Since Case and Deaton (2015) coined the term ‘deaths of despair,’ there has been significant empirical work and public interest in the topic. Yet social scientists studying this topic lament the absence of a clear theory of despair. Philosophical inquiry into the nature and value of hope has begun to fill this gap, with despair often cited as the opposite of hope. The assumption that hope and despair are opposites has helped to motivate two central tasks (...) in the literature: how a theory of hope can make sense of the difference between hope and despair, and how hope might prevent people from falling into despair. Yet the focus of inquiry has been principally on hope. This paper builds on the existing literature to offer a theory of despair. We argue that despair is a mode of sadness whereby one experiences the loss of reasons to take seriously that which one desires. Our account of despair captures a set of desiderata that any theory of despair should explain, and it offers useful conceptual resources to social scientists studying deaths of despair. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that hope is polysemous in that it sometimes refers to hoping and other times to being hopeful. That it has these two distinct senses is reflected in the observation that a person can hope for an outcome without being hopeful that it will occur. Below, I offer a new argument for this distinction. My strategy is to show that accepting this distinction yields a rich account of two distinct ways in which hope can be lost, (...) ways that map onto the two senses of hope: A person can lose hope either by ceasing to hope for an outcome (hopelessness) or by ceasing to be hopeful that it will obtain (despair). Thinking about these negative attitudes in these two ways, I contend, is explanatorily rich and fruitfully reveals how they differ in phenomenology, behavioral differences, and the ways in which a person can escape them. (shrink)

Although doubt (Tvivl) and despair (Fortvivlelse) are widely recognized as two central and closely associated concepts in Kierkegaard’s authorship, their precise relationship remains opaque in the extant interpretive literature. To shed light on their relationship, this paper develops a novel interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the connection between despair and our agency over our beliefs, and its significance for Kierkegaard’s ethics of belief. First, I show that an important yet largely overlooked form of Kierkegaardian despair involves either (...) failing to take ethico-religious responsibility for one’s practical agency over one’s beliefs, or misusing one’s practical agency over one’s beliefs by refusing to recognize or comply with externally given ethico-religious norms governing belief. Second, I argue that Kierkegaard takes properly exercising one’s agency over one’s beliefs to matter because beliefs are partly constitutive of the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) that Kierkegaard regards as the cure for despair. (shrink)

As scholars and activists have begun to note, without the ability to feel despair we might lack the necessary clarity to abandon failing pursuits and find new directions. In this paper, I add to the current debate regarding the nature and value of despair. I argue that despair should not be viewed strictly as a form of sadness but rather as an emotional reaction through which we apprehend the loss of a future as likely. As such, (...) class='Hi'>despair is not only valuable because it provides a reflective break. Instead, it is a response of restless apathy which prepares us both to retreat and renounce our commitments, and to launch last resort “desperate” acts. Despair is not only valuable as an antidote to wishful hoping but, more fundamentally, because it counteracts our resistance to reconsidering plans we are diachronically committed to. As beings with temporally extended agency, we form intentions that guide, monitor, and rationally control action across time. Despair allows us to respond to the disheartening lowering of chances of success by urgently reconsidering our plans, in spite of our inherent resistance to doing so. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair (and demonic evil) and to show its relevance for discussions of the guise of the good thesis (i.e. that in f-ing intentionally, we take f-ing to be good). Contemporary discussions of diabolic evil often emphasise the phenomena of despair and acedia as apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good. I contend that Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair is relevant to these discussions, because it reconciles (...) demonic (extreme) despair and acedia with the guise of the good. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard provides an influential, systematic account of despair that relates evil, despair, and acedia to each other. Michelle Kosch argues that this account goes beyond Kierkegaard’s German predecessors by introducing a concept of diabolic evil and despair. By contrast, the present paper argues that Kierkegaard takes diabolic evil to be impossible, although he offers a rich analysis of the demonic that resembles diabolic agency. Still, Kierkegaard’s analysis rests on ontological assumptions about the nature of the good that belong to a Platonico-Christian tradition that is controversial today. (shrink)

In today’s world we appear to place a premium on happiness. Happiness is often portrayed, directly or indirectly, as one of the key aims of education. To suggest that education is concerned with promoting unhappiness or even despair would, in many contexts, seem outlandish. This paper challenges these widely held views. Focusing on the work of the great Russian writer, Fyodor Dostoevsky, I argue that despair, the origins of which lie in our reflective consciousness, is a defining feature (...) of human life. Education, I maintain, should not be seen as a flight from despair but as a process of deepening our understanding of suffering and its potentially pivotal role in our humanisation. In developing these ideas, I draw on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death and Unamuno’s The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations, among other sources. (shrink)

Jeff Benedict has seen both good and bad in his career as a journalist. Some of the best are the extraordinary people he has met who have made deliberate choices to live happier lives despite the extreme hardship that each of them have faced. Although life will knock us down from time to time, this book is an important reminder that we all can make a choice to get back up, brush ourselves off, and keep pressing forward. Replace anger with (...) forgiveness through studying the real-life examples of seven inspiring mentors. Avoid discouragement by purposefully recognizing God's hand in your life. Diminish the heartache from tragedy through the concentrated act of serving others. Gain insights from parents who were deliberate in safeguarding their children against harmful influences. Stand strong through life's adversity through the examples of powerful prayer. (shrink)

From the start of the Arab revolutions in late 2010, a connection between the law, state, political economy, gender norms and orientalist ideology has formed the foundation of women's systematic exclusion from politics. By unmasking processes in Egypt that have created the ideological and material conditions of externalising women's revolutionary acts, estranging their political involvement, and exposing them to various forms of violence, this article offers a gendered political reading of the concept of alienation. The article suggests that gender-normative ideology's (...) characterisation of women's images, roles and acts during and after revolutions, corresponds to the most profound form of alienation. The article identifies the externalisation and subjugation of women, and objectification of their revolutionary acts as modes of alienation. Moreover, it proposes that the implementing of these modes of alienation are necessary for creating conditions that allow for the reconfiguration of power dynamics that restore the authoritarian power of the state. This discussion suggests that the sphere of politics not only relates to political activism and conflict between revolutions and counterrevolutions, but that it is also a battlefield for the (re)production of gender-normative knowledge. (shrink)

Initially portrayed as the “great equalizer,” the COVID-19 pandemic has proved anything but. This essay recounts the sobering social disparities and vulnerabilities that the pandemic has exposed, especially when it comes to the inequalities that are baked into existing membership regimes, before turning to narratives of hope and democratic renewal. My discussion shines a spotlight on the relationship between borders, (im)mobility, and struggles for recognition and inclusion that have long been central to the practice of citizenship. Focusing on pathways to (...) the acquisition of full membership status for those who are currently denied it, I will deploy logics and policies that have already begun to take shape in different parts of the world, with the goal of amplifying their effects and multiplying their scale. I identify three possible trajectories for postpandemic recovery, two of which offer ways to enhance equality of status and public standing by enlarging the circle of membership: first, through contribution (or what I will term “jus contribuere”), and second, by highlighting what we might call “solidarity in place.” The third reaction, which we might call the “stratification of membership,” pulls in the opposite direction by sharply redrawing the lines—legal, economic, social—that have distinguished insiders from outsiders, and exacerbated patterns of stratification and inequality of status and opportunity that predate the pandemic. (shrink)

In her book Hopeful Pessimism, Van der Lugt argues that, often, political activists act regardless of the outcome of their action. This form of action is informed by a ‘blue hope’ that finds its value in commitment regardless of effect and is based on openness of the future and uncertainty, not evidence and probability. This short essay argues for an alternative explanation of political action: often, activists are acting from despair, and the effects, outcomes and consequences are the central (...) motivating factor despite the near impossibility of success. Acting from despair involves a tragic pursuit of one’s goals that is (almost certainly) doomed to fail to reach one’s goals. An agent that acts from despair is (1) motivated by the outcome they desperately want to bring about and, at the same time, (2) accurately judges the outcome to be extremely unlikely or impossible to achieve for the agent. I argue that acting from despair is not only just as plausible as blue hope for explaining political action but often captures the normative orientation of political activism better than blue hope can. (shrink)

The question of meaning in life has enjoyed renewed attention in analytic discourse over the last few decades. Despite the apparently “existential” quality of this topic, existential philosophy has had little impact on this re-energized conversation. This paper draws on Kierkegaard’s _The Sickness unto Death_ in order to challenge the objectivist theory of meaning in life. According to that theory, a meaningful life is one replete with objective goods. Kierkegaard, however, exposits four forms of the spiritual sickness he calls (...) class='Hi'>despair that are compatible with the possession of objective goods. If this account is convincing, it poses a challenge to the objectivist view, suggesting that a subjective contribution is also necessary to fully account for meaning in life. By a process of negative inference, this paper concludes by sketching out what this subjective contribution might look like and suggests the term “authenticity” in order to capture this subjective element of a meaningful life. (shrink)

Climate despair (CD) has been recently attracting sustained attention, increasingly seen as apt vis-à-vis the climate crisis and, at once, an obstacle to the very mobilisation needed to address it. Against this backdrop, the paper analyses the prudential value of mainstream critical views of CD (as epistemically irrational, strategically irrational, and a ‘luxury’ emotion that only marginally climate-vulnerable individuals can afford). Drawing on sociological and psychoanalytic sources, the paper highlights how one typically neglected pathway from CD to climate inaction (...) passes through non-(fully-)conscious processes of denial of the climate crisis, whose psychological function is protecting individuals from highly distressing emotions. Notably, rather than being an isolated, pathological reaction, living in denial of the seriousness of the crisis is a psychological response supported by a plethora of social forces. By showing how mainstream critiques of CD can also afford support to defensive processes of denial, the paper shows that there are pro tanto prudential reasons to refrain from circulating them as they can unwittingly lead to more withdrawal from, rather than engagement with, climate action. (shrink)

Dehejia has tried to create a place within the main frame of culture and philosophy of Indian art for a legitimate analytic theory called despair.

How are we to read and how translate the brief formulae with which ‟The Sickness unto Death” introduces two forms of ‛authentic despair’? In response to Michael Theunissen’s claim that, to conform with the actual drift of Kierkegaard’s thought, the first of the two forms of despair should be given priority, an alternative reading that conforms with the published ordering is defended on the strength of both the text itself and the development of Kierkegaard’s thought up to the (...) time of its writing. The further aim, shared with Theunissen, is to widen the basis for assessing the continuing relevance of Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair. (shrink)

In her book Hopeful Pessimism, Van der Lugt argues that, often, political activists act regardless of the outcome of their action. This form of action is informed by a ‘blue hope’ that finds its value in commitment regardless of effect and is based on openness of the future and uncertainty, not evidence and probability. This short essay argues for an alternative explanation of political action: often, activists are acting from despair, and the effects, outcomes and consequences are the central (...) motivating factor despite the near impossibility of success. Acting from despair involves a tragic pursuit of one’s goals that is (almost certainly) doomed to fail to reach one’s goals. An agent that acts from despair is (1) motivated by the outcome they desperately want to bring about and, at the same time, (2) accurately judges the outcome to be extremely unlikely or impossible to achieve for the agent. I argue that acting from despair is not only just as plausible as blue hope for explaining political action but often captures the normative orientation of political activism better than blue hope can. (shrink)

This article examines the importance of doubt in Western philosophy, with particular attention to the work of Søren Kierkegaard and Miguel de Unamuno. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus ventures down the pathway of doubt, finds it perplexing and difficult and discovers that he is unable to return to his pre-doubting self. In despair, the meaningfulness of his life is called into question. Unamuno, a great admirer of Kierkegaard, acknowledges the suffering that accompanies doubt while affirming the pivotal role of (...) uncertainty, despair and struggle in realising our humanity. From Unamuno, we can acquire a keener sense of the part education has to play in both forming us as doubting beings and allowing us to work constructively with the despair engendered by this formation. (shrink)

In times of a prevailing sense of crisis and disorder in modern politics, there is a growing sentiment that anger, despair or resignation are more appropriate attitudes to navigate the world than hope. Political philosophers have long shared this suspicion and shied away from theorising hope more systematically. The aim of this article is to resist this tendency by showing that hope constitutes an integral part of democratic politics in particular. In making this argument I draw on Kant’s conceptualisation (...) of hope as a psychological condition on action under circumstances where the chances of making a difference are dim. Given that the Kantian agent avoids the threat of despair in the pursuit of political goals by placing trust in her fellow citizens, hope has the potential to positively transform democratic practices. (shrink)

: The category of despair plays a central role in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous corpus, but its meaning is controversial. This paper offers an interpretation of its use in Either/Or (in particular, in the claim the aesthetic life is despair and the ethical life freedom from despair). After examining and rejecting two recent alternatives, I argue that despair is the conscious or unconscious assumption of a passive or fatalistic attitude toward one's existence, which attitude is informed by a (...) misconstrual of the nature of human agency. (shrink)

Hegel's "highway of despair," introduced in his _Phenomenology of Spirit_, represents the tortured path traveled by "natural consciousness" on its way to freedom. Despair, the passionate residue of Hegelian critique, also indicates fugitive opportunities for freedom and preserves the principle of hope against all hope. Analyzing the works of an eclectic cast of thinkers, Robyn Marasco considers the dynamism of despair as a critical passion, reckoning with the forms of historical life forged along Hegel's highway. _The Highway (...) of Despair_ follows Theodor Adorno, Georges Bataille, and Frantz Fanon as they each read, resist, and reconfigure a strand of thought in Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_. Confronting the twentieth-century collapse of a certain revolutionary dialectic, these thinkers struggle to revalue critical philosophy and recast Left Hegelianism within the contexts of genocidal racism, world war, and colonial domination. Each thinker also re-centers the role of passion in critique. Arguing against more recent trends in critical theory that promise an escape from despair, Marasco shows how passion frustrates the resolutions of reason and faith. Embracing the extremism of what Marx, in the spirit of Hegel, called the "ruthless critique of everything existing," she affirms the contemporary purchase of radical critical theory, resulting in a passionate approach to political thought. (shrink)

Given the current and future suffering associated with human-made climate change and the lack of political action in response to it, it seems only natural to feel despair. However, despair has a bad reputation among climate ethicists and in the wider public. In this paper, we will push back against this view and argue that there is considerable value in climate despair. More specifically, we shall maintain that climate despair can be valuable in two respects. First, (...) it is epistemically valuable because it constitutes a particularly apt way of recognizing the severity of what has already happened and is likely to happen because of human-made climate change, and because it can provide a “reflective break” that allows us to rearrange our values and find new strategies to tackle climate change. Second, climate despair can have various valuable expressive and signaling functions. Most importantly, perhaps, it can send the message that the despairing person cares about important moral values and norms, and remind us all of how big a moral problem climate change, in fact, is. (shrink)

[W]e might despair of despair itself, rather than of life, and cast that off, and begin, and so reverse our direction.This is a finely conceived, elegantly written, and exquisitely executed work. At its center, there is Naoko Saito ’s creative appropriation of one of Cavell’s most fecund suggestions—philosophy is first and foremost an activity and, as such, it is either akin to or, more strongly, identifiable with practices of translation.1 Everything I have to say concerns translation, if only (...) implicitly. Moreover, I offer everything as a friendly amendment. That is, I take my reflections on her book to be in accord with both the spirit and, in most instances, even the letter of her texts. Whether or not she... (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of the Thomistic vice of despair, one of two vices opposed to the theological virtue of hope. Aquinas's conception of despair as a vice, and a theological vice in particular, distances him from contemporary use of the term "despair" to describe an emotional state. His account nonetheless yields a compelling psychological portrait of moral degeneration, which I explain via despair's link to its "root," the capital vice of sloth. Cases in which (...) sloth and its offspring vices progress into full-fledged despair raise intersecting issues about whether and how despair might be remediable. I conclude by considering puzzles regarding despair's disordered effects on the intellect and will and weighing three possible means of remedying it. (shrink)

Hope is lost or out of reach for many people struggling to survive in our world today. There are countless reports of despair among victims of war and genocide, refugees and asylum seekers, women a...

Both within the climate movement and in academic circles, it has become common advice to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis is the opposite of hope and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference. As our actions do make a difference, despair is not a fitting response to climate change). Further, we (...) have pragmatic reasons to avoid despair as it leads to apathy and inaction about climate change. This chapter argues that despair is a rationally apt response to the climate crisis. Despair is a fitting response to the structural features of the climate crisis in terms of fragmentation of agency, making despair an accurate representation of a situation lacking agency. Despair is an important source of moral knowledge about the structure of the climate crisis, which is not automatically outweighed by pragmatic reasons and demanding to avoid despair can lead to affective injustice. The chapter closes with considerations of whether despair really does hinder moral imagination. (shrink)

Those of us who enjoy certain products of the global industrial economy but also believe it is wrong to consume them are often so demoralized by the apparent inefficacy of our individual, private choices that we are unable to resist. Although he was a deontologist, Kant was clearly aware of this ‘consequent-dependent’ side of our moral psychology. One version of his ‘moral proof’ is designed to respond to the threat of such demoralization in pursuit of the Highest Good. That version (...) of the argument says that the capacity that faith and trust in God has to sustain our moral resolve licenses that faith and trust, from a practical point of view. My goal here is to argue that Kant’s proof has a contemporary, secular analogue in modern industrial contexts where the apparent “inefficacy” of an individual consumer’s choices in the face of massive insensitive supply-chains is a threat to her moral resolve. I conclude by suggesting that the Kantian approach may license us in adopting (as an item of defeasible moral faith) an evidential decision-theoretic principle regarding what it is to ‘make a difference.’ This in turn licenses trust -- if not in God then in other right-minded people. (shrink)

The literature on Kierkegaard is often content to paraphrase. By contrast, Michael Theunissen articulates one of Kierkegaard's central ideas, his theory of despair, in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confronts it with alternatives. Understanding what Kierkegaard wrote on despair is vital not only because it illuminates his thought as a whole, but because his account of despair in The Sickness unto Death is the cornerstone of existentialism. Theunissen's book, published in German in 1993, is widely regarded (...) as the best treatment of the subject in any language. Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair is also one of the few works on Kierkegaard that bridge the gap between the Continental and analytic traditions in philosophy. Theunissen argues that for Kierkegaard, the fundamental characteristic of despair is the desire of the self "not to be what it is." He sorts through the apparently chaotic text of The Sickness unto Death to explain what Kierkegaard meant by the "self," how and why individuals want to flee their selves, and how he believed they could reconnect with their selves. According to Theunissen, Kierkegaard thought that individuals in despair seek to deny their authentic selves to flee particular aspects of their character, their past, or the world, or in order to deny their "mission." In addition to articulating and evaluating Kierkegaard's concept of despair, Theunissen relates Kierkegaard's ideas to those of Heidegger, Sartre, and other twentieth-century philosophers. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard has been called many things, from brooding genius and "melancholy Dane" to the father of existentialism. Yet, rather than clarify the nature of Kierkegaard's writings, such labels have often obscured other important aspects of his authorship. Such, indeed, is the case with Kierkegaard's standing as a spiritual author. In From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard, Christopher B. Barnett endeavors to remedy this problem. He does so in two overarching ways. First, he orients the reader (...) to Kierkegaard's grounding in the Christian spiritual tradition, as well as to the Dane's own authorial stress on themes such as upbuilding, spiritual journey, and faith. Second, Barnett maintains that Kierkegaard's spirituality is best understood through the various "pictures" that populate his authorship. These pictures are deemed "icons of faith," since Kierkegaard consistently recommends that the reader contemplate them. In this way, they both represent and communicate what Kierkegaard sees as the fulfillment of Christian existence. In the end, then, From Despair to Faith not only offers a new way of approaching Kierkegaard's writings, but also shows how they might serve to illuminate and to deepen one's relationship with the divine." -- Publisher's description. (shrink)

The realities of modern war provide lots of reasons for pessimism and despair. In this article, I identify ways pessimism cannot only undercut the types of political action needed to end war but also conflict with central democratic norms, e.g. equality and political autonomy. Contrary to the growing literature on pessimism, which stresses its resources for negotiating the moral chaos and disenchantment of modernity, I highlight the democratic costs of relying on pessimism to stop war. To do this, I (...) clarify the meaning of despair, identify two sources of hope, and distinguish three different types of despair. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the experience of hope by focusing on experiences that seem to rival hope, namely, disappointment, desperation, panic, hopelessness, and despair. I explore these issues phenomenologically by examining five kinds of experiences that counter hope (or in some instances, seem to do so): first, by noting the cases in which hope simply is not operative, then by treating the significance of both desperation and pessimism, next by examining the experience of hopelessness, and finally, by treating (...) the experience of despair. Here despair is shown to constitute the most profound challenge to hope among these experiences and to be foundational for the others, even though it is disclosed ultimately as founded in hope. (shrink)

Despair is often taken to be a psychological malady. However, this paper argues that certain forms of despair, along with hope, have value in the way that they shape the narratives through which we imagine possible futures. Just as hope provides encouragement for the attainment of an outcome and so motivates the pursuit of that outcome, despair, of the right form, can redirect our efforts away from implausible outcomes and so help support coherent narratives that make future (...) hoped for scenarios meaningful. Accordingly, narrative also provides a means by which we might understand some of our hopes and despairs as warranted or not. There are two purposes to this paper. First, this paper will clarify the contrast between episodic and dispositional forms of hope and despair. Second, this paper will apply that contrast to the narratives that frame our future imaginaries. As we face the challenges of climate change and other concerns that change the trajectory of our future narratives to the new and unfamiliar, it will be increasingly important to understand the relationship between our future imaginaries, meaningful hopes and despairs, and threats to motivation. (shrink)

The theme of religious despair appears several times in Hegel’s philosophy. Each meaning differs from the preceding ones, but presupposes them. Gradually a totality of sense unfolds which remains latent in each instance taken singularly. The development is most clearly apparent in The Phenomenology of Spirit which presents the various moments of despair as following necessarily from the internal logic of the religious consciousness itself. That schema of development provides a framework for incorporating the descriptions in the Lectures (...) on Aesthetics as well as those in the History of Philosophy, and, above all, the conclusion of Faith and Knowledge in which the famous expression, “God is dead,” first appears. One passage does not seem to fit into this logical development. The pessimistic evaluation of the modern age at the end of the 1821 lecture notes on the philosophy of religion does not follow from Christianity’s own principles, but rather moves directly against its “truth.” Nevertheless, as we shall see, even this deviation may be “justified” as a direct consequence of attitudes provoked by the Christian faith in its struggle with the Enlightenment. Precisely because of this final predicament Hegel presents his philosophy of spirit as a - hopefully temporary - refuge for religion from the outward and inward ravages of the Enlightenment, In the following paper I shall consider the four phases in which the despair of religion appears in the Phenomenology of Spirit and, by way of conclusion, briefly situate the final section of the 1821 lecture notes. (shrink)

According to Gabriel Marcel, no task is more important and more complex than looking for ways of confronting and overcoming despair. Therefore, the search for the essence of hope is the objective of this paper. Reference is made to the theme of the open soul in Henri Bergson’s, Gabriel Marcel’s, and Jan Patočka’s works. Such a soul is not centred in itself; moreover, according to Marcel, hope and soul are intrinsically linked together. Hope opens people towards the future. The (...) concept of hope in the biblical context is shown briefly, according to which hope is in God (Ps 62:5), while God is coming to man. At the same time, biblical texts sketch a pathway to hope, setting out from suffering through endurance and character (Rom 5:3–4). The paper stresses that hope takes root in dialogue and that a person is empowered to adopt hope as a gift. (shrink)

A common view among latter-day Kantians is that hope is needed to defeat the threat of moral demotivation. I argue against this view by drawing on Kant’s neglected account of despair. On this account, despair is an affect in response to hopelessness. A certain kind of despair—wild despair—can be intensely motivating. Wild moral despair (as I call it) can even help to sustain moral motivation. Yet this presents a challenge: since wild moral despair can (...) defeat moral demotivation, why hope over despair? I answer that by hindering reflection, affects hinder the exercise of our practical rationality for Kant. Yet this cost extends not only to despair, but also to affective hope. Non-affective hope can defeat moral demotivation without this cost, and thus is the kind of hope that has true value for Kant. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s efforts to develop a uniquely existential approach to philosophy were furthered by his experimental use of the literary device of pseudonymous authorship. The existential import of his pseudonyms is twofold: they not only diagnose the spiritual malaise that afflicts their readers, but also manifest this distress, unwittingly, in their various efforts to address the crisis at hand. In the case of Fear and Trembling, we are invited to witness the pseudonymous author and narrator, Johannes de Silentio, in his (...) class='Hi'>despair, as he fails to escape the crisis he presumes to address. (shrink)

In a recent thought-provoking piece, Peter Roberts argues against the central role of happiness as a guiding concept in education, and argues for more attention to be paid to despair. This does not mean cultivating despair in young people, but allowing them to make sense of their own natural occasional despair, as well as the despair of others. I agree with Roberts about happiness, and about the need for more attention to despair, but I argue (...) that focusing too much on despair is dangerous without paying simultaneous attention to goodness. Roberts argues that students must be helped to face the despair born of the realisation that we can never be sure of the moral grounds on which our actions are based, we can never fully know ourselves, and that education should make us more appreciative of what we don't know. I argue against all three claims: there are some moral truths that we can know; we can know enough of ourselves in certain contexts; education should not only teach intellectual humility, it should also give us confidence in appreciating the sources of meaning that are ordinarily available, e.g. personal relationships. The paper concludes with a response to the objection that my position is little more than old-fashioned moralism and conservatism. (shrink)

Digital platforms crunching massive amounts of online data are adept at predicting and manipulating human behavior. They filter our choices, shape our decisions, and influence our actions. As these technologies become more powerful in the coming years, we face the prospect of an accelerated erosion of human agency and widespread passivity. Among other psychological ailments, participants of the AI-enabled attention economy will suffer from despair. Free will appears to be at stake.

This article investigates the convergence between Kierkegaard’s concept of despair and Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism. The piece argues that (1) both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche rely on an internal critique of ways of life which collapse on their own terms; (2) both despair and nihilism involve a radical, existential aporia and double-mindedness which can be (3) either conscious or non-conscious; (4) there is some overlap between the main types of nihilism and the different types of inauthentic (non-conscious) despair; (...) (5) finally, a comparison with Nietzsche makes it possible to make sense of inauthentic despair without resorting to theological presuppositions or a twentieth century depth psychology notion of the unconscious. (shrink)

In this article, we examine how white working-class women reimagine gender in the face of social and economic changes that have undermined their ability to perform normative femininity. As blue-collar jobs have disappeared, scholars have posited that white working-class men and women have become increasingly isolated, disconnected from institutions, and hopeless about the future, leading to a culture of despair. Although past literature has examined how working-class white men cope with the inability to perform masculinity through wage-earning and family (...) authority, gender has been undertheorized in these discussions, treating working-class women’s and men’s despair interchangeably. Drawing on 37 in-depth interviews conducted in a former coal-mining town in northeastern Pennsylvania, we identify three overarching strategies that women deploy in their life histories to cope with disruption: embracing pain as an opportunity for self-growth; dispelling shame and striving for equality; and enduring suffering. These strategies allow women to feel hopeful and worthy as they confront enormous challenges, whether starting over following relationship dissolution, learning to be independent from men, or simply surviving hardship for the sake of their children. We explore the implications for recreating gender identity in each strategy and question how different strategies might serve to protect women from, or alternatively solidify, sentiments of despair. (shrink)

This paper is a study of Kierkegaard’s concept of despair. The Danish etymology of fortvivleslse is examined in order to argue that, for Kierkegaard, despair is not simply a feeling, but is more fundamentally a willed misrelation in the self.