Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is (...) unable to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. 1Introduction 2Motivations 2.1Theory change 2.2Permutation invariance 3Metaphysics 4Generalism 4.1Quantifier generalism 4.2Algebraic generalism 5Why Generalism Is Not Ontic Structural Realism 6Ontic Structural Realism as Meta-metaphysics 7Conclusion. (shrink)

According to quantifier generalism, all facts about the world can be expressed in a language devoid of proper names, whose only referential expressions are variables bound by quantifiers. This paper considers and repels some of the recently raised objections against this position. The central part of the paper presents a critical analysis of the claim advanced by Ted Sider that quantifier generalism is inevitably holistic and therefore requires unusually strong expressive resources when applied to infinite domains. Using an (...) example of arithmetic, it is shown that there is a simple generalistic description of natural numbers that does not resort to any infinitary conjunctions or quantifiers. Such generalistic accounts also exist in many cases involving continua (such as descriptions of matter distribution in a continuous space). Moreover, these accounts are arguably superior to their individualistic counterparts due to their parsimony. In addition to that, Sider’s argument alleging that generalism cannot account for the difference between non-isomorphic models of arithmetic is repelled. (shrink)

The disagreement between generalists, who claim that conspiracy theories can be evaluated as a class, and particularists, who claim that each conspiracy theory must be evaluated on its own merits, has been one of the main dividing lines in the literature on conspiracy theories, although it has recently been suggested that consensus has settled in favour of particularism. In this paper we first argue that as it stands this disagreement is merely verbal: both sides are correct, given what they mean (...) by ‘conspiracy theory’. We then revive a substantial version of the debate by adopting the project of analysing the ordinary concept of a conspiracy theory, which offers clear criteria on a correct definition. Our proposal is that the definition that best fits these criteria is one on which conspiracy theories are undermined by the testimony of epistemic superiors. Importantly, our definition implies the truth of generalism. While the paper is centrally concerned with advancing a novel view on the nature of conspiracy theories, its broader interest lies in the important connections it draws between this topic and recent discussions of epistemic authority, testimony, and defeat. (shrink)

Relationism is the view that our best physical theories can dispense with spacetime. To show the feasibility of relationism, philosophers have suggested a whole range of approaches, from the postulation of a physical plenum to the use of modality. Shamik Dasgupta has recently suggested using his Generalism to develop a relationist account of spacetime. This paper argues that Dasgupta’s Generalism offers no hope to the defenders of relationism. We first present Generalism in what we take to be (...) its most perspicuous formulation. We then discuss a recent argument by Sider (2020) against Generalism and show how to defuse it. Finally, we present a novel argument against Generalism based on Barrett’s criterion of parsimony (Barrett 2022). (shrink)

This paper is a survey of the generalism-particularism debate in ethics. It's an updated version of "Moral Particularism", in Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics (Continuum, 2011), pp. 247-260.

Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a (...) regulative ideal.". (shrink)

The chapter addresses a problem that affects both regulatory and tort law efforts to control exposure to carcinogens. What should be done when a disease may be the result of “joint causation”? That is, there are two or more possible causes, each of which alone would be sufficient to explain the presence of disease. Tort law has developed a solution to this problem which has recently been adopted by some courts considering toxic torts. However, the problem of joint causation and (...) more general issues raised by causation reveal weaknesses in tort law for compensating victims exposed to toxic substances. Because of these and other problems with tort law, administrative institutions at least _in principle_ may better control human exposure to toxic substances. However, such institutions face enough practical problems that they will not always reliably protect people from toxic substances. In the end, the chapter argues, there are several good reasons for preferring administrative agencies to tort law to provide environmental health protection. However, these theoretical advantages should not blind us to some of the political shortcomings of relying on administrative agencies. For that reason such agencies should not replace tort law, which can continue to serve a backup function to the agencies in our legal system. (shrink)

This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral (...) reasoning. Then I discuss Dancy’s objections to it. I argue that Dancy’s appeal to default reasons is philosophically equivalent to a holistic version of generalism, and hence incompatible with particularism (Section 6) and that his resistance to accept holistic generalism is the result of a foundationalist view of reasoning (Section 7). As an alternative to foundationalism I defend an Aristotelian dialectical view of moral reasoning. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the topics discussed in the book and likens the assessment of toxic substances to the experience of peering through a glass darkly. The work is divided into five main chapters and these chapters give an exploration of the scientific background necessary for understanding the subject. The book examines the practice of predicting risks from animal bioassays and addresses the normative implications of the scientific uncertainties in risk assessment. In addition, the book examines problems in (...) the statistics of human epidemiological studies and animal bioassay and considers practical evidence-gathering problems, theoretical difficulties, and traditional practices in interpreting epidemiological studies and offers an alternative to traditional practices. (shrink)

This chapter argues against the shift in paradigm in favor of scientific evidence in tort law cases. Recent proposals, seeking to require more demanding scientific evidence in toxic tort (and other) suits, are mistaken because these seem to impose a universal standard of evidence for quite different institutions—with the risk of distorting existing reasonable tort law relationships, and erring on the side of exclusion rather than admission of evidence. Since the plaintiff bears the burden of production, requiring that this be (...) met by proof equivalent to the criminal law's “beyond a reasonable doubt,” requirement, as some have argued, this substantially distorts the balance of interests between plaintiff and defendant. The appropriate paradigm is not that for scientific practice but the traditional tort law standard of evidence articulated in _Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co._, which said that the appropriate standard is not scientific certainty but “legal sufficiency.” The paradigm of choice in torts is in a sense inclined to retain much of the status quo. (shrink)

This chapter continues the argument of why ideal levels of scientific accuracy should not be applied in torts and administrative law by focusing on two issues. Firstly, the standards of evidence ought to be appropriate to the institutional context. Secondly, justice requires that priority be given to avoiding false negatives and underregulation. One requires justification of the epistemic presupposition, the other, justification of the underlying moral view. The first issue states that the burden of proof that must be satisfied in (...) order to make a particular institutional decision will depend at least in large part upon the kinds of mistakes one seeks to avoid. For example, criminal law stringently protects against convicting innocent people. To avoid this, the equivalent of false positives, the state must overcome a high burden of proof to establish its case. By contrast, in screening patients for life-threatening diseases we might seek very much to avoid missing someone who has the disease, to avoid false negatives. The second issue comes from the premise that in the common law of torts, distributive issues are not decided as a matter of consistent theory but are developed by means of case-by-case adjudication between two parties. Although judges try to produce consistent decisions over time, but they do not always succeed. If the law is not necessarily consistent, it is especially important to have a better view of more fundamental and consistent normative principles to guide epistemology. (shrink)

The chapter discusses some of the risk assessment issues that arise in administrative agencies charged with regulating carcinogens. It is argued that present assessment strategies, as well as some recommended by commentators, both of which are inspired by the paradigm of research science—the use of careful, detailed, science-intensive, substance-by-substance risk assessments—paralyze regulation. The identification, assessment, and regulation of potential carcinogens are all too slow to evaluate adequately the existing universe of 50,000–100,000 chemical substances, and the 1,000–1,500 new ones that are (...) added each year. Thus, for identified carcinogens we need to adopt something like the expedited approximation procedures, which permit faster evaluation of potentially toxic substances. Alternative approaches to regulatory science which acknowledge and use normative considerations to guide assessment procedures and which recognize the importance of the rate of evaluation will expedite risk assessments and reduce regulatory false negatives and underregulation. (shrink)

This chapter provides some scientific background of risk assessment and sets up some of the institutional questions concerning the appropriate evidentiary standards needed within torts and administrative law to establish the requisite harms or risks of harm. The discussion here focuses on animal bioassays and human epidemiological studies, two aspects of carcinogen risk assessment relied upon in regulatory institutions to ascertain risks to human beings. The best evidence that proves that a substance causes cancer to human beings is provided by (...) _well-done_ epidemiological studies with large samples and sufficient follow-up. However, the chapter begins by considering animal studies, which is the evidence much more frequently relied upon by regulatory agencies, although it is less typically used in tort law and some jurisdictions give it little credence. There are uncertainties in animal bioassays which are large enough such that two different researchers using exactly the same data points from an animal study can come to much different conclusions. (shrink)

In this book, the idea of moral generalism, i.e. morality depends on moral principles, and its arguments are debunked. The author argues that there are no substantive true moral generalizations, and that the existence and provision of such generalizations are not necessary conditions for plausible moral thought, action and education.

The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.

Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral (...) facts explain particular moral facts (i.e. facts about the moral attributes of particulars). Moral holism maintains that what is a moral reason to φ in one case may not be one in another, and may even be a moral reason not to φ given suitable circumstances. Some ‘moral particularists’ maintain that moral holism motivates scepticism about the existence of and need for moral principles, along with scepticism about the viability of principle-based approaches to ethics and moral theory. But I argue that moral holism is itself a form of moral generalism, one that takes facts about the right- and wrong-making powers of (generic) moral factors to explain certain particular moral facts—namely, the rightness and wrongness of particular actions. I also argue that a moral-theoretic version of dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, powers, or capacities are the fundamental units of explanation—explains both why moral holism is true and why moral generalism is true. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a particularist understanding of thick evaluative features, something that is rarely done and is fairly controversial. That is, I argue that sometimes that the fact that an act is just, say, could, in certain situations, provide one with a reason against performing the action. Similarly, selfishness could be right-making. To show this, I take on anti-particularist ideas from two much-cited pieces (by Crisp, and by McNaughton and Rawling), in the influential Moral Particularism anthology (eds.) (...) Hooker and Little (OUP). My paper has already been cited by other people working in the field. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a particularist understanding of thick evaluative features, something that is rarely done and is fairly controversial. That is, I argue that sometimes that the fact that an act is just, say, could, in certain situations, provide one with a reason against performing the action. Similarly, selfishness could be right-making. To show this, I take on anti-particularist ideas from two much-cited pieces (by Crisp, and by McNaughton and Rawling), in the influential Moral Particularism anthology (eds.) (...) Hooker and Little (OUP). My paper has already been cited by other people working in the field. (shrink)

I argue for a kind of sub-category generalism about conspiracy theories. I identify four features that negatively contribute to the evaluation of any conspiracy theory that has them. I argue that particularism about conspiracy theories is in conflict even with this moderate position. I explain the implications of sub-category generalism for questions about the epistemic environment in which epistemic agents operate. I argue that even if there are pragmatic reasons for being vigilant about the possibility of malign conspiracies, (...) this does not support rejecting the claim that it is a prima facie epistemically wrong to believe a conspiracy with any of the four features I identify. I discuss how the favoured sub-category generalism may help to refine discussion about the relationship between the psychology of those who believe conspiracy theories and subjects who have delusions. There are grounds for thinking that believers in conspiracy theories display irrationality at least as bad as those suffering from delusions. This is not to pathologise believers in conspiracy theories but recognise the continuities between those who have delusions and believers who are not the subject of clinical attention. (shrink)

W. D. Ross is commonly considered to be a generalist about prima facie duty but a particularist about absolute duty. That is, many philosophers hold that Ross accepts that there are true moral principles involving prima facie duty but denies that there are any true moral principles involving absolute duty. I agree with the former claim: Ross surely accepts prima facie moral principles. However, in this paper, I challenge the latter claim. Ross, I argue, is no more a particularist about (...) absolute duty than a utilitarian or a Kantian is. While this conclusion is interesting in its own right, it is also important, I argue, because it prevents us from overlooking Ross's criterion of moral obligation and because it may have implications on the broader debate between particularists and generalists. (shrink)

Cum arată un om moral? Este acesta un om care se află în posesia unor principii ferme și știe cum să le aplice? Sau este un om care, neavând nevoie de reguli morale, reușește de fiecare dată să ia decizia corectă? Poate fi moralitatea codificată într-un set de principii universale? Sau viața morală este mult prea complexă pentru a fi guvernată de reguli stricte? Dar dacă moralitatea nu constă în aplicarea unor standarde generale, ci în capacitatea de a lua decizii (...) corecte, cum știm că o decizie este corectă? Iar dacă explicațiile morale trebuie să fie structurate de crtierii universale, cum putem să dăm seama de pluralitatea și singularitatea contextelor etice? Toate aceste întrebări și dileme, care au configurat destinul eticii occidentale de la Platon și Aristotel până în zilele noastre, sunt abordate într-o cheie nouă în filosofia morală contemporană. Apologia principiilor morale și critica acestora constituie cei doi poli între care oscilează etica, împărțind filosofia morală contemporană în două concepții rivale: generalismul și particularismul. Ce argumente au filosofii generaliști și cum răspund susținătorii particularismului? Cât de valabile sunt raționamentele vehiculate și ce s-ar putea spune în plus? Nu cumva, în decursul istoriei, s-a pierdut ceva esențial pentru gândirea morală, ceva care face ca frământările etice ale omului contemporan să fie nesfârșite, sterile și înșelătoare? (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices (...) in aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that specificationism deprives rights of any significant role in practical reasoning before it arrives at a conclusion, while the generalist conception preserves the practical role we intuitively assign to rights in reasoning directed to action. Assuming that a conception of rights faithful to ordinary practical reasoning is preferable, this fact gives a strong reason to prefer generalism over specificationism, although not without qualification. To be satisfactory from the practical standpoint, any account of rights that (...) adopts the generalist view must include second-order principles to orientate agents with regards to addressing rights conflicts. I show that my practical analysis is substantially different from others available in the literature. (shrink)

Source: Author: Leonila C. Crisostomo, Ma. Teresa G. Generales, Amelita L. de Guzman The primary purpose of this study is to ascertain the benefits of the National Service Training Program implementation and to identify the problems encountered by its implementers. Results showed that the benefits derived from the program were topped by enhancement of skills on basic leadership with emphases on the ability to listen and ability to communicate which were rated very important and very much benefited among other training (...) aspects of the program. Results also revealed that students are aware of the importance of physical, mental and social health as well as the observance of proper hygiene for overall sense of well-being. Although recreation is one aspect that the respondents find important, appreciation of it underscores the need to have more time for assignments and projects as most of the respondents are enrolled in their respective courses with 29 units, making them unable to appreciate the perks of involving themselves into various recreational activities. Problems in the implementation showed lack of provision of materials and equipment and of budgetary allocation which rendered full implementation weak as students and faculty involved in the community immersion have to rely on their own resources, in addition to the indifference and passivity of the local government officials. Based on the findings, the researchers recommended that: the school administrators need to allocate adequate budget for materials and equipment; periodic faculty development trainings and; to look into the passive attitude of the local officials to ensure that implementation NSTP projects will benefit both clients and implementers. ]]>. (shrink)

This paper is a critical investigation about the historical origins of two contemporary approaches in ethics: moral particularism and moral generalism. Moral particularism states that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral thought doesn’t consist in the application of moral principles to cases, but in understanding the morally relevant features of an action, which vary from case to case. In opposition, moral generalism is the traditional claim that moral decisions are made by applying general rules to (...) particular actions. Plato is often seen as a moral generalist for his appeal to Forms which are universal standards, while Aristotle is regarded as a precursor of moral particularism for stressing the importance of the “the prudence”, which is the intellectual capacity to perceive the irreducible specificity of a context, and the importance of “the means” which differs from person to person. First I will take Plato into discussion, and I will briefly reconstruct his theoretical account on Justice and virtue in order to establish his “generalist” orientation. Then I will analyze Aristotle’s alleged particularism by appealing to his texts and assessing some considerations of a few contemporary authors. At the end of the paper, I will question both particularism and generalism for the appropriation of the two ancient philosophers, on the ground that modern moral philosophy which is an action centered ethics is hard to reconcile with ancient moral thought which was an agent centered one. (shrink)

At the beginning of the pandemic, many music ensembles had to stop their activities due to the confinement. While some found creative ways to start making music again with the help of technologies, the transition from “real” rehearsals to “online” rehearsals was challenging, especially among older amateur musicians. The aim of this case study was to examine the effects of this transition on three community band conductors and three older amateur musicians. Specific objectives were to explore intergenerational relationships to support (...) online group music-making; digital literacy and access in later life; and online music-making in a COVID-19 context. Semi-structured interviews were conducted and theoretical thematic analysis was undertaken. Results were analyzed from the conductors’ and older musicians’ perspectives, and common trends were combined to facilitate interpretation. The first theme showed that being part of an intergenerational ensemble contributed positively to the learning experience online. The second theme demonstrated that because both conductors and musicians were new to the online rehearsals, it contributed to attenuate the age-related digital divide that may have been observed in other studies. Regarding access in later-life, older musicians reported benefits associated with rehearsing online, specifically in terms of distance/commute, time, energy, and cost. However, for those who did not already have internet and electronic devices, the cost of acquiring all the necessary equipment to make music online could have been too high. Finally, the third theme revealed that musicians appreciated the opportunity to make music online and indicated that it was definitely better than having nothing, especially for its social aspects. In conclusion, while participants noted several challenges associated with online music-making, they were also appreciative of the opportunity to continue making music at a time when in-person rehearsals were not possible. Pedagogical implications are discussed, specifically the importance of the support network, of meeting people where they are, of learning to adapt, and of collaborative teaching. (shrink)

(2010). Remaining True to Our Values – Reflections on Military Ethics in Trying Times. Journal of Military Ethics: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 183-194. doi: 10.1080/15027570.2010.510850.

Moral particularism denies that moral reasons present in particular cases depend on any suitable provision of moral principles. If they did, there should be invariable reasons. But reasons are holistic: whether a consideration is a reason may vary with the context. This work responds to particularism with a moderate form of generalism, according to which it is compatible with reasons holism that moral reasons are fundamentally determined by moral principles. The holism of reasons is explained by construing moral principles (...) as hedged: they determine reasons that are invariable, but only given the presence of certain suitable conditions. Both what may function as a reason and what may function as a suitable condition is determined by the given principle's normative basis---the basis on which we attribute to reasons normative force capable of justifying action. Such determinations don't happen fundamentally on a case-by-case basis, but instead set on the holism of reasons the sorts of antecedent constraints that particularism cannot accept. So, although the view rules out standard forms of generalism, it doesn't collapse into particularism. The moderate generalist view of moral metaphysics is argued also to ground better explanations of the relevant sorts of moral facts than its particularist rivals. It is also argued that generalism can regard moral principles as necessary for good moral deliberation without requiring that the deliberator represent them to herself in explicit propositional form. Psychologically, the grasp of moral principles that is required for proper responsiveness to reasons determined by principles may simply structure one's capacity to be responsive to reasons. Finally, on moderate generalism, overall moral verdicts about particular cases are a function of the relative strengths of the reasons present in them. It is argued, from the structure of value and evaluative comparisons, that the relative strengths of reasons are determined not by priority principles that order competing principles but by evaluative comparisons of the alternatives for which the competing principles specify reasons. A plausible moral epistemology is sketched on which the context-sensitivity of such comparisons doesn't make them too weak to justify moral verdicts. (shrink)

I defend a form of generalism in ethics and aesthetics. Generalism about a domain D is the view that there are principles that play an explanatory role in the metaphysics of D and can be used in reasoning when thinking about D. I argue that in both aesthetics and ethics, there are generic generalizations that are principles. I do this by (i) explaining the nature of a particularly important kind of generic, (ii) argue that generics of this kind (...) play a explanatory role, and (iii) argue that we licitly use these truths in reasoning about ethics and aesthetics. (shrink)

February 1, 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................... .......................ii STATEMENT OF INTEREST............................................................................................ ................. v..