The Mahayana tradition in Buddhist philosophy is defined by its ethical orientation--the adoption of bodhicitta, the aspiration to attain awakening for the benefit of all sentient beings. And indeed, this tradition is known for its literature on ethics, which reflect the Madhyamaka tradition of philosophy, and emphasizes both the imperative to cultivate an attitude of universal care (karuna) grounded in the realization of emptiness, impermanence, independence, and the absence of any self in persons or other phenomena.This position is morally (...) very attractive, but raises an important problem: if all phenomena, including persons and actions, are only conventionally real, can moral injunctions or principles be binding, or does the conventional status of the reality we inhabit condemn us to an ethical relativism or nihilism?In Moonpaths, the Cowherds address an analogous problem in the domain of epistemology and argues that the Madhyamaka tradition has the resources to develop a robust account of truth and knowledge within the context of conventional reality. The essays explore a variety of ways in which to understand important Buddhist texts on ethics and Mahayana moral theory so as to make sense of the genuine force of morality. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relation between causation and the notion of emptiness described in Buddhist philosophy. While the Madhyamaka school argues that some entity’s being caused implies its being empty, some contemporary authors have argued that there is a ‘Humean’ regularity account of causation that can both be understood as a plausible model of the earlier Buddhist Abhidharma account of causation and also block the Madhyamaka inference from causation to emptiness. After describing the (...) Abhidharma account of causation, the ‘Humean’ regularity account and the Madhyamaka argument from causation to emptiness, we assess some ways in which this argument may be developed, with particular focus on the ‘ladder of causation’ and on the Madhyamaka account of time. The debate about the relation between causation and emptiness, it appears, is a facet of a more comprehensive metaphysical debate between a (moderate) foundationalism and a thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism. (shrink)

One strategy Mādhyamikas use to support their claim that nothing has intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is to argue that things with intrinsic nature could not enter into causal relations. But it is not clear that there is a good Madhyamaka argument against ultimate causation that understands causation in ‘Humean’ terms and understands dharmas as tropes. After exploring the rationale behind the intrinsic-nature criterion of dharma-hood, I survey the arguments Mādhyamikas actually give for their claim that anything dependently originated must be devoid (...) of intrinsic nature, and suggest that none actually succeeds in ruling out this hypothesis about how ultimate causation might work. (shrink)

In this study, I reconstruct and compare Alain Badiou’s Being and Event (2005) and Graham Priest’s One (2014), arguing that the ontologies pursued within the two texts are intriguingly analogous in a number of ways. Both Badiou and Priest are committed to thinking through classically ontological problems without denying the validity of the paradoxes they raise; both regard Plato’s Parmenides as an early and formative account of these paradoxes; both establish conclusions to the effect that unity – or “oneness” – (...) is indeed a contradictory phenomenon; and both, as a corollary of this conclusion, develop frameworks which confer ontological prominence upon "the void" and "emptiness" respectively, thereby arriving at what appears to be a shared ontological nihilism. In this comparative study, I not only enquire whether the frameworks adopted by Badiou and Priest really do lead to nihilist conclusions, but also attempt to clearly outline their trajectories of thought for the benefit of those who might be tempted to dismiss their seemingly outlandish theses out of hand. (shrink)

The scholar Mark Siderits defends two views about Buddhism. The first is that the Buddhist denial of independently existing selves is best understood as a kind of reductionism, according to which wholes, by virtue of being nothing more than their atomic parts, are conventionally real but ultimately unreal. The second is that the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness is not a metaphysical thesis, according to which nothing has an intrinsic nature of its own, but rather a semantic thesis, according to (...) which no statement about ultimate reality is true. This chapter uses central metaphysical doctrines from the Huayan School of Chinese Buddhism to develop, in contrast, a nonreductionist approach to wholes and a metaphysical construal of emptiness. (shrink)

In one of his last works, “Emptiness and That-is-ness”, Keiji Nishitani, the main figure of the postwar Kyoto school, tried to construct an alternative logic to the Western classical logic. This chapter aims to advance or restructure his unfinished project by means of paraconsistent logic—a contemporary nonclassical logic. In so doing, some ideas of Jízāng, a great master of the Sānlùn school of classical Chinese Buddhism, are consulted and analyzed in terms of contemporary logic and analytic philosophy. Finally, as (...) a candidate of the logic of emptiness, that is, the logic that incorporates the philosophies of emptiness, this chapter proposes a three-valued system which has a fixed point of negation that is taken to be a designated value. (shrink)

Margaret Archer is probably the critical realist who has most significantly affected the debate around the relationship between social structure and agency. In the volume, Being Human: The Problem of Agency, she aims to better define what is meant by the properties and causal powers of agency itself, i.e., self-consciousness and reflexivity. In this paper, this theoretical attempt is reviewed through the critical standpoint of Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna’s philosophy appears to be a particularly compelling tool for criticizing Archer’s theory. Claiming the (...) emptiness of everything, the founder of the Buddhist Madhyamaka school provides a critical perspective for revising the distinctiveness of human properties and causal powers. Specifically, Nagarjuna’s rejection of the intrinsic nature of all entities reveals that Archer’s attempt to discern something as inherently human is questionable. If our sense of self emerges from embodied practice in the natural world, it may be that it cannot be demolished by social and linguistic forces. However, this does not mean that it can be regarded as a sui generis human property and power. That same embodied practice in the world makes human beings empty of inherent nature. Nevertheless, since emptiness itself is empty, we cannot conclude that human beings are inherently empty, but merely conventionally empty. (shrink)

하리발마의 『성실론(成實論)』에는 삼삼매(三三昧) 셋을 공(空)의 의미 한 가지로써 파 악하는 선관(禪觀)이 나타난다. 이에 근거하면, 공삼매의 의미를 해명하는 것이 삼삼매의 의미를 이해하는 핵심과제가 된다. 『성실론』에서 하리발마는 수많은 경문(經文)을 인용하여 주장의 근거로 삼는 경우가 많 지만, 경문의 출처를 찾아내는 일은 매우 어렵다. 『성실론』 ｢삼삼매품(三三昧品)｣에는 5개 소의 경증(經證)이 있지만, 공삼매의 의미를 밝히는 데 크게 도움되지 않는다. 따라서 현 존하는 남북 양전에서 갖가지 형태로 공삼매의 의미가 서술되는 경문을 먼저 발굴하여 분 석하는 과정이 필요하다. 본 논문은 이러한 문제의식에 바탕하여 초기불전에 나타난 공개 념, 공삼매의 의미를 (...) 밝히는 데 주력할 것이다. 분석결과 공개념과 공삼매의 의미는 다음의 세 가지로 정리된다. 첫 번째 의미는 ‘없 음, 결여’의 뜻으로 쓰이는 경우이다. 선정을 수행하는 과정에서 하위 단계에 존재하는 지각작용을 차례로 제거하면서 상위의 선정으로 향상해나가는 과정을 묘사할 때 ‘없음’ 이라는 공의 뜻이 중심 역할을 하고 있는 사례이다. 두 번째 의미는 ‘비움’이다. 비움이란 모조리 없앤다는 말이 아니라 마음을 더럽히고 문제를 일으키는 부적절한 감정들을 비워낸다는 뜻이다. 탐욕, 분노, 무지 따위를 양산하 는 외부대상에 끌려나가지 않고 안으로 마음의 힘을 해치는 요소들을 비워나가는 과정을 공으로 해석한 대의가 드러나는 경우이다. 세 번째 의미는 경험 현상의 내용을 구성하는 대상을 실체로 보지 않는 사고방식이다. 망상과 아만에 토대한 중생이라는 생각의 문제점 지적, ‘나[吾我], 남[人], 목숨[壽命]’에 대해 분별하는 생각 없이 헤아리는 경지, 심리 현상을 지어내어 구성하는 작용[行, saṅkhārā]의 근간을 잘라냄, 모든 현상을 공의 이치로 바라볼 수 있는 능력의 확보, 무엇 보다 우리가 존재라고 말하는 경험현상은 모두 텅 비어 있는 것이라고 관찰한다는 논지가 분명하게 드러나고 있어서 하리발마 삼삼매관의 연원을 찾아낼 수 있다. (shrink)

Internet-based religious learning has presented a new face to the diversity of Muslim youth. This article aims to analyse and evaluate Muslim youth’s understanding, attitudes, and religious practices and demonstrate the impact of internet-based Islamic learning. As many as 23 Muslim youths in Jepara, Central Java, aged 17–20 years, became the informants of this study. Data were collected through in-depth interviews and observations. Further research data were analysed descriptively and interpretatively. This study found that most Muslim youths who studied Islam (...) online experienced confusion and emptiness in religion caused by an incomplete learning process. Most Muslim youths do not have solid theological views, pseudo-worship practices and weak religious ideologies. This study suggests that teenagers acquire essential Islamic knowledge from credible sources such as kyai with clear scientific credentials. This foundation enables them to discern reliable Islamic content in cyberspace, safeguarding against distortions in their understanding of Islam and spirituality. Contribution: This research provides a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities of the impact of internet-based learning on the diverse experiences of Muslim youth. Although the internet has the potential to be an invaluable source of knowledge, the challenges of integrating information with traditional understanding require serious attention. (shrink)

The Diamond Sutra and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, though grounded in distinct traditions, converge in their critique of the substantial “self,” revealing it as a fantasy produced by symbolic or conceptual structures. The Sutra dismantles attachment to “name-and-form,” asserting that realizing emptiness (śūnyatā) entails realizing non-self (anātman). Lacan, through the mirror stage, the Symbolic Order, and the Real, exposes the subject’s alienation within language, where desire continually circles around a constitutive lack. Both disclose that symbolic systems simultaneously generate and obscure (...) reality. Practically, the Diamond Sutra prescribes the letting-go of all attachments—“letting the mind function without abiding anywhere”—while Lacan’s ethics of “traversing the fantasy” calls for confronting one’s fundamental lack and assuming responsibility for desire. By juxtaposing their approaches to the deconstruction of ego-fantasy, critique of symbolic mediation, and transcendence of illusion, this paper illuminates a shared insight into the interrelation of desire, language, and the real. (shrink)

The ontology of talent management and the semantic emptiness of talent is my focus in this chapter. From an interdisciplinary perspective that draws on methods and insights from cognition, social psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and sociology, I will demonstrate how a lack of semantic clarity in talent management in fact is a semantic emptiness and represents an ontological problem that questions the very existence of talent in the actual world. The implications of the semantic emptiness of talent has (...) created an accidental ontology of talent management and led to a significantly high subjective bias and inadequacy in talent management, particularly in talent recruitment, causing considerable failure in companies’ talent management. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toward a Dialectics of Emptiness: Overcoming Nihilism and Combatting Mechanization in Nishitani Keiji’s Postwar ThoughtGriffin WernerIn his postwar writings on nihilism in modernity, Nishitani Keiji (1900–90) does not explicitly articulate the structure of the relationship between the mechanization of the world and nihilism. Instead, he discusses mechanization with respect to his critique of modern worldviews such as atheism, scientism, and liberalism and how they have contributed to the (...) advent of nihilism and the loss of human autonomy in modern Europe and Japan.1 According to Nishitani, before the advent of scientism and the subsequent progression of unfettered technological development, pre-Western-Enlightenment and pre-Meiji-period worldviews consisted of a fundamental embodied connection between a people or culture and their spiritual traditions. In Europe’s case, due to the death of God and the subsequent shift from a Christian worldview to an atheistic and scientistic one, a historical period of nihilism began. Modern mechanistic worldviews like Descartes’s, Nishitani argues, present the world as consisting of dead matter that is fundamentally separated from the indubitable ego. No longer is the world considered to be “alive” in the sense of there being a fundamental connection between human life and the living, breathing world around it. Rather, from the perspective of the ego, the modern world is simply a cold and lifeless world of dead machines.As discussed in Religion and Nothingness, the development of structurally Cartesian worldviews led to or caused the advent of nihilism in Europe. Consequently, European culture lost its cultural ground in Christianity and individuals lost their foundational meaning which supported their understanding of themselves in relation [End Page 129] to others, the world, and a transcendent God. As Japan began to modernize, or, arguably, “Westernize,” it inherited a Cartesian-like worldview and, over time, subsequently lost touch with its traditional philosophical and religious ground as well. As a result, the modern period of nihilism began in both Europe and Japan as both peoples lost touch with the traditional meaning that supported them.While this description between mechanization and nihilism implies a causal relationship, I argue that the relationship between nihilism and the mechanization of the world can be more accurately articulated in terms of a dialectical relationship. In the modern context, not only does the mechanization of the world lead to or exacerbate a culture’s plunge into nihilism or an individual’s confrontation with the abyss of nihility, but nihilism also reinforces and exacerbates the mechanization of the world. As partners in this dialectical oscillation, each reinforces the other as one (culture or person) continuously spirals deeper and deeper into meaninglessness, ultimately to the culminating point that Nishitani calls the “mechanization of man.”2Just as Nishitani argues that the problem of nihilism can only be solved by way of radicalizing nihilism to the “field of emptiness,” the structural oscillation between nihilism and mechanization will continue at the levels of the individual and the culture unless nihilism and mechanization are overcome. However, rather than only overcoming nihilism to reach emptiness in the individual, and that leading to social and political change, I argue that overcoming the dialectical tension between nihilism and mechanization will require a “dialectics of emptiness.” Such a dialectic will combat nihilism and mechanization with a mutually reinforcing tension between personal transformation, which overcomes nihilism by way of stepping back to the field of emptiness, and socio-political transformation by way of a politics of emptiness. Solving the problem of nihilism in modernity—insofar as it is always already in relation to mechanization—will require more than individual existential confrontation and transformation. Through one’s individual overcoming of nihilism, one must also aim to “empty” those institutions which contribute to the mechanization of the world. While Nishitani highlights the individual’s religious quest as the impetus for the social and political change necessary to overcome the problem of nihilism at the cultural level, an analysis of how that might be done and what [End Page 130] may be politically necessary in order to do so is missing from his thought.As such, my aim in this article is twofold: I attempt to shed light on the structure of nihilism and... (shrink)

Notions such as Sunyata, Catuskoti, and Indra's Net, which figure prominently in Buddhist philosophy, are difficult to readily accommodate within our ordinary thinking about everyday objects. Famous Buddhist scholar Nagarjuna considered two levels of reality: one called conventional reality and the other ultimate reality. Within this framework, Sunyata refers to the claim that at the ultimate level objects are devoid of essence or "intrinsic properties", but are interdependent by virtue of their relations to other objects. Catuskoti refers to the claim (...) that four truth values, along with contradiction, are admissible in reasoning. Indra's Net refers to the claim that every part of a whole is reflective of the whole. Here we present category theoretic constructions which are reminiscent of these Buddhist concepts. The universal mapping property definition of mathematical objects, wherein objects of a universe of discourse are defined not in terms of their content, but in terms of their relations to all objects of the universe is reminiscent of Sunyata. The objective logic of perception, with perception modeled as [a category of] two sequential processes (sensation followed by interpretation), and with its truth value object of four truth values, is reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of Catuskoti. The category of categories, wherein every category has a subcategory of sets with zero structure within which every category can be modeled, is reminiscent of Indra's Net. Our thorough elaboration of the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and category theory can facilitate better understanding of Buddhist philosophy, and bring out the broader philosophical import of category theory beyond mathematics. (shrink)

Drawing on Gary Snyder’s notion of the wild, which he uses to describe the Chinese term dao, or the way of Great Nature, this essay takes up through a series of comparisons with such diverse thinkers as Eihei Dōgen, Martin Heidegger, and Alphonso Lingis, the fundamental question of what it means to be human. More specifically, it is an inquiry into the activity of being human, that is, what does it mean to move and dwell on the Earth. Focusing on (...) the concept of emptiness, in both its Buddhist and Western connotations, the activity of traveling and dwelling—here described as walking—is considered in relation to what it means to be among other non-human entities and elements such as animals, mountains, water, and sky. The resulting reorientation from such interaction, which is becoming more alien in our increasingly technological world, is necessary if we are to retain, or recover, a sense of what it means to be fully human. (shrink)

Feelings of emptiness represent a common experience among individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) that are not well understood. Theoretical literature suggests that emptiness functions to downregulate intense emotional experiences in BPD, but this has not been tested. This study examines whether (1) emptiness at baseline and emptiness in response to stressors (i.e. emptiness reactivity) is elevated in BPD relative to clinical and healthy controls (HCs), and whether (2) emptiness reactivity predicts emotion reactivity across (...) self-report, skin conductance response (SCR), and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) indices of emotion. Participants (N = 120) with BPD, generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), or HCs provided measurements of emptiness, self-reported emotion, SCR, and RSA at baseline and following a rejection-themed stressor. Results revealed that baseline emptiness was highest in the BPD group compared to the HC group and the GAD group. There were no significant group differences for emptiness reactivity. Overall, increases in emptiness predicted increases and decreases in emotional reactivity via self-report and RSA, respectively. These results suggest that higher baseline emptiness rather than emptiness reactivity is characteristic of BPD. Future research using longitudinal and ecological momentary assessment designs is needed to examine the causes of emptiness and how it can be effectively reduced. (shrink)

Commented article: WANG, L.; WANG, B. Q. Between emptiness and reality: from the white space in Chinese painting to the philosophy of form in western art. Trans/Form/Ação: Unesp journal of philosophy, Marília, SP, v. 48, n. 3, p. e025010, 2025. Available at: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/16396. Submission: 21/7/2025 – Decision: 25/7/2025 – Revision: 27/7/2025 – Publication: 8/8/2025.

This sustained and distinctively Buddhist challenge to the ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness resolves the incoherence implicit in the Sartrean conception of nothingness by opening to a Buddhist vision of emptiness. Rooted in the insights of Madhyamika dialectic and an articulated meditative (zen) phenomenology, Nothingness and Emptiness uncovers and examines the assumptions that sustain Sartre's early phenomenological ontology and questions his theoretical elaboration of consciousness as "nothingness." Laycock demonstrates that, in addition to a "relative" nothingness (the (...) for-itself) defined against the positivity and plenitude of the in-itself, Sartre's ontology requires, but also repudiates, a conception of "absolute" nothingness (the Buddhist "emptiness"), and is thus, as it stands, logically unstable, perhaps incoherent. The author is not simply critical; he reveals the junctures at which Sartrean ontology appeals for a Buddhist conception of emptiness and offers the needed supplement. (shrink)

Watsuji Tetsurô is famous for having constructed a systematic socio-political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought, in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a (...) balanced theory of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine-tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non-duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities. (shrink)

Lorsque nous parlons généralement d’un espace vide, ce vide n’est pas réellement vide physiquement. L’espace vide est rempli d’air, de matière invisible, mais il ne peut pas être vu ou capturé. Pourtant, nous savons bien que l’air, élément indispensable pour tous les êtres vivants, est également présent autour de nous. Devrions-nous alors considérer différemment l’espace vide et l’air dans l’installation? Pour Yasuaki Onishi, sculpteur et installateur in situ, l’espace vide est un lieu essentiel pour l’installation et l’inspiration. Il s’intéresse à (...) l’invisible, à l’espace, à l’air, à l’espace négatif, etc. Il révèle ce qui est invisible, en utilisant un matériau léger tel qu’un adhésif liquide noir et le support de matériaux immatériels tels que la lumière, l’air ou d’autres matériaux intangibles. Parmi ses travaux, en particulier, en analysant les œuvres de la série Vertical Volume, Daily Distance, Gawa, Shaping Air – A Breath of Mobility et Vertical Space, nous cherchons dans cette étude la signification de l’air invisible, du ki, du svi, du wonsang et le sens du vide du Tao et du bouddhisme. Quel est le sens du vide dans une installation de Yasuaki Onishi? Et quel est l’enjeu entre l’espace vide et l’espace plein, l’espace visible et l’espace invisible, la matérialité et l’immatérialité? Dans son travail, qui ne suit pas le processus général de la sculpture traditionnelle, nous trouverons le lien avec la signification de l’espace négatif et avec le terme coréen gan, l’espace-temps, avec le mot japonais ma qui constitue un concept esthétique au Japon. When we generally speak of an empty space, this empty is not really physically empty. The empty space is filled with air, invisible matter, but it cannot be seen or captured. However, we know that air, an essential element for all living things, is also present around us. So should we consider differently the empty space and air in the installation? For Yasuaki Onishi, sculptor and installator in situ, the empty space is an essential place for installation work and inspiration. The empty space that we think is empty is filled with substances that are invisible. The empty space is filled with air, but it can’t be seen or captured. He is interested in the invisible, space, air, negative space, etc. He reveals what is invisible, using a light material such as a black liquid adhesive, with the support of non-material materials such as light, air or other intangible materials. Among his works, in particular, by analyzing the works of the series Vertical Volume, Daily Distance, Gawa, Shaping Air – A Breath of Mobility and Vertical Space, we look for the meaning of invisible air, breath, ki, svi, the etymology of sunyata, wonsang 원상, and the meaning of emptiness of Tao and Buddhism. Through the work of Yasuaki Onishi, what is the meaning of the emptiness in his installation? And what is at stake between empty space and full space, visible space and invisible space, materialism and immateriality. In his work, which does not follow the general process of typical sculpture, we will find the connection with the meaning of “negative space” and the term Korean gan “간 ”, the space-time, as the Japanese word “ma ” that use as a concept of aesthetics in Japan. (shrink)

Huayan Buddhist philosophers and John Dewey share a perspective on emptiness or dependent origination. This article compares Dewey's local, contextual, and relational metaphysics with Huayan thinkers’ use of the metaphor of Indra's jewel net to extend their relational metaphysics to an infinite extent. Huayan thinkers base their ethics of compassion on the recognition of the infinite relatedness of all things. Dewey prefers constructing social institutions that foster experiences that are reliably aesthetically unified. This dispute is significant because pragmatism and (...) Buddhism both provide promising ethical positions based on the understanding of persons as temporally limited and relational. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 167-170 [Access article in PDF] Journey into Emptiness: Dogen, Merton, Jung, and the Quest for Transformation. By Robert Jingen Gunn. New York: Paulist Press, 2000. xiv + 334 pp. Written by a New York psychotherapist who also has Zen training, the thesis of this book is that the experience of emptiness is a necessary precondition to spiritual transformation. "Emptiness" is defined as (...) "an experience of being without, of not having, not having answers, not having property, not having love or power or hope" (1). "Transformation" is described as a path that leads to the realization of our rootedness in a transcendent dimension. Three paths of transformation are discussed through three case studies: Buddhism in the experience of Dogen; Christianity through the life of the Trappist monk Thomas Merton; and Depth Psychology as developed in the life experience of Carl Jung. In each case the major obstacle to be overcome is ego and ego attachments. The transformation process, argues Gunn, is often triggered by an initial experience of emptiness such as the early loss of one's mother, an experience of death, divorce, depression, illness, failure, identity confusion, or loss of community. The traditions of Buddhism, Christianity, and Depth Psychology view a person's pivotal experience of emptiness "not as something painful to be avoided, but a door, leading to a larger vision and experience of connection to all of life" (7). Response to the experience of emptiness can be by either engagement or avoidance. Refusing the path of transformation will add to one's burden of suffering whether understood as karma, sin, or neurosis. Yet this is often the contemporary choice. Afraid to move into the unknown, or to let go of ego control, we hold on to whatever is within our grasp—a house, a marriage, an idea, an identity—and avoid the challenge of realizing our true selves. Choosing to enter the Buddhist Way, to take up one's cross or to make the unconscious conscious, is to adopt transformation from an initial emptiness to a "way of life that consists in ever-expanding awareness, continual letting-go of attachments and increasing freedom and service to all of life, to being itself" (9).The author suggests that three stages in the experience of emptiness and self-transformation [End Page 167] are found in the case studies of Dogen, Merton, and Jung: (1) experienced emptiness in their own lives; (2) used that experience to embark on their own path of transformation; and (3) returned to offer their practical experience as a method for others to use. Although viewed differently by each, emptiness is primary for all, and the self that is let go of remains but is transformed. For Dogen, in emptiness we let go of everything, including self and emptiness itself. What remains is no-thing, an insubstantiality that is neither nothing nor something, but leads us back to the Self, which is everything. For Merton, letting go of everything leaves an empty self experienced as poverty, but a poverty that leads to fulfillment, which finds the true Self hidden with Christ in God—free for God, free for others, free for whatever God wills. For Jung, emptiness is the sacrifice of ego to the larger Self, which transcends individual consciousness.While the analyses of the emptiness/transformative experiences of Dogen and Merton are well done, the presentation of Jung lacks depth and completeness. The author's psychotherapist vocation seemed to artificially force the analysis—as, for example, in Gunn's attempt to show that in each case the major trigger of the emptiness experience was the early loss of the mother.I found the presentation of Dogen's Buddhist experience to be the most fully developed and convincing of the three case studies. Gunn does an excellent job of situating Dogen's experience within the context of Buddhism by presenting a well-researched and well-written summary of Buddha, Nagarjuna, and Bodhidharma; however, the contribution of the Theravada understanding is completely ignored. The presentation of Nagarjuna is especially well done, but the author... (shrink)

This book offers a triangular comparative analysis by evaluating three different religious approaches to emptiness. It reveals what emptiness or nothingness mean in different cultural and religious contexts. Further, it assesses each tradition’s emptiness concerning the emptiness of the believer, the emptiness of the world, and perhaps even the (temporary or permanent) emptiness of God. Chapters include perspectives on different religions and though being manifest in different ways within their respective traditions, the Hindi and (...) Buddhist concept of śūnyatā, the Christian concept of divine kenosis, and the Ṣūfī concept of fanā’ share a common denominator: all three signify “emptiness”. Covered are both sprititual and “mundane” functions of this emptiness that the three religions address. This monograph appeals to students and researchers and reveals that the idea of an “empty” reality that is purified of superfluous fullness are philosophical concepts relevant for all domains of life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Desideri's Understanding of EmptinessEnzo Gualtiero BargiacchiThe works of Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733)1 lay forgotten in the archives for a very long time;2 had they been studied, European studies of Tibet and Buddhism would have begun a century earlier. The partial publication of his Relazione in 1904 was not enough to make scholars of Buddhism interested in the subject and resulted only a modest enthusiasm in the geographical and anthropological fields.3 (...) Later the Swedish geographer and explorer Sven Hedin (1865–1952) stated that Desideri "had accomplished a journey which ought to make his name forever famous,"4 and also that "by far the greatest part of Desideri's narrative is a description of the cult and religion of the Tibetans, which is not less admirable than the geographical part."5 But it was yet another geographer and explorer, Filippo De Filippi (1869–1938), who made available the Jesuit missionary's work by publishing an English version of the Relazione6 in 1932. Charles Oldham recognized that "there will no longer be any excuse for the ignorance and misconceptions regarding Desideri, to which Cornelis Wessels and De Filippi have drawn such pointed attention."7In reality, however, Desideri's work would still be awarded inadequate consideration for some time, apart from the generous praise of Giuseppe Tucci, which appeared exclusively in Italian articles and books, and of a few other scholars of Buddhism. This continued even after the critical edition of the Relazione and letters, expertly edited by Luciano Petech,8 despite the prestigious reputation of this academic and the ISMEO, the institute directed by Tucci that sponsored the series; very little attention was also paid to the translations by Saverian missionary Giuseppe Toscano9 (1911–2003) of Desideri's works in the Tibetan language.10 Around the turn of the millennium academics such as Donald Lopez, Rudolf Kaschewsky, and Martin Brauen began to pay closer attention to Desideri's work.In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the Jesuit missionary's work, as shown by the panel "Buddhism in the Writings of Ippolito Desideri" at the Fifteenth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Atlanta, 23–28 June 2008), as well as two fundamental events concerning it; now Michael Sweet is completing the new English edition and translation of the Relazione.11Even today Desideri's writings can still provide academics in various disciplines with useful material for reflection, and not only in historical terms. As far as Tibetan religion is concerned, Desideri extensively discussed many important topics, in the Relazione and in his works in Tibetan, with considerable interpretative skill. [End Page 101] Unfortunately, none of this information reached the scholarly community, with the exception of a few rough ideas.12Roy Andrew Miller13 has pointed out his correct interpretation of the mantra oṁmaṇi padme hūṁ; more recently Rudolf Kaschewsky has maintained that Desideri's excellent linguistic analysis of this mantra "may mark the memorable beginning of Tibetology in the West."14 But the most surprising result is without doubt his perfect understanding of the Buddhist concept of emptiness. Tucci states thatSome aspects of Tibetan theology are very difficult to understand: for example, the concept of Ton pa gni—insubstantiality of all phenomenal things—in which, following the ancient mystical tendencies of the Mahayana, Buddhists dissolve all appearance and illusion, men and things, inexistent and unreal like a dream or mirage. Even today very few Westerners are able to attain a perfect understanding of the depth of this doctrine. It is therefore amazing how Desideri, with no knowledge of Indian philosophy, was able to grasp the real meaning of these difficult ideas.15Let us define here the reasons for this discovery and consider its profound meaning.Desideri certainly possessed remarkable linguistic and logical-philosophical aptitude, and he had honed and developed these skills during the challenging studies typical of Jesuit schools. He was furthermore assisted by a tenacious and heroic determination to fulfill his mission, but one of the decisive factors in explaining the reasons for his cognitive success lies in the complete honesty of his approach, as a man and a priest convinced of... (shrink)

This article introduces a non-Anglophone concept of gong qi as a metaphor for ‘corporation’. It contributes an endogenous perspective from a Sino-Japanese organizational context that enriches mainstream business ethics literature, otherwise heavily reliant on Western traditions. We translate the multi-layered meanings of gong qi based on analysis of its ideograms, its references into classical philosophies, and contemporary application in this Japanese multinational corporation in China. Gong qi contributes a perspective that sees a corporation as an inclusive and virtuous social entity, (...) and also addresses the elusive, implicit, and forever evolving nature of organizational life that is rarely noticed. We propose gong qi can be applied in other organizations and wider cultural contexts to show a new way of seeing and understanding business ethics and organization. Rather than considering virtue as a list of definable individual qualities, we suggest that the metaphor of gong qi reveals how virtue can be experienced as indeterminate, yet immanently present, like the substance of emptiness. This, then allows us to see the virtue of immanence, the beauty of implicitness, and hence, the efficacy of gong qi. (shrink)

A philosophical exploration of Buddhist concepts, focusing on the interplay between emptiness and dependent origination. The book offers profound insights into the nature of reality and existence. Ideal for students of Buddhism and philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nihilism, Science, and Emptiness in NishitaniHase ShotoEmptiness and NihilismIt may be sufficiently known by now that the trunk line of Nishitani’s philosophy is the ‘idea of emptiness.’ Indeed, from his Philosophy of Primordial Subjectivity (1940) through his God and Absolute Nothingness (1948) and Nihilism (1949) right into Religion and Nothingness (1961), Nishitani’s thinking has fundamentally turned around the idea of emptiness. 1 Not that in the (...) three works preceding Religion and Nothingness the idea of emptiness is treated overtly as such. Rather, in those works the idea is continually growing, as it were, on an invisible underground level, to come finally to the surface in Religion and Nothingness. It is as if the emptiness that had grown strong by withstanding the pressure of the ‘rock’ of nihilism came into the open by overthrowing that rock.As it was the key to the solution of the problem of nihilism that had beset him in his youth, the idea of emptiness was more than a mere idea for Nishitani. It was something on which the possibility of existence entirely depended for him. Therefore, he did not speak of the idea of emptiness but of the ‘standpoint of emptiness.’ For Nishitani, nihilism was not simply a philosophical problem, a problem accidentally encountered in the course of his philosophical investigations. It was a problem he had been saddled with willy nilly as a result of his own nature and temperament as well as of the conditions of his time. He then decided to shoulder the problem as his particular task. In other words, nihilism assumed for him the nature of a destiny. Consequently, the ‘standpoint of emptiness,’ at which he arrived at the end of the arduous struggle for the solution of the problem of nihilism, took on for him the character of a reliable slab of granite discovered at the bottom of his own existence: something with a depth reaching all the way to the core of the earth and a solidity sufficient to carry the weight of nihilism. Of all this Nishitani himself was clearly aware. Let me reflect a few moments on Nishitani’s idea of emptiness in its relationship with nihilism.How did Nishitani view this nihilism that constituted the basic problem for him? He defined his own philosophical standpoint as, in the final analysis, “the overcoming of nihilism by way of nihilism.” In his own estimate, the nihilism he struggled with was an extremely “difficult” and “hard to solve” problem for philosophy—a problem wherein intellectual aporia and existential conundrum intertwine; not the [End Page 139] kind of problem that finds a solution provided one makes the necessary efforts; a problem that is hard to get hold of: the study of various thought systems appears only to circle around its periphery. Thus, “at a certain moment I decided to give up my philosophical efforts and to tackle the problem by Zen [meditation], away from all intellectual efforts. At that point, for the first time and little by little, a way to its solution came in sight.” 2This kind of patient struggling with one particular problem, as we see it in Nishitani’s case, may not be unheard of but is certainly not commonplace. If we may call this attitude or way of facing problems a ‘method,’ it appears to be described by Simone Weil, where she writes: “The method proper to philosophy consists in clearly seeing insoluble problems in their insolubility, and then to contemplate them, concentratedly and indefatigably, for years, without any hope in the waiting. According to this criterion, there are few philosophers. But ‘few’ may be saying too much. The passage to the transcendent is opened when the human faculties—intellect, will, human love—run into a limit, and then the human being stays on this threshold, beyond which it cannot put a single step—and this without turning away, without knowing what it desires, and concentrated on the waiting. It is a state of extreme humiliation. It is unachievable for anybody who is not capable of accepting humiliation.” 3We may say that, just like Simone Weil herself, who for many years struggled with the insoluble problem of ‘unhappiness... (shrink)

He who has seen everything empty itself is close to knowing what everything is filled with. Emptiness is probably the most important philosophical and religious concept of Mahayana Buddhism. Its precise meaning has been explained differently by different schools and in different Buddhist cultures, but almost all Mahāyāna Buddhists would agree with the following characterization: Philosophically , emptiness is the term that describes the ultimate mode of existence of all phenomena, namely, as naturally ‘empty’ of enduring substance, or (...) self-existence : rather than being independently self-originated, phenomena are dependently originated from causes and conditions. Emptiness, thus, explains how it is that phenomena change and interact as they do, how it is that the world goes on as it does. Religiously , emptiness is the single principle whose direct comprehension is the basis of liberation from samsāra, and ignorance of which, embodied in self-gasping is the basis of continued rebirth – hence suffering – in samsāra. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Merton and Buddhism: Wisdom, Emptiness and Everyday MindKristin Johnston LargenMerton and Buddhism: Wisdom, Emptiness and Everyday Mind. Edited by Bonnie Bowman Thurston. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2007. 271 pp.This particular book—Merton and Buddhism—is the fourth in a series that seeks to study world religions “through the lens of Thomas Merton’s life and writing” (p. viii). The first three volumes in the series are Merton and Sufism, (...) Merton and Hesychasm, and Merton and Judaism. This book continues in the same format and includes essays from a variety of scholars addressing various aspects of Merton’s engagement with different schools of Buddhism. It is divided into four main parts, with a fifth part that contains a helpful bibliography as well as notes on the different contributors. Additionally the text is peppered with a variety of illustrations, including a center section with many pictures of images of the Buddha from different cultural contexts. The assortment of black-and-white illustrations include pictures of people Thomas Merton (1915–1968) met on his travels, pictures he took while on his “Asian Journey,” and pictures of Merton himself and Our Lady of Gethsemani Monastery.The volume begins with two helpful essays that orient a novice reader to the volume. The first essay, by the late Roger Corless (1938–2007), is a simple, straight-forward [End Page 218] introduction to Buddhism. This is useful for readers who are drawn to this book by the desire to learn more about Merton but have no background in Buddhism itself. The second essay is by Bonnie Thurston, who describes her piece as “Merton and Buddhism 101” (p. 15). Her essay describes primarily the “when” and the “why” of Merton’s interest in Buddhism, noting that Merton was not interested in becoming a Buddhist himself, but rather believed that his own (and others’) practice of Christianity could be positively informed by Buddhism, particularly in its attention to meditation and dismantling what Merton called the “false self.”The second main part of the book is devoted to essays that each focus on Merton’s engagement with a specific Buddhist tradition. While it is clear that Merton was particularly influenced by and drawn to Zen Buddhism (Ruben Habito supplies the essay on Merton’s experience with Zen in this section), he did not limit himself to Zen, but sought out connections and experience with individuals from diverse Buddhist backgrounds. Thus, the first essay in this section details his meetings with monks from the Theravada tradition and emphasizes the central role Merton’s own monastic identity played in his understanding and evaluation of Buddhism as a whole.The second essay is of particular importance, as it discusses Merton’s engagement with Tibetan Buddhism, which many believe would have developed into a much deeper connection had his exposure to Tibetan Buddhism not come at the very end of Merton’s life. The author of this essay, Judith Simmer-Brown, notes that “Previously, Merton’s interests had been in Zen Buddhism, but after meeting Tibetans in India he felt an immediate rapport” (p. 53). The Tibetans also shared this experience. The Dalai Lama (from whom Merton received meditation instruction), Trungpa Rinpoche, and Chadral Rinpoche, among others, all recognized his spiritual depth and honesty. At the end of her essay, Simmer-Brown reflects on the strong impression the mountain Kanchenjunga made on him (this is the “seventh mountain” of Merton’s personal geography—see The Seven Mountains of Thomas Merton, by Michael Mott) and speculates as to how Merton might have continued to explore Tibetan Buddhism, had he lived beyond the year.The final essay in this section is of a different nature, but serves a very important purpose. John Keenan’s essay, “The Limits of Thomas Merton’s Understanding of Buddhism,” makes clear that Merton’s understanding of Buddhism reflects the general ignorance of Buddhism by Western Christians at that time, and thus, while Merton’s engagement with Buddhism was “welcome and mind-stretching” to his audience in the 1960s, it is “quite insufficient today for any dialogue with Buddhism, or with Zen” (p. 121). Keenan notes that a large part of the problem stems from Merton’s... (shrink)

Madhyamaka Buddhism is famously centered on the doctrine of emptiness, often glossed as the view that there are no essences. This chapter addresses two interrelated questions about that doctrine. First, is the Madhyamaka doctrine of essencelessness more plausibly to be regarded as a necessary or a contingent truth? Second, is the doctrine of essencelessness in contradiction with the views of those prominent Mādhyamikas who also claim that essencelessness is the essence of all things? The chapter argues that the Madhyamaka (...) doctrine of essencelessness is most plausibly to be regarded as a necessary truth, but that a modern Mādhyamika can safely affirm without contradiction the apparently paradoxical claim that emptiness is the essence of all entities. (shrink)

Let a great Tibetan scholar guide you through one of Nagarjuna’s masterworks. In Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness Khensur Jampa Tegchok walks us carefully through a classic of Indian Buddhist philosophy, explaining the implications of its philosophical arguments and grounding its advice in a recognizable day-to-day world. In Precious Garland, the source text for this commentary, Nagarjuna advises his patron king on how best to take advantage of human life to secure a happy rebirth in the next life while (...) making progress toward the goal of enlightenment. Known primarily for his incisive presentation of emptiness, here Nagarjuna shows his wise understanding of how to navigate the intricacies of worldly life to balance everyday needs with spiritual practice. Loaded with equal measures of penetrating explanations of the highest reality and inspiring encouragement towards the bodhisattva practices, Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness makes the case for living a thoughtful, morally upright life in the world to achieve immediate and ultimate spiritual goals. (shrink)

In his Precious Garland, a classic of Indian Buddhist philosophy, Nagarjuna advises a king on how best to secure a happy rebirth while making progress toward the ultimate goal of enlightenment. In Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness, Khensur Jampa Tegchok walks us through the Precious Garland, drawing out the implications of its arguments and grounding its advice in our world today, with equal measures of penetrating explanation and inspiring encouragement.

_Unlock the profound wisdom of Buddhism and transform your understanding of reality.__Patterns in Emptiness_ delves into the core Buddhist teaching of dependent origination, revealing its power to unlock doctrines of karma, rebirth, suffering, liberation, and compassion. Discover how this essential teaching can reshape your perspective, providing an antidote to disordered thinking and disruptive emotions. Lama Jampa Thaye illuminates the interconnected nature of existence, guiding you toward a clearer understanding of meditation and the path to inner peace. This insightful exploration is (...) perfect for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of Buddhist philosophy and its practical applications. (shrink)

Resumen: Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar e interpretar sistemáticamente los pensamientos de Tang Junyi sobre el vacío y la sustancia en la literatura y el arte. Para garantizar una comprensión profunda y completa de las opiniones de Tang Junyi durante el proceso de investigación, primero adoptamos un enfoque de “lectura detallada” para estudiar sus obras recopiladas. Además, empleamos un “método de análisis conceptual”, centrándonos en refinar y elucidar conceptos clave dentro de sus pensamientos literarios. Al mismo tiempo, utilizando un (...) “método de revisión de literatura”, comparamos las ideas de Tang Junyi con los hallazgos de investigación relacionados de otros académicos. A través de un análisis sistemático, el autor cree que la perspectiva de Tang Junyi sobre el vacío y la sustancia en literatura y arte no es una construcción conceptual aislada, sino una perspectiva única formada contra la cultura y filosofía tradicional china. Este concepto está en el corazón de su teoría literaria y es un nodo brillante en su sistema filosófico. Al profundizar en el “vacío y sustancia” dentro de los pensamientos literarios de Tang Junyi, podemos comprender mejor sus contribuciones a la literatura y la filosofía, proporcionando una nueva perspectiva de investigación y marco para estudiar la teoría y cultura literaria china. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of empty names that is consistent with direct-reference theory and Millianism.

나가르주나는 『근본중송』 제24품 제18번 게송에서 “연기가 공이다.”라고 선언했다. 이후 이 도식은 대승불교 공 개념이 초기불교 연기 개념의 연속임을 환기시키는 역할을 했다. 이 도식에 따라 불교 내부에서 연기와 공을 동일시하는 경향이 출현하고, 나아가 ‘연기가 공이고 공이 연기’라는 사고까지등장한다. 다시 말하면 “연기하는 것이 공하다.”라는 명제가 “공한 것이 연기한다.”라는 명제로 확장했다. 본고에서는 현대 분석철학에서 사용하는 엄밀한 의미의 ‘동일성’ 개념을 사용하여 연기하는 것과 공한 것이 결코 필연적으로 동일하지 않고, 따라서 공 개념은 연기 개념을 대체할 수 없음을 증명하고자 한다. 이 증명을 위해 본고에서는 어떤 동일성 (...) 명제가 참이기 위해서는 현실세계뿐만 아니라 모든 가능세계에서도 참이어야 한다는 양상논리와 가능세계 의미론의 ‘필연적 동일성’ 개념을 도구로 사용한다. 연기하는 것은 모든 가능세계에서 공하지만, 공한 것이 모든 가능세계에서 연기하지는 않는다. 연기하는 것과 공한 것이 필연적으로 동연적(同延的)이지 않기 때문에 연기와 공을 필연적으로 동일하다고 볼 수 없다. 양상 논리학은 연기와 공이 모든 가능세계에서 동일하지 않으면 어느 하나의 세계에서도 동일하지 않다고 보아야 한다고 말한다. 연기와 공이 동일하지 않기 때문에 공은 연기를 대체할 수 없다. (shrink)

The view that everything is empty (śūnya) is a central metaphysical plank of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It has often been the focus of objections. Perhaps the most important of these is that it in effect entails a nihilism: nothing exists. This objection, in turn, is denied by Mahāyāna theorists, such as Nāgārjuna. One of the things that makes the debate difficult is that the precise import of the view that everything is empty is unclear. The object of this essay is to (...) put the debate in a new light. It does so by proposing a mathematical characterization of Emptiness—that is, the totality of empty things—showing that, whatever it is, it has a definite structure and is not, therefore, to be identified with nothingness. (shrink)

This paper presents a personal perspective on the Mahayana understanding of Emptiness (śūnyatā) through a detailed reading of the Heart Sutra. While commonly interpreted as a metaphysical negation, emptiness in the Mahāyāna tradition signifies the dynamic, non-substantial, and interdependent nature of all phenomena, which arise and dissolve relationally without inherent, fixed essence. Chapter 1 examines the classical formula “form is emptiness, emptiness is form” and its extension to feelings, perceptions, volition, and consciousness, highlighting the interdependent constitution (...) of subjective and objective reality. Chapter 2 explores the emptiness of all dharmas (sarva-dharma-śūnyatā) and the impermanence of conditioned existence, emphasizing the functional, relational interpretation of emptiness as the basis for arising, transformation, and interaction. Chapter 3 investigates the Heart Sutra’s negations concerning suffering, ignorance, aging, death, and attainment (no suffering, no origin, no cessation, no path; no wisdom, no attainment), connecting these to the Four Noble Truths, the twelve links of dependent origination, and Mahāyāna soteriology. Throughout, the paper integrates personal reflections, highlighting how the recognition of emptiness fosters insight, compassion, and freedom from conceptual attachment. By reframing emptiness as dynamic non-substantiality rather than nihilistic void, this study contributes to a clearer understanding of the Heart Sutra for both scholarly and practice-oriented audiences, bridging doctrinal analysis and lived experience. Keywords Emptiness (Śūnyatā), Heart Sutra, Mahāyāna Buddhism, Dynamic Non-Substantiality, Dependent Arising, Four Noble Truths, Personal Perspective, Interdependent Phenomena. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish the meaning of Dharma as the principle of self-denial and emptiness. Dharma, a key concept in the religious thought of India, has the literal meaning of "supporter.” Something that supports something else does not exist for itself. Just as the truth supporting the universe is Dharma, so the four pillars supporting the roof of the house to prevent it from collapsing are also Dharma. The four pillars supporting the house do not exist for themselves, (...) but create an empty space in the house. In this respect, the essence of Dharma is self-denial, self-sacrifice. The traditional ascetic practices and religions in India is referred to as sanatana dharma (eternal truth), and the core is the complete extinction of I-ness (individual consciousness). When individual consciousness is completely lost, mokṣa (nirvana) is achieved. The moment the eternal truth is achieved, the individual consciousness becomes zero, and this position can be likened to the center (0) where the x- and y-axes meet in the coordinates of mathematics. Just as the center in the coordinates of mathematics is a place where the value of the x-axis is zero and the value of the y-axis is zero, the center of the universe, that is, nirvāṇa is achieved when individual consciousness is completely lost. Dharma is the path of becoming nothing to reach the zero point, and the process of self-denial is bound to entail pain. The pain involving voluntary self-denial can be rather a positive nourishment for the realization of Dharma. In fact, we can say that the core of the Hindu ethics of Aśrama-dharma (the 4 cycles of human life) and Varṇa-dharma (the caste system) is voluntary renunciation for the complete extinction of individual consciousness and renunciation concerning that which is possible. (shrink)

This chapter explicates the philosophy of the body of sixth-century Buddhist thinker Kūkai. Kūkai brings together what initially seem to be opposing concepts: body and emptiness. He does this in the context of formulating a system of cosmology inseparable from religious practice. We interact with the rest of the cosmos through our body. Kūkai characterizes the cosmos in turn as the body of the Buddha, who personifies the embodiment of the dharma. This cosmic body is comprised of myriad bodies (...) through their interactivities, in which we ourselves partake. The interdependence obtains both horizontally (among microcosmic bodies) and vertically (between macrocosm and microcosm). But this interdependent nature of bodies also means emptiness. All bodies are empty of substantiality. Enlightenment is to realize this emptiness of all. An additional factor is language because Kūkai conceives the body as the linguistic medium for communicating that dharma of emptiness. (shrink)

A collection of quotations, folktales, parables, and personal stories that illustrate the hidden value and spiritual possibilities of emptiness.

This paper excavates the practice-oriented background and therapeutic significance of emptiness in the Madhyamaka philosophy attributed to Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao. Buddhist emptiness unravels experiential and linguistic reification through meditation and argumentation. The historical contexts and uses of the word indicate that it is primarily a practical diagnostic and therapeutic concept. Emptiness does not lead to further views or truths but, akin to yet distinct from Ajñāna and Pyrrhonian skepticism, the suspension of assertion. This sense of emptiness (...) as a practice can be traced in the intercultural transmission of Madhyamaka from Nāgārjuna, its paradigmatic philosopher, to Sengzhao 僧肇, its first pivotal indigenous Chinese representative. (shrink)

Watsuji Tetsurô’s Ethics is one of the most important works in Japanese ethical thought. But scholarly research in English has largely focused on the first of three volumes of Ethics, leaving the latter two oft-neglected. In order to balance out the views of Watsuji’s ethics, this paper focuses on the contributions of the second and third volumes of Ethics. These volumes are essential for any concrete understanding of Watsuji’s ‘ethics of emptiness’. The second volume develops the ideas of the (...) first, particularly how the dual-structure is concretely realized through the various stages of ethical organization. The third volume develops the notions of space and time from the first volume into a theory of climate and history. By analyzing these, we can understand Watsuji’s system as a whole and clarify Watsuji’s unique contribution to ethical theory. (shrink)

La fenomenología tiene sus orígenes históricos en el pensamiento de Edmund Husserl. Este autor desarrolló el métodofenomenológico, que tiene como objetivo llegar a las “cosas mismas”. El desarrollo del concepto de fenomenología continúa a través del trabajo de Nishitani Keiji. En la fenomenología de este autor, perteneciente a la llamada “Escuela de Kioto”, se llega a la comprensión de la “cosa misma” como vacío. Este concepto esencial de su pensamiento se analiza en la primera sección del presente artículo. La segunda (...) sección se centra en un análisis de las obras de Dōgen y Meister Eckhart, así como en su recepción en el pensamiento de Nishitani Keiji. Estos autores son ejemplos paradigmáticos de un tipo de pensamiento que no puede enmarcarse dentro de las tradiciones metafísicas y onto-teológicas occidentales y orientales. En la tercera sección, se explica cómo la experiencia del vacío culmina en la aspiración última de la fenomenología de llegar a las “cosas mismas”. Esencial en esta sección es la confrontación de Nishitani con el pensamiento de Heidegger. Finalmente, en la última sección, y a modo de conclusión, se hace una propuesta sobre posibles líneas de investigación basadas en los desarrollos de Heidegger y Nishitani. (shrink)

“Everything is interconnected” is a central theme of Chinese Buddhism. This article examines how four prominent Chinese Buddhist schools—Tiantai 天台, Sanlun 三論, Huayan 華嚴, and Chan 禪—engaged with interconnectedness during the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581–907 CE), the golden age of Chinese Buddhism. While Tiantai, Sanlun, and Huayan developed distinctive theses of interconnectedness by advancing beyond the Indian Buddhist doctrine of emptiness (Sanskrit: śūnyatā), which denies that objects have intrinsic nature (Sanskrit: svabhāva), their insights were echoed and integrated in (...) practice-oriented Chan Buddhism. This article analyzes this historical development through two lenses: first, by tracing the evolution of interconnectedness in Chinese Buddhism, it reveals how Chinese Buddhists developed distinctive views that further the Indian doctrine of emptiness; second, by showing how contemporary concepts of identity and dependence can elucidate historical Chinese Buddhist theses while revealing alternative perspectives to contemporary views, it demonstrates how Chinese Buddhism and contemporary metaphysics can be mutually enriching. (shrink)