One's inaccuracy for a proposition is defined as the squared difference between the truth value (1 or 0) of the proposition and the credence (or subjective probability, or degree of belief) assigned to the proposition. One should have the epistemic goal of minimizing the expected inaccuracies of one's credences. We show that the method of minimizing expected inaccuracy can be used to solve certain probability problems involving information loss and self-locating beliefs (where a self-locating belief of a temporal (...) part of an individual is a belief about where or when that temporal part is located). We analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, the duplication version of the Sleeping Beauty problem, and various related problems. (shrink)

This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information. We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with the problem of (...) measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications. _1_ Introduction _2_ Formal Analyses of the Three Interpretations _2.1_ Reduction in doubt _2.2_ Reduction in uncertainty _2.3_ Divergence _3_ Inconsistency with Epistemic Value of Information _4_ Problem of Measure Sensitivity _5_ Reduction in Expected Inaccuracy _6_ Resolution of the Problem of Measure Sensitivity _6.1_ Alternative measures of inaccuracy _6.2_ Resolution by strict propriety _6.3_ Range of applications _7_ Global Scoring Rules _8_ Conclusion. (shrink)

Pereboom (2011) is an extremely rich investigation of some of the central questions in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the foreground are the usual suspects from the current scene, but Kant and Russell loom in the background, and footnotes elaborate connections to people as apparently remote from the normal run of things as Dilthey and Derrida. With so much covered one is inevitably forced to focus on some things, setting aside others. Here I will concentrate on two ideas contained in (...) the first part of the book: Pereboom's ‘qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis’ and his criticisms of ‘the epistemic strategy’, a strategy I have defended in a number of places (e.g. Stoljar 2006, 2009). (shrink)

The problem of joint measurement of incompatible observables is investigated. Measurements are represented by positive operator-valued measures. A quantitative notion of inaccuracy is defined. It is shown that within this framework joint inaccurate measurements are possible for arbitrary maximal projection-valued measures on finite-dimensional spaces. The accuracy of such measurements is limited, as is shown by an inaccuracy inequality we derive. This new type of uncertainty relation can be unambiguously interpreted as referring to measurement precision rather than preparative quality. (...) Several recent experiments are seen to be realizations of such joint measurements. (shrink)

I ask whether and when historical inaccuracy in a work of art constitutes an aesthetic flaw. I first consider a few replies derived from others: conceptual impossibility, import-export inconsistency, failure of reference, and imaginative resistance. I argue that while there is a grain of truth to some of these proposals, none of them ultimately succeeds. I proceed to offer an alternative account on which the aesthetic demerits of historical inaccuracies stem from a violation of the conversational contract between author (...) and audience. The key question is what that contract implies. (shrink)

Yablo has argued for an alternative form of if-thenism that is more conducive with his figurative fictionalism. This commentary sets out to challenge whether the remainder, ρ, tends to be an inaccurate representation of the conditions that are supposed to complete the enthymeme from φ to Ψ. Whilst by some accounts the inaccuracies shouldn't set off any alarm bells, the truth of ρ is too inexact. The content of ρ, a partial truth, must display a sensitivity to the contextual background (...) conditions for subtraction to work properly in Yablo's view. Using a toy example, I argue that Yablo's subtraction model tends to yield partial truths as remainders that fail to rule out inaccurate expressions that may prove to be problematic for it. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to show that within contemporary philosophy of perception, it has become far from clear what proponents of the Content View mean when they claim that experience has accuracy conditions and, therefore, accuracy evaluable content. Two very different interpretations can be discerned here, one which holds that content _has_ accuracy conditions and one which explicitly identifies content with such conditions. On the other hand, the paper wants to argue (...) that neither of these versions succeeds in showing why we should attribute either accuracy conditions or accuracy evaluable content to perceptual experience. To this end, I will present an elaborated argument (which focuses on the moon illusion) to show why we have as yet no reason to think that perceptual experience has accuracy conditions and, therefore, accuracy evaluable content. Instead, it will be argued that perceptual experience is best thought of as accuracy _maker_, not as something which can itself be representationally accurate or inaccurate. (shrink)

After an initial period of popularity in the 1960s and 1970s, André Malraux’s works on the theory of art, "The Voices of Silence" and "The Metamorphosis of the Gods", lapsed into relative obscurity. A major factor in this fall from grace was the frosty reception given to these works by a number of leading art historians, including E.H. Gombrich, who accused Malraux of an irresponsible approach to art history and of "reckless inaccuracies". This essay examines a representative sample of the (...) art historians' arguments and contends that they reveal serious misreadings of Malraux’s texts and a recurring tendency to confuse matters of interpretation with matters of fact. The article suggests that the charge of irresponsibility might well be levelled at the critics themselves, and that the myth of Malraux as guilty of ‘reckless inaccuracies’ needs to be debunked. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with the (...) problem of measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications. (shrink)

The accuracy principle is one of the key standards of informational privacy. It epitomises the obligation for those processing personal data to keep their records accurate and up-to-date, with the aim of protecting individuals from unfair decisions. Currently, however, different practices being put in place in order to enhance the protection of individuals appear to deliberately rely on the use of ‘inaccurate’ personal information. This article explores such practices and tries to assess their potential for privacy protection, giving particular attention (...) to their legal implications and to related ethical issues. Ultimately, it suggests that the use of ‘inaccurate’ data can potentially play a useful role to preserve the informational autonomy of the individual, and that any understandings of privacy or personal data protection that would tend to unduly limit such potential should be critically questioned. (shrink)

One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we made this norm mathematically precise; in this paper, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of (...) Bayesianism follow from the norm, while the characteristic claim of the Objectivist Bayesian follows from the norm along with an extra assumption. Finally, we consider Richard Jeffrey’s proposed generalization of conditionalization. We show not only that his rule cannot be derived from the norm, unless the requirement of Rigidity is imposed from the start, but further that the norm reveals it to be illegitimate. We end by deriving an alternative updating rule for those cases in which Jeffrey’s is usually supposed to apply. (shrink)

Proposed is a two-factor explanation for our resistance to illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. The first is that we lack, and can't easily imagine, ways of checking the accuracy of introspective phenomenal representation. The second is that illusions of phenomenal consciousness would themselves appear to be phenomenally conscious. The illusionist's defence is to apply illusionism to illusions of consciousness, but the result, even if formally coherent, resists imaginative conception.

One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its sequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this paper, we make this norm mathematically precise in various ways. We describe three epistemic dilemmas that an agent might face if she (...) attempts to follow Accuracy, and we show that the only inaccuracy measures that do not give rise to such dilemmas are the quadratic inaccuracy measures. In the sequel, we derive the main tenets of Bayesianism from the relevant mathematical versions of Accuracy to which this characterization of the legitimate inaccuracy measures gives rise, but we also show that Jeffrey conditionalization has to be replaced by a different method of update in order for Accuracy to be satisfied. (shrink)

We investigate two main sources of information inaccuracies in demand information sharing along the supply chain. Firstly, we perform a systematic literature review on inaccuracy in demand information sharing and its impact on supply chain dynamics. Secondly, we model several SC settings using system dynamics and assess the impact of such information inaccuracies on SC performance. More specifically, we study the impact of four factors using three SC dynamic performance indicators. The results suggest that demand error has a negative (...) impact on SC performance, which is exacerbated by the magnitude of the error and by low demand variability scenarios. In contrast, demand delay produces a nonlinear behavior in the supply chain response, being influenced by the supply chain configuration. (shrink)

BackgroundQuotations are crucial to science but have been shown to be often inaccurate. Quotation errors, that is, a reference not supporting the authors’ claim, may still be a significant issue in scientific medical writing. This study aimed to examine the quotation error rate and trends over time in the medical literature.MethodsA systematic search of PubMed, Web of Science, and reference lists for quotation error studies in medicine and without date or language restrictions identified 46 studies analyzing 32,000 quotations/references. Literature search, (...) data extraction, and risk of bias assessments were performed independently by two raters. Random-effects meta-analyses and meta-regression were used to analyze error rates and trends (protocol pre-registered on OSF).Results16.9% (95% CI: 14.1%-20.0%) of quotations were incorrect, with approximately half classified as major errors (8.0% [95% CI: 6.4%-10.0%]). Heterogeneity was high, and Egger’s test for small study effects remained negative throughout. Meta-regression showed no significant improvement in quotation accuracy over recent years (slope: -0.002 [95% CI: -0.03 to 0.02], p = 0.85). Neither risk of bias, nor the number of references were statistically significantly associated with total error rate, but journal impact factor was: Spearman’s ρ = –0.253 (p = 0.043, binomial test, N = 25).ConclusionsQuotation errors remain a problem in the medical literature, with no improvement over time. Addressing this issue requires concerted efforts to improve scholarly practices and editorial processes. (shrink)

Work by social constructionists over the past decade and a half has reenforced the epistemological pessimist's despair that our system of science could ever be a mirror of nature. Realists argue that the amazing success of modern science at precise prediction and control indicates just the contrary. In response, social constructionists often point out that these successes seldom apply to the world as it comes naturally, but only as it is reconstructed in the scientist's laboratory. But this does not explain (...) how scientific accounts, which are as wide of the mark as constructionists suppose in their general descriptions of the natural world, could be so effective in a limited environment, even if that environment is as benignly constructed as possible. This paper suggests that a more wholistic view of nature than modern science usually presupposes may provide an answer. (shrink)

Levinstein recently presented a challenge to accuracy-first epistemology. He claims that there is no strictly proper, truth-directed, additive, and differentiable scoring rule that recognises the contingency of varying importance, i.e., the fact that an agent might value the inaccuracy of her credences differently at different possible worlds. In my response, I will argue that accuracy-first epistemology can capture the contingency of varying importance while maintaining its commitment to additivity, propriety, truth-directedness, and differentiability. I will construct a scoring rule — (...) a weighted scoring rule — and a global inaccuracy measure that has all four required properties and recognises the contingency of varying importance. I will show that Levinstein’s and my results coexist without contradicting each other. (shrink)

Chapter 4 contends that evaluation of a number of criticisms of conceivability arguments against physicalism highlights the advantages of the challenge to arguments of this kind based on the qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis. This challenge crucially involves the claim that we introspectively represent phenomenal properties as having certain qualitative features, while it is an open possibility that they actually lack them. Robert Stalnaker, John Hawthorne, and David Braddon-Mitchell each contend that the apparent conceivabilities at issue in these arguments presuppose the (...) falsity of physicalism, and as a result they fail to pose a strong objection to the physicalist. Daniel Stoljar has argued that due to our ignorance, the conception of the physical operative in these arguments is in effect not ideal, and that this undercuts their force. Stephen Yablo calls into question the Kripke-inspired thought that once it is established that conceivability arguments are not subject to confusion about which propositions are being conceived, then they are in the clear. In his analysis, a defect that may still persist is a failure of the ideality condition on conceivability. I argue that in each case the qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis can correct or embellish these contentions profitably. In the discussion of Yablo’s contribution, I develop a more comprehensive diagnosis of why conceivability arguments might be compelling while at the same time unsound. (shrink)

This chapter contends that a Kantian perspective on the nature of introspective representation inspires a defense of a physicalist understanding of phenomenal states in the face of the most prominent arguments against it. Immanuel Kant claims that introspective representations (those of _inner sense_) are entities caused by the states they represent and are distinct from them, and that they mediate the representational relationship between the subject and the introspected psychological states. As a result, the subject may not represent these states (...) as they are in themselves. It is argued that Kant's position yields a significant challenge to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, and that it provides a response to those — like Joseph Levine and Robert Adams — who maintain that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal that the physicalist will have difficulty closing. (shrink)

A challenge we face in a world that has been shaped by, and continues to be shaped by, racist attitudes and institutions is that the evidence is often stacked in favor of racist beliefs. As a result, we may find ourselves facing the following conflict: what if the evidence we have supports something we morally shouldn’t believe? For example, it is morally wrong to assume, solely on the basis of someone’s skin color, that they’re a staff member. But, what if (...) you’re in a context where, because of historical patterns of discrimination, someone’s skin color is a very good indicator that they’re a staff member? When this sort of normative conflict looms, a conflict between moral considerations on the one hand and what you epistemically ought to believe given the evidence on the other, what should we do? It might be unfair to assume that they’re a staff member, but to ignore the evidence would mean risking inaccurate beliefs. Some, notably Tamar Gendler (2011), have suggested that we simply face a tragic irresolvable dilemma. In this chapter, I consider how these cases of conflict arise and I canvass the viability of suggested resolutions of the conflict. In the end, I argue that there’s actually no conflict here. Moral considerations can change how we epistemically should respond to the evidence. (shrink)

Bayesians have traditionally taken a dim view of the Inference to the Best Explanation, arguing that, if IBE is at variance with Bayes ' rule, then it runs afoul of the dynamic Dutch book argument. More recently, Bayes ' rule has been claimed to be superior on grounds of conduciveness to our epistemic goal. The present paper aims to show that neither of these arguments succeeds in undermining IBE.

Pereboom and Caruso propose the quarantine model as an alternative to existing models of criminal justice. They appeal to the established public health practice of quarantining people, which is believed to be effective and morally justified, to explain why -in criminal justice- it is also morally acceptable to detain wrongdoers, without assuming the existence of a retrospective moral responsibility. Wrongdoers in their model are treated as carriers of dangerous diseases and as such should be preventively detained (or rehabilitated) until they (...) no longer pose a threat to society. Our main concern in this paper is that Pereboom and Caruso adopt an idiosyncratic meaning of quarantine regulations. We highlight a set of important disanalogies between their quarantine model and the quarantine regulations currently adopted in public health policies. More specifically, we argue that the similarities that Pereboom and Caruso propose to substantiate their analogy are not consistent—despite what they claim—with the regulations underlying quarantine as an epidemiological process. We also notice that certain quarantine procedures adopted in public health systems are inadequate to deal with criminal behaviors. On these grounds, we conclude that Pereboom and Caruso should not appeal to the quarantine analogy to substantiate their view, unless they address the issues and criticism we raise in this paper. (shrink)

The training of engineers in the field of hydraulics on the territory of contemporary Ukraine began more than a century ago at the Mechanical Department of the Kharkiv Institute of Technology (KhTI). This article, dedicated to the history and the establishment of the hydraulic laboratory in Kharkiv, provides clarity on the role of its founders. In particular, it outlines the reasons that forced Heorhiy Fyodorovych Proskura to abruptly shift his research focus from hydraulics and hydraulic engineering to aviation and aeronautics. (...) This change of his scientific interests later paved the way for the establishment of Kharkiv Aviation Institute (KhAI). (shrink)

Chapter 3 develops a response to David Chalmers’s conceivability argument against (ordinary) physicalism analogous to the objection to the knowledge argument set out in Chapter 1. The conceivability argument hinges on the claim that it is conceivable, in an appropriately sophisticated way, that a world that is (nothing but) an exact physical duplicate of the actual world feature no phenomenal consciousness – i.e., that a zombie world is conceivable. From this premise the argument reasons to the conclusion that the complete (...) physical truth does not necessitate the complete phenomenal truth, or even any phenomenal truth, and that therefore physicalism is false. I develop a response to this argument appeals to the same central claim as the foregoing reply to the knowledge argument. Physicalism requires that phenomenal truths be a priori derivable from the complete physical truth about the actual world. However, if introspection did represent phenomenal states inaccurately, on analogy with our ordinary visual color representations on Locke’s conception, then the truth of physicalism would not require propositions about phenomenal properties as they are represented introspectively to be derivable a priori from the complete physical truth about the actual world. For if the qualitative natures these phenomenal properties are introspectively represented as having are incorrectly attributed to them, and are features these properties actually lack, then it might well be that all facts about the real natures of phenomenal states are derivable a priori from the complete physical truth after all. (shrink)

Chapter 1 contends that it is a serious open possibility that introspection misrepresents phenomenal properties as having qualitative natures that they really lack, and that this possibility supplies a response to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. If this possibility were actual, then the appearance that microphysically omniscient Mary learns something new upon leaving her black-and-white room could be due to our ignorance of this misrepresentation. When Mary leaves the room and sees the red tomato we imagine her having the belief of (...) the form: (A) Seeing red has R, On a first proposal, ‘R’ is taken to refer to a property with a qualitative nature accurately represented by the introspective what-it-is-like-to-sense-red mode of presentation. Then because phenomenal redness has no such nature, what Mary believes would be false, and thus she would not acquire a new true belief. On the other hand, if ‘R’ is conceived instead to refer to a property with a qualitative nature that appears to Mary in the what-it-is-like-to-sense-red way, yet is misrepresented by this mode of presentation, and is instead straightforwardly physical, we can suppose that her belief is true. But since in the room she already believed the truth expressed by (A), she also would not acquire a new true belief. So either the belief of form (A) is false, or it is true but Mary already had it when she was in the room. On neither option is the knowledge argument sound. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ de- grees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more, rather than less accurate degrees of belief, and (ii) that it is better to have less, rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain ways of becoming less incoherent always guarantee improvements in accuracy. Incompatibilities between (...) particular incoherence and inaccuracy measures can be exploited to argue against particular ways of measuring either inaccuracy or incoherence. (shrink)

Works of fiction are often criticized for their historical inaccuracies. But this practice poses a problem: why would we criticize a work of fiction for its historical inaccuracy given that it is a work of fiction? There is an intuition that historical inaccuracies in works of fiction diminish their value as works of fiction; and yet, given that they are works of fiction, there is also an intuition that such works should be free from the constraints of historical truth. (...) The puzzle of historical criticism is that these intuitions are obviously in conflict, and yet we wish to give up neither. In this essay, I address the shortcomings of two seemingly intuitive strategies for solving the puzzle: the puzzle cannot be solved by appealing to historical constraints of a work’s genre, nor can it be explained as an instance of imaginative resistance. Given the failure of these two strategies, I suggest that there is no easy way to account for our conflicting intuitions and that the puzzle is deserving of greater attention. (shrink)

This paper proposes an analysis of surprise formulated in terms of proximity to the truth, to replace the probabilistic account of surprise. It is common to link surprise to the low probability of the outcome. The idea seems sensible because an outcome with a low probability is unexpected, and an unexpected outcome often surprises us. However, the link between surprise and low probability is known to break down in some cases. There have been some attempts to modify the probabilistic account (...) to deal with these cases, but as we shall see, they are still faced with problems. The new analysis of surprise I propose turns to accuracy and identifies an unexpected degree of inaccuracy as reason for surprise. The shift from probability to proximity allows us to solve puzzles that strain the probabilistic account of surprise. (shrink)

This chapter examines to what extent it is true that fiction is a problematic source of information about empirical matters. This is done via a comparison with what are often thought of as paradigmatic sources of empirical knowledge, at least in well-formed cases: historical texts. The focus of the discussion is on _testimony_—roughly, the conveying of information to a hearer with the aim of being believed, partly on the speaker’s say-so—as it occurs in both historical and fictional _texts_. The chapter (...) concludes that despite appearances, in many typical cases fiction can be a relatively solid source of information about the world, so that indignant responses to occasions of inaccuracy in fiction may not be misplaced after all. (shrink)

Philosophic inquiry into the mental states of elite athletes during skilled motor performance continues to grow. In contrast to the bulk of these works that focus almost exclusively on skillful performance, this paper examines athletic motor behavior from a point of inexactness – or even failure – in athletic performance. Utilizing the works of Michael Polanyi, who believed that both ideas of achievement and failure were equally necessary to understand the behavior of living things and their physical actions, I examine (...) the notion of failure as a framework to scrutinize the cognitive processes occurring during the development and performance of skilled motor behavior. After reviewing Polanyi’s conceptions of personal knowing to locate the source of inaccuracy in human activity, I present Polanyi’s distinction between two kinds of mistakes and apply each to inaccurate sport performance. I then suggest that mistakes in sport should be re-conceptualized beyond their current negative connotations. Instead, conceptions of mistakes should also include respect for ‘man’s most distinguished act’ – that being the production of knowledge. From this expanded perspective, the value of inexact motor performance can be found in addition to notions of uncertainty and skill development in what Polanyi calls ‘metaphysical implication of a groping for reality’. In some final thoughts, I will suggest future implications of the value of the inexact on broader sport issues. (shrink)

Concerning the notorious Sleeping Beauty problem, philosophers have debated whether 1/2 or 1/3 is rational as Beauty’s credence in the coin’s landing heads. According to Kierland and Monton, the answer depends on whether her goal is to minimize average or total inaccuracy because, while the expected average inaccuracy of Halfing is smaller than that of Thirding, the expected total inaccuracy of Thirding is lower than that of Halfing. In this paper, I argue that Halfing is average accuracy (...) dominated but Thirding is not; and that each of the standard forms of Halfing and Thirding regards a different credence assignment as better than itself in terms of total accuracy. Therefore, Halfing is irrational, and Thirding is likely to be rational, for the goal of minimizing average inaccuracy; but both Halfing and Thirding, at least in their standard forms, are irrational for the goal of minimizing total inaccuracy. (shrink)

The goal of a partial belief is to be accurate, or close to the truth. By appealing to this norm, I seek norms for partial beliefs in self-locating and non-self-locating propositions. My aim is to find norms that are analogous to the Bayesian norms, which, I argue, only apply unproblematically to partial beliefs in non-self-locating propositions. I argue that the goal of a set of partial beliefs is to minimize the expected inaccuracy of those beliefs. However, in the self-locating (...) framework, there are two equally legitimate definitions of expected inaccuracy. And, while each gives rise to the same synchronic norm for partial beliefs, they give rise to different, inconsistent diachronic norms. I conclude that both norms are rationally permissible. En passant, I note that this entails that both Halfer and Thirder solutions to the well-known Sleeping Beauty puzzle are rationally permissible. (shrink)

This paper examined the integrity, impact and good governance value of election prophecies (EPs) in the last 20 years in selected African countries juxtaposed with President Donald Trump’s EPs in America. As a primary source, empirical research was conducted alongside a historical survey. The data collected from 519 respondents revealed that a majority believe in prophecies, but they queried the integrity, impact and value of EPs due to the inconsistency, inaccuracy, confusion and unhealthy public panics engendered. Despite the adverse (...) effects, many adherents still subscribe to the phenomenon due to the psychological and emotional influence. Subsequently, this article critiqued the research outcome through Biblical Theology. It held that EPs remain vital in the public life of nations, but the current approach in Africa needs some review. These include: (1) the need to revisit the tasks of prophets as Hope givers, Reformers and those who speak truth to power in pre- and post-election seasons; (2) the scrutiny of EPs by the plurality of Prophets, ecumenical leaders and the public, with the four suggested evaluation indices; and (3) the need to curb the negative effect of EPs on healthy electoral processes using enacted public account policies. Contribution: This article contributes to an interdisciplinary religious aspect of research covering Biblical theology, psephology and politics. (shrink)

The discussion of a particular kind of interpretation of the energy-time uncertainty relation, the “pragmatic time” version of the ETUR outlined in Part I of this work [measurement duration (pragmatic time) versus uncertainty of energy disturbance or measurement inaccuracy] is reviewed. Then the Aharonov-Bohm counter-example is reformulated within the modern quantum theory of unsharp measurements and thereby confirmed in a rigorous way.

Wedgwood focuses his discussion around two evaluative concepts: _correctness_ and _rationality_. Wedgwood proposes that these two concepts are related in the following way: one belief state is more rational than another if and only if the first has less expected inaccuracy than the former. He argues, however, that this view should not be understood as a form of consequentialism since it is not the _total_ consequences of a belief state that determine its rationality. The view is rather a version (...) of _epistemic teleology_. Wedgwood deploys this view to illuminate the difference between synchronic and diachronic evaluation of belief states as well as to disarm objections that have been leveled against epistemic consequentialism. (shrink)

Decision-making capacity (DMC) assessments determine whether patients may authorize medical interventions, yet the prevailing sliding-scale model, requiring greater certainty of capacity for higher-risk decisions, fails to account for the ethical implications of declaring a patient incapacitated. When patients are found to lack DMC, decision-making authority shifts to surrogate decision-makers, whose well-documented inaccuracy in predicting patient preferences frequently leads to treatment that does not align with the patient's values. Thus, DMC assessment is not merely a clinical determination but also an (...) ethically significant act that may wrongfully strip patients of authority over decisions whose consequences they alone must bear. As such, when a patient expresses a treatment preference, does not clearly lack DMC, and faces an intervention that is restrictive, invasive, painful, or permanent, clinicians should adopt a more autonomy-protective approach. An algorithm is provided to help clinicians determine when to allow patients with unclear capacity to retain decision-making authority. (shrink)

BackgroundDonepezil, an acetylcholinesterase inhibitor used in the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease, has been widely cited in media and bioethics literature on cognitive enhancement (CE) as having the potential to improve the cognitive ability of healthy individuals. In both literatures, this claim has been repeatedly supported by the results of a small study published by Yesavageet al.in 2002 on non-demented pilots (30–70 years old). The factors contributing to this specific interpretation of this study’s results are unclear.MethodsWe examined print media and interdisciplinary (...) bioethics coverage of this small study, aiming to provide insight into how evidence from research may be shaped within different discourses, potentially influencing important policy, ethics, and clinical decisions. Systematic qualitative content analysis was used to examine how this study was reported in 27 media and 22 bioethics articles. Articles were analyzed for content related to: (1) headlines and titles; (2) colloquialisms; and, (3) accuracy of reporting of the characteristics and results of the study.ResultsIn media and bioethics articles referencing this small study, strong claims were made about donepezil as a CE drug. The majority of headlines, titles, and colloquialisms used enhancement language and the majority of these suggest that donepezil could be used to enhance intellectual ability. Further, both literatures moved between reporting the results of the primary study and magnifying the perceived connection between these results and the CE debate that was alluded to in the primary study. Specific descriptions of the results overwhelmingly reported an improvement in performance on a flight simulator, while more general statements claimed donepezil enhanced cognitive performance. Further, a high level of reporting accuracy was found regarding study characteristics of the original study, but variable levels of accuracy surrounded the presentation of complex characteristics (i.e., methods) or contentious properties of the CE debate (i.e., initial health status of the study subjects).ConclusionsHyped claims of CE effects cannot be completely accounted for by sheer inaccuracy in reporting. A complex interaction between the primary and secondary literature, and expectations and social pressures related to CE appears to drive enthusiastic reports. (shrink)

During word learning, incorrect guesses about meaning are inevitable, particularly in difficult learning situations. Prior research has shown that optimally difficult tasks improve word learning and retention, but found no item‐level effects of first‐guess inaccuracy on learning, raising the question of how difficulty and guessing accuracy interact in this process. Effects of first‐guess accuracy on retention are unknown. To unpack the effects of task difficulty and first‐guess accuracy on word learning and retention, we conducted two cross‐situational word‐learning (CSWL) studies. (...) In Study 1, 49 English‐speaking adults completed a difficult CSWL task with four items presented on each trial. Their word learning was tested immediately following the learning phase and then again 48 h later. Data were analyzed with respect to the accuracy of the first guess of a word's meaning. Participants in this study learned and retained words best when their first guess had been correct. Study 2 simplified learning, presenting three items per trial. Fifty‐two English‐speaking participants showed high levels of learning and retention, with no significant differences based on first‐guess accuracy. Comparing data across these studies revealed effects of both task difficulty and first‐guess accuracy on learning, as well as an interaction of these factors, revealing a greater cost to inaccurate first guesses on the more difficult task. Retention of word meanings, however, was associated only with task difficulty. These results have implications for theories of error‐driven versus difficulty‐driven learning. (shrink)

The focus of this paper will be on an argument that has been recently put forward by Kevin Dorst against the desirability of the irrationalist explanation of the phenomenon of group polarization. I will show that this argument is unsound, as it crucially relies on an implausible interpretation of the notion of higher-order inaccuracy in the epistemic domain. To do so, it will prove useful to discuss two alternative ways of formalizing the principle ruling out inaccurate higher-order beliefs, which (...) I will call the Non-Inaccuracy Constraint. Arguments structurally similar to Dorst’s one might be raised against the desirability of irrationalist explanations of other phenomena. My objection to Dorst’s argument would apply to them as well, and consequently its scope goes beyond the case of polarization. (shrink)

According to the Qur'an, the Prophet was commissioned to convey the Qur'an to all mankind and the jinn. This duty can be perceived as a human-specific practice in the Qur'an in the first place. This is because the literal approach leads to the assumption that the Qur'anic addresses are addressed to human beings, especially men. However, when the artistic style of the Qur'anic language is analyzed in terms of rhetoric, it is understood that these addresses are addressed to all human (...) beings, men and women, as well as all jinn. This study tries to clarify that the art of taghlīb, which is one of the artistic features of the Qur'anic address, constitutes evidence that the jinn are also liable beings and that they are responsible for the entire content of the Qur'an. The Qur'anic address was delivered to human beings through the Prophet, who was a human prophet. Therefore, human beings are obligated to the Qur'an. However, it is understood from some verses that the jinn are also the addressees of the Qur'an and that the Prophet conveyed Islam to them as well. It is noteworthy that the Qur'an contains some commands, prohibitions and admonitions regarding the jinn, who are ontologically different from humans. These verses indicate that the jinn are obliged by the commands and prohibitions of the Qur'an and condemned by its judgments. It is understood that determining the meaning of the obligation of these beings, which cannot be perceived by human senses, is an important issue both in terms of determining the perspective of the Qur'an regarding the jinn and in terms of eliminating the negative perception of the jinn that is common among the society. From the Qur'anic point of view, jinn are beings who live in the world like humans but have their own way of being and lifestyle. Since they are beings that cannot be perceived by the senses, we can only know as much about the jinn as the Qur'an and Sunnah inform us. In the Qur'an, it is pointed out that they are beings who are responsible for servitude like humans. Some hadiths also provide information to this effect. In the light of this information, examining the nature of the jinn's responsibilities towards the Qur'an, their obligations towards worship, and their attitudes towards the Qur'an's commands and prohibitions (against the prisoner) is not only instrumental in revealing the scope of the Prophet and the Qur'an's address, but also important in terms of determining the perspective that the Qur'an puts forward regarding the jinn's obligations. The study also sheds some light on the inaccuracy of today's perception of the jinn. In addition, the issue of the offer is dealt with as the subject of theology and is defined for human beings. However, the Qur'an states that the obligated being is not only the human species. Again, the term “al-mahkkûm aleyh” is a term that refers to the obligated person in the Fiqh methodology, and as in the definition of the offer, this term is constructed only on the basis of human beings. It is mentioned in some verses that the Qur'an addresses the jinn as well. Therefore, it is important to identify the beings that the Qur'an considers as the addressee, the obliged and the condemned. It is also understood that these definitions should be evaluated by taking into account the perspective put forward by the Qur'an. This study examines the jinn, who are one of the interlocutors that the Qur'an indicates that they are obligated and condemned. Since the studies on the jinn are generally conducted within the theological framework, the focus has been on determining their ontological structure, their state of existence, their vital activities and their status in relation to faith. However, it has been observed that their position vis-à-vis Islam and the Qur'an from the perspective of the Qur'an has not been specifically analyzed. For this reason, in this study, in the light of the information in the Qur'an, the jinn's status of being liable and being against the condemned is examined. In the Qur'an, human, angel, jinn, animal and other beings in nature are mentioned as types of beings. It is understood from the Qur'an that among these beings, humans and jinn were created with a free will and an inclination towards servitude. As a result of the study, the meaning of the jinn's will and willpower and their being obliged to the Qur'an's commands and prohibitions regarding faith, deeds and morality as the addressee of the Qur'an is revealed. In this study, in which the survey method, one of the social sciences research methods, was preferred, the verses containing information about the jinn were identified, and the verses among these verses that reveal that the jinn are liable and condemned were analyzed by taking into account the order of the Mushaf. Then, the issue of whether the jinn are the addressees of the Qur'an's addresses is analyzed by taking into account the style of taglīb, one of the characteristics of the Qur'anic address. (shrink)

Humans are endowed with a suite of cognitive mechanisms that enable them to mitigate the risk of misinformation and underlie their epistemic vigilance. When direct access to the initial source of information is unavailable, individuals often rely on the vigilance of others to acquire beliefs. Moreover, monitoring the critical alertness of one’s interlocutors is essential for interpreting their communicative intentions, particularly in cases of deliberately conveying false information, such as lies or verbal irony. However, little is known about the human (...) capacity to track others’ epistemic vigilance and use this information to guide belief formation and pragmatic interpretation. This study investigates whether children aged from 4 to 8 selectively trust vigilant over gullible informants. Our findings suggest that selective trust based on informant vigilance towards inaccuracy begins to emerge around the age of 6. (shrink)