Museums’ structures, spaces, and exhibits are understood as semiotic resources that make spatial texts that communicate a discourse defined by the authorities of the museum or its curators. The current study follows a social-semiotic approach in analyzing the spatial discourse of the Children’s Museum in Amman. It demonstrates that interpersonal meanings are semiotically communicated to children visitors in the Museum by firstly establishing a “comfort-zone” and secondly by aligning children visitors into groups with shared qualities, attitudes, and dispositions of (...) affiliation and solidarity, and thirdly by providing abstract and material representations of the real world that encompasses participants, processes, events, and places. These interpersonal meanings produce a pedagogical discourse that semiotically addresses Jordan’s energy and water challenges, and that can “charge” the Museum’s role as a “Bonding Icon” that stands for shared communal ideals that Jordanians might identify with, or rally around. (shrink)

Using the first-person plural pronoun wǒmen to refer to a child is repeatedly observed in Chinese parents’ interaction. To understand its interpersonal meanings, this study investigates this non-prototypical pronoun use in Chinese parents’ community of practice. The analysis shows that the non-prototypical use of this pronoun not only displays agency and connection between parents and children but also reveals the seemingly close but detached relationship among parents. This non-prototypical pronoun use unveils the complex and dynamic nature of relational work. (...) We argue for the significance of community of practice in relational work studies, as it can proffer social and cultural contexts to pronoun use and a situated understanding of interactants’ interpersonal relationships. The present study contributes to the documentation of the non-prototypical use of wǒmen in Chinese contexts and the comprehension of its interpersonal meanings. (shrink)

Inferential Role Semantics is often criticized for being incompatible with the platitude that words of different speakers can mean the same thing. While many assume that this platitude can be accommodated by understanding sameness of meaning in terms of similarity of meaning, no worked out proposal has ever been produced for Inferential Role Semantics. I rectify this important omission by giving a detailed structural account of meaning similarity in terms of graph theory. I go on to argue (...) that this account has a number of attractive features, prominent among them that it makes sameness of meaning probabilistically determine co-reference. (shrink)

On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful, and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined (...) and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility. I conclude that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible. (shrink)

Ideologies about threatening language from scholarly and practitioner communities of practice reflect a genre replete with stances of violence and threatener control, wherein authorial intent is more strongly attributed to threats possessing characteristics that strengthen a threatener’s role in or commitment to the act. Using the resources of Appraisal analysis, this article examines the ways in which interpersonal stances, or a speaker or writer’s commitment to or attitudes about a person or proposition, are manifested and function in a realized (...) threat of violence. The analysis reveals that threateners use myriad rhetorical strategies to convey interpersonal meaning and take stances that both strengthen and weaken their apparent level of commitment, thus contradicting the one-sidedness of threatening language ideologies and demonstrating the need for further research on stancetaking in threatening discourse. (shrink)

Within the growing developmental literature on children's testimonial learning, the emphasis placed on children's evaluations of testimonial evidence has shielded from view some of the more collaborative dimensions of testimonial learning. Drawing on recent philosophical work on testimony and interpersonal trust, we argue for an alternative way of conceptualizing the social nature of testimonial learning. On this alternative, some testimonial learning is the result of a jointly collaborative epistemic activity, an activity that aims at the epistemic goal of true (...) belief, but that does so by means of an irreducibly social process. (shrink)

We compare a number of influential approaches to human communication with the aim of understanding what it means for interpersonal communication to be a form of social action. In particular, we discuss the large-scale social normativity advocated by speech act theory, the view of communication as small-scale social interaction proper of Gricean approaches, and the intimate connection between communication and cooperation defended by Tomasello. We then argue in favor of a small-scale view of communication capable of accounting for the (...) normative effects of communicative acts; to this purpose, we introduce the concept of interpersonal normativity and analyze its relationship with communicative intentions. (shrink)

Despite the initial promise of social media platforms as a means of facilitating discourse on matters of civic discourse, in practice it has turned out to impair fruitful conversation on civic issues by a number of means. From self-isolation into echo chambers, to algorithmically supported filter bubbles, to widespread failure to engage politically owing to psychological phenomena like the ‘spiral of silence’, a variety of factors have been blamed. I argue that extant accounts overlook the importance of interpersonal relationships (...) to sustaining quality civic discourse on social media. Drawing on an Aristotelian account of friendship with an emphasis on the value of interpersonal difference plus the influence of interactions on individual character, I argue that a common scapegoat for the failure of civic discourse online—the variety of “unfriend” disconnection tools offered on various platforms—actually show promise at promoting better-quality civic conversation and overcoming the obstacles present on social media platforms. (shrink)

The present study aimed to explore the effectiveness of two typical intrapersonal strategies (cognitive reappraisal, CR; expressive suppression, ES) on interpersonal emotion regulation (IER), and uncover the physiological synchrony pattern underlying this. A sample of 90 friend dyads (N = 180) was randomly assigned to the CR, the ES, or the control group. In each dyad, the target underwent a negative emotional task (induce sadness by recalling a negative event), and the regulator was assigned to implement the CR strategy, (...) the ES strategy, or no action to down-regulate the targets’ negative emotions. Self-reported results showed that compared to the control group, both CR and ES strategies decreased the targets’ negative emotions, and increased the targets’ positive emotions, indicating a successful IER effect. And the ECG results revealed that relative to the control condition, both CR and ES strategies evoked stronger physiological synchrony (heart rate synchrony and heart rate variation synchrony) during the emotion regulation stage of IER. Overall, these findings demonstrated the similar efficacy of reappraisal and suppression strategies implemented by the regulators to improve the targets’ negative emotions, and suggested that the physiological synchrony might have an important relational meaning during the IER process. (shrink)

Two large online surveys were conducted among employees in Germany to explore the importance employees and organizations place on aspects of interpersonal respect in relation to other work values. The first study (n = 589) extracted a general ranking of work values, showing that employees rate issues of respect involving supervisors particularly high. The second study (n = 318) replicated the previous value ranking. Additionally, it is shown that the value priorities indicated by employees do not always match their (...) perceptions of actual organizational practices. Particularly, interpersonal respect issues that involve employees’ supervisors diverge strongly negative. Consequences and potentials for change in organizations are discussed. (shrink)

We understand interpersonal reality as consisting of those social facts that are informally created by people for themselves in everyday interactions, and involve the collective acceptance of positive and negative deontic powers. We submit that, in the case of interpersonal reality, Gilbert’s concept of a joint commitment is a suitable view of what collective acceptance amounts to. We then argue that creating interpersonal reality, even in common everyday-life situations, typically requires conversational exchanges involving several layers of joint (...) commitments, and in particular joint commitments to projects, joint meaning, and the joint commitments that are constitutive of conversations. (shrink)

This paper summarizes and rebuts the three standard objections made by social choice theorists against interpersonal utility. The first objection argues that interpersonal utility is measningless. I show that this objection either focuses on irrelevant kinds of meaning or else uses implausible criteria of meaningfulness. The second objection argues that interpersonal utility has no role to play in social choice theory. I show that on the contrary interpersonal utility is useful in formulating goals for social (...) choice. The third objection argues that interpersonal utility in social choice theory can be replaced by clearer notions. I show that the replacements proposed are unsatisfactory in either interpersonal utility's descriptive or explanatory role. My conclusion is that interpersonal utility has a legitimate place in social choice theory. (shrink)

This paper extends Merleau-Ponty’s arguments regarding the interpersonal character of human spatiality and Bateson’s conception of the dynamically extended nature of consciousness. The central argument is that human communication is essentially spatial in nature, and that it is experienced and expressed as such. Using this analysis, the paper argues that Anorexia nervosa should not primarily be understood as an eating disorder, but rather as a spatially expressed and felt communication disorder. Moreover, it demonstrates that anorexia is not an illness (...) of an individual, but rather is a symptom of an ailing system of communication, most commonly that of an ailing family. By means of a novel interpretation of anorexia as a neurosis that both reflects a contracted environment and also offers a spatially significant gesture in response to this contracted environment, the paper helps to elucidate the spatial nature of communication in general and to show how acts of communication are not primarily acts or experiences of isolated individuals confronting other self-sufficient individuals, but are rather spatially shared and expressed experiences of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Understanding innate core cognition for social relations as a deep, generative social grammar that helps solve the learnability problem of discovering who relates to whom in what ways “amounts to asking how human social life is understandable, and hence possible” (Thomsen & Carey, 2013, p.17). Expanding the focus beyond enduring interpersonal relationships allows us to understand how social and societal meaning (e.g., in ideology) reflect fundamental forms of relational coordination ultimately grounded in cross-species affordances.

Humans are by nature social beings tuned to communicate and interact from the very beginning of their lives. The sense of touch represents the most direct and intimate channel of communication and a powerful means of connection between the self and the others. In our digital age, the development and diffusion of internet-based technologies and virtual environments offer new opportunities of communication overcoming physical distance. It however, happens that social interactions are often mediated, and the tactile aspects of communication are (...) overlooked, thus diminishing the feeling of social presence, which may contribute to an increased sense of social disconnection and loneliness. The current manuscript aims to review the extant literature about the socio-affective dimension of touch and current advancements in interactive virtual environments in order to provide a new perspective on multisensory virtual communication. Specifically, we suggest that interpersonal affective touch might critically impact virtual social exchanges, promoting a sense of co-presence and social connection between individuals, possibly overcoming feelings of sensory loneliness. This topic of investigation will be of crucial relevance from a theoretical perspective aiming to understand how we integrate multisensory signals in processing and making sense of interpersonal exchanges, this is important in both typical and atypical populations. Moreover, it will pave the way to promising applications by exploring the possibility to use technical innovations to communicate more interactively in the case of people who suffer from social isolation and disconnection from others. (shrink)

This article evaluated the effects of an interpersonal skills program based on artistic expressions to reduce intimate partner violence in college students. The research was of explanatory type, quasi-experimental design and used the Dating Abuse questionnaire (adapted by Osorio, 2014), the Interpersonal Skills questionnaire with reliability of 0.81 having as results in the entry test in terms of violence a mean of 88. 16 and after the program was applied it decreased to 81.2, in interpersonal skills the (...) mean of 46.6 increased to 53.3 with large effect size according to Cohen's d 7.889 CI95% (6.246-9.532), statistically significant differences were found in terms of violence. (shrink)

We show that knowledge satisfies _interpersonal independence_, meaning that a non-trivial sentence describing one agent’s knowledge cannot be equivalent to a sentence describing another agent’s knowledge. The same property of interpersonal independence holds, mutatis mutandis, for belief. In the case of knowledge, interpersonal independence is implied by the fact that there are no non-trivial sentences that are common knowledge in every model of knowledge. In the case of belief, interpersonal independence follows from a _strong interpersonal (...) independence_ that knowledge does not have. Specifically, there is no sentence describing the beliefs of one person that implies a sentence describing the beliefs of another person. (shrink)

The article deals with relational aspects of mental disorders. The author takes into account the influence of mental illness on intersubjectivity and interpersonal relations in three aspects: “attitude to the illness,” that is, changes in the functioning of the subject and difficulties in dealing with the experience of mental illness; “dialogical relationship” in the form of difficulties in maintaining social cognition and entering into relationships with others; “social consensus,” that is, difficulties in adapting to the social world and a (...) common sense deficit. The analysis is made with reference to phenomenological research in contemporary philosophy of psychiatry. The result of this study is a reconstruction of a “different existence,” in other words, presentation of the transformation of the life-world and the specific way of inhabiting the world of a person in a mental crisis. Symptoms and experience of the illness are presented in the light of human possibilities of transformation. The analysis emphasizes the role of patients’ subjectivity and their efforts to find the meaning of a painful situation. The study of subjective aspects of disorders aims to reveal their consequences for understanding how to deal with mental crisis and to understand the positive aspects of the recovery process. (shrink)

Summary The task of this article is to review the principle of relational determination, as described by Solomon Asch (1952) which expands over Karl Duncker’s (1939) critique of ethical relativism. Relational determination has much to offer to the therapeutic community first with regard to interpersonal relations and social relations. My main goal is to extend this relational analysis to intrapsychic life, which may expose new potentialities for internal conflict resolution and personal integration, predicated on the cultivation of relational understanding (...) (i.e., recognition of relational determination in organization of conscious experience). But this approach is best illustrated in its application to value differences and conflict across societies, which are typically viewed from the absolutist or relativist perspective. The principle of relationality casts doubt on elementaristic assumptions common to both (e.g., meaning constancy). Such assumptions lead to some ill-considered conclusions: of irreconcilable moral differences dividing both individuals and groups, deprived of any basis in understanding. Those views fail to consider the contexts underlying the meanings and valuations we impute. When these are taken into account, Duncker’s hypothesis of an invariant relation between meaning and value finds support. Value differences (or changes) need not represent fundamental differences in morality, but instead (factual) differences in understanding of the situation. If so, then value differences may indeed be both understandable and reconcilable. Relational determination reveals this same potentiality with regard to intrapsychic conflict, where the same presumption of irreconcilable differences must be overcome. Work by Erich Neumann provides a valuable depth psychological perspective on this inner conflict, which accords surprisingly well with the relationality principle in particular and field theory in general. From that vantage point, psychological defenses may be recognized as structural properties of yet unreconciled psychical fields. Gestalt theory’s relational view, which aligns well with Neumann’s account of a “new ethic” helps to reveal the processes by which these defensive postures might abate, as value realms that earlier dwelt in hostile opposition develop more of a conscious and respectful relation with each other, as the individual inches toward greater wholeness. (shrink)

Interpersonal preemptive behavior means that a party undertakes a costly action that inflicts harm to another to remove or disable a potential threat. This present study examined the emotional mechanisms underlying interpersonal preemptive behavior. The findings revealed that in interpersonal interaction situations, individuals experienced higher levels of fear and hope when they perceived the potential threat of the gaming partner and were more likely to initiate preemptive behavior; fear and hope both mediated the relationship between potential threat (...) and preemptive behavior, but they had opposite effects, with fear increasing individuals’ preemptive behavior, while hope decreases individuals’ preemptive behavior. This study has important theoretical implications for a deeper understanding of the causes of interpersonal conflict. (shrink)

The relationship of climate and monetary resources to various freedoms can be enriched if the conceptual links psychobehavioral adaptations are conceptualized more broadly as reflections of a richer cultural context that involves multiple physical and psychological resources, as proposed by social resource theory and a number of models of the emergence of social meaning.

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction The Tacit ‐ Agreement Approach to Morality as Social Construction Speaker Relativism What it Might Mean for Morality to be Constructed as Part of Human Culture Explaining Moral Commonalities and Differences Across Cultures Relativism and the Meaning of Moral Terms Explaining Intra ‐ Group Disagreement Why Fundamental Intragroup Disagreement Might Be Inevitable References.

This paper is based on the premise that one major reason for adolescent pupil dissatisfaction in our schools is the neglect of moral and social education as an essential ingredient of all genuine education. A model is presented to demonstrate the importance of three aspects of the learning situation: academic learning, interpersonal learning and the locus of authority, in the class. This reveals four typical learning contexts which are examined in turn. It is argued that though learning at the (...) academic and interpersonal levels where authority lies with the teacher may have certain benefits, it is inadequate and indeed restrictive in terms of producing a fully educated young person. Learning at the academic and interpersonal levels where authority lies with the pupil(s) is then considered and examples discussed in each case. An important conclusion is that learning at the interpersonal level where authority lies with the pupil(s) must be provided if young people are to have any real possibility of attaining moral maturity and of feeling the school has taught them anything about the meaning of being human. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Interpersonal and Emotional Beginnings of Understanding: A Review of Peter Hobson’sThe Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of ThinkingShaun Gallagher (bio)Hobson's book (2002) is extremely accessible, interestingly interdisciplinary, and knowledgeable in all the right ways. He pulls together work in psychiatry, experimental psychology, and psychoanalysis in a framework that is relevant to issues in the philosophy of mind. We are told much of this in the preface, (...) and it is true. I think it is an excellent book for students and for theorists who have an interest in, but who are not working in the specific areas of, cognitive development. I recommend it highly for those audiences. For those who are already working in these areas, and for those who are already familiar with Hobson's work, there are no surprises. As someone who has learned a good deal from Hobson and who is in substantial agreement with many of his conclusions, I read the first six chapters of the book looking for something new and exciting, but did not find it. The reader will nonetheless find clear and careful discussions of contributions from evolutionary theory, developmental psychology, and psychopathology to our understanding of the mind.Hobson does tackle the difficult question of why we should include psychoanalysis as part of the investigation. He views psychoanalysis as a kind of experimental procedure. Like the experimentalist, the psychoanalyst "sets up an unusual situation that allows him to observe things that would otherwise remain hidden" (p. 19). What the psychoanalyst looks for in these arrangements are patterns of relationship that shape all of the patient's behavior and thought, relations with others and with herself. The analyst has to engage in something like a second-person phenomenology, examining not only the subjective [End Page 253] patterns of the patient, but also the effects (specifically the emotional effects) those patterns have on the analyst himself. The outcome of analysis, for purposes of the research project that Hobson is engaged in, is twofold. First, the psychoanalytic procedure reaches certain dimensions of thought and social relationships that seem unavailable to experimental approaches. "We find that the mind works in ways that are more complex than common sense or even experimental psychology would suggest. In particular, there are ways of thinking and relating to people that appear to be more primitive and less rational than we might suppose" (pp. 21-2). Second, psychoanalysis shows that what happens within an individual's mind is essentially related to what happens in her social relationships. The latter point, as Hobson notes, is a central theme of his book.This is all well and good, the experimental psychologist might say, but it seems overly subjective. After all, if the data include the emotional effects that a patient might have on the investigator, how precisely can we make that scientifically objective? I think that the right answer to that question is embodied in Hobson's approach, and perhaps in who Hobson is. Hobson is himself an experimental psychologist, as well as a practicing psychoanalyst and psychiatrist. He balances the claims that he bases on psychoanalysis with results from studies (including many of his own studies) in experimental psychology and psychiatry. To put it precisely, the task is not to turn the subjective or intersubjective data from psychoanalysis into objective data, but to explore subjectivity (which is certainly part of what we want to explain) by means of a method that gets at things from a different perspective, but that is also consistent with and balanced by the more objective results of experimental science. My own doubts about psychoanalysis are somewhat mitigated by the balance that Hobson maintains throughout this book.Chapters 2 through 6 summarize a large number of studies that ultimately make the case for the importance of intersubjectivity in the development of mental abilities. Chapter 2 explores the necessary prerequisites for the emergence of thought in infancy. Evidence found in experiments on and observations of the interaction between infants and caregivers, early imitation, and emotional relatedness supports the picture of a mix of innate and acquired aspects that move the child toward thought. Significant emphasis is devoted to the role of perception and... (shrink)

Context: Maturana’s views on cognitive processes and explaining have ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to link ethics and epistemology to facilitate thinking about how to promote respect between different viewpoints through mutual understanding. Method: Maturana’s views on ethics are outlined in three domains: the personal, the interpersonal, and the societal. Results: The ethical implications that emerge around the notion of reality with or without parenthesis, the concept of the legitimate other, and Maturana’s conjectures about the origins (...) of human social groups. Social groups in which cooperation is more important than competition are based on love in the sense that others are accepted as legitimate members of the community. An epistemology that responds to the biological origins of human cognition is one that is more open to cooperation, honesty, responsibility, and respect than an epistemology that takes reality as given and the task of human cognition to represent truth. Implications: This framework for thinking about cognitive processes provides a way of approaching disagreements so they become opportunities for discussion rather than for power assertion of one reality over another. In a world where strongly held viewpoints on ethics and reality lead to conflict, promoting viable models of cognitive process that link cognition and ethics may lead to insights that promote tolerance. Ideas from attribution theory in social psychology are presented as a means of facilitating the emergence of the concept of the legitimate other in discussion about disagreements. (shrink)

Introduction Ethical climate in medical contexts is referred to the organizational environment consisting of medical staff interpersonal relationships regarding patient care. This element affects staff behavior in an organization. The investigation and comparison of the effects of the interventions promoting ethical climate are among important nursing challenges that should be considered by researchers. The present study was conducted to compare the effect of nurses’ ethical decision-making skills and interpersonal communication training on their ethical climate. Materials and methods This (...) experimental study was performed on 90 nurses working in the general teaching hospitals of Mashhad, Iran. The sampling process was conducted in two stages. Nurses were divided into three groups: intervention 1 (ethical decision-making skills group), intervention 2 (interpersonal communication skills group) and control group. The intervention was separate 12-h workshops for each of the intervention groups. The ethical climate questionnaire by Victor and Cullen was used to assess the score of ethical climate in the three groups both at the beginning and 4 weeks after the workshop. The data were analyzed in Statistical Package for Social Sciences software (version 16) using descriptive statistics, analysis of variance, Kruskal–Wallis, paired sample t-test, Wilcoxon test, and post hoc Tukey’s test. Ethical considerations were as follows: The study design was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Mashhad University of Medical Sciences. Informed consent was obtained from all subjects, and they were ensured about the confidentiality terms. Results The mean scores of the ethical climate test at the first stage were obtained as 66.0 ± 5.5, 67.8 ± 6.9, and 67.7 ± 7.2 in the ethical decision-making, interpersonal communication, and control groups, respectively. Accordingly, the three groups were not significantly different in terms of this variable (df = 87, f = 0.70, P = 0.005). However, after the intervention (i.e. second stage), a significant difference was observed among the three groups regarding the mean scores of the ethical climate test In this regard, the calculated mean scores in the ethical decision-making, interpersonal communication, and control groups were 99.3 ± 6.3, 90.4 ± 7.7, and 67.4 ± 7.9, respectively (df = 87, f = 152.00, P < 0.001). Conclusion Training workshops about ethical decision-making skills and interpersonal communication on the ethical professional climate of nurses was effective. Nonetheless, the effect of ethical decision-making skill training was found to be higher than interpersonal communication skill training. Therefore, it is recommended that nursing managers hold training workshops to improve the ethical climate for nurses. (shrink)

Digital technology has facilitated additional means for human communication, allowing social connections across communities, cultures, and continents. However, little is known about the effect these communication technologies have on the ability to accurately recognize and utilize nonverbal behavior cues. We present two competing theories, which suggest (1) the potential for technology use toenhancenonverbal decoding skill or, (2) the potential for technology use tohindernonverbal decoding skill. We present preliminary results from two studies to test these hypotheses. Study 1 (N= 410) found (...) that global screen time was unrelated to nonverbal decoding skill. However, how participants spent their time using technology mattered. Participants who reported more active technology use (i.e., posting content) self-reported that their nonverbal decoding skill (as measured by the Emotional Sensitivity subscale of the Social Skills Inventory) was superior but performed worse on objective measures of decoding skill (using standardized tests including the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy-Adult Faces and the Workplace Interpersonal Perception Skill). By contrast, passive users performed significantly better on objective measures of nonverbal decoding skill; although they did not self-report any difference in their skill compared to less passive users. Study 2 (N= 190), and a mini-meta analysis of both studies, replicated this pattern. These effects suggest a roadmap for understanding the theoretical relationship between technology use and nonverbal communication skills. We also provide recommendations for future research, including the use of experimental designs to determine causal pathways and to advance our conceptual understanding of the relationship between technology use and nonverbal decoding skill. (shrink)

Background: The classical symptom specificity hypothesis (Blatt, 1974) links obsessional symptoms to autonomous interpersonal behavior. Inconsistent findings from cross-sectional group studies on symptom specificity have previously been associated with several conceptual and methodological limitations intrinsic to nomothetic research. Previous empirical case research reported ambivalences between autonomous and dependent interpersonal behavior in obsessional pathology. Aim and Method: The present ‘theory-building’ case study specifically aims at further refinement of the classical symptom specificity hypothesis by testing specific operationalizations within an empirical (...) single case design. Consensual Qualitative Research for Case studies is used to quantitatively and qualitatively describe the longitudinal, clinical interplay between obsessional symptoms and interpersonal dynamics throughout the process of a psychodynamic therapy. Interpersonal functioning is assessed by means of the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme method. The classical symptom specificity hypothesis is contrasted to an alternative hypothesis of interpersonal ambivalences as determinants of obsessional symptoms. Results: Close associations between obsessions and interpersonal dynamics are observed. Findings predominantly affirm the ambivalence hypothesis rather than the classical symptom specificity hypothesis. Psychodynamic interventions focusing on interpersonal conflicts are related to symptomatic changes. Conceptual and methodological considerations, limitations and future research indications are discussed. (shrink)

In their article, Smith and Mackie argue that vaccine mandates do not impair the voluntariness of informed consent, even when refusal entails significant consequences, such as the loss of employment.1 Drawing on Kiener’s interpersonal consenter–consentee justification, they claim that consent remains valid because third-party coercion does not vitiate voluntariness; what matters is whether the consent receiver wrongs the consent giver.2 Since clinicians neither impose nor collaborate in the relevant threats, consent obtained under a mandate—though motivated by pressure—remains voluntary. On (...) this view, the tension between mandatory vaccination and informed consent dissolves once voluntariness is conceptualised within the clinical dyad. This argument is internally coherent, yet its very precision reveals the limits of a narrow interpersonal account when assessing consent in coercive contexts. If informed consent embodies the principle that individuals have a moral right to decide freely about their bodies and health, it is difficult to restrict its ethical relevance to the behaviour of the physician alone.3 The central issue is not whether the clinician threatens or manipulates the patient, but whether the broader context preserves the individual’s capacity for meaningful self-determination. When refusing vaccination means losing one’s job, it is problematic to claim that no coercion is present merely because the formal act of consenting remains intact. The first difficulty concerns the reduction of voluntariness to an interpersonal property. …. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to the question of meaning in life by criticizing Thaddeus Metz’s objectivist theory in his book Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. I propose the concept of “the heart of meaning in life,” which alone can answer the question, “Alas, does my life like this have any meaning at all?” and I demonstrate that “the heart of meaning in life” cannot be compared, in principle, (...) with other people’s meaning in life. The answer to the question of “the heart of meaning in life” ought to have two values, yes-or-no, and there is no ambiguous gray zone between them. I believe that this concept constitutes the very central content of meaning in life. (shrink)

While sport is often pursued more for reasons of meaning than morality, philosophers have had far less to say about the former. How are the ends of sport related to meaning and morality? I address the question through the case study of boxing. One reason for this approach is that the moral status of boxing is contested, which makes it an interesting candidate for immoral, meaningful activity. Drawing on Wolf’s hybrid account of meaning in life, I argue (...) that boxing can be a meaningful pursuit insofar as it fosters positive self-transformation and interpersonal connection. I then consider a structural obstacle facing the pursuit of meaning in competitive sport and look at the instructive case study of Tyson Fury. I make use of Setiya’s distinction between telic and atelic ends in order to diagnose the problem. Finally, I address the likely objection that the goals of boxing are either absurd or immoral and, therefore, unsuited to the pursuit of a meaningful life. (shrink)

Neurocognitive models (e.g., Schirmer & Kotz, 2006) have helped to characterize how listeners incrementally derive meaning from vocal expressions of emotion in spoken language, what neural mechanisms are involved at different processing stages, and their relative time course. But how can these insights be applied to communicative situations in which prosody serves a predominantly interpersonal function? This comment examines recent data highlighting the dynamic interplay of prosody and language, when vocal attributes serve the sociopragmatic goals of the speaker (...) or reveal interpersonal information that listeners use to construct a mental representation of what is being communicated. Our comment serves as a beacon to researchers interested in how the neurocognitive system “makes sense” of socioemotive aspects of prosody. (shrink)

Current conceptions of shame emphasize its negative communication value as a phenomenon of conscious experience. A tendency in our contemporary society is to view this phenomenon as an extremely disparaging and undesirable experience that every person should avoid or eliminate. It has become a cultural norm now that shame, perceived as human failure or sickness, is to be rejected, hidden, and not discussed. It is believed to stand in the way of personal progress and self-realization. The research literature mirrors not (...) only the lack of interest in understanding but the ignorance of this central-to-human-life experience. The present study examines the meaning and communicative structure of shame through an application of the phenomenological method of Merleau-Ponty and Lanigan. My analysis is grounded in empirical phenomenology and focuses on meaning as reflected in verbal protocols. The results obtained dispel the misleading notion of shame as primarily a negative, to-be-avoided experience. Rather, reflection on the empirical data indicates that the subjects do not adopt the negative theoretical model of shame but accept it as a universal positive experience of communication that is fundamental in their self-improvement process. (shrink)

instead he argues for a conditional: "if there is such a thing as narrow content, it is holistic," where holism is taken to be "the doctrine that any _substantial_ difference in W-beliefs, whether between two people or between one person at two times, requires a difference in the meaning or content of W" (153, 152).

Emotions and consciousness are intimately linked and often conceived from a purely intrapersonal perspective. This paper explores the implications of considering emotions as not only intrapersonal but also as interpersonal and transpersonal heterarchical (i.e., every component has potentially equal importance) systems. It is telling that in contemplative traditions and contemporary research on hypnotic experience, deep 'inner' experience is pregnant with interpersonal and transpersonal meanings. Similarly, the propensity to have porous conscious experiences is paralleled by the tendency to be (...) affected by the emotion of others. Anecdotal and experimental evidence on anomalous events clearly suggests that strong emotions can have non-local effects. That consciousness and emotions are embedded within interpersonal and transpersonal fields has important epistemological and ethical implications. (shrink)

Although the concept of the consumer–brand relationship has undergone rapid change over the past two decades, the issue of brand addiction is still generally neglected in the literature. Based on social identity theory, the research develops a conceptual model of the influence of self-expressive brands and susceptibility to interpersonal influence on brand addiction. The results of this research demonstrate both separate and joint effects of SEBs and SUSCEP on brand addiction. In addition, harmonious brand passion and obsessive brand passion (...) positively mediate the relationships among SEB, SUSCEP, and brand addiction. The research explores the formation mechanism of brand addiction from a new perspective and has important practical implications for brand marketers concerned with finding the most effective means to enhance the consumer–brand relationship. (shrink)

This paper considers the ethics of placebo‐controlled trials in developing countries, where a treatment already exists but is not available due to the low local standard of care. Such trials would not be permitted in more developed nations where a higher standard of care is available. I argue that there are moral intuitions against such trials, but a further intuition that if the trials were aimed at producing treatment options for the developing world, that would be more permissible than if (...) the trials were designed with the benefit of rich world people in mind. An approach based upon GA Cohen's work on interpersonal justifiability is suggested to allow us to explain these intuitions. Cohen's framework shows that these trials are ethically problematic because the inequality in healthcare provision between developing and developed nations that allows them to take place is at least partly the pharmaceutical corporations’ fault. Following Cohen's argument, this means the trials are non‐comprehensively justified. This allows for a more complete explanation of our intuitions than to consider such trials as cases of exploitation, because intuitions on the ethicacy of research can vary even when the exploitation relation remains the same. It is then established that there is good empirical evidence to believe that pharmaceutical corporations do fail the interpersonal justifiability test. The policy implications of this judgement are then considered, and it is suggested that the framework might be equally applicable to examining the permissibility of research conducted on vulnerable people within more developed nations. (shrink)

The epistemological ideal would aim to respect the different scientific traditions from which the scientist can be fed, which may not follow the hegemonic lines. Interpersonality in science would mean a scientific multiculturality that respects the different paradigms developed in epistemology. We will see which epistemological conception has a closer relation with the dimensions that trialism proposes, according to which law is composed with sociologic, normologic and dikelogic elements. In the end, it will be possible to have a clearer idea (...) of the complexity in a more diverse sense, which develops trialism not only as the vision of the lawyer’s profession, but also as a research perspective. The complex thought, as an epistemological attitude which is open to the different methodological tools provided by the different epistemological perspectives in the philosophy of science, allows a better coexistence of contradictory positions within a single epistemological posture. Thus, a scientist can profit from the different tools in each of them. Having proved the close relation between the trialistic theory and the complex thought, a scientist of law will be able to develop deeper research lines, having more respect for his tendencies in the trialism. El ideal epistemológico apuntaría a que se respeten las distintas tradiciones científicas en las que pueda abrevar el científico, que pueden no seguir las líneas hegemónicas. La interpersonalidad en la ciencia significaría una multiculturalidad científica respetuosa de los distintos paradigmas que se desarrollan en la Epistemología. Veremos qué concepción epistemológica se relaciona más con las dimensiones que plantea el trialismo según el cual el Derecho está compuesto de elementos sociológicos, normológicos y valorativos (dikelógicos). Al final de lo cual se hará más clara la complejidad, en el sentido de diversidad, que desarrolla la teoría trialista como perspectiva de investigación, y no sólo como herramienta para la profesión abogadil. El pensamiento complejo, como actitud epistemológica abierta a las distintas herramientas metodológicas que provienen de las diversas perspectivas en filosofía de la ciencia, permite una mayor convivencia de posiciones contrarias al interior de una misma postura epistemológica. Y así, un científico podrá aprovechar las distintas herramientas de cada una de ellas. Habiéndose probado la estrecha relación entre la teoría trialista y el pensamiento complejo, un científico del Derecho podrá desarrollar más líneas de investigación y con mayor profundidad, respetándose más sus tendencias, en el trialismo. (shrink)

This article explores the psychology behind thinking and communicating, subsequently proposing a pragmatic model for improving these processes. It begins from the consideration that we all operate very limited cognitive “machines”: in an average lifetime, the human brain can theoretically store up to 0.0000084% (8.4×10⁻⁸) and consciously process some 0.0000000000512% (5.12×10⁻¹³) of the (digital) information that was ever created, captured or replicated by humans. Such a dismally low ratio between human cognitive capacities on the one side, and the total amount (...) of existing information on the other means that thinking and communicating—especially on “difficult” topics such as warfare, politics or religion—usually involves unilateral or hypolateral thinking. This is defined as people’s general tendency to ignore most of the existing information on any topic; to specialize only on information immediately available and; to use cognitive strategies and other cognitive meta-mechanisms to simplify thinking processes. On the basis of these considerations, the article proposes: (1) a logical proof of why most of our “objective” knowledge is in fact built from emotions and intentions, rather than from rationality and ontological proofs—suggesting that our “inner world” is the ultimate driver of the “outer world” as we perceive it; and (2) a model of hyperlateral or omnilateral thinking, whereby we consciously follow a technique to become aware of the existence of a multitude of perspectives on any one topic, a necessary precondition for meaningful thinking and communication to happen. (shrink)

How does monetization affect interpersonal relationships? Drawing on social phenomenology, I argue that an answer must account for money’s symbolic dualism: On the one hand, as Zelizer has shown, money is differentially earmarked according to the interpersonal relationships it flows through. On the other hand, in everyday life, people tend to associate money with cold impersonality. Money’s dual association with both the interpersonal and the impersonal imbues the relationships it flows through with a sense of risk, which (...) I call “the risk of lost meanings.” Analyzing the implications of this sense of risk, I argue that it turns trust into a relational preoccupation and constrains intersubjective experience. The risk of lost meanings may motivate risk-avoidance strategies, but these strategies are largely counterproductive. Shedding new light on a long-standing debate in the sociology of money, I discuss the implications of this argument for analyses of monetary developments and local currencies. (shrink)

This chapter suggests that one of Henry James’s three great later novels, The Wings of the Dove is an exacting study of the enormously intricate processes through which we human beings come to understand one another. This process is one in which real words—that is, not merely words as transcribed, or words on paper, but words as voiced by a person, by a character—display their power in revealing who we are, what we mean, and what we mean to each other. (...) In the novel Merton Densher only gradually comes to realize—first through vague hints, then through ambiguous intimations, then through clarified intimation, then through non-explicit implication, then through clear implication, and finally through explicit statement—what Kate Croy’s plan is (i.e., to let the terminally ill Milly Theale fall in love with and marry Densher, leaving him her vast fortune which, after her demise, will be theirs). And James shows that the communication of meaning need not always be a matter of explicit statement, but can also be shared action that is based on, or indicative of, shared understanding of a kind that is still in its way voiced, but in these cases through a kind of Kierkegaardian indirection, where what they do voice conveys mutual understanding of content not, or not yet, propositionally encapsulated.It is true, Hagberg observes, that one may find it initially implausible to investigate voice, where voice is understood as a too-often-unappreciated determinant of meaning, within the pages of a novel (which, of course, is in the first instance read and not heard). But a closer look proves otherwise: James delivers not only words of a flatly “transcribed” kind. He captures the tone, the voice, of an important linguistic interaction—which he does not only by describing the tone with a sculpted precision, but more importantly still by fully setting out the present psychological and emotional context of an utterance and the backstory, the psychic history, that leads to, and inflects the meaning of, this present utterance and that leads that utterance to be voiced in the way that it is. Read this way, we come to see how James’s late masterpiece makes a significant contribution to the philosophy of language and to the theory of meaning of a kind that incorporates a rich awareness of the significance of voice. Hagberg suggests that what we see here is a literary presentation of the comprehension of interpersonal meaning of a kind so intricate and so truly human that it takes the length of a novel to show it. (shrink)

Social meaning and interaction are shaped by situational elements (real or imagined, explicit or implicit). In this chapter, we introduce the Social Context Network Model (SCNM), which aims to capture the neuroanatomical underpinnings of contextual determinants of social cognition. In the SCNM, prefrontal areas are involved in the generation of focused predictions by updating associations among events (targets) in a specific context. Target-context associations and their experiential learning are indexed by temporal regions. Finally, insular networks support the convergence of (...) emotional and cognitive states related to the coordination between external and internal milieus (or interoception). In brief, we propose that fronto-insulo-temporal networks are critical for the integration of interoceptive states and emotions with social information in order to predict and ascribe social meanings. This framework is then extended to dimensional and transnosological approaches to neuropsychiatry. We highlight how the SCNM can provide clinical and theoretical shortcuts for frontotemporal dementia, autism spectrum disorders, and other neuropsychiatric conditions, supporting a basic contextual impairment underlying social cognition deficits. We present new SCNM paradigms, testable dimensional and transdiagnostic hypotheses, and potential interventions for neuropsychiatric conditions. Finally, we propose a situated approach to formulate tasks that closely resemble everyday cognition while observing key methodological constraints. (shrink)

In response to Alan Holland's 'Darwin and the meaning in life' (Environmental Values 18: 503—518) I argue that there can be room in a Darwinian world for talk of value, in the sense of interpersonal reasons to promote, preserve or cherish some of the states of that world, or to be glad about those states. Darwinian theorists can recognise a range of intrinsically valuable states of affairs, from the pleasure or the happiness of creatures to their flourishing, and (...) need not discard axiology in general. The context of the passage criticised by Holland is explained to show that I was attempting to supply a vocabulary (such as 'reasons to be glad') usable by religious sceptics as well as believers, for comparing worlds with parasitism and predation and worlds without them; the shape of such comparisons is further delineated. Reasons for being tentative about trans-world comparisons are also supplied. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 261-264 [Access article in PDF] Mind, Meaning, and the Brain Thomas Fuchs, MD, PhD Keywords: Mind, brain, meaning, translation, depression. A Systemic View of the Mind Progress in brain research over the past two decades demonstrates the power of the neurobiological paradigm. However, this progress is connected with a restricted field of vision typical of any scientific paradigm. The psychiatrist should (...) be aware of this restriction, because, unlike the brain scientist, he deals with patients, not with brains. The restricted view may be described by the terms of (1) reductionism, (2) reification, and (3) isolation.Reductionism: Neurobiology tends to regard subjectivity as a mere by-product of the brain's activity as a symbol-manipulating machine or an information processor. Consciousness becomes an epiphenomon of the neuronal machinery that, operating behind our back, creates the illusion of a continuous self and of an autonomous will (Churchland 1995; Roth 1996).Reification: Mental or subjective states seem to be localizable in the brain; thoughts or feelings, it appears, may be observed in the colored illumination of cortical and subcortical structures. This results in the belief that brain images could also show the cause of a mental illness, or even the illness itself, which then manifests, for instance, in a reduced metabolic activity in certain areas of the cortex.Isolation: As a further consequence, this view isolates the individual patient and considers his illness separated from the interconnections with his environment. However, on these interconnections his personal experiences and dispositions are founded, and it is the actual interpersonal situation that has triggered his present illness.Walter Glannon's paper successfully counters these tendencies toward a neurobiological reductionism with an extended view of the mind: "... the mind is not located in any one place but is distributed among the brain, the body, and the environment." Of course, who observes someone's brain will never see his thoughts, his pain, or his anxiety. For consciousness is not a localizable object or state at all but a process of relating to something: a perceiving of, remembering of, wishing for, aiming at, and so on. Thus on the phenomenological level, there is nothing like a "mental event" that could be isolated from the world and from the stream of conscious experiences. The mind exists only embedded in the world and in the temporal process of life.The same applies to the biological level: Consciousness is based on the continuous interaction of the brain with the organism, and of the organism as a whole with the environment. The role of the brain for mental phenomena is thus comparable to the role of the heart in the circulatory system or of the lung in the respiratory system. Of course, the lung is the central organ of breathing, but respiration may not be restricted to the [End Page 261] lung, nor to the organism as a whole. It means constant exchange with the environment, and there is no sense in asking whether the air taken in still belongs to the surroundings or already to the organism. The same systemic unity is found in the circle of perception and action mediated by the brain: When I am writing a letter, there is no place in the unity of action where my "self" ends and the "world" begins, no border that separates inner and outer worlds.There is another argument to be raised against the reification of the mind if we consider the aspect of a historical biology. From birth on, our mind as well as the correlated brain structures are essentially formed by social and cultural influences. The brain is not inserted into the world as a prefabricated apparatus but through its plastic development in and from the world. Thus it adapts epigenetically to its specific natural and social environment like a key to a lock. This complementarity makes it impossible to restrict one's view to the anatomic organ and requires an interdisciplinary approach to brain-environment investigation, as for example, under the heading of a "social cognitive neuroscience" (Ochsner and Lieberman 2001).As Glannon goes on to argue, to overcome... (shrink)

What sense could it make to describe your life as ‘unlivable’? What is it not only to be alive but to have a life that you live or lead? I answer by developing a social understanding of the pursuit of meaning in life. True to other uses of ‘meaning,’ I propose, meaning in a life is communicative. If you experience your life as ‘unlivable,’ recovery can lie in this communicative dynamic: you regain the experience of leading your (...) life by letting others remind you of meanings you have communicated to them in leading it. My argument develops an analogy between two dimensions in which you project an investment – a care, concern, love, or the like – when you form an intention or plan. Intrapersonally, you project your investment as communicatively intelligible to your own future self at ‘plan’s end.’ Interpersonally, you project it as communicatively intelligible to others who might come to love this thing that you love simply because you love it, as an expression of love for you. The normativity of meaning in your life puts rational pressure on you not only to abandon investments that you cannot communicate but to experience the meaning in investments that you retain. (shrink)

Concepts are basic elements of thought. Piaget has a conception of the nature of concepts as informational or computational operations performed in an inner milieu and enabling the child to understand the world in which it lives and acts. Concepts are, however, not merely logico‐mathematical but are also conceptually linked to the mastery of language which itself involves the appropriate use of words in social and interpersonal settings. In the light of Vygotsky's work on the social and interactive nature (...) of children's thinking and the nature of language as an essentially public currency of rule‐governed signs, we are led to reconstrue conceptual mastery as the acquisition of an interactive and interpersonal repertoire of tools which introduces the child to the world of those who educate it. In this way we come to see the elements of mind as constitutively involving that activity in which the determinants of meaning constrain and direct the child's linguistic development. (shrink)