In this chapter I offer a critique of the received way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction and propose an alternative approach that takes as its point of departure the epistemic agency exhibited by people navigating impossible situations together. One such situation is becoming increasingly common in the context of climate change: so-called “natural” disasters wreaking havoc on communities—flooding homes, collapsing infrastructures, and straining the capacities of existing organizations to safeguard lives and livelihoods. What happens when philosophical reflection (...) begins here—in places where the institutions and practices that have emerged over the last century seem incapable of addressing the problems communities face now, and where people find themselves turning to one another for the sake of their own survival? (shrink)

The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings from all the things we did not do when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, collective inaction and omission have not yet received much attention in the literature. (...) collective inaction, I argue, can be attributed to a group of agents where a collective action x that the agents did not perform was collectively feasible at time t where each agent in that group had sufficient reason to contribute to performing x or others had a reasonable expectation that they would perform x. I show that, perhaps surprisingly, we can speak of collective inaction even where only one member of the group fails to act. However, where large and dispersed groups of agents are concerned, there is often no meaningful way of attributing collective failings. Still, I contend that the failure to close the global emissions gap and—in some cases—to generate herd immunity are indeed on us. (shrink)

This study aims to identify the following factors that affect the physical inactivity of the students in saint joseph college aged 12- 16 years old. It aims to understand the impact of this crisis and how to address this pressing issue. A descriptive- survey research design was utilized to document the respondents' behavior, demographics, and experiences correlated to the questions provided. The questionnaire includes 15-item questions that seek to gather information on their basic profile, current experiences, and behavior towards physical (...) activities. The study discovers that teenagers aged 12-16 years old are inactive in physical activities and sports due to some reasons like exposure to too much time to gadgets, whether the activity provides a fun and offers socialization, lack of motivation, occupied schedules for other matters, the covid- 19 pandemic, costly sports equipment on the sports of their interest, the unavailability of playing area, and lastly health concerns. Therefore, physical inactivity only alleviates certain issues, physically, mentally, spiritually, and socially. Physical inactivity is the result of demotivated individuals, physical illiteracy, prolonged screen time, and health issues. (shrink)

When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into (...) groups capable of so doing. In this paper I argue that several questionable assumptions have shaped the character and scope of inquiry to this point, precluding us from grappling with a range of important questions concerning the epistemic dimensions of collective inaction. I offer an overview of recent conversation concerning collective inaction, advance a critique of the picture of responsibility that has emerged from this conversation, and propose an alternative approach to th... (shrink)

Putting measures in place to prevent wrongdoing in organizations is important, but detecting and correcting wrongdoing are also vital. Employees who detect wrongdoing should, therefore, be encouraged to respond in a manner that supports corrective action. This article examines the influence of the ethical culture of organizations on employee responses to observed wrongdoing. Different dimensions of ethical culture are related to different types of intended responses. The findings show that several dimensions of ethical culture were negatively related to intended (...) class='Hi'>inaction and external whistleblowing and positively related to intended confrontation, reporting to management, and calling an ethics hotline. (shrink)

Despite a growing literature on environmental inaction, it remains poorly understood. This article examines much of this literature including environmental ethics, policy studies, disaster theory, and psychology. Among the many existing explanations, we examine shifting values, rational incentives, and psychological barriers to action. Ultimately, we show how most of these explanations rely on simplistic assumptions about subjectivity. To address this, we apply the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to show how an understanding of habit informed by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology reveals the (...) deeper conditions of both action and inaction. (shrink)

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on (...) Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported... (shrink)

This article features the contributions of Fichte and Schopenhauer to a philosophical account of action against the background of Kant's earlier and influential treatment of the topic. The article first presents Kant's pertinent contributions in the areas of general epistemology and metaphysics, general practical philosophy, the philosophy of law and ethic. Then the focus is on Fichte's further original work on the issue of action in those same areas. Finally, the article turns to Schopenhauer's radical revision of the Kantian and (...) Fichtean affirmative accounts of acting and willing through the correlated introduction of the irrational will, the self-negated will and ethical inaction. (shrink)

how's going human civilizat5ion: preparing to leave earth behind?

The present text aims to develop a new perspective on Young's social connection model by focusing on the reification of market processes. The starting point is the inconsequentialism argument, which holds that consumers have too little influence to bear responsibility for structural injustices such as the climate crisis.

Admissions to upper-tier universities have become increasingly competitive. The erosion of gains made during the Civil Rights Era is evidenced by recent legal actions at the University of Michigan. In this paper I argue that affirmative action programs remain a necessary means for achieving social justice. Further, I argue that more than mere affirmative action, what is also required is Nancy Fraser’s “Transformative Action.” To reach these conclusions, the paper is divided into three parts: (1) The continued assault on Affirmative (...) Action; (2) the SAT and race; and (3) transformative action. (shrink)

At some time around August 324b.c., Antipater, the regent of Macedonia received orders from Alexander the Great that he was to be replaced with another eminent officer in the Macedonian court, Craterus. In addition to his removal from office, Antipater was ordered by Alexander to leave Macedonia for the East, bringing with him fresh levies to replenish those that comprised Craterus' own contingent of veterans from Opis. Though Craterus left Alexander's court shortly thereafter, neither man can be said to have (...) made the journey speedily or directly. A range of reasons has been given to explain Craterus' slow advancement, including the construction of infrastructure to allow the transportation of military resources from east to west, the poor state of his health, and the need to recruit more men. By the time of Alexander's death in June of 323, Craterus and his forces had only reached the province of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia. Antipater's immediate reaction to his new role is not recorded, but what is known is that he remained steadfast in Macedonia, seemingly in defiance of Alexander's orders. It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate Antipater's refusal to depart from Macedonia, to explore whether tensions between Antipater and his replacement could account for Craterus' sluggish advance and to highlight the impact that Greek domestic politics had on Antipater's position in Macedonia. (shrink)

This article seeks to question the relationship between “Political”, “Life” and “Action”, returning to the reading of Hannah Arendt’s concept of “ vita active ” in The Human Condition. Particularly, going back to the subject of “action” as a condition of possibility of “political life”. To do this, this analysis will focus on the thought of Philo, especially in a strange text in his corpus: The contemplative life or supplicants. The aim of the paper is to reflect on the place (...) where philosophical reflection and theological reflection as a political forms are installed and what implications does this has: what happens when the foundation of teaching does not pass through the “ vita activa ” but by a passive life under consecration to the task of reflection and study: can we raise from there a communal manner that constitutes politics as in-action? (shrink)

The effects of anthropogenic climate change may be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism (...) is a significant cause of climate change inaction. The answer to this question depends mainly on the extent to which being a moral nihilist reduces one's likelihood of taking action against climate change. At first sight, the extent seems to be considerable. I argue, however, that this assumption is false. Only slightly more non-nihilists than nihilists are led to climate-friendly actions by moral considerations. And in absolute terms, morality plays such a minor role in leading people to act that the difference is barely noticeable. (shrink)

After an industrial accident it often becomes clear that no one ever asked “Does this facility pose a risk to residents? Why don’t such moral questions get asked?” This paper constructs a typology that presents a comprehensive and systematic account of why moral questions never get raised publicly. The typology is constructed by using the Model of Moral Inaction and the risk triad framework which are both developed in this paper from already existing social science literature.

Continuing growth, insofar as it increases human environmental impact, is in conflict with the environment. ‘Green growth’, if it increases the absolute size of the economy, is an oxymoron. Environmental limits are discountenanced, a pretence made possible because they are difficult to specify in advance. The consequent weakness in public discourse, both moral and intellectual, has worsened into contradiction as it has become ever more studiously unadmitted. It is obscured with language that is misleading or self-contradictory, and even issues from (...) institutions that exist to respect correctness. At its most conforming it gives rise to overshoot, by which statements meant to sound authoritative are in fact open to ridicule. Such untruthfulness perpetuates climate change inaction, and in a kind of direct action those using such language, contrary to their public or professional duty, could be asked to justify themselves in plain English. (shrink)

Agamemnon’s death cries elicit an elaborate choral debate structured to track and satirize the movement from interventionist impulse to evasion and inaction, and characterized by procedural terminology, the categories speech/delay/action, and self-conscious reflections on its own deliberative practice. These are familiar themes from later strictures of public discourse, in history and political oratory, and from that perspective the dramatic chorus too may be read as a meta-rhetorical comment on ekklesiastic deliberation where logoi and erga fly out of sync. I (...) argue that the inconclusive debate glances beyond its immediate context and resonates with the extra-textual experiences of Aeschylus’ audience. (shrink)

This Article explores several meanings of a regulatory preference for government inaction. It explains the rise to dominance of this inaction preference in the United States and its distorting influence on the perception and understanding of regulation. Specifically, the Article demonstrates how basic terms in regulation, such as “government failure,” “regulatory capture,” and “deregulation,” acquired misleading connotations suggesting that government inaction is always superior to government action. The Article further explains how, through government inaction, the U.S. (...) legal system accommodates rent extraction - the profitable exploitation of market imperfections and favorable laws. Several developments in recent decades have considerably improved the capacity of very small groups in society to collect rents, namely, use talent and positional advantages to gain increasing levels of earnings. The Article argues that the parallel rise of the inaction preference has contributed to this trend, primarily because the availability of rent extraction opportunities draws talent that utilizes them with growing effectiveness. The purpose of the Article is to clarify several aspects of the relationships between regulation and rent extraction or, more precisely, to emphasize that government inaction may entail undesirable income effects. (shrink)

In economic situations where action entails a fixed cost, inaction is the norm. Action is taken infrequently, and adjustments are large when they occur. Interest in economic models that exhibit ''lumpy'' behavior of this kind has exploded in recent years, spurred by growing evidence that it is typical in many important economic decisions, including price setting, investment, hiring, durable goods purchases, and portfolio management. In The Economics of Inaction, leading economist Nancy Stokey shows how the tools of stochastic (...) control can be applied to dynamic problems of decision making under uncertainty when fixed costs are present. Stokey provides a self-contained, rigorous, and clear treatment of two types of models, impulse and instantaneous control. She presents the relevant results about Brownian motion and other diffusion processes, develops methods for analyzing each type of problem, and discusses applications to price setting, investment, and durable goods purchases. This authoritative book will be essential reading for graduate students and researchers in macroeconomics. (shrink)

This paper offers a structural diagnosis of the global climate inaction paradox: why, despite overwhelming scientific consensus and public awareness, meaningful action on climate change remains elusive. Drawing from Judgemental Philosophy, we argue that climate judgement is structurally undermined due to the failure of the Judgemental Triad: constructibility, coherence, and especially resonance. We demonstrate how temporal, spatial, and affective disconnects render climate scenarios experientially unownable. This disjunction leads to a collapse of judgement—not of information or will. As a remedy, (...) we propose a new framework for climate ethics based on restoring resonance with the planetary future, redefining climate responsibility not as a burden of facts, but as a structure of return. (shrink)

Research on action–inaction regret has mostly examined morally-neutral, instrumental choices; far less is known about regret in prosocial contexts where help-offering is morally valued yet can be intrusive. We hypothesised that failing to meet recipients’ expectations by offering unwanted help (action) would elicit more regret than not offering wanted help (inaction), particularly under weak prosocial norms. We manipulated (Study 1) or measured (Study 2) prosocial norms using workplace vignettes (N = 425). When norms discouraged helping, participants anticipated more (...) regret following action, compared to inaction. However, when workplace norms encouraged helping, participants anticipated more regret following inaction. Moreover, participants expected actors to be less willing to help in the future than non-actors, especially under weak prosocial norms. These findings show that anticipated regret and behavioural intentions following prosocial action or inaction depend on social norms, suggesting that what people perceive as common behaviour shapes expected emotions and intentions in moral domains. (shrink)

In our busy and hurried lives, we are losing the ability to be inactive. Human existence becomes fully absorbed by activity – even leisure, treated as a respite from work, becomes part of the same logic. Intense life today means first of all more performance or more consumption. We have forgotten that it is precisely inactivity, which does not produce anything, that represents an intense and radiant form of life. For Byung-Chul Han, inactivity constitutes the human. Without moments of pause (...) or hesitation, acting deteriorates into blind action and reaction. When life follows the rule of stimulus–response and need–satisfaction, it atrophies into pure survival: naked biological life. If we lose the ability to be inactive, we begin to resemble machines that simply function. True life begins when concern for survival, for the exigencies of mere life, ends. The ultimate purpose of all human endeavour is inactivity. In a beautifully crafted ode to the art of being still, Han shows that the current crisis in our society calls for a very different way of life: one based on the _vita contemplative_. He pleads for bringing our ceaseless activities to a stop and making room for the magic that happens in between. Life receives its radiance only from inactivity. _Also available as an audiobook._. (shrink)

Despite increasing pressure to deal with climate change, firms have been slow to respond with effective action. This article presents a multi-level framework for a better understanding of why many firms are failing to reduce their absolute greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to climate change. The concepts of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance from research in psychology, sociology, and organization theory can explain the phenomenon of organizational inaction on climate change. Antecedents related to short-termism and uncertainty avoidance reinforce one another (...) at three levels—individual, organizational, and institutional—and result in organizational inaction on climate change. The article also discusses the implications of this multi-level framework for research on corporate sustainability. (shrink)

In the study of Emmanuel Levinas’s political philosophy, a prevalent theme has been the compatibility, or lack thereof, between ethics and politics. Often this issue culminates in the problem of the necessity of political violence. In recent years, the consensus has largely shifted towards supporting the mutual dependence of politics and ethics, and in this article, I also argue that these two categories are indeed compatible. However, this leads to some potential issues. After Annabel Herzog, I suggest that a major (...) question plaguing Levinas’s political philosophy is the problem of teleology: can ethical action in the realm of politics ever be for or in the name of a cause? I argue that Levinas’s theory of political Judaism does entail a risk of teleology or theodicy. This risk can only be avoided if in addition to ethical action one leaves room for ethical inaction in the realm of politics. (shrink)

While large portions of the mammalian genome are known to replicate sequentially in a distinct, tissue‐specific order, recent studies suggest that the inactive X chromosome is duplicated rapidly via random, synchronous DNA synthesis at numerous adjacent regions. The rapid duplication of the inactive X chromosome was observed in high‐resolution studies visualizing DNA replication patterns in the nucleus, and by allele‐specific DNA sequencing studies measuring the extent of DNA synthesis. These studies conclude that inactive X chromosomes complete replication earlier than previously (...) thought and suggest that the strict order of DNA replication detected in the majority of genomic regions is not preserved in non‐transcribed, “silent” chromatin. These observations alter current concepts about the regulation of DNA replication in non‐transcribed portions of the genome in general and in the inactive X‐chromosome in particular. (shrink)

This discussion of Sergio Tenenbaum’s excellent book, Rational Powers in Action, focuses on two noteworthy aspects of the big picture. First, questions are raised about Tenenbaum’s methodology of giving primacy to cases in which the agent has all the requisite background knowledge, including knowledge of a means that will be sufficient for achieving her end, and no significant false beliefs. Second, the implications of Tenenbaum’s views concerning the rational constraints on revising our ends are examined.

Planetary degradation continues despite widely publicized eco-friendly behaviors of individual firms, creating a big disconnect. Drawing upon paradox theory, we examine the prevalence of both corporate compensatory action and environmental inaction after a firm commits environmental misdeeds. We argue that both limited compensatory actions and persistent inaction pose significant moral, economic, and system-level ecological implications. Next, based on insights from crisis management literature, we propose a multi-stage, sequential model to predict both the likelihood that a firm takes eco-friendly (...) action after misdeeds and, if it does, the extent of these actions. In the first stage, we hypothesize that firm size, a proxy for visibility, positively moderates the likelihood of taking eco-friendly action to redirect negative attention after misdeeds. In the second stage, we hypothesize that smaller, more nimble firms have an implementation advantage, leading to a higher likelihood of more action after misdeeds. Based on 12,012 observations from the KLD sample of US-based firms between 2013 and 2019, inclusive, we find support for the big disconnect, since we find that inaction is the most common response after misdeeds. We also find that larger firms are more likely to have eco-friendly behaviors. And, for those firms who take action, smaller firms undertake more compensatory actions after environmental misdeeds. Persistent inaction and dispersed, small-scale compensatory actions can be problematic. Smaller firms may expend unnecessary resources and not get credit for disparate, eco-friendly activities. At the same time, larger firms may get more credit than deserved despite relatively limited actions. Collectively, inaction and dispersed compensatory action may not have sufficient impact to alter ecological degradation with subsequent intergenerational, irreversible harms. Nuanced practical and scholarly implications that curtail limited action while encouraging small firm experimentation are explored. (shrink)

As the sustained and devastating extent of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic becomes apparent, a key focus of public scrutiny in the UK has centred on the novel legal and regulatory measures introduced in response to the virus. When those measures were first implemented in March 2020 by the UK Government, it was thought that human rights obligations would limit excesses of governmental action and that the public had more to fear from unwarranted intrusion into civil liberties. However, within the (...) first year of the pandemic’s devastation in the UK, a different picture has emerged: rather than through action, it is governmentalinactionthat has given rise to greater human rights concerns. The UK Government has been roundly criticized for its inadequate response, including missteps in decision-making, delayed implementation and poor enforcement of lockdown measures, abandonment of testing, shortages of critical resources and inadequate test and trace methods. In this article, we analyse the UK Government’s missteps and compare them with published international guidance; we also contrast the UK’s decisions with those taken by several other countries to understand how its actions and inactions have contributed to unfavourable outcomes. Using an analytical perspective that demonstrates how human rights are both a protection from the power of the state and a requirement that governmental powers are used to protect the lives, health and wellbeing of citizens, we argue that the UK Government’s failure to exercise their powers competently allowed the virus to spread without ensuring the country had the means to manage a high case load. This abject failure has led to one of the highest rates of deaths per capita worldwide. We offer several lessons that can be learnt from this unfortunate, but preventable, situation. (shrink)

Without exaggeration, it could be said that we are entering a golden age of neuroscience. Informed by recent developments in neuroimaging that allow us to peer into the working brain at both a structural and functional level, neuroscientists are beginning to untangle mechanisms of recovery after brain injury and grapple with age-old questions about brain and mind and their correlates neural mechanisms and consciousness. Neuroimaging, coupled with new diagnostic categories and assessment scales are helping us develop a new diagnostic nosology (...) about disorders of consciousness which will likely improve prognostication and suggest therapeutic advances. Historically such diagnostic refinement has yield therapeutic advances in medicine and there is no reason to doubt that this will be the case for disorders of consciousness, perhaps bringing relief to a marginalized population now on the periphery of the therapeutic agenda. In spite of this promise, the translation of research findings into the clinical context will be difficult. As we move from descriptive categories about disorders of consciousness, like the vegetative or minimally conscious states, to ones further specified by integrating behavioral and neuroimaging findings, humility not hubris should be the virtue that guides the ethical conduct of research and practice. (shrink)

Recently, a multinomial process tree model was developed to measure an agent’s consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and generalized inaction/action preferences when making moral decisions (CNI model). However, the CNI model presupposed that an agent considersconsequences—norms—generalizedinaction/actionpreferences sequentially, which is untenable based on recent evidence. Besides, the CNI model generates parameters at the group level based on binary categorical data. Hence, theC/N/Iparameters cannot be used for correlation analyses or other conventional research designs. To solve these limitations, we developed the CAN algorithm (...) to computenormandconsequencesensitivities and overallaction/inactionpreferences algebraically in a parallel manner. We re-analyzed the raw data of the original CNI model to test the methodological predictions. Our results demonstrate that: (1) theCparameter is approximately equal between the CNI model and CAN algorithm; (2) theNparameter under the CNI model approximately equalsN/(1 −C) under the CAN algorithm; (3) theIparameter andAparameter are reversed around 0.5 – the larger theIparameter, the more the generalized inactionversusaction preference and the larger theAparameter, the more overall actionversusinaction preference; (4) tests of differences in parameters between groups with the CNI model and CAN algorithm led to almost the same statistical conclusion; (5) parameters from the CAN algorithm can be used for correlational analyses and multiple comparisons, and this is an advantage over the parameters from the CNI model. The theoretical and methodological implications of our study were also discussed. (shrink)

The classical distinction between leisure and work is often used to define features of the emancipated life. In Aristotle leisure is defined as time devoted to purposeful activity, and distinguished from the labour time expended merely to produce life’s necessities. In critical theory, this classical distinction has been adapted to provide an image of emancipated life, as purposively driven, fulfilling and meaningful activity. Aspects of this adapted definition undermine the classical leisure/work distinction to the extent that the demand for meaningful (...) work, i.e., a leisure-work conjunction, is now used as a critical perspective on unfulfilling, oppressive labour. Rancière, however, is critical both of this idea of an extended franchise for leisure and of its dependence on craft and artisanal labour as the model of satisfying, skilled work. Instead of Aristotelian leisure, or ‘fulfilling’ work, Rancière identifies in the state of reverie an alternative marker for the emancipated life. The theme is consistent across the scattered archival, historiographical, philosophical, literary and aesthetic contexts his writing treats. But since reverie is defined as disengagement from action, the position raises a number of difficulties. This article examines how Rancière connects reverie to emancipation. It focuses on two questions: the nature of the relation between his definition of reverie and the classical, Aristotelian concept of action; and, whether, given the constitutive non-relation between reverie and action that he outlines, Rancière’s position can address the persistent problem in critical theory of the motivation for the emancipated life. It is argued that his highlighting of the potential communicative significance of modes and scenes of emancipated life is relevant to this problem. The key argument is that rather than developing a ‘theory’, his approach to emancipation focuses on and values communicable experiences of emancipation, and that states of reverie are one such type of valued experience. (shrink)

Neoliberalism has installed an unending competitive struggle in the economy. Within this context activists have pushed for a reappraisal of laziness and inactivity as forms of resistance. This idea has been picked up by Maurizio Lazzarato and Giorgio Agamben in different ways. I start with explaining the former’s appraisal of laziness as a release of potentialities unrealizable under financial capitalism. Lazzarato’s appraisal of laziness however resembles neoliberal theories of innovation, because both share the conceptual persona of a subject whose potentialities (...) exceed the current status quo. Potentiality is thus not an unambiguous antagonist of capitalism, as Lazzarato suggests. In order to adequately oppose neoliberalism, Lazzarato should question the role of potentiality in capitalism. Agamben has undertaken such a project. In the second part of the essay I consequently argue that Agamben’s philosophy of inactivity as impotentiality is able to circumvent neoliberalism and the society of the spectacle. (shrink)

Discussion of Fodor's doctrine of 'methodological solipsism' and Stich's principle of autonomy' has been concerned to show that these principles are incompatible with psychological theories which appeal to states with content (e.g. beliefs and desires). Concern with these issues, and the subsequent attempt to develop a notion of 'narrow' content which is solipsistic or autonomous, has, I believe, obscured a more fundamental issue: No theory which satisfies these principles would ever be able to explain behavior under descriptions which are in (...) fact important to psychology. But I do not simply argue that there are descriptions under which psychological theories will not in fact explain behavior; I argue that descriptions under which psychological theories do explain behavior are not compatible with solipsistic principles. I develop several thought experiments to demonstrate this. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the seeming tension found in The Bhagavad Gita in our duties as described in the practice of Karma yoga. The path of Karma yoga involves renunciation and yet we also have an obligation to act righteously. How are we to simultaneously choose a path of duty and let go of what our actions along that path produce? I will argue that the seeming tension is a result of a misunderstanding of renunciation or non-attachment as well (...) as an incomplete view of the dualistic philosophy of yoga theory. I describe the two main paths of yoga that are emphasized in The Bhagavad Gita, Jnana yoga or the path of knowledge and Karma yoga or the path of action, and argue that it is necessary to understand Karma yoga in light of Jnana yoga and to apply Jnana yoga so that it‟s not an abstract school of thought, but a philosophy that can be applied to best live our lives. (shrink)

The motives behind the author’s decision to resuscitate a patient are examined. This is prompted by the realisation that he ignored the man’s apparent wish not to be saved for fear of criticism from both relatives and colleagues. The way in which decisions are made when the interests of the doctor and the patient clash are briefly explored. Self interest may play a more significant role than is commonly accepted.