ABSTRACT There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, only actual sequence features can ground free agency. This paper argues that and can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally (...) tracks q. According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, and can’t be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness. (shrink)

Over the course of my career, I have sought to motivate and present a comprehensive actual-sequence theory of moral responsibility, according to which moral responsibility does not require access to alternative possibilities (“freedom to do otherwise”). Such a theory renders the defense of compatibilism easier. Indeed, I have argued that my approach implies the compatibility of both causal determinism and indeterminism with moral responsibility. I call my account, “semicompatibilism.” In this paper I defend my view against some salient (...) objections. I explain how the Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) can be employed to call into question the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). That is, I show how to interpret the dialectic surrounding the inference from the FSCs to the falsity of PAP. Further, I defend my approach against the proponents of the view that moral responsibility requires the “fair opportunity to do otherwise.”. (shrink)

The Frankfurt cases motivate the notion that we should adopt an “actual-sequence” approach to moral responsibility. On this sort of view, moral responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise; rather, it is a function of (possibly modal) characteristics of the actual sequence leading to the behavior in question. This chapter addresses a significant challenge to the actual-sequence approach; the challenge has it that we cannot extrapolate from classical Frankfurt-style cases to a conclusion about (...) the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility, since the Frankfurt-style cases feature “counterfactual interveners,” whereas causal determination is a property of the way the actual sequence unfolds. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a sketch of an overall theology that dispenses with “alternative-possibilities” freedom in favor of “actual-sequence” freedom. I hold that acting freely does not require freedom to do otherwise, and that acting freely is the freedom component of moral responsibility. Employing this analytical apparatus, I show how we can offer various important elements of a theology that employs only the notion of acting freely. I distinguish my approach from the important development of Open Theism (...) by William Hasker. My view about God’s foreknowledge is in-between comprehensive foreknowledge and no foreknowledge. (shrink)

Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note (...) that the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases also fail to undermine the actual-sequence model. My second strategy of defense consists in revitalizing the original motivation for the actual-sequence model, by revamping it, isolating it from claims that do not fully capture the same idea, and arguing that it can be developed in a successful way. (shrink)

This chapter lays out a view of freedom according to which the following two claims are true: first, acting freely is, at least partly, a matter of being sensitive to reasons; second, acting freely is exclusively a function of having a certain kind of actual causal history. It is notoriously difficult to reconcile claims of this type. For being sensitive to reasons appears to be a modal property of agents, one that agents possess by virtue of their capacity to (...) react to reasons in _other_ possible worlds, and this seems to clash with the idea that acting freely is just a function of _actual_ causal histories. The chapter argues that the reconciliation can be achieved by focusing on the absences of certain reasons, and the role that those absences play in the actual causal history of the agent’s behavior. (shrink)

This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin’s recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin’s ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.

This work presents an "actual-sequence" model of moral responsibility. In contrast to many traditional views, an "actual-sequence" model holds that ascriptions of moral responsibility do not necessarily depend upon whether agents are free to pursue alternative courses of action; rather what is important is what the agents actually do, and how their actions come to be performed. ;Part One of this work sketches an actual-sequence theory that associates moral responsibility with control. I motivate this (...) approach through a series of "Frankfurt-type" examples which illustrate that even though agents lack alternative possibilities, they still may be held responsible in virtue of freely bringing about an event; such agents are said to exercise "actual causal control." The proposed theory has the important advantage of reconciling responsibility and causal determinism, even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. The next two chapters aim to defend this "semi-compatibilist" view against a variety of objections. Chapter 3 addresses a range of objections which can be raised against the Frankfurt-type examples. Chapter 4 addresses Peter van Inwagen's "direct" argument which purports to show that responsibility and determinism are incompatible. ;Part Two of this work presents a more precise analysis of actual causal control. Through an examination of several approaches , Chapters 5 and 6 develop an analysis of control which is based on the idea that in order to be responsible, agents must act in ways that are responsive to an appropriate pattern of both moral and non-moral reasons. Chapter 7 expands this account by arguing that ascriptions of responsibility depend not only on the current responsiveness of an agent, but also on the history which leads to this pattern of response. To support this point, I sketch an account of the process of taking responsibility which captures one way in which historical considerations play an important role in our ascriptions of moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the relationship between moral bioenhancement and the actual-sequence account of moral responsibility (AS). I first provide definitions of the notions of moral bioenhancement and moral responsibility that I use in this paper, where these notions are based on the capacity definition put forward by DeGrazia (2012) and the guidance theory account of responsibility developed by Fischer and Ravizza (1998) respectively. I then address some shortcomings in these accounts and offer improvements. Thereafter, I explore (...) the relationship between them along two dimensions: backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. On the backward-looking path I contend that, when assessed through the lens of the AS, moral bioenhancement is permissible only provided that it does not override or degrade the reasonsresponsiveness of the enhanced agent. However, if these conditions are met, such enhancement will in many cases be normatively desirable, and in perhaps some cases –when the foreseen threat of harm resulting from the absence of enhancement is sufficiently great– even obligatory. Along the forward-looking track, I argue that moral bioenhancement is permissible, ceteris paribus, and normatively desirable given there is a pro tanto reason to pursue promotions of reasons-responsiveness. Finally, I argue that the demands of moral responsibility do not – on their own terms – rule out the possibility that moral bioenhancement can sometimes be obligatory. (shrink)

Despite their differences, responsibility theories of all types (skeptics, forward-looking, backward-looking) concur on the following conditional: If someone deserved to suffer for an act, then they would be blameworthy for that act. Here I sketch a way of rejecting that conditional. In particular, using some of Śāntideva’s distinctions, I offer a new way of thinking about desert: Wrongdoers deserve to, and do, suffer for their wrongdoings, but they do not deserve our blame. It may be that vice is (part of) (...) its own deserved punishment, whether or not anyone can have the free will required for blameworthiness. More generally, wrongdoers may not deserve negative responses of any kind from anyone else, yet they may still deservedly suffer in proportion to their wrongdoings. (shrink)

One of the earliest applications of transfinite numbers is in the construction of derived sequences by Cantor [2]. In [6], the existence of derived sequences for countable closed sets is proved in ATR0. This existence theorem is an intermediate step in a proof that a statement concerning topological comparability is equivalent to ATR0. In actuality, the full strength of ATR0 is used in proving the existence theorem. To show this, we will derive a statement known to be equivalent to ATR0, (...) using only RCA0 and the assertion that every countable closed set has a derived sequence. We will use three of the subsystems of second order arithmetic defined by H. Friedman , which can be roughly characterized by the strength of their set comprehension axioms. RCA0 includes comprehension for Δmath image definable sets, ACA0 includes comprehension for arithmetical sets, and ATR0 appends to ACA0 a comprehension scheme for sets defined by transfinite recursion on arithmetical formulas. MSC: 03F35, 54B99. (shrink)

Sibley, Kello, Plaut, and Elman (2008) proposed the sequence encoder as a model that learns fixed‐width distributed representations of variable‐length sequences. In doing so, the sequence encoder overcomes problems that have restricted models of word reading and recognition to processing only monosyllabic words. Bowers and Davis (2009) recently claimed that the sequence encoder does not actually overcome the relevant problems, and hence it is not a useful component of large‐scale word‐reading models. In this reply, it is noted (...) that the sequence encoder has facilitated the creation of large‐scale word‐reading models. The reasons for this success are explained and stand as counterarguments to claims made by Bowers and Davis. (shrink)

We define DNA sequence by a bottom-up approach, starting with a real sequence from an actual biological sample. By providing axioms for notions of string, substring and strand, we formally define a DNA sequence, and a DNA molecule as composed of two antiparallel strands. We note that a sequence is a kind of group in which each member stands a certain relation to every other. The spatial aspects of a DNA sequence are also described.

Significant associations have been found between specific human leukocyte antigen (HLA) alleles and organ transplant rejection, autoimmune disease development, and the response to infection. Traditional searches for disease associations have conventionally measured risk associated with the presence of individual HLA alleles. However, given the high level of HLA polymorphism, the pattern of amino acid variability, and the fact that most of the HLA variation occurs at functionally important sites, it may be that a combination of variable amino acid sites shared (...) by several alleles (shared epitopes) are better descriptors of the actual causative genetic variants. Here we describe a novel approach to genetic association analysis in which genes/proteins are broken down into smaller sequence features and then variant types defined for each feature, allowing for independent analysis of disease association with each sequence feature variant type. We have used this approach to analyze a cohort of systemic sclerosis patients and show that a sequence feature composed of specific amino acid residues in peptide binding pockets 4 and 7 of HLA-DRB1 explains much of the molecular determinant of risk for systemic sclerosis. (shrink)

Actual-sequence views of responsibility are views according to which moral responsibility is a function of actual sequences, histories, or ancestries. In recent years these views have acquired much popularity as an attractive kind of compatibilist answer to the problem of determinism and the freedom of the will. But what does it mean to say that responsibility is ‘a function of the actual sequence’? In this paper I examine different possible ways to cash out this idea. (...) I show that one of them is immune to important objections to which the others are prey. This motivates a type of actual-sequence view that is unorthodox in two main respects. First, it understands the expression ‘the actual sequence’ in a way that is different from the way in which it seems typically to have been understood. Second, on this view, non-actualized possibilities of a certain kind are always relevant to the moral responsibility of agents. (shrink)

This article extends prior conversation analytic research on the preference organization of sequence-initiating actions. Across two languages, this article examines one such action: explicitly soliciting an account for human conduct. Prior work demonstrates that this action conveys a challenging stance towards the warrantability of the accountable event/conduct. When addressees are somehow responsible for the accountable event/conduct, explicit solicitations of accounts are frequently critical of, and thus embody disaffiliation with, addressees. This article demonstrates that, when explicit solicitations of accounts embody (...) disaffiliation, they are systematically ‘withheld’ and, thus, can be characterized as ‘dispreferred’ actions. This article also examines: a) deviant cases, where account solicitations are not withheld, which is a practice for embodying aggravated disaffiliation; and b) negative cases, where account solicitations actually embody affiliation, and as such are typically treated as preferred actions and not withheld. (shrink)

Since the first draft of the human genome was published in 2001, DNA sequencing technology has advanced at a remarkable pace. Launched in 1990, the Human Genome Project sought to sequence all three billion base pairs of the haploid human genome, an endeavor that took more than a decade and cost nearly three billion dollars. The subsequent development of so-called “next generation” sequencing methods has raised the possibility that real-time, affordable genome sequencing will soon be widely available. Currently, NGS (...) methods can be used to sequence up to 60 billion base pairs per day. Whole-genome sequencing costs an estimated $5,000-10,000, with that number predicted to fall to $1000 in the near future.In the past few years, the availability of high-throughput NGS methods has led to a proliferation of potential and actual clinical applications for NGS. NGS therefore has the potential to usher in the long-awaited era of personalized medicine. (shrink)

Background While integrating genomic sequencing into clinical care carries clear medical benefits, it also raises difficult ethical questions. Compared to traditional sequencing technologies, genomic sequencing and analysis is more likely to identify unsolicited findings (UF) and variants that cannot be classified as benign or disease-causing (variants of uncertain significance; VUS). UF and VUS pose new challenges for genetic health professionals (GHPs) who are obtaining informed consent for genomic sequencing from patients.Methods We conducted semi-structured interviews with 31 GHPs across Europe, Australia (...) and Canada to identify some of these challenges.Results Our results show that GHPs find it difficult to prepare patients to receive results because a vast amount of information is required to fully inform patients about VUS and UF. GHPs also struggle to engage patients – many of whom may be focused on ending their ‘diagnostic odyssey’ – in the informed consent process in a meaningful way. Thus, some questioned how ‘informed’ patients actually are when they agree to undergo clinical genomic sequencing.Conclusions These findings suggest a tension remains between sufficient information provision at the risk of overwhelming the patient and imparting less information at the risk of uninformed decision-making. We suggest that a shift away from ‘fully informed consent’ toward an approach aimed at realizing, as far as possible, the underlying goals that informed consent is meant to promote. (shrink)

This paper investigates and develops generalizations of two-dimensional modal logics to any finite dimension. These logics are natural extensions of multidimensional systems known from the literature on logics for a priori knowledge. We prove a completeness theorem for propositional n-dimensional modal logics and show them to be decidable by means of a systematic tableau construction.

In the theory of the early state it was fundamentally new and important from a methodological point of view to define the early state as a separate stage of evolution essentially different from the following stage, the one of the full-grown or mature state. ‘To reach the early state level is one thing, to develop into a full-blown, or mature state is quite another’ (Claessen and Skalník 1978b: 22). At the same time they (as well as a number of other (...) authors) indicated quite soundly that not all early states were able to become and actually became mature ones (see e.g., Claessen and Skalník 1978a; Claessen and van de Velde 1987b; Shifferd 1987). Thus there was formed exactly an evolutionary sequence of statehood in the form of a two-stage scheme: the early state – the mature state. And that explained a lot in the mechanisms and directions of the political evolution. However, the former of these two stages of the evolution of statehood (the early state) has been studied rather thoroughly, whereas the latter (the mature state) has not become the subject of a similarly close examination. Unfortunately, the analysis of the mature state has been little advanced in those several contributions to the subsequent volumes of the Early State project (further referred to as Project) where the subject was touched upon. In the present paper after a brief analysis of the Project participants' views on the mature state I will present my own approach to the distinction of the stages of the evolution of statehood which to my mind develops and supplements Claessen – Skalník's ideas on the subject. However, this has made it necessary to suggest new formulations of the main characteristics of each stage of the evolution of the state. (shrink)

We introduce a novel, linguistic-like method of genome analysis. We propose a natural approach to characterizing genomic sequences based on occurrences of fixed length words from a predefined, sufficiently large set of words (strings over the alphabet {A, C, G, T} ). A measure based on this approach is called compositional spectrum and is actually a histogram of imperfect word occurrences. Our results assert that the compositional spectrum is an overall characteristic of a long sequence i.e., a complete genome (...) or an uninterrupted part of a chromosome. This attribute is manifested in the similarity of spectra obtained on different stretches of the same genome, and simultaneously in a broad range of dissimilarities between spectral representations of different genomes. High flexibility characterizes this approach due to imperfect matching and as a result sets of relatively long words can be considered. The proposed approach may have various applications in intra- and intergenomic sequence comparisons. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Frankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natural to interpret it as the claim that the only (...) facts that are relevant to an agent’s freedom are certain facts about actual causes. This would imply that any non-actual (counterfactual) facts are simply irrelevant to the freedom of agents. This paper argues that this interpretation is mistaken, and proposes a better one. It also discusses the related but more general question of the type of project that we are invested in when giving a theory of freedom: Are we interested in the bottom-level grounding facts, or are we interested in some higher-level facts? (shrink)

In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts (...) of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom. (shrink)

Plausibly, agents act freely iff their actions are responses to reasons. But what sort of relationship between reason and action is required for the action to count as a response? The overwhelmingly dominant answer to this question is modalist. It holds that responses are actions that share a modally robust or secure relationship with the relevant reasons. This thesis offers a new alternative answer. It argues that responses are actions that can be explained by reasons in the right way. This (...) explanationist answer comes apart from the modalist answer. For it holds that actions are responses to reasons if they are explained by those reasons even if they don’t share a modally robust relationship. Explanationism thus offers a novel way of vindicating the intuition that alternative possibilities don’t matter to responding to reasons and (consequently) free agency. The key dialectical position the thesis develops is that both modalism and explanationism constitute attempts to capture he core type of relationship encoded by the notion of a response. Responses to reasons, at core, involve a non-accidental relationship between reason and action. We can either understand non-accidentality as a modal phenomenon – as a modally robust tracking between two facts. Or we can understand non-accidentality as an explanatory phenomenon – as a special explanatory relationship between two facts. According to my rival explanationist proposal, two facts share a non-accidental relationship iff we can give a unified explanation of why both obtain. Unified explanations are explanations of why [p&q] that cannot be decomposed into two (or more) separate independent explanations of p and of q. Consequently, according to explanationism about responding to reasons, actions are responses to reasons iff those reasons offer a rational explanation of the action that cannot be decomposed into separate independent components. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio has criticized the reasons-responsiveness theory of freedom for being inconsistent with the actual-sequence view motivated by the Frankfurt-style cases. Specifically, reasons-responsiveness conceived as a modal property does not pertain to the actual sequence of the agent's action and thereby it is irrelevant to the agent's freedom and moral responsibility. Call this the challenge of irrelevance. In this article, I present this challenge in a new way that overcomes certain limitations of Sartorio's argument. I argue (...) that the root of the challenge is that reasons-responsiveness as an unmanifested modal property seems to be nonexplanatory for the agent's action. I show that reasons-responsiveness theorists will confront this challenge even if they do not endorse the actual-sequence view. Finally, I deflate this challenge with David Lewis's model of causal explanation, showing that reasons-responsiveness is explanatory in virtue of providing information about the causal history of the agent's action. (shrink)

Contemporary compatibilists, united in the view that freedom and determinism are compatible, are nevertheless divided. Leeway compatibilists maintain that freedom is characterized by the ability to do otherwise, whereas source compatibilists hold that freedom consists in the actual sequence of events issuing in the action. In this article, I offer a hybrid account drawing on insights from both camps. My account hinges on a distinction between free agency and free action. I suggest that one should employ the leeway (...) model when theorizing about free agency, and the source model when theorizing about free action. This enables compatibilists to resolve an apparent conflict: Frankfurt-style cases suggest that freedom does not require alternative possibilities but this goes strongly against our common-sense conception of freedom. In addition, my account helps compatibilists to gain a more complete and coherent understanding of human freedom. (shrink)

In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, (...) I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume. (shrink)

I define predeterminism as the claim that what is actual is actual with certainty, and provide a proof of it in this paper. Predeterminism solves a major problem: modal realism’s probability distributions for selecting the actual world from all the possible worlds, are either arbitrary, because they are not unique, or they do not sum up to one. This problem is solved by replacing modal realism with a set-theoretic plenitude subjected to cosmological natural selection. Essentially, because worlds (...) reproduce with unequal success, and because there are so many of them in the plenitude, worlds outnumber and outweigh each other with infinite factors. An infinitely growing sequence of worlds, or a world life, comes out as the unique champion in this evolutionary competition and is certainly actual. The proof uses the ideas that the probability to be actual for a world is proportional to its size, age, and abundance, and that all the possible worlds are set-theoretically well-ordered by cosmological natural selection. (shrink)

This chapter characterizes actual-sequence views by appeal to a thesis about the grounds of freedom. Actual-sequence views are motivated by some fundamental insights about Frankfurt cases, and they are contrasted with views that appeal to alternative possibilities of action. Several Frankfurt cases are examined in detail. A causal version of an actual-sequence view is laid out, one that takes freedom to be exclusively grounded in actual causal histories. A central feature of the view (...) is a supervenience claim: the claim that freedom supervenes on actual causal histories. There is also an account of Widerker’s objection to the Frankfurt view, and Frankfurt’s rebuttal. (shrink)

Computer-mediated webchat is fast replacing voice support in customer service. Whilst previous studies have explored how communication breaks down in customer service voice exchange in off-shored/outsourced multinational companies; studies into webchat exchange in the same industries are scarce. Given the high stakes of customer service interactions – for example customer satisfaction, return intention and loyalty to the company – there is an urgent need to understand how conversations unfold, in a linguistic sense, in successful and unsuccessful service. This study, using (...) interactional linguistics, has used a close interpretative process to analyse instances of problematic exchange showing two key causes of communicative disruption. This first relates to disrupted turn adjacency where the sequence and flow of the exchange becomes confusing. The second relates to conceptual misunderstandings of terms in the exchange that may have multiple meanings. As workplaces invest millions of dollar in recruiting, training and appraising global webchat agents to serve their customers, the findings of this study can fruitfully inform webchat training and coaching that impact performance at work and provide high satisfaction to customers. (shrink)

In the first part of this text, the author includes a synthesis of Mircea Eliade and Ioan Petru Culianu’s thoughts regarding the actuality of ancient mythologies and their camouflaged presence within the cultural, political, social, and entertainment practices of the contemporary human being. The main idea of this text is that the Eliade-Culianu paradigm of the myths’ interpretations is of actuality because, in the first place, does not deceive the specific of mythology and explains myths through myths. The text then (...) presents the author’s ideas regarding the camouflaged presence of certain mythological phantasms within the games of the quotidian. Basically, these phantasms refer to the social mythologies reactivated in the world after September, 11, 2001, to mythological content of the neighborhood subcultures’ practices, as well as to the need of reinventing the “black sheep”. The author also mentions the mythological sequences disguised in a successful book - The Da Vinci Code - or in the extravagant car promotions in the contemporary Occident. (shrink)

This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral responsibility into sharper focus, helping us to better (...) understand actual-sequence theories of moral responsibility more generally and showing how actual-sequence theorists should respond to a recent criticism. (shrink)

Simulations, in which healthcare professionals are observed in dialogue with role-played patients, are widely used for assessing professional skills. Medical education research suggests simulations should be as authentic as possible, but there remains a lack of linguistic research into how far such settings authentically reproduce talk. This article presents an analysis of a corpus of general practice simulations in the United Kingdom, comparing this to a dataset of real-life general practitioner consultations. Combining corpus linguistic and conversation analytic methodologies, key interactional (...) features of the simulations are identified, particularly those associated with successful/unsuccessful performance in terms of the examiner’s grading. The corpus analysis identifies various forms of the phrase ‘tell me more about’ to occur significantly more frequently in the simulations compared to real GP consultations, typically in the opening sequences and most frequently in successful cases. It falls to a conversation analysis of the data, examining this phrase within the interactional context of these opening sequences, to better understand the actions it performs. Successful candidates in the simulations are found to perform a consistent sequential pattern, often incorporating this phrase. Although simulated, these interactions have real professional consequences for those being assessed. Linguistic findings about what constitutes successful interaction or differences to real-life practice therefore have important implications for professional education and assessment. (shrink)

This piece is reflection in preparation for lectures in the universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh, Sussex, and Bath. It conveys the sequence and general content of an argument for a different answer to the question of what it is to be conscious. The piece is new, but not what is still to come, a completed articulation in a book. That will include second and no doubt third thoughts, not to mention more scholarship.

Studies of implicit learning have shown that individuals exposed to a rule-governed environment often learn to exploit 'rules' which describe the structural relationship between environmental events. While some authors have interpreted such demonstrations as evidence for functionally separate implicit learning systems, others have argued that the observed changes in performance result from explicit knowledge which has been inadequately assessed. In this paper we illustrate this issue by considering one commonly used implicit learning task, the Serial reaction time task, and outline (...) what we see as an important problem associated with each of the commonly used methods used to assess explicit knowledge. This is that each measure requires a form of response which is dependent on the subjects having some knowledge of the serial-order of the sequence. We argue that such methods, or more specifically their analyses, seriously underestimate other sources of knowledge, which may be available to subjects during their performance of the SRT task. In support of this argument we demonstrate that subjects' serial-order knowledge can, in principle, be independent of subjects' knowledge of the statistical structure of the sequence, and we propose an alternative method for analysing performance on the Generate task which avoids this problem. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer has long championed semicompatibilism, the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility even if determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Since (as Fischer agues) moral responsibility is grounded in facts about the actual sequence, it is not threatened by the Consequence Argument, which threatens only the idea that we have access to alternative sequences. This view is attractive in part because it allows us to sidestep thorny questions about the fixity of (...) the past and the fixity of the laws. But in this paper I explore two alternative ways we might be able to sidestep those thorny questions while defending a more thoroughgoing compatibilism, about both moral responsibility and free will. My alternative proposals both depend on coming to see free will, in addition to moral responsibility, as an actual-sequence notion. (shrink)

In previous work, I have claimed that the Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities work even in a world in which the actual sequence proceeds in a manner congenial to the libertarian. In “Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions,” Widerker criticizes this claim. Here I cast some doubt upon the criticism. Widerker’s critique depends on the falsity of a view held by Molina (and others) about the possibility of non-deterministic grounds for “would-conditionals.” Apart from this (...) point, there are plausible versions of libertarianism which avoid the thrust of Widerker’s criticism. (shrink)

In this paper, I take a critical look at Sartorio’s book Causation and Free Will (2016). Sartorio offers a rich defence of an actual-sequence view of freedom, which pays close attention to issues in the philosophy of causation and how they relate to freedom. I argue that although this focus on causation is illuminating, Sartorio’s project nevertheless runs into some serious difficulties. Perhaps most worrying amongst them is whether the agent-based reason-sensitivity account, offered by Sartorio, is consistent with (...) Frankfurt-style cases – the very cases which are provided as the sole reason to endorse an actual-sequence view of freedom. I suggest that given that powers and causation are so intimately bound together, the debate is skewed somewhat by thinking of these as rivals. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correctly explained in two distinct ways). To defend pluralism, I identify two distinct (but compatible) styles of explanation in paleobiology. The first approach ("actual sequence explanation") traces out the particular forces that affect each species. The second approach treats the trend as "passive" or "random" diffusion away from a boundary in morphological space. I argue that while these strategies are distinct, some trends (...) are correctly explained in both ways. Further, since neither strategy can be reduced or eliminated from paleobiology, we should accept that both strategies can provide correct explanations for a single trend. (shrink)

One reason that many of the philosophical debates about free will might seem intractable is that di erent participants in those debates use various terms in ways that not only don't line up, but might even contradict each other. For instance, it is widely accepted to understand libertarianism as\the conjunction of incompatibilism [the thesis that free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism] and the thesis that we have free will" (van Inwagen (1983), 13f; see also Kane (2001), 17; (...) Pereboom (2006), xiv). However, for van Inwagen's later reservations about the use of the term `libertarianism', see van Inwagen (2008), relevant pages). This makes perplexing a number of views that have the name `libertarian compatibilism' (see Vihvelin (2000) and Arvan (2013)) as on the standard use of the terms involved, the name appears to involve a contradiction. Even the meaning and usage of the term `free will' is itself contested. Manuel Vargas writes that \`free will' is a term of both ordinary and technical discourse" (Vargas (2013), 325). However, it is not clear if the ordinary use of the term always tracks the technical use. But in an in uential paper on \How to Think about About the Problem of Free Will," Peter van Inwagen claims that \the phrase `free will' . . . hardly exists except as a philosophical term of art. Its non- philosophical uses are pretty much con ned to the phrase `of his/her own free will' which means `uncoerced"' (van Inwagen (2008), 320 footnote 1). To many of us, a look at the philosophical and literatures of the past millennium suggest a use that need not be a technical notion, even if it is often used in a technical way. No matter how this debate about the `ordinary use' of the phrase turns out, recognizing that `free will' gets used in di erent ways and being careful in such usage is important in order to avoid what Chalmers has called `merely verbal disputes' (Chalmers (2011)). For this reason, we want to be very clear in how we understand and de ne free will. There seem to be at least two di erent fundamental notions of what free will is in the contemporary literature. The rst of these, which seems to have garnered the most attention in the last century, works under the assumption that for a person to rightly be said to have free will, she must have the ability 1 to do otherwise than what she does, in fact, do. Under this view I could be said to have freely chosen to drive to work only if I also could have freely chosen, for example, to bike to work or to skip work altogether. This approach to free will is referred to as a `leeway-based approach' (cite my book) or an `alternative- possiblities approach' (see Sartorio (2016).) In contrast, a smaller percentage of the extant literature focuses primarily on the issues of `source,' `ultimacy,' and `origination'. This second approach doesn't focus immediately on the presence or absence of alternative possibilities. On this approach, I freely choose to drive to work only if I am the source of my choice and there is nothing outside of me from which the choice is ultimately derived. In what follows, we refer to the rst of these conceptions|the conception that free will is primarily a matter of having alternative possibilities|as the `leeway- based' conception. Similarly, we will refer to the second of these conceptions| that free will is primarily a matter of our being the source of our choices in a particular way|as the `sourcehood' conception. (John Fischer and Carolina Sartorio refers to sourcehood views as `actual sequence' views; see Fischer (2006) and Sartorio (2016)). Both of these notions can be seen in the following passage taken from Robert Kane: We believe we have free will when we view ourselves as agents ca- pable of in uencing the world in various ways. Open alternatives, or alternative possibilities, seem to lie before us. We reason and deliberate among them and choose. We feel (1) it is `up to us' what we choose and how we act; and this means we could have chosen or acted otherwise. As Aristotle noted: when acting is `up to us,' so is not acting. This `up-to-us-ness' also suggests (2) the ultimate control of our actions lies in us and not outside us in factors beyond our control (Kane (2005), 6). In the next two sections, I look in greater detail at each of these two approaches to the nature of free will, and how they each seek to approach what it means for an action to be `up to us'. I also show how the di erences between these two conceptions cut across the debate about what Kane refers to as the Com- patibility Question: \Is free will compatible with determinism?" (Kane (1996), 13). Along the way, I also brie y point out a number of ways how which of these conceptions is at work shapes how one engages various arguments and other issues regarding. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen famously offers a version of the luck objection to libertarianism called the ‘Rollback Argument.’ It involves a thought experiment in which God repeatedly rolls time backward to provide an agent with many opportunities to act in the same circumstance. Because the agent has the kind of freedom that affords her alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, she performs different actions in some of these opportunities. The upshot is that whichever action she performs in the actual- (...) class='Hi'>sequence is intuitively a matter of mere chance. I explore a new response to the Rollback Argument. If there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom, then the agent performs the same action each time she is placed in the same circumstance, because that is what she would freely do in that circumstance. This response appears to negate the chancy intuition. Ultimately, however, I argue that this new response is unsuccessful, because there is a variant of the Rollback Argument that presents the same basic challenge to the libertarian on the assumption that there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. Thus, true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom do not provide the libertarian with a solution to the Rollback Argument. (shrink)

Kenneth Waters and Marcel Weber argue that the joint use of distinct gene concepts and the transfer of knowledge between classical and molecular analyses in contemporary scientific practice is possible because classical and molecular concepts of the gene refer to overlapping chromosomal segments and the DNA sequences associated with these segments. However, while pointing in the direction of coreference, both authors also agree that there is a considerable divergence between the actual sequences that count as genes in classical genetics (...) and molecular biology. The thesis advanced in this paper is that the referents of classical and molecular gene concepts are coextensive to a higher degree than admitted by Waters and Weber, and therefore coreference can provide a satisfactory account of the high level of integration between classical genetics and molecular biology. In particular, I argue that the functional units/cistrons identified by classical techniques overlap with functional elements entering the composition of molecular transcription units, and that the precision of this overlap can be improved by conducting further experimentation. (shrink)

Even within biology, different types of explanation can be found: causal explanations, mechanistic explanations, reductive explanations, mathematical model-based explanations, actual-sequence explanations, and robust-process explanations. On top of this, different types of explanation can be sought for the same phenomenon, entailing different conditions of what counts as a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon. I make sense of this complexity by using the notions of explanatory aims and standards of explanatory adequacy. Pertaining to scientific practice rather than the empirical content (...) of science, these ideas likewise matter to science education and classroom practice. Standards of explanatory adequacy permit adjudicating the goodness of different explanations suggested by students, and they underlie the explanatory sense-making one obtains upon having constructed an explanation. Explanatory aims guide the type of explanation sought after, so as to foster student engagement and motivate explanation construction. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, I explore whether the alternatives could be physically undifferentiated, despite their moral difference. The reason there is (...) an ineliminable moral difference is because there is an ineliminable causal one: The agent’s choice must be caused by his own inclinations in one sequence, but by Black’s manipulation in the other. Whether this causal difference entails a physical one depends on whether we suppose causal relations conform to Humean supervenience. The denial of the latter requires us to either reject any broadly Humean view of causation, or else to suppose that we can individuate events or their qualities independently of the physical facts. If these are coherent possibilities, such examples may show that physically differentiated alternatives are not required for moral responsibility. This could support compatibilism, but only if such examples adequately parallel determinism, and I remain sceptical on this point. (shrink)

Sequence learning is fundamental to a wide range of cognitive functions. Explaining how sequences—and the relations between the elements they comprise—are learned is a fundamental challenge to cognitive science. However, although hundreds of articles addressing this question are published each year, the actual learning mechanisms involved in the learning of sequences are rarely investigated. We present three experiments that seek to examine these mechanisms during a typing task. Experiments 1 and 2 tested learning during typing single letters on (...) each trial. Experiment 3 tested for “chunking” of these letters into “words.” The results of these experiments were used to examine the mechanisms that could best account for them, with a focus on two particular proposals: statistical transitional probability learning and discriminative error-driven learning. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that error-driven learning was a better predictor of response latencies than either n-gram frequencies or transitional probabilities. No evidence for chunking was found in Experiment 3, probably due to interspersing visual cues with the motor response. In addition, learning occurred across a greater distance in Experiment 1 than Experiment 2, suggesting that the greater predictability that comes with increased structure leads to greater learnability. These results shed new light on the mechanism responsible for sequence learning. Despite the widely held assumption that transitional probability learning is essential to this process, the present results suggest instead that the sequences are learned through a process of discriminative learning, involving prediction and feedback from prediction error. (shrink)