In this article, I argue that modern spacetime physics causes problems for a number of traditional accounts of modality, but also offers important new ideas about the connection between modal and non-modal features of reality. I suggest that recent work on relational observables in general relativity and quantum gravity can help us understand how non-modal features of reality could arise from modal features of reality within some form of modal ontic structural realism. In particular, I argue that the notion of (...) an ‘internal view,’ as employed in the partial/complete observables formalism and the quantum reference frame formalism, is an important conceptual insight which can help address outstanding problems in the philosophy of lawhood and modality. (shrink)

Observability is a modelling property that describes the possibility of inferring the internal state of a system from observations of its output. A related property, structural identifiability, refers to the theoretical possibility of determining the parameter values from the output. In fact, structural identifiability becomes a particular case of observability if the parameters are considered as constant state variables. It is possible to simultaneously analyse the observability and structural identifiability of a model using the conceptual tools of differential geometry. Many (...) complex biological processes can be described by systems of nonlinear ordinary differential equations and can therefore be analysed with this approach. The purpose of this review article is threefold: to serve as a tutorial on observability and structural identifiability of nonlinear systems, using the differential geometry approach for their analysis; to review recent advances in the field; and to identify open problems and suggest new avenues for research in this area. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider what recent work on background independent physics can do for structuralism, and what structuralism can do for background independent physics. I focus on the problems of time and observables in gravitational physics. The ‘frozen’ character of the observables of general relativity is usually considered to constitute a serious problem for the theory. I argue that by invoking correlations between physical quantities we can provide a natural explanation of the appear- ance of time and change in (...) timeless structures. I argue that this response can resolve a problem with Max Tegmark’s ‘extreme structuralist’ position. I then consider what bearing the mathematical representation used has on the debate over the nature of structure in discussions of structural realism. I argue that it has both the resources to ground the notion of structure in physics and to answer the ‘no relations without relata’ objection. (shrink)

An observable on a quantum structure is any σ-homomorphism of quantum structures from the Borel σ-algebra of the real line into the quantum structure which is in our case a monotone σ-complete effect algebra with the Riesz Decomposition Property. We show that every observable is a smearing of a sharp observable which takes values from a Boolean σ-subalgebra of the effect algebra, and we prove that for every element of the effect algebra there corresponds a spectral measure.

This paper argues, through the framework of Judgemental Philosophy (JP), that three core challenges of 20th-century intellectual history—the 'Wigner's Friend' paradox in quantum mechanics, the 'dismantling of simultaneity' in Einstein's relativity, and 'différance' in Derridean deconstruction—are, in fact, different expressions of the same underlying structural principle. We show that the Wigner's Friend paradox can be resolved by reinterpreting the 'collapse' as a subject-dependent 'meaning-fixation'. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this concept of a 'subject-dependent reality' is necessarily linked to the 'relativity of (...) meaning' from a relativistic perspective, and that its internal mechanism of meaning generation follows the structure of Derrida's différance—the ceaseless differing and deferring of meaning. Ultimately, this paper addresses the problem of the 'observer'—which runs through all three issues—by proposing a unified model of the 'resonating observer': a subject who, within the constraints of physical and semantic spacetime, ceaselessly judges and generates meaning, propelled by the Resonance Drive (RD). (shrink)

Modern quantum theory describes physical systems by means of complex-valued state structures whose full dynamical content cannot be reduced to directly observable quantities. While observables are necessarily real-valued, they arise from a richer formal organization that includes phase-sensitive and non-directly accessible structure. This paper argues that the distinction between “real” and “imaginary” components is therefore best understood as epistemic rather than ontological. What appears in measurement is not a separate domain of being, but a selective disclosure of a unified (...) physical reality. -/- On this basis, the “space of possibilities” is reinterpreted not as a second world beyond the real, but as the non-reduced domain of dynamically admissible structure encoded in the state description of a system. Recent results reported in measuring spin correlation between quarks during QCD confinement provide an empirical illustration of this view by showing that correlations which later become directly observable may originate in non-directly accessible structures and remain dynamically effective across transformation. -/- The observable is thus not the whole of the real, but one mode through which it becomes accessible. (shrink)

An observational analysis of selected Nightline program transcripts was undertaken to advance understanding of conversational arguments used in the service of public policy debate. Results indicate that Nightline discussions involved more compound structural variations, but fewer simple, convergent and eroded argument structures than had been found in previous research. In contrast to previous efforts, the development of prompter and delimitor argument structures was also identified. In addition, the program's moderator, Ted Koppel, used challenge structures as his primary method of proposing (...) issues for debate. Discussion focuses on features of Nightline argument complexity and proposes directions for future research. (shrink)

Every linear perspective image has a center of the perspective construction. Only when observed from that location does a 2D image provide the same stimulus as the original 3D scene. Geometric analyses indicate that observing the image from other vantage points should affect the perceived spatial structure of the scene conveyed by the image, involving transformations such as shear, compression, and dilation. Based on previous research, this paper presents a detailed account of these transformations. The analyses are presented in (...) a uniform manner, illustrated with special 3D diagrams, and embedded in a wider framework of related perspective paradigms. Such analyses provide the potential theoretical basis for empirical work on the effects of changes of observer vantage points on the perception of spatial structure in perspective images. (shrink)

This essay continues the philosophical synthesis developed in Reality as a Structured Process. Part I argued that reality is not exhausted by factual actuality, but must be understood as a structured open process in which actuality emerges from potentiality without eliminating it. The present essay examines how this structured openness becomes accessible, centered, experienced, and interpreted. The argument unfolds in four steps. First, the distinction between observable and non-observable structure is interpreted epistemically rather than ontologically. What becomes measurable is (...) not opposed to the real, but represents a finite mode of disclosure within a richer physical organization. Second, consciousness is understood neither as a universal property of all things nor as a miraculous emergence from pure exteriority. It arises where openness, selective stabilization, resonance, integration, self-reference, and centering generate a stable inner domain. Third, the essay distinguishes between pre-subjective openness, pre-phenomenal subjectivability, and phenomenality. Reality may be intrinsically open to the emergence of experience without already being experiential in its most basic structure; yet this openness becomes relevant to consciousness only insofar as it can be organized, under specific conditions, as an inner perspective. This allows for a non-reductive account of consciousness that avoids both reductive physicalism and classical panpsychism. Finally, the essay turns to meditative, nondual, and spiritual experience. Such experiences may be profound, transformative, and therapeutically significant, yet they do not by themselves establish a final metaphysical ontology. The structure of an experience is not automatically the structure of reality. A responsible philosophy of consciousness must therefore distinguish experience, interpretation, ontology, usefulness, and epistemic authority. The result is an open realism in which observability, consciousness, healing, and spiritual meaning appear as modes of disclosure within the space of possibilities, without reducing reality to factuality or inflating experience into metaphysical certainty. (shrink)

Coherent Observational Epistemology (COE) is a methodological framework concerned with the structural conditions under which heterogeneous observational sequences can jointly support scientific inference. In an era of distributed measurement infrastructures—astronomical networks, climate observatories, particle detectors, biomedical laboratories—scientific practice increasingly depends on the integration of observational outputs originating from independent localities. Yet the epistemic as sumptions underlying such integration often remain implicit and unexamined. COE addresses this gap by providing: (i) foundational principles governing observation, fixation, ordering, and coherence; (ii) secondary principles (...) describing operational constraints and methodological safeguards; and (iii) an axiomatic system that formalizes the structural requirements enabling inter-local evidential synthesis. The goal of COE is not to replace existing modelling frameworks but to clarify the epistemological preconditions that make cross-local inference scientifically justified. (shrink)

Indirect observation is a recent concept in systematic observation. It largely involves analyzing textual material generated either indirectly from transcriptions of audio recordings of verbal behavior in natural settings (e.g., conversation, group discussions) or directly from narratives (e.g., letters of complaint, tweets, forum posts). It may also feature seemingly unobtrusive objects that can provide relevant insights into daily routines. All these materials constitute an extremely rich source of information for studying everyday life, and they are continuously growing with the burgeoning (...) of new technologies for data recording, dissemination, and storage. Narratives are an excellent vehicle for studying everyday life, and quantitization is proposed as a means of integrating qualitative and quantitative elements. However, this analysis requires a structured system that enables researchers to analyze varying forms and sources of information objectively. In this paper, we present a methodological framework detailing the steps and decisions required to quantitatively analyze a set of data that was originally qualitative. We provide guidelines on study dimensions, text segmentation criteria, ad hoc observation instruments, data quality controls, and coding and preparation of text for quantitative analysis. The quality control stage is essential to ensure that the code matrices generated from the qualitative data are reliable. We provide examples of how an indirect observation study can produce data for quantitative analysis and also describe the different software tools available for the various stages of the process. The proposed method is framed within a specific mixed methods approach that involves collecting qualitative data and subsequently transforming these into matrices of codes (not frequencies) for quantitative analysis to detect underlying structures and behavioral patterns. The data collection and quality control procedures fully meet the requirement of flexibility and provide new perspectives on data integration in the study of biopsychosocial aspects in everyday contexts. (shrink)

It is proposed that the physical structure of an observer in quantum mechanics is constituted by a pattern of elementary localized switching events. A key preliminary step in giving mathematical expression to this proposal is the introduction of an equivalence relation on sequences of spacetime sets which relates a sequence to any other sequence to which it can be deformed without change of causal arrangement. This allows an individual observer to be associated with a finite structure. (...) The identification of suitable switching events in the human brain is discussed. A definition is given for the sets of sequences of quantum states which such an observer could occupy. Finally, by providing an a priori probability for such sets, the definitions are incorporated into a complete mathematical framework for a many-worlds interpretation. At a less ambitious level, the paper can be read as an exploration of some of the technical and conceptual difficulties involved in constructing such a framework. (shrink)

Structural Omission, originated by Deborah Scott, is a framework in contemporary realist painting that addresses the limits of observation, perception, and knowing. It is not an abstract theory but a practice formalized through three principles—Ground (Perceptual Limits), Structure (Structural Incompleteness), and Consequence (Narrative Without Resolution). It organizes painting around what can be seen and what remains beyond reach, holding the known and the unknowable together. This paper defines Structural Omission as an epistemological framework that repositions realism after the collapse (...) of certainty. By connecting art practice to the philosophical problem of incomplete knowledge, it proposes that absence within representation can operate as load-bearing structure rather than deficiency. Drawing on thinkers such as Michael Fried, Jacques Rancière, Roland Barthes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the text argues that Structural Omission offers realism a conceptual survival strategy in an era of algorithmic completion and digital closure. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relation between two frameworks addressing the structure of scientific observation and temporal order: Coherent Observational Epistemology (COE) and the Theory of Global Time (TGT). The apparent tension between them reflects a deeper philosophical problem concerning the relation between epistemic reconstruction and ontological temporal structure. -/- COE analyzes the conditions under which heterogeneous observational sequences produced by independent observational localities can be integrated into a coherent evidential structure. In this framework, global observational order arises (...) as an epistemic construction resulting from structural compatibility between local observational practices. -/- The Theory of Global Time approaches temporal structure from a different perspective. Rather than treating time as a pre-existing coordinate or metric parameter, it interprets time as a canonical ordering relation reconstructed from observer-registered events. Temporal history is thus understood as a chain within an ordered structure generated by reception events, and once such a canonical order has been reconstructed it cannot be retroactively modified. -/- The paper argues that the perceived conflict between these views arises from a conflation of epistemic and ontological levels. COE governs the epistemic alignment of observations, while TGT constrains the ontological structure of reconstructed temporal history. Once these levels are distinguished, the two frameworks become mutually compatible. -/- On this basis the paper introduces a structural principle—the Temporal Reconstruction Constraint—according to which observational reconstruction may refine or extend the accessible event structure but must preserve the canonical order of previously reconstructed history. The result is a layered account of scientific inference in which observational practice, epistemic reconstruction, and temporal ontology play distinct but interrelated roles. -/- This perspective contributes to philosophical debates on the nature of temporal order, the epistemology of scientific observation, and the relation between observational practices and temporal ontology. (shrink)

We develop a relativistic perspective on structures of quantum observables, in terms of localization systems of Boolean coordinatizing charts. This perspective implies that the quantum world is comprehended via Boolean reference frames for measurement of observables, pasted together along their overlaps. The scheme is formalized categorically, as an instance of the adjunction concept. The latter is used as a framework for the specification of a categorical equivalence signifying an invariance in the translational code of communication between Boolean localizing contexts and (...) quantum systems. Aspects of the scheme semantics are discussed in relation to logic. The interpretation of coordinatizing localization systems, as structure sheaves, provides the basis for the development of an algebraic differential geometric machinery suited to the quantum regime. (shrink)

The philosophy of social science faces a persistent explanatory gap in reflexive systems: when modeling alters what is being modeled, predictive frameworks become unstable at the moments they are most needed. Complexity theory and reflexivity each address part of this problem — nonlinearity, feedback, recursive expectation — but each leaves comparatively underspecified the moment at which structured indeterminacy resolves into a realized social outcome. -/- This article proposes Potentialism and the Quantum-Continuity Model (QCM) as a candidate epistemological framework. Rather than (...) claiming social systems are literally quantum, QCM treats quantum theory as a source for disciplined structural analogy, transferring the bare structure by which multiple live possibilities resolve into a definite outcome — while explicitly bounding what does and does not carry over. From this it generates three concepts: Transition Zones, Quantum Thresholds, and Quantum Measurement Events. The framework positions itself among existing accounts of constitutive observation — self-fulfilling prophecy, performativity, and second-order systems theory — specifying what it adds to them. -/- The Arab Spring serves as illustration, with briefer extensions to the 2008 financial crisis and #MeToo. QCM offers a vocabulary for discontinuous social resolution, reorienting inquiry from prediction toward the navigation of structured indeterminacy. (shrink)

Information about the structure of a causal system can come in the form of observational data—random samples of the system's autonomous behavior—or interventional data—samples conditioned on the particular values of one or more variables that have been experimentally manipulated. Here we study people's ability to infer causal structure from both observation and intervention, and to choose informative interventions on the basis of observational data. In three causal inference tasks, participants were to some degree capable of distinguishing between competing (...) causal hypotheses on the basis of purely observational data. Performance improved substantially when participants were allowed to observe the effects of interventions that they performed on the systems. We develop computational models of how people infer causal structure from data and how they plan intervention experiments, based on the representational framework of causal graphical models and the inferential principles of optimal Bayesian decision‐making and maximizing expected information gain. These analyses suggest that people can make rational causal inferences, subject to psychologically reasonable representational assumptions and computationally reasonable processing constraints. (shrink)

Ancient Greek Philosopher Protagoras’ famous statement, “Man is the measure of all things,” is traditionally interpreted as a doctrine of epistemological relativism. This paper proposes a mathematical reinterpretation connecting Protagorean observer-dependence, Einsteinian relativity, quantum measurement theory, and the Ibaguner Fractal Operator (IFO). A generalized observer geometry is introduced in which reality emerges through recursive observer projections. Within this framework, truth, measurement, and observation become manifestations of a single holographic principle.

An important approach to theories in science focuses on the logical structure of the theory. Central to this understanding is the Ramsey sentence reading of what a theory asserts. Issues of the indeterminacy of the interpretation of the theory become crucial. Does the theoretical structure guide us to real things and features in the world or only to a structural “embedding” for the genuine, observational structure. Claims concerning the “underdetermination” of the referential structure of the theory (...) are often taken as conclusive arguments against a realist reading of the theory. But is this correct? David Lewis invokes the notion of natural properties to try to solve some of these issues. Structuralism takes the preserved element in theory change to be these structures to address the problem of continuity of science through radical theory change. (shrink)

Standard philosophical discussions of theory-ladeness assume that observational evidence consists of perceptual outputs (or reports of such outputs) that are sentential or propositional in structure. Theory-ladeness is conceptualized as having to do with logical or semantical relationships between such outputs or reports and background theories held by observers. Using the recent debate between Fodor and Churchland as a point of departure, we propose an alternative picture in which much of what serves as evidence in science is not perceptual outputs (...) or reports of such outputs and is not sentential in structure. (shrink)

Informal rigour is the process by which we come to understand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic discourse, and argue that different foundational programmes should countenance different underlying logics (intermediate between first- and second-order) for formulating set theory. By bringing considerations of (...) perturbations in modal space to bear on the debate, we will suggest that a promising option for representing current set-theoretic thought is given by formulating set theory using quasi-weak second-order logic. These observations indicate that the usual division of structures into \particular (e.g. the natural number structure) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally and unintentionally general structures. (shrink)

Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational? These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes (...) (Lee, 2020; Worsnip, 2018a). It has also been suggested that, in the course of good first-personal deliberation, agents should treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits (Worsnip, 2021). In this paper, I raise a worry for these two theses concerning structural rationality. Roughly, I argue that some imperfect epistemic agents (like us) can be disposed to have structurally irrational combinations of attitudes. Also, when these imperfect agents deliberate, they should not treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits. Given our imperfections, being structurally irrational can very well be the best option we have. More generally, these observations reveal that structural rationality should not always be theorized independently from more “substantive” norms, like responsiveness to reasons or expected value optimization. (shrink)

Events and situations are represented by strings of temporally ordered observations, on the basis of which the events and situations are recognized. Allen’s basic interval relations are derived from superposing strings that mark interval boundaries, and Kamp’s event structures are constructed as projective limits of strings. Observations are generalized to temporal propositions, leading to event-types that classify event-instances. Working with sets of strings built from temporal propositions, we obtain natural notions of bounded entailment from set inclusions. These inclusions are decidable (...) if the sets are accepted by finite automata. (shrink)

This study aims to establish a formal system grounded in observation, transforming the properties and outcomes of empirical observation into rigorously treatable mathematical structures, thereby constructing a strictly epistemological mathematical framework for physics and the natural sciences. Starting from the indistinguishability inherent in observation, we rigorously demonstrate how the modern mathematical notions of structure and morphism can be employed to represent phenomena as objects within topological spaces; and, by analyzing the relations among observations, how causality and dynamics can be (...) strictly reconstructed as evolution processes centered on observable phenomena. This study reveals that the necessity of mathematics in the natural sciences arises from the fact that mathematical logic itself is the only possible language through which natural phenomena can be coherently described. Accordingly, epistemology is established as the foundational language of the natural sciences, and a complete logical reconstruction of the fundamental concepts of physics is achieved without invoking any ontological assumptions. (shrink)

This work develops an ontological framework underlying contemporary physical theories, addressing a gap between formal admissibility and physical realization. Modern physics—quantum field theory, special relativity, and general relativity—successfully constrains admissible states, relations, and transitions, yet remains largely silent on how admissible structures become realized physical facts. This paper argues that the limitation is ontological rather than dynamical or epistemic. Two complementary notions are introduced. Structural indifference is the principle according to which physical structure distinguishes roles and invariants, but not (...) the individual identity of the carriers realizing those roles. The coherence operator enforces relational compatibility among admissible roles, ensuring that realized parameter assignments are mutually consistent without fixing absolute numerical values. Together, these notions explain how observable universality can arise without global uniformity of laws or constants. Local variability of parameters becomes compatible with stable structure, while identical observational patterns emerge through coherence and translatability rather than numerical identity. Quantum mechanics is shown to be complete at the level of admissibility but ontologically incomplete with respect to realization. Gravity is interpreted as a global modulator of structural indifference, shaping large-scale regimes of realization without altering quantum formalism. The framework does not modify existing physical theories, introduce new dynamics, or rely on probabilistic selection. Instead, it articulates an ontological layer beneath current formalisms, clarifying why physical description works, how realization occurs, and why identity fixation is unnecessary. (shrink)

The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the relation…lies-at-some-spatial-distance-from…obeys necessary (...) truths that need not apply to other relations with the same causal profile. This observation is especially important if, as David Lewis argued, the only alternatives to skepticism are structuralism and an anti-Humean stance toward modality. Some pertinent views of David Chalmers’s are discussed, and parallels are drawn between the structuralist response to skepticism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s between pattern and phylogenetic cladists. What was always at stake in the discussion was not how work in systematics should be carried out, but rather how this practice should be metatheoretically interpreted. In this article, we criticize Pearson’s account of the metatheoretical factors at play in this discussion. Following him, we focus on the issue of circularity, and on the role that phylogenetic hypotheses play in the determination of “primary (...) homologies”. Pearson argues that the recognition of primary homologies cannot be achieved without recourse to previous phylogenetic knowledge, and that to claim otherwise is to state that primary homologies are observable. To show why that view would be inadequate, he appeals to Hanson’s views about theory-laden observation, alongside with a specific case study, which allegedly illustrates the more complex relation between observation and theory. We will argue that the pattern cladists’ point is better addressed by taking a quite different approach: instead of thinking in terms of observability, the topic can be tackled by paying attention to the way in which concepts are determined. We will take the notion of T-theoricity from metatheoretical structuralism and show that, once the issue is discussed with the appropriate metatheoretical framework, the alleged counterexample brought up by Pearson is not problematic at all for pattern cladism. (shrink)

Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The representations are therefore shared between self and other. But what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations of action?; are (...) SRA sensory or motor representations?; are SRA representations of the action as a global unit or as a set of elementary motor components? After outlining a model of the motor hierarchy, we conclude that the best candidate for SRA is intentions in action, defined as the motor plans of the dynamic sequence of movements. We shed new light on SRA by highlighting the causal efficacy of intentions in action. This in turn explains phenomena such as inhibition of imitation. (shrink)