We investigated the influence of personality and culture on effects of mortality salience (MS) over cultural worldview defense (CWVD). We hypothesized that CWVD reactions to MS differ between Germany and Poland because of the higher conservatism of the latter country, and that they are moderated by action vs. state orientation. In this study German (N=112) and Polish (N=72), participants were exposed either to MS or to a control condition (dental pain). Punishment ratings to trivial offences and serious social transgressions were (...) measures of CWVD. Results showed that social transgressions in both conditions were more strongly punished in Poland than in Germany. Additionally, compared to the control condition, under MS action oriented punished serious transgressions more strongly in Germany whereas state oriented punished serious transgressions more strongly in Poland. That is, the effects of MS on CWVD are moderated by personality and culture. We interpret the opposite pattern of punishment to serious social transgressions given by action and state orientedin in Germany and Poland, respectively, according to the higher emotional autonomy of action-oriented persons in either culture. (shrink)

My basic research question – well beyond the scope of this book – is what the relationships between cognitive processes and cultural structures and practices are. Here, I get closer to answering this question in the following five steps: (1) I present cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science, characteristic of the approaches to wide cognition, i.e., embodied, embedded, extended, ecological psychology, enactivism, etc. (2) I distinguish two dimensions of the distributed cognition approach: as a theoretical framework and (...) as a task model, focusing on the former. This distinction has so far eluded cognitive science theorists, and this approach has not been sufficiently analysed as a potential theory of cognitive science in general and the basis for its integration, being reduced to the dimension of the task model. (3) I discuss approaches in research on interactions in distributed cognitive systems, focusing more on the notion of external representations, and mostly on the notion of affordance. When assessing the potential of the latter, I look for consistency in what is crucial for understanding the interactions, between ecological psychology and design research. (4) I analyze the up to now underestimated potential of the distributed cognition approach in the dispute over the bounds of cognitive processes. (5) I identify and assess the analogies between the distributed cognition approach and the neo-mechanistic model of explanation that has become popular in cognitive science, and indicate possible benefits for the integration of the latter. As one can see, I am not trying to fully answer the question about the relationship between cognition and culture, but rather assess to what extent cognitive science in its current form is capable of. (shrink)

This volume is written jointly by Witold Marciszewski, who contributed the introductory and the three subsequent chapters, and Roman Murawski who is the author of the next ones - those concerned with the 19th century and the modern inquiries into formalization, algebraization and mechanization of reasonings. Besides the authors there are other persons, as well as institutions, to whom the book owes its coming into being. The study which resulted in this volume was carried out in the Historical Section (...) of the research project _Logical Systems and Algorithms for Automatic Testing of Reasoning,_ 1986-1990, in which participated nine Polish universities; the project was coordinated by the Department of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the Bia??l??ystok Branch of the University of Warsaw, and supported by the Ministry of Education 1987). The major part of the project was focussed on the software for computer-aided theorem proving called Mizar MSE ) due to Dr. Andrzej Trybulec. He and other colleagues deserve a grateful mention for a hands-on experience and theoretical stimulants owed to their collaboration. (shrink)

Most discussions of the reproducibility crisis focus on its epistemic aspect: the fact that the scientific community fails to follow some norms of scientific investigation, which leads to high rates of irreproducibility via a high rate of false positive findings. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there is a heretofore underappreciated and understudied dimension to the reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience that may prove to be at least as important as the epistemic dimension. This is (...) the communication dimension. The link between communication and reproducibility is immediate: independent investigators would not be able to recreate an experiment whose design or implementation were inadequately described. I exploit evidence of a replicability and reproducibility crisis in computational science, as well as research into quality of reporting to support the claim that a widespread failure to adhere to reporting standards, especially the norm of descriptive completeness, is an important contributing factor in the current reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

Studies on human–artifact interaction stimulate reflection on the bounds of cognition, agency, and even morality (e.g. Floridi and Sanders, 2004). Richard Heersmink (2017) compares distributed cognition (DCog) and distributed morality theory and claims that some artifacts, depending on their use, have cognitive and moral status but lack cognitive and moral agency. According to him, an extended cognitive system (ECS) has agency when artifact(s) included in the system are fully transparent and densely integrated into the cognitive processes of the user, whereas (...) a distributed cognitive system (DCS) without central control lacks agency. My doubts do not concern Heersmink's main claim. Irrespective of the final assessment of the moral status of distributed systems, I argue that the assumption that the assessment of the degree to which humans and artifacts are cognitively integrated is not always feasible and distorts our understanding of DCog.EXTENSION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE COGNITIVEHeersmink (2017) sums up the well-known concepts of “wide” cognition: cognitive states and processes may go beyond individual minds to involve people and artifacts; human agents and artifacts form integrated systems performing information-processing tasks. Cognitive activity sometimes extends beyond the brain to non-neuronal parts of the body and elements of the environment. Two famous examples are: a navigation team on board of a surface vessel at sea (Hutchins 1995), and a man with Alzheimer’s disease who supports his biological memory by means of a notebook (Clark and Chalmers 1998). As Heersmink writes: “Clark’s extended cognition theory focuses on single agents interacting with artifacts, whereas Hutchins DCog theory typically (though not exclusively) focuses on larger systems with more than one agent interacting with artifacts. In such wider cognitive systems, there are thus one or more individuals interacting and coupling with cognitive artifacts” (2017).Heersmink recognizes the significant difference between the two concepts, relying on Hutchins’s comments (2014): extended cognition is just a special case of DCog opening up a much broader view of the different types of cognition. Among them, „[s]ome systems have a clear center while other systems have multiple centers or no center at all’’ (Hutchins, 2014, p. 37).So far, Heersmink’s summary is not controversial. What is problematic is his view that it “is better to conceive of system membership in terms of the degree of cognitive integration of humans and artifacts” (2017). This integration depends on different dimensions including the kind and intensity of information flow between human and non-human components, accessibility of the scaffold, durability of the coupling, amount of user trust, degree of transparency-in-use, ease of interpretation of the information and the amount of personalization or cognitive transformation (2017; 2015). Hence, cognitive artifacts can be integrated more or less deeply.COGNITIVE SYSTEM AS A MECHANISMLet's go back to the way Hutchins defines DCSs. For him, distribution means interaction (2006, p. 376–377). When we take the DCog perspective, we do not “make any claim about the nature of the world. Rather, it is to choose a way of looking at the world, one that selects scales of investigation such that wholes are seen as emergent from interactions among their parts” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 36). DCog is not a kind of cognition, but a perspective on all of cognition. “[T]he notions of centralized and distributed are always relative to some scale of investigation. (...) The boundaries of the unit of analysis for DCog are not fixed in advance; they depend on the scale of the system under investigation, which can vary (…)” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 36).DCS—to which ECSs belong—doesn’t constitute any more or less integrated agent “casing”. Hutchins shows that DCSs may have different scales (the brain is one example), and the large systems he studied offer something like Gulliver's perspective in the land of giants: an opportunity for direct observation of cognitive processes in the macroscale occurring in an environment (1995, p. 128–129).Therefore, the assumption that it is always possible to grade the cognitive integration between an agent and artifact may fail in the case of some complex DCSs. Artifacts are not “attached” to the “genuinely” cognitive part of the system but are its equally important components. It is only the system as such that can have agency potential or can be the center for something else.DCS should be viewed as a mechanism (e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Ylikoski, 2015). A mechanism is a structure that performs a function by means of its organized component parts and operations. It is responsible for one or more phenomena. Mechanisms can occur in nested hierarchies and can work cyclically, but they can also be responsible for one-off events only. Mechanisms can also be computational (Miłkowski, 2013; Piccinini, 2015). Thus, in the DCS it is the interaction of active components and time coordination that is important for its mechanism(s), whilst the components themselves can be physically separated and coordinated only temporarily. At the same time, mechanisms may be more or less durable, and more or less tightly organized. In other words, Heersmink’s claims can be better stated in the mechanistic framework without distorting the original idea of DCog.CONCLUDING REMARKSFor Heersmink, an ECS has agency when an artifact is fully transparent and densely integrated into the cognitive processes of its user; for this reason (according to Heersmink’s criterion for being an agent and having agency), a distributed system without central control lacks agency because it is not a system whose intentions are being realized. My doubts do not concern Heersmink's main claim, but a minor one, although important for understanding DCog. In complex cases, it is meaningless to ask about the degree of cognitive integration of humans and artifacts in DCSs. Demanding such an integration brings to mind the anthropomorphic fallacy. The ECS in which a person can fully control the operation of her/his artificial extensions is only a special simple case of DCog. Wider cognitive systems are not added to “genuine” cognitive systems, but they themselves are “genuine” systems: their components interact in a coordinated manner, as in the case of any mechanism. (shrink)

Witold Gombrowicz (1904-1969), novelist, essayist, and playwright, was one of the most important Polish writers of the twentieth century. A candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1968, he was described by Milan Kundera as “one of the great novelists of our century” and by John Updike as “one of the profoundest of the late moderns.” Gombrowicz’s works were considered scandalous and subversive by the ruling powers in Poland and were banned for nearly forty years. He spent his (...) last years in France teaching philosophy; this book is a series of reflections based on his lectures. Gombrowicz discusses Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in six “one-hour” essays and addresses Marxism in a shorter “fifteen-minute” piece. The text—a small literary gem full of sardonic wit, brilliant insights, and provocative criticism—constructs the philosophical lineage of his work. (shrink)

For a free filter F on $$\omega $$ ω, endow the space $$N_F=\omega \cup \{p_F\}$$ N F = ω ∪ { p F }, where $$p_F\not \in \omega $$ p F ∉ ω, with the topology in which every element of $$\omega $$ ω is isolated whereas all open neighborhoods of $$p_F$$ p F are of the form $$A\cup \{p_F\}$$ A ∪ { p F } for $$A\in F$$ A ∈ F. Spaces of the form $$N_F$$ N F constitute the (...) class of the simplest non-discrete Tychonoff spaces. The aim of this paper is to study them in the context of the celebrated Josefson–Nissenzweig theorem from Banach space theory. We prove, e.g., that, for a filter F, the space $$N_F$$ N F carries a sequence $$\langle \mu _n:n\in \omega \rangle $$ ⟨ μ n : n ∈ ω ⟩ of normalized finitely supported signed measures such that $$\mu _n(f)\rightarrow 0$$ μ n ( f ) → 0 for every bounded continuous real-valued function f on $$N_F$$ N F if and only if $$F^*\le _K{\mathcal {Z}}$$ F ∗ ≤ K Z, that is, the dual ideal $$F^*$$ F ∗ is Katětov below the asymptotic density ideal $${\mathcal {Z}}$$ Z. Consequently, we get that if $$F^*\le _K{\mathcal {Z}}$$ F ∗ ≤ K Z, then: (1) if X is a Tychonoff space and $$N_F$$ N F is homeomorphic to a subspace of X, then the space $$C_p^*(X)$$ C p ∗ ( X ) of bounded continuous real-valued functions on X contains a complemented copy of the space $$c_0$$ c 0 endowed with the pointwise topology, (2) if K is a compact Hausdorff space and $$N_F$$ N F is homeomorphic to a subspace of K, then the Banach space C(K) of continuous real-valued functions on K is not a Grothendieck space. The latter result generalizes the well-known fact stating that if a compact Hausdorff space K contains a non-trivial convergent sequence, then the space C(K) is not Grothendieck. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE On the Rhetorical Point of View. Why rhetoric declined, and what remained of it. Once upon a time rhetoric was a vast and influential branch of ...

Author: Trzeciakowski Witold Title: TWO VISIONS OF THE HUMANITY – DAYBREAK OF ZYGMUNT KRASIŃSKI AND HYMNS TO NIGHT OF NOVALIS (Dwie wizje nowej ludzkości: Przedświt Zygmunta Krasińskiego i Hymny do Nocy Novalisa Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 71-90 KEYWORDS: KRASIŃSKI, NOVALIS, HEGEL, GESCHICHTSPHILOSOPHIE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In dem Aufsatz Zwei Vorstellungen zur Zukunft der Menschheit – „Przedświt” von Zygmunt Krasiński und „Hymnen an die Nacht” (...) von Novalis analysiert und vergleicht Wiesław Trzeciakowski zwei für die polnische und deutsche Romantik bedeutende visionäre Vorstellungen über die Zukunft der Menschheit. Den beiden Poeten erscheint sie als eine ganze und zugleich einheitliche Potenz ihrer gesamten geistigen Möglichkeiten zu sein. Auf der Erde lässt sich die Einheit der Menschheit durch Mitgefühl und gegenseitige Liebe ihrer Mitglieder erkennen. So versteht man die auf diese Weise begriffene Menschheit als Gott getreue Universalität, die nachseinen Geboten lebt. Diese Anschauung von Z. Krasiński erkennt man auch in Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie, besonders im Begriff des Gegensatzkampfes: die widerstrebenden Kräfte vernichten sich, um eine neue Qualität hervor zu bringen, wodurch sie dann am Ende im Einklang stehen. Novalis verwendet dagegen, um dieselbe Idee auszudrücken, Begriffe aus der Alchemie. Die miteinander kämpfenden Gegensätze sind aufgelöst in der Liebe und werden durch sie als Schlüssel für die Natur- und Menschenerkenntnis anerkannt. Geht Novalis’ all sein Sinnen und Trachten an den Mystizismus, an die endgültige Synthese der Alchemie (Hochzeit der Metalle), Glauben an die Gnosis, die Mysterien der Antike (besonders bei der Göttin Isis am Tempel zu Sais) sowie der Christenheit, so sieht die Quelle der Inspiration von Krasiński anders aus. Sie basiert auf seiner eigenen Geschichtsphilosophie der christlichen Märtyreridee, in der er die Geister der Opfer aus der antiken Nero-Zeit beschwört, deren Blut die Legitimation für die Existenz der Christenheit bildet. Ihr Tod war nicht fruchtlos, den tiefsten Sinn ihrer Qual stellt das Kreuz sowie die Auferstehung Christi dar. Graf Z. Krasiński lebte am liebsten in Rom, wo er sich als polnischer Poet und Denker politisch und geistig frei fühlte. Er stellte die Teilung Polens in den Kontext zur Kreuzigung Christi und der christlichen Geschichte, wobei die Geschichte keinen Selbstzweck darstellt. In der Zeit des irdischen Daseins von Menschen geht es doch nicht nur um die reine körperliche Existenz und die Weitergabe von Leben, was häufig von Z. Krasiński in seinem Werk betont wird. (shrink)

In a small literary gem full of sardonic wit, brilliant insights, and provocative criticism Witold Gombrowicz discusses Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger in six "one-hour" essays—and addresses Marxism in a "fifteen-minute" piece. "Who hasn't wished for a painless way to find out what the big shots of philosophy—Hegel and Kant, Nietzsche and Sartre—thought of the human condition? It has never been easy reading such formidable thinkers, and most explainers and textbooks either get it wrong or massacre the (...) language. So imagine my pleasure in opening Witold Gombrowicz's _Guide to Philosophy in Six Hours and Fifteen Minutes_, an exceptional effort at summarizing concepts in bold, declarative sentences.... [This book] is like the course in philosophy you wish you had taken."—David Lehman, _Bloomberg News_ "A must for every reader of Gombrowicz."—Denis Hollier, New York University. (shrink)

The affirmative answer to the title question is justified in two ways: logical and empirical. The logical justification is due to Gödel’s discovery that in any axiomatic formalized theory, having at least the expressive power of PA, at any stage of development there must appear unsolvable problems. However, some of them become solvable in a further development of the theory in question, owing to subsequent investigations. These lead to new concepts, expressed with additional axioms or rules. Owing to the so-amplified (...) axiomatic basis, new routine procedures like algorithms, can be reached. Those, in turn, help to gain new insights which lead to still more powerful axioms, and consequently again to ampler algorithmic resources. Thus scientific progress proceeds to an ever higher scope of solvability. The existence of such feedback cycles –in a formal way rendered with Turing’s systems of logic based on ordinal – gets empirically supported by the history of mathematics and other exact sciences. An instructive instance of such a process is found in the history of the number zero. Without that insight due to some ancient Hindu mathematicians there could not arise such an axiomatic theory as PA. It defines the algorithms of arithmetical operations, which in turn help intuitions; those, inturn, give rise to algorithmic routines, not available in any of the previous phases of the process in question. While the logical substantiation of the point of this essay is a well-established result of logico-semantic inquiries, its empiricalclaim, based on historical evidences, remains open for discussion. Hence the author’s intention to address philosophers and historians of science, and to encourage their critical responses. (shrink)

The paper presents two objections against Putnam’s Twin Earth argument, which was intended to secure semantic externalism. I first claim that Putnam’s reasoning rests on two assumptions and then try to show why these assumptions are contentious. The first objection is that, given what we know about science, it is unlikely that there are any natural-kind terms whose extension is codetermined by a small set of microstructures required by Putnam’s indexical account of extension determination. The second objection is that there (...) may not be a plausible concept of a speech community whose adoption would classify Oscar and Twin Oscar as members of different speech communities and, at the same time, render Oscar and Twin Oscar as being in the same psychological state. I contend that Putnam’s argument fails because both objections are justified. (shrink)

For Thomas Fuchs, the human body is an integral component of man’s subjectivity. Access to the body is mediated by the multifarious perspectives he takes – the physical body [Körper], the lived body [Leib], and the body that employs one of the perspectives. However, none of these is exhaustive of the human experience of the body, as the body also constitutes a repository of memory, the nature of which coincides with the nature of man himself – a being irreducible to (...) the animal world, since it cannot be explicated solely in the biological or biological-cultural dimension. Fuchs exposes the mechanisms of body memory and the impact these mechanisms exert on shaping the unique nature of human reality. Through body memory, which unobtrusively but radically moderates man’s memory, the human world gains its uniqueness and overrides the heritage of the past and shapes the present while opening future horizons. (shrink)

We argue that Yarkoni's proposed solutions to the generalizability crisis are half-measures because he does not recognize that the crisis arises from investigators' underappreciation of the roles of theory in experimental research. Rather than embracing qualitative analysis, the research community should make an effort to develop better theories and work toward consistently incorporating theoretical results into experimental practice.

La compréhension de la raison humaine a été déterminante pour la phénoménologie de Husserl. Des Recherches logiques à la Krisis , le problème de la raison semble l'un de ses principaux thèmes de réflexion. Husserl aborde la question sous plusieurs angles distincts, évoquant les concepts de monde, de temps et de responsabilité. Ses découvertes l'ont conduit à identifier la crise de la culture. Les commentateurs doivent aujourd'hui mettre en question le concept husserlien de raison, s'ils veulent comprendre pleinement cette thèse. (...) Cet article fait valoir que le concept de raison de Husserl est élaboré en corrélation avec celui de non-raison, conduisant les phénoménologues à adopter une division binaire entre rationalité et irrationalité. Par contraste avec les commentateurs qui accentuent le caractère rationnel de la phénoménologie husserlienne, cet article affirme que l'introduction du concept d'irrationalité dans l'investigation phénoménologique élargit significativement la compréhension initiale de la phénoménologie telle qu'elle est définie dans les Recherches . Husserl fut confronté à cette question par ses propres recherches. En conséquence, on affirme ici que la phénoménologie a connu un développement immanent menant de la thèse de la raison objective à celle de la corrélation entre raison et non-raison. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest wykazanie podobieństw oraz różnic w pojmowaniu nieskończo-ności przez Józefa Tischnera i Blaise’a Pascala. W projekcie krakowskiego filozofa człowiek ma status podmiotu dramatycznego. Jednak, co często bywa przeoczane, nie jest on aktorem dramatycznym, gdyż jego udziału w dramacie niepodobna utożsamiać z odgrywaniem roli – nie gra on w dramacie, lecz pozostaje w nim na poziomie najgłębszego egzystencjalnego uczestnictwa. Jest zaangażowany w dramat osobiście, bezpośrednio i całkowicie. Będąc podmiotem dramatu, otwiera się zarówno na to, co skończone, jak i na (...) to, co nieskończone. Otwiera się na przedmioty oraz na osoby, na świat oraz na nietożsamą z nim scenę dramatu, i wreszcie – na czas dramatyczny, rozpięty między usłyszeniem pytania a udzieleniem odpowiedzi. Dramatyczną kondycję człowieka warunkuje jego otwarcie na Nieskończoność. Nie tylko określa ona świat – transcendentny, różny od immanentnego środowiska zwierząt – ale pojawia się w horyzoncie pragnienia, będącego czym różnym od potrzeb. Potrzeby mają charakter utylitarny, pragnienie jest transcendentne – zarówno w swej genezie, jak i formach przejawu, bowiem eskaluje w miarę swego zaspokajania. Potrzeby nie wykraczają poza skończoność. Pragnienie, przeciwnie „karmi się własnym głodem”, ponieważ, według słów Emmauela Lévinasa: „Upragnione nie wypełnia go, lecz pogłębia”. Dla Pascala, podobnie jak dla Tischnera, tym, co gwarantuje możliwość otwarcia się na nieskończoność, nie jest wiedza, lecz wiara religijna. (shrink)

Studies on music in the area of cognitive sciences – quite varied despite their short history – meet with scepticism. The author of this introduction, presenting some spectacular examples of research on musical improvisation, tries to demonstrate that they enrich rather than reduce our understanding of this phenomenon.

Rationalism is the ontological and epistemological view to the effect that there exist abstract entities—as classes, numbers, points, etc.—being cognitively available to our minds. Thus, the axiom of abstraction can be interpreted as the most concise statement of the rationalist position in its ontological facet. The acknowledging of abstracts may be motivated either with their direct intellectual vision, as claimed by Plato, or with their ‘indispensability’ for scientific progress, as claimed by Quine and a host of other famous thinkers. For (...) such a practical approach the term ‘Pragmatic Rationalism’ should be in order (more frequently one speaks of ‘pragmatic platonism’ but in the present context this term would be misleading). Among its followers there are some eminent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Predominantly, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz for his program of empirical methodology of sciences, and Alfred Tarski for the abundant use of highly abstract concepts in his mathematical research. Radical nominalism pioneered by Stanisław Leśniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński, denying the existence of classes, did not comply with methods and results of sciences. However, there is a moderate version of nominalism which pragmatically does admit classes, for the sake of scientific progress. This version has been suggested by Andrzej Grzegorczyk under the name of ‘liberal reism’. In such a pragmatic form, nominalism can comply with pragmatic rationalism, and the other way around. The latter is not bound to deny what nominalism says about ontological and epistemological priority of physical individuals. Even such a convinced rationalist as Gödel shared with nominalists (unlike Plato) that observational statements concerning physical individuals are most basic in the structure of our knowledge. A nice example of such reconciliation is found in Tarski’s work ‘Foundations of the geometry of solids’. He recedes from Euclid’s idea of point as a primitive concept, in accordance with the claim of reistic nominalism that only solids can play such a role. Instead, he starts from the concept of sphere, defining ‘the point as the class of all spheres which are concentric with a given sphere’. Thus, the typically abstract concept of class (attacked by radical nominalism) proves indispensable to do justice to the ontological priority of physical individuals—a hallmark of nominalism. In such a way, Tarski, when doing justice to nominalism, at the same time gains considerable scores for pragmatic rationalism as well. Such a constructive collaboration of the two opposing camps within the School sheds a new light on the School’s ability to solve hard problems with a vigorous and ‘penetrative discussion’ between opposite standpoints. (shrink)

Artykuł ten ma celu zaakcentowanie i uzupełnienie wybranych wątków książki Witolda Wachowskiego Poznanie rozproszone. Od heurystyk do mechanizmów (2022). W tekście uwzględniono aktualną sytuację, w jakiej znajdują się nauki poznawcze, z perspektywy koncepcji poznania rozproszonego i związanych z nią badań. Podczas gdy książka koncentruje się bardziej na strukturze tej koncepcji i jej osadzeniu w tradycjach badawczych, w artykule nacisk kładzie się na przedstawienie wciąż niedocenianego potencjału poznania rozproszonego jako uniwersalnego rozumienia poznania, faktycznych konsekwencji badawczych tej perspektywy, przy jednoczesnym doprecyzowaniu relacji (...) z mechanicyzmem, jak i potencjału integracyjnego – wszystko to w świetle aktualnej kondycji kognitywistyki. ----------------------------------------- Zgłoszono: 31/12/2023. Zrecenzowano: 10/04/2024. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 13/05/2024. (shrink)

The organization of the cyclical open-air festival Night of Culture in Lublin in cooperation with a research group works on two levels. The first is the level of an offer of experiences and reflections for the audience of the Night of Culture. The second is the level of research – social and other – on the design, implementation and effects of the first level. On both levels, a phenomenon plays an important role that can be described from the perspective of (...) cognitive ecology with the term "affordance." A systematic analysis of this can lead to the third level: a meta-analysis of the street festival under discussion. I will not undertake such a complex task in this text, which is partly a review and then a "report", but I will make a brief reconstruction of the conceptual and design work of the Affordances Activity, in which I participated significantly and regularly, as well as will consider the stage of the production of designed objects and their subsequent operation during this year's (2023) edition of the Night of Culture, in which a group of volunteers (students of the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University) played an important role. Remarks of the aforementioned meta-research dimension of the project constitute a wide margin of the article. (shrink)

The paper is a comment on distributed cognition treated as an approach to the study of all cognition. This account is presented by E. Hutchins in the article “The cultural ecosystem of human cognition”, as well as in other works.

We attempt to define the classical propositional logic by use of appropriate derivability conditions called Cn-definitions. The conditions characterize basic properties of propositional connectives.

Artykuł ten jest recenzją książki Mechanizmy predykcyjne i ich normatywność, skoncentrowaną na trzech zakresach tej publikacji. Pierwszy zakres obejmuje kontekst wydawniczy, czyli kwestię zapotrzebowania na taką pracę, biorąc pod uwagę język publikacji, jej dostępność itd. Drugi zakres dotyczy akademickiego potencjału tej książki jako obszernego opracowania koncepcji przetwarzania predykcyjnego. Trzeci zakres natomiast wiąże się z główną ambicją Autora książki i jednocześnie najbardziej wymagającym wątkiem tej pracy, jako studium problemu normatywności w ujęciu koncepcji przetwarzania predykcyjnego i wyjaśniania (neo)mechanistycznego.