacifism and human rights to international law and conscientious objection. May considers a variety of thinkers and theories, including Hugo Grotius, Kant, Socrates, Seneca on restraint, Tertullian on moral purity, Erasmus's arguments against just war, (...) and Hobbes's conception of public conscience. The guiding idea is that the possibility of a just war is conceded, but not at the current time or in the foreseeable future due to the nature of contemporary armed conflict and geopolitics - wars in the past are also unlikely to have been just wars. This volume will interest scholars and upper-level students of political philosophy, philosophy of law, and war studies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Through a brief analysis of the reflections of some prestigious contemporary philosophers such as Norberto Bobbio, Mulford Quickert Sibley, Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, Michael Allen Fox, David Cortright, Larry May, John Rawls, Eric Reitan, Johan Galtung and David Boersema, this essay reconstructs Russell's pacifist commitment during the First World War. This dramatic event represented a real watershed for his multifaceted and ingenious personality, leading to his new political and civil commitment. Through a series of articles and lectures, he fought against (...) militarism, was in favour of a world government and underlined the psychological causes of war (the difference between ‘creative’ and ‘possessive’ impulses). All this coincided in part with the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the ideas of which he initially shared; at the time of the Leeds Convention (1917), he believed that the March revolution would involve a complete political and economic change at the international level by removing the causes of war. It was not by chance that he decided to join the Independent Labour Party, a choice that marked his separation from the Liberals. Although the latter explored in depth different forms of pacifism, Russell implicitly recalled the formula ‘Pax enim non belli privatio’ by Baruch Spinoza, supporting a fundamental paradigm of the modern political theory. (shrink)

Of all the attitudes and theories associated with or identified as "pacifism," only the doctrine that everyone ought not to resist violence with force is of philosophical interest, And it is logically incoherent. Pacifism's popularity rests on confusions about what the doctrine really is. If we have rights, We have the right to prevent infringements upon them. We have the right to use force to protect our rights, And in the degree necessary to accomplish that end. (staff).

It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept (...) of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars. (shrink)

In this chapter, I introduce a novel conception of pacifism. This conception arises out of considering two key insights drawn from Cheyney Ryan’s work, specifically his characterization of the ‘pacifist impulse’ as a felt rejection of killing and his analysis of contemporary Western attitudes to war and methods of fighting, as reflecting a condition of alienated war. I expand on these claims and argue that considering them together reveals an important problem for pacifism. Specifically, the alienated condition of contemporary violence (...) renders the pacifist impulse impotent with respect to its usual function, i.e. to inhibit violence. In response, I propose re-conceiving of pacifism: Building on the Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation and re-appropriation, I describe this proposed alternative view of pacifism as re-appropriated violence. (shrink)

'What is called the utopian dream of pacifism is in fact a practical policy - indeed the only practical, the only realistic policy that there is.' Aldous Huxley. Over 50 years and 100 million war-related deaths later, and with the world in turmoil, the truth of Huxley's views is felt by more and more people. -/- But pacifism continues to be ill understood, a problem to which pacifists themselves sometimes contribute. The title of Huxley's classic book, Ends and Means, in (...) a sense, describes the core of pacifism; the essay from which the title of this pamphlet is taken rehearses that debate and asks 'Can good ends be achieved by bad means?' Can, for example, the death of children, surely the most innocent of victims and amongst the most common casualties in any war, be justified on any grounds? This is a challenge to the apologists of war who claim it a moral means to an end. But the rhetoric of war, as indeed the apparent imperative to prepare for war, with all the jobs and family comforts that making and selling guns and bullets provide, crowds out this simple question, lest we are discomfited by our answer. -/- Huxley's views are as pertinent and challenging today as the day they were written - and perhaps more urgent. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the consolidation of the US colonial rule, continuing the pattern of using ruse and force against the Filipino resistance fighters but especially against the Muslims of Moroland. Throughout the process of counterinsurgency, application of ruthless violence—noted by San Juan, recalling Mark Twain’s satirical essay as among the most brutal in all of the colonial world—has been methodical, remorseless, and justified by the belief in a racial hierarchy wherein the Filipinos, including the Moros, were deemed as savages, incapable (...) of self-government, and in need of “civilization.” Notes from San Juan indicate that the US acquisition of the Philippines, far from being benign, has actually sprung from the imperative of capital accumulation, and that colonial policies have set the stage for a clientelist Philippine–US relations, the continuing conflict in Moroland, and the diaspora under the neoliberal division of labor designed to extract surplus value from former colonies through unequal exchange. (shrink)

The article questions concepts of ‘democratic peace’ that presuppose an intrinsic relation between pacifism and democracy. This view lacks from both, empirical evidence and historical insight. Instead, pacifism as political and personal virtue can be better linked to the Deweyan idea of democracy as the basic way of life, that is, mutual cooperation and self-realisation. But not only pacifism but also warfare and aggressive conduct often are rooted and result in an ethos of solidarity and cooperation. Therefore, the task for (...) any realistic concept of democratic pacifism is at least two-fold: finding ‘moral equivalents’ (W. James) to war and cultivating an ethos of self-criticism and self-restraint as already the Old Testament’s prophets have proclaimed. (shrink)

This article seeks to consider the policing of anti-fracking protests at Barton Moss, Salford, from November 2013 to April 2014. We argue that women at Barton Moss were considered by the police to be transgressing the socio-geographical boundaries that establish the dominant cultural and social order, and were thus responded to as disruptive and disorderly subjects. The article draws upon recent work on pacification, which views police power as having both destructive and productive dimensions, to consider the impact of (...) police violence on women involved in protest. We seek to explore the ways in which this violence impacts not only on those involved in protest but also those on the peripheries. The article suggests that the threat and use of sexual violence by police towards women aims to enforce compliance within the protest movement and to send a message, specifically to those on the fringes of the movement, that protest is illegitimate and inherently dangerous. As such, sexual violence forms part of the social production and construction of gender and is instrumental in the making and remaking of subjectivities. The case study suggests that police brutality towards women at Barton Moss, therefore, operated as a disciplinary function to regulate acceptable forms of protest and acceptable forms of femininity. (shrink)

This anthology explores the many and varied connections between pacifism, politics, and feminism. Each topic is often thought about in academic isolation; however, when we consider how they intersect and interact, it opens up new areas for discussion and analysis.

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well (as is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the crisis in Kosovo in 1999). According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not surprising, since the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of values. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of an alternative value system. And the quarrel between the two parties about (...) supposedly descriptive matters never ceases, as there is no objective reality that could settle the issue. The pacifist’s value-laden perspective on reality is informed by Christian charity and humility: a specific mixture of optimism (about human nature) and pessimism (about human powers). (shrink)

This paper expands Prasenjit Duara’s proposal that Asian religions and philosophies offer hope for a sustainable future. After outlining Duara’s sociology of history that describes the crisis of global modernity in terms of three global changes, namely the rise of non-western nations, the crisis of climate change, and the decline of religious or transcendent sources of authority, Duara proposes that grassroots organizations coupled with Asian religious and philosophical beliefs and practices offer different ways of understanding the relationship between the person (...) and the environment, and between our universal-planetary interests and our national interests. Drawing from Asian and Pacific indigenous teachings, I propose a type of depth ecology called “existential parity” that all things and creatures have value, generating a moral corollary called the “existential commitment” that humans take responsibility for the environment and each other. The existential commitment offers an environmental ethics that promotes sustainable agriculture to feed the world’s population. Pacific agroforestry practices can be implemented in urban settings to help mitigate climate change and food shortages. -/- Keywords: depth ecology, agroforestry, Asia Pacific, food ethics, sustainable future. (shrink)

Interest in pacifism—an idea with a long history in philosophical thought and in several religious traditions—is growing. The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence is the first comprehensive reference designed to introduce newcomers and researchers to the many varieties of pacifism and nonviolence, to their history and philosophy, and to pacifism’s most serious critiques. The volume offers 32 brand new chapters from the world’s leading experts across a diverse range of fields, who together provide a broad discussion of pacifism and (...) nonviolence in connection with virtue ethics, capital punishment, animal ethics, ecology, queer theory, and feminism, among other areas. This Handbook is divided into four sections: (1) Historical and Tradition-Specific Considerations, (2) Conceptual and Moral Considerations, (3) Social and Political Considerations, and (4) Applications. It concludes with an Afterword by James Lawson, one of the icons of the nonviolent American Civil Rights movement. The text will be invaluable to scholars and students, as well as to activists and general readers interested in peace, nonviolence, and critical perspectives on war and violence. (shrink)

"Responding to the unprecedented violence of our times, and the corresponding interest in nonviolent solutions, this book takes up the heart of pacifism: its critique of what pacifists have termed the war system. Pacifism as War Abolitionism provides an account of the war system that draws on contemporary sociology, history, and political philosophy. The core of its critique of that system is that war begets war, and hence war will not be ended--or even constrained--by finding more principled ways to fight (...) war, as many imagine. War can only be ended by ending the war system, which can only be done nonviolently. This has been the message of pacifism's great voices like Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Dorothy Day. It is the principal message of this book. Key Features: Draws extensively on the sociological and historical research on war to expand the usual philosophical discussion beyond hypothetical accounts ; Expands the dialogues on the ethics of war beyond just war theory to its principal alternative: pacifism ; Engages discussion of empire and imperialism in relation to the logic and development of the war system ; Presents pacifism's response to the reality of war today, including the idea of 'never-ending war"--. (shrink)

This article formulates a critical response to Professor Jacek Hołówka’s opinion on (the philosophical debate about) the morality of war. It is claimed that by rejecting the plausibility of any argument justifying the occasional permissibility of military action. Hołówka finds it difficult to avoid (tacitly) endorsing some form of pacifism. In its radical version – presumably most closely matching Hołówka’s apparent position on war ethics – pacifism is shown to be completely unsupported by any serious social or political theory. More (...) extensive analysis is focused on a compromise version of pacifism proposed recently by David Rodin. Described as “the middle ground between pacifism and just war theory,” Rodin’s proposal permits military resistance to genocidal violence while banning all other types of war, specifically defensive wars waged by invaded states. As closer scrutiny indicates, the view is based on faulty analogies, it disregards the reasonably expected increase in human rights abuses following most invasions, and it underestimates the natural inclinations of some aggressor states to embrace murderous methods of subjugating the populations of the annexed territories. What is more, the limited pacifism Rodin promotes is bound to effectively incapacitate sovereign states even when they confront unquestionably genocidal aggression (in most cases preceded by a purely political “takeover” of the attacked country). This paper concludes by endorsing the states’ traditional right to self-defence: granted only to “minimally just societies,” it turns out to be the most credible safeguard against conventional military aggression and its possible calamitous escalations – the threat of the latter being all too often grossly underrated by pacifists. ----------------------------------------- Received: 31/05/2024. Reviewed: 10/09/2024. Accepted: 27/09/2024. (shrink)

This article seeks to expose some of the implications of certain versions of pacifism for matters of criminal punishment, arguing that the plausibility of these versions of pacifism depend on the extent to which their implicit denials of certain central punishment-related concepts are themselves reasonable.

Education – typically and rightly held to be an incontrovertible good – has for some time now been dominated by mass formal schooling systems. These systems routinely harm and oppress many students. I argue that they do so impermissibly, and I call this stance “educational pacifism”. I propose that Maria Montessori’s views on mass formal schooling systems broadly align with educational pacifism and that, therefore, she can be considered an educational pacifist. Finally, I claim that contemporary Montessorians ought to be (...) educational pacifists, firstly because educational pacifism makes a compelling moral argument and secondly because Montessori herself agrees with it. (shrink)

Philosophical pacifism is an inquiry and research agenda that begins from the presumption that war is wrong and which seeks to imagine a more peaceful and less violent future. This article proposes five key questions that serve to elucidate the complexity of philosophical pacifism, helping to distinguish it from a simplistic and dogmatic opposition to war. The key questions are: Who has an obligation to be peaceful or nonviolent? To whom is pacifism addressed? When (or in what circumstances) is nonviolence (...) required? What kinds of nonviolence should be employed? And in what manner and to what degree is the commitment to nonviolence supposed to be manifest? These kinds of questions are implicit in the philosophical literature on pacifism; they can be summarized in the question: “Whose pacifism, which nonviolence?” Guided by such questions, and enriched by analogies with feminist theory, philosophical pacifism offers a more useful critical social and political theory than the just war tradition, especially in our endeavor to achieve what Kant called “a perpetual peace.”. (shrink)

Mainstreaming Pacifism: Conflict, Success, and Ethics covers the history of philosophy concerning successful political means, and proposes an original interpretation of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Marx and Gandhi. The book counters the objection that pacifism is ineffective, and proposes that pacifism is not for a sect, but rather draws its most effective strategies from, and contributes them to, the mainstream political tradition.

The just war tradition began life, primarily in the writings of Augustine and other Church Fathers, as a reaction to pacifism. In my view, contemporary just war adherents should also see pacifism as their main rival. The key question of the just war tradition is how to justify war, given that war involves intentionally attacking or killing innocent people. And this justificatory enterprise is not an easy one. Today some theorists argue that some, but not all, soldiers are liable to (...) be attacked, especially those who fight in an unjust war. In this view, some of those who fight and kill in unjust wars should not be excused for following orders or even for their ignorance. Yet, it is often hard to tell if one is fighting in an unjust war, or whether military orders are unjust. I will argue that, especially in light of new work by just war adherents, the moral risks of participating in war are so high that pacifism, at least in its contingent form, should be seen as a reasonable option. The new versions of the just war doctrine bring us much closer to pacifism than their adherents would admit. (shrink)

Pacifism involves a number of related moral positions, endorsed for different reasons, often evoking powerful emotional responses. To understand pacifism, we need to identify what pacifism is, or what pacifisms there are, by (1) looking at pacifism's core meaning, etymology, uses, near neighbors, and relationship to just war theory; (2) distinguishing absolute versus contingent pacifism; (3) categorizing pacifism's chief motivators such as nonviolence, nonkilling, moral autonomy, libertarianism, nuclear war, and religious teachings; (4) highlighting pacifism's role in international relations in the (...) United Nations, pacifist nations, the human rights debate, and legal standing as conscientious objectors; and (5) articulating and responding to pacifism's perennial criticisms. (shrink)

In the literature, the Rule of Law (ROL) is mainly explained, and its value justified, by reference to its support for a liberal conception of human agency. As such, the connection between the ROL and legitimacy is normally considered contingent if the conception of the ROL is thin. It can be rendered necessary, it seems, only by a substantive conception that incorporates other political ideals, notably democracy. Without recourse to such a move, this article defends a necessary ROL-legitimacy connection by (...) exploring the ROL’s contribution to the task of pacification, which, I argue, is inherent in the claim of legitimacy. My interpretation re-orients the ROL’s foundational value from the liberal conception of human agency to politically inspired fear and summa mala. The paradigmatic shift is in line with the realism approach to political theory which derives and explains moral claims in political theories from considerations of basic political necessity. (shrink)

Anti-war pacifism eschews modern war as a means of attaining peace. It holds war to be not only evil and supremely harmful, but also, on balance, morally wrong. But what about force short of war? The aim of this paper is to analyse targeted killing, a specific form of force short of war, from an anti-war pacifist perspective, or, more specifically, from two related but distinct pacifist perspectives: conditional and contingent. Conditional pacifism deems war to be unjustified if the condition (...) that innocent persons are killed in war is satisfied. Since this condition is always fulfilled, conditional pacifism implies the impermissibility of modern war. Contingent pacifism concedes that war would be morally acceptable if its harms were sufficiently outweighed by its benefits, but maintains that no (or very few) wars meet this criterion. The empirical reality of war is such that it cannot be justified, because it harms too many innocents in proportion to the harm it prevents. Pacifists’ treatment of targeted killing short of war should thus concentrate on the harm it does to innocents. Conditional pacifists should focus on whether targeted killing kills innocents, while contingent pacifists should focus on whether the harm it does to innocents is disproportionate to its benefits. (shrink)

Moral philosophers generally regard pacifism with disdain. Forty years ago, Jan Narveson called it a "bizarre and vaguely ludicrous" doctrine, and that assessment is, in some form or other, still common today. Few contemporary ethicists self-identify as pacifists, and in peace and war studies, just war theory is now the standard. That standard perpetuates the stereotype of pacifism as naïve and wrongheaded. The only way to make nonviolent commitments respectable under the prevailing view is by subsuming them under just war (...) logic, as in John Lango's recent appeal for nonviolent interventionism. In brief, just war theory dominates the discourse. What makes this dominance problematic is that just war theory systematically misconstrues and caricatures the pacifist position. Pacifist commitments can only be properly understood when the lenses of just war theory are put aside. Only then is it possible to understand why pacifism appears ridiculous in the literature. Straw men usually do. (shrink)

Cheyney Ryan characterizes anti-war pacifism as a position that is fundamentally opposed to war. He distinguishes two types of pacifism: political and personal. As Ryan points out, these types overlap in their opposition to war, yet differ in their logic - in their reasons for being opposed to war. Political pacifism opposes war as a matter of policy (war as a social practice), while personal pacifism opposes killing as an act and thereby opposes war as instances of killing. After explaining (...) how both types are unconditionally and absolutely opposed to war, he proceeds to discuss each type in detail. Personal pacifism raises questions about its rationality and its role in politics. Political pacifism brings to light two dimensions of the so-called war system - war-making (battle in war) and war-building (mobilizing resources for battle). Specifically, this type of pacifism objects to war-making for its inhumanity and injustice, as well as the injustices involved in the process of war-building. Ryan concludes his essay with remarks about the conflicts between the just-war theory approach to war and pacifism. To move forward in addressing these conflicts, Ryan proposes that we need a "critical war theory", an interdisciplinary study of war that does not prejudge whether war is justified. (shrink)

I argue there is no pacifist commitment implied by the practice of mothering, contrary to what Ruddick suggests. Using violence in certain situations is consistent with the goals of this practice. Furthermore, I use Ruddick's valuable analysis of the care for particular individuals involved in this practice to show why pacifism may be incompatible with caring passionately for individuals. If giving up passionate attachments to individuals is necessary for pacifist commitment as Ghandi claims, then the price is too high.

Pacifists imagine a “great peace,” to borrow a phrase from Martin Buber. This great peace will uphold justice and respect for humanity. It will not efface difference or negate liberty and identity. The great peace will be a space in which genuine dialogue can flourish—in which we can encounter one another as persons, listen to one another, embrace our common humanity, and acknowledge our differences. The great peace is much more than the absence of war. It is holistic, organic, dialogical, (...) and thick with human relation.The dream of the great peace runs aground on the reality of petty conflicts, dehumanizing institutions, selfishness, egoism, arrogance, murder, war, and psychopathology. While ordinary selfishness poses a mundane obstacle to the great peace, genocide appears to create a reductio ad absurdum argument against the dream of the great peace and against pacifism itself. Critics will argue that in extremis a pacifist would be either mad or immoral to remain committed to nonviolence. This idea has been explored by a number of critics who argue that pacifism is primarily for dreamers and idealists, who are not willing to do what is necessary to confront evil and atrocity in the real world.This paper argues that a moderate commitment to pacifism and nonviolence remains plausible despite the atrocity objection. Some may argue that the term “pacifism” is not applicable to a position that admits that there are exceptional cases in which violence can be justified. But as I have argued elsewhere, there are varieties of pacifism (Fiala, 2004; 2008; 2014a; 2014b). The type of pacifism described here is transformational or transformative pacifism. Transformational pacifism is not absolutist in its rejection of violence, even though it offers a comprehensive critique of violence that aims at creating the great peace by changing the way we think and talk about war, violence, and peace itself. Martin Buber is a good example of a transformational pacifist. He admitted that some form of violence could be justified (say, in response to the Holocaust). But his goal was not to justify violence—rather, he wanted to transform the world in order to prepare the way for the great peace. One important consideration here is that Buber is not primarily a political thinker or an applied ethicist: rather, he offers a metaphysical, religious, psychological, and cultural theory. Transformative pacifism is located at that higher level. It idealizes, speculates, and imagines. For this reason, critics might condemn it as utopian. But trans-formative pacifism remains inspiring and useful. (shrink)

The spread of formal constitutions during the last two and a half centuries worldwide is closely associated with the fact that armed conflict between (national) states has receded and that within each state, or at least in many of them, socioeconomic and cultural dynamics more conducive (in comparison to pre-modern times) to a peaceful resolution of political disputes have emerged. Vice versa, constitutions typically aim to contribute to a further internal pacification of a given human society and their ultimate (...) measure of success is the degree of their contribution towards that end. A formal constitution is a sort of a civil peace (in contrast to civil war) agreement between the various political forces or groups of a given human society, insofar as its drafting procedure was inclusive or, alternatively, as far as those forces have ex post facto accepted the constitutionally foreseen roadmap for political decision-making. Thus, pacification and constitutionalism are positively correlated and there is a partial mutual causation linking them. (shrink)

To continue the project of explicating Pacific values and worldviews, this paper focuses on correlative thinking in some of the cultural philosophies of the Pacific islands, especially Micronesia. Correlative thinking differs, in degree, from scientific and academic logic that emphasize the truth-value of statements. After examining aspects of correlative thinking in Bali and the Philippines, I extract some characteristics of Pacific philosophies from cultural practices, myths, and beliefs. Unlike William Alkire (Alkire, 1972), I find that Pacific islanders use correlative thinking, (...) not dualism, to fill their canoes and baskets of wisdom, so that they can navigate between contemporary logic or scientific thinking, and their cultural knowledge systems and ways of reasoning. (shrink)