In this article I rethink Rawls' conception of international economic justice, with a particular focus on international trade. I ground my normative argument on a different interpretation of the concepts of basic structure and of basic institution. I use the contemporary international trading system to illustrate my normative interpretation. I use the Law of Peoples to discuss the Rawlsian concept of basic structure. I contest Samuel Freeman's interpretation of this concept as one that pertains exclusively to the domestic realm. As (...) a reply, I work out an interpretation of basic institutions valid for both the national and international context. I base my understanding on the impact and the form of membership that characterize basic institutions. Both properties are compatible with an extension of the concept of a basic institution to the international domain. I then show how the World Trade Organization (WTO) system can be compared to a domestic basic institution. I analyse the decisional setting that surrounds the choice of joining the WTO. I conclude that no real alternative exists. Hence, WTO membership is not to be considered a completely free policy choice. I also state that the new system is witnessing a strong expansion of the areas subject to trade governance. Such expansion is responsible for the growing impact that international trade has on domestic institutions and hence on people. Finally, I use my analysis of contemporary international trading relations to test Rawls' position in the Law of Peoples. I conclude that although Rawls' principles for fair trade and international cooperation can regulate GATT-style international trade, they are not proficient in assessing the new characteristics of international trade. (shrink)

The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995 and was the outcome of the Uruguay Development Round of trade negotiations replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is based in Geneva (Switzerland) and consists of 164 member countries (www.wto.org). The WTO is the global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. It is the only forum that can create binding and enforceable international trade rules. All major decisions are made by the membership (...) as a whole with each member having an equal voice. In practice, however, emphasis is on consensus decision-making. The highest decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference that meets at least once every 2 years. The goal of the WTO is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible. (shrink)

World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement includes the Annex 2 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that reveals with WTO dispute settlement rules and procedures. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures. The article analyses the problematic issues of the direct effect of the DSB decisions in the European Union (EU) legal order. ECJ concluded that an individual does not have the right to challenge, the incompatibility of Community measures with WTO rules, even if the DSB (...) had previously declared the EU legislation to be incompatible with those rules. The position of the ECJ is based on the WTO dispute settlement system specifics—the importance of the negotiation between the parties, even after the DSB decision-making and lack of reciprocity, which means that major commercial partners of the EU does not recognize the direct effect of DSB decisions. (shrink)

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the best dispute settlement mechanisms in the world. Under WTO rules, aggrieved parties must establish a “prima facie” case before the panel can call on the offending party to respond to the claims. The objective of the present study is to critically evaluate the application of the concept of burden of proof underWTOdispute settlement mechanism.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the international trade regime within which it operates, is regularly evaluated in terms of distributive outcomes or opportunities. A less-established concern is the extent to which the institutional structure of the trade regime enables agents to exert control over the economic forces to which they’re subject. This oversight is surprising, as trade negotiations amongst states have profound impacts upon what options remain open to those states and their citizens in regulating their economies. This article (...) contributes to filling this lacuna in the literature. Following on from recent neo-republican work on global and international justice, it argues that a major problem with the WTO is that it fails to effectively mitigate the domination of some states by others within its negotiations. Such domination prevails despite the employment of negative consensus as a decision-making procedure. (shrink)

Food trade is of economic importance for both developed and developing countries. Food, however, is a special commodity. Firstly, the lack of food -- hunger, under-nourishment, and starvation -- is one of the world's pressing moral problems. But food is not only special because it is necessary for our survival; food is also special because it is strongly related to our social and cultural identity. Two recent transatlantic trade conflicts over food -- over the use of artificial growth hormones in (...) beef production and over the use of biotechnology in food production -- show that food is a specific commodity. In these trade-conflicts, the obligations flowing from free-trade treaties collide with the cultural and social meanings of food. Current international trade agreements neglect this point and force countries to fight their case in the field of food safety science. This causes a bias in the discussion. Europe's resistance towards artificial growth hormones and GM-food is not strictly science based; it is also culture based. For a fair resolution of trade-conflicts, this needs to be accommodated in international trade legislation. With the help of the notion of public reason I defend that precaution with regard to scientific uncertainty, and the possibility for compulsory labelling with regard to sensitive non-nutritional properties of foodstuffs, need to be incorporated in international food trade regulations. (shrink)

There may not be many points of consensus over what best promotes economic development, but here is one that has formed over the past decade: the institutional context matters a lot. This represents the single greatest shift in economic thinking about development since World War II, for there once was an almost equally clear consensus that institutions..

Jordan acceded to the WTO in 1999. In its accession Jordan agreed, for example, to reduce tariffs on imported products and open its services market; it also modified its intellectual property regime. Jordan enjoyed special and differential treatment in few areas and was not able to designate olive oil as a good eligible for special safeguards. The WTO agreements required fundamental changes in the domestic laws and regulations of Jordan. The article concludes by arguing that Jordan’s accession to the WTO (...) was a lengthy and costly process. Jordan agreed to an arduous package of legal and economic reforms. Given that Jordan agreed to greater commitments compared to the obligations of the original WTO members, the multilateral trading system witnessed an accession saga. (shrink)

The World Trade Organization has been the target of social justice activists since its inception in 1994, with many seeking to reshape or rescind the WTO agreements. This article instead explores possible interventions into WTO adjudication by compelling the reinterpretation of existing WTO documents. Such an approach can take several forms: mobilizing professional expertise, engaging technical standards, and constructing companion regimes. Using the recent United States/european Community genetically modified organisms case as a reference point, this article explores opportunities for implementing (...) the last two strategies. The Codex Alimentarius, an international food standards regime, seems to provide a particularly promising location for reconstructing WTO risk and governance procedures. The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, an international environmental regime, deeply challenges narrow readings of WTO texts but may not have enough legal force in the WTO. These alternative locations for intervention hold promise and risks for activists seeking international justice in environment, food, and trade. (shrink)

In the wake of massive structural changes within the world trade the WTO faces important challenges. Like an invisible world govemment the WTO uses its agreement as a sort of basic law. This basic law demands equal chances for every human being in the world. Therefore it is important to strengthen the WTO in order to pave the way for fair conditions within the world trade. This essay asks which circumstances are necessary to achieve this goal.

My comment on the third chapter of Peter Singer’s One World consists of two parts. In the first, I criticise a common but simplistic approach to the issue of economic globalisation. This approach presumes that charges against the WTO can be translated-more or less directly-into charges against current development trends of the global economy. The WTO is not the only institution that legally structures the global economy, nor are decisions of the GATT or WTO panel necessarily reliable indicators of the (...) major trends in the ever more integrated world market. It is, moreover, far from clear whether competition between jurisdictions leads to a ‘race to the bottom’. In the second part of the paper, I (i) criticise the idea of a general conftict between ‘the market’ and ‘democracy’. (ii) I defend the WTO’s consensus rule against Singer’s charge of being “a very strange view of democracy” and try to make its benefits clear. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the location of the sources of global poverty and injustice. I take it as granted that the members of the globally lowest income group live in unacceptable conditions and suffer from injustice. Yet the source of this injustice is a debatable question. Often the existing global institutions are seen as major causes behind this injustice. By taking the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as a practical example, I aim to show that blaming the institutions as (...) such can lead to misguided conclusions. The WTO, in fact, is quite just if one merely analyses its institutional structure. I argue that the major source of injustice are rather the prevailing power structures and the conduct of individual governments within this institutional framework, in other words the metaprocedural unfairness in the trade negotiations. I further argue that applications of Rawlsian theory of justice tend to be misleading at the global institutional level, as they focus disproportionately on the institutional structure, and tend to underestimate the relevance of the conduct of governments and the existing power structures, which allow powerful countries to use the institutional framework unjustly in their favour. (shrink)

This chapter examines interactions between environmental sustainability provisions in free trade agreements (FTAs) and environmental sustainability developments in the World Trade Organization (WTO). While most FTA sustainability provisions remain ‘defensive’, the ‘offensive’ sustainability provisions included in FTAs that set sustainable development as a primary goal using trade as a tool to achieve it are increasing. Insufficient in themselves, sustainability provisions in FTAs must be supplemented by multilateral or plurilateral trade and sustainability instruments in the WTO, given the need for global (...) collective effort to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This chapter argues that some ‘defensive’ sustainability provisions in FTAs reflect and build upon WTO dispute settlement practice; other ‘offensive’ sustainability provisions that do not exist in the WTO have been invented in some FTAs. It discusses how these FTA environmental sustainability provisions have promoted relevant initiatives in the WTO and whether they constitute building blocks for multilateral or plurilateral sustainability provisions. (shrink)

The WTO looks like a downbound train. Its relevance has been eviscerated, and if there was any doubt to this effect, the recent MC13 (13th WTO Ministerial Conference) exemplified the size of the problem. Trading nations should ponder the cost of non-WTO: it risks having ripple effects. It is not just gains from trade that will shrink. It is global cooperation that will suffer. At a moment when the world community is facing global challenges like climate change and, for this (...) reason, needs to act together, trade is driving its members apart.1This is not an appropriate moment to revamp the WTO as necessary. Current times call for damage control. The membership should “soldier on” within its confines and adopt the suggested corrective action to keep it afloat, awaiting more favorable circumstances to proceed with an overhaul. (shrink)

The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) has been the object of many studies in politics, law, and economics focusing on institutional design problems. This paper contributes to such studies by accounting for the argumentative nature and sophisticated features of the DSS through a philosophical analysis of the procedures through which it is articulated. Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory is used as a hermeneutic device to disentangle the types of ‘orientations’ (compromise, consensus, and mutual understanding) pertaining to DSS procedures. We show that (...) these latter are oriented primarily to put the parties in a position to reach mutual understanding. Such an orientation is no mere idiosyncrasy of the DSS but is the only one consistently conducive to the WTO's general aims, in response to the various types of disputes that may arise between its Members. Before closing, we bring our procedural considerations to bear on the reform proposals of the DSS. (shrink)

The WTO is going through an unprecedented crisis that has seriously eroded its relevance. The repeated invocations of national security against other members are evidence of a growing distrust. Industrial policy in the name of national security was unheard of when the WTO entered the realm of international relations. The disputes that arise cannot be adequately addressed because the WTO contract cannot be adequately enforced due to the dysfunctional Appellate Body. But even if this were not the case, could enforcement (...) of an outdated contract ever solve the emerging problem? The response in this book is negative—the WTO contract is in dire need of updating. Alas, no one is working in this direction. The WTO is facing what Joseph Nye called a “Kindleberger trap”: the parties that could take the lead to invest in the international order are either unwilling or find it impossible to do so. Trading nations seem to have forgotten that the cost of no WTO is sizeable anyway (if trade growth wanes). And there is a risk that the cost extends beyond international commercial relations. (shrink)

While what to do is straightforward, how to do it is quite demanding. The WTO is facing a Kindleberger trap. The entity that can rally the troops (the US) does not want to do so largely because a discussion regarding trade liberalization and the reinforcement of the role of the WTO is not a winner in US domestic politics. Overwhelmingly, US voters associate trade openness with trade deficits vis-à-vis China. On the other hand, the entity that would like to rally (...) the troops (China) does not have the requisite soft power to provide the impetus. To reverse the current situation, only imaginative solutions can help. The European Union could emerge as the inspirational middle power. If it manages to work effectively with the G20 (a very generous assumption) then there is a glimpse of hope that the current situation could be reversed. (shrink)

Multiple negotiating rounds of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World TradeOrganization (WTO) since 1947 have conferred economicbenefits through liberalized international trade. Agrowing body of evidence also points to linkagesbetween liberalized trade and damage to the globalenvironment, ecology, and natural resource base.Ironically, the increased economic well-beingconferred by trade liberalization ultimately providesthe basis for improved environmental protection. It isthe interim environmental damage due to tradeliberalization that is controversial and needingamelioration. The proposition here is to promotefurther trade liberalization, but only (...) as long asenvironmental ethics and sustainability issues aresatisfactorily addressed. Trade liberalization shouldnot be permitted at the expense of adequateenvironmental protection and sustainability. FutureWTO rounds need to address both development benefitsand environmental ethics issues in a net socialwelfare maximization setting. (shrink)

Critics of international trade agreements often cast them as threats to human health, and they can point to some sobering warnings from world history. Infectious diseases have swept across political boundaries, carried by traders, colonists, and other agents of globalization. Transnational epidemics have laid economies low, undermining political stability. The spread of viruses and bacteria to peoples previously unexposed and therefore lacking immunity has decimated populations and changed the political course of continents. Trade, exploration, and warfare have repeatedly produced encounters (...) between peoples at different levels of agricultural and technological development. Often, the results have been devastating for the disadvantaged group — economic marginalization, loss of sovereignty and culture, and collapse of public health. Yet the rise of civilization — plant and animal domestication, division of labor, technology, and resulting prosperity — was powered in large part by movement of products and knowledge along routes of trade and migration. (shrink)

This article applies social entropy theory to international trade law, suggesting that observed shifts in world trading system towards disorder a.

A benchmark question in contemporary food regimes scholarship is how to theorize agriculture’s incorporation into the WTO. For the most part, it has been theorized as an institutional mechanism that facilitates the ushering in of a new, so-called ‘third food regime’, in which food–society relations are governed by the overarching politics of the market. The collapse of the Doha Round negotiations in July 2008 makes it possible, for the first time, to offer a conclusive assessment as to whether this is (...) the case. Using a broadly conceived world-historical framework, this article contends that the WTO is more appropriately theorized as a carryover from the politics of the crisis of the second food regime, rather than representing any putative successor. The Doha Round’s collapse in Geneva in July 2008 should put an end to speculation of a WTO-led transformation of global food politics towards unfettered market rule; the supposed basis for a neo-liberalized ‘third food regime’. Consequently, it is through analysis of the factors that framed the Doha Round’s collapse, rather than in the WTO itself, that provide insights into the defining elements of a new global politics of food. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to develop proposals for the liberalization of the financial services sector of the economy of Turkmenistan in the context of the country's potential accession to the World Trade Organization. The article considers the problems and challenges that Turkmenistan may face in the process of negotiations on the terms of accession to the WTO. The scientific novelty lies in the theoretical justification of the expediency of maintaining the status quo in trade in financial services in (...) the short and medium term within the initial list of specific obligations of the country provided for by the GATS. As a result, in the conditions of macroeconomy and its transitional nature, taking into account the unpredictable volatility of hydrocarbon prices, it is recommended to leave the existing restrictions on access to the financial services market and on the national regime unchanged in the context of a gradual process of lifting restrictions on the movement of capital and its complete liberalization. (shrink)

This book investigates whether treaty interpretation at the ECtHR and WTO, which are sometimes perceived as promoting 'self-contained' regimes, could constitute a means for unifying international law, or, conversely, might exacerbate the fragmentation of international law. In this regard, the practice of the ICJ on treaty interpretation is used for comparison, since the ICJ has made the greatest contribution to the development and clarification of international law rules and principles. Providing a critical analysis of cases at the ICJ, ECtHR and (...) WTO, both prior to and since the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the book reveals how the ECtHR and WTO apply the general rules of treaty interpretation in patterns which are similar to those used by the ICJ to address difficulties in interpreting the text of treaties. Viewed in the light of the ECtHR's and WTO's interpretative practices, both the VCLT's general rules of interpretation and the ICJ's interpretative practice serve to counteract the fragmentation of international law.. (shrink)

The rush to measures described in the previous chapter raises the question of whether we observe lawful behavior or lawlessness. The legal benchmark to decide this issue is WTO law, as all semiconductor producers are WTO members. The WTO regulation of subsidies is quite outdated and, to some extent, baseless in economic theory as well. The subsidies agreement lumps all subsidies into the same basket. There is no agreement at all on export licensing. The national security clause is equally outdated, (...) and furthermore, questions are legitimately raised regarding its justiciability. Case law has not helped either. (shrink)

The current crisis of neoliberalism is calling into question the relevance of key international institutions. We analyze the origins, nature, and possible impacts of the crisis through comparing two such institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both originated in the post-World War II U.S.-led hegemonic order and were transformed as part of the transition to global neoliberalism. We show that while the IMF and the WTO have been part of the same hegemonic project, their (...) distinct institutional features have put them on significantly different trajectories. Historical differences in the two institutions’ systems of rules have placed the IMF in a more vulnerable position than the WTO, which provides clues to the future contours of global economic governance. (shrink)

This article examines the impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on domestic trade policies and practices. It shows that protectionist measures, including those practiced by the United States, have been effectively challenged, and consequently restricted, due to the WTO strengthened dispute settlement procedures. I show that the new procedures affected the substantive policy outcomes by changing the political influence of competing actors. Specifically, I identify four transformations affecting the political influence of participants: the re-scaling of political authority, the judicialization (...) of inter-state relations, the institutionalization of the international organization, and the structural internationalization of the state. Based on this case, the article offers a view of globalization as an institutional project. This view emphasizes the political dimension of the process of globalization; it suggests that this project was facilitated by transforming the institutional arrangements in place; and it identifies the contradictions inherent in it both to U.S. hegemony and to the globalization project itself. (shrink)

The tension between economic policy and health policy is a longstanding dilemma, but one that was brought to the fore with the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement in 1994. The pharmaceutical industry has long argued that intellectual property protection is vital for innovation. At the same time, there are those who counter that strong IPP negatively impacts the affordability and availability of essential medicines in developing countries. However, actors on both sides of the debate were (...) in agreement that something needed to be done to address the HIV/AIDS crisis, especially in developing countries. In response to sustained and significant pressure from civil society groups, members of the World Trade Organization agreed to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001. The Declaration clarified that countries unable to manufacture the needed pharmaceuticals could obtain more affordable generics elsewhere if necessary. (shrink)

Anwarul Hoda and Ashok Gulati: WTO Negotiations on Agriculture and Developing Countries Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10806-010-9278-y Authors Benjamin M. Munro, Kansas State University Department of Geography Manhattan KS 66506 USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

The Report of the National Academy of Sciences Monitoring International Labor Standards: Techniques and Sources of Information shows that assessing compliance can be carried out in a thorough, transparent fashion, allowing alternative evaluators to identify where they disagree in assessment. Drawing on the Report and written by the Chair of the Committee that produced it, this paper offers a short overview of the principal challenges in assessing compliance with the ILO core labor standards, and offers a simple framework for investigating (...) compliance. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for trying to include labor standards in trade agreements. (shrink)

The purpose of this document is to consider possible industrial policy measures that could be contemplated by the South African Government to provide support for the export competitiveness of the country’s processed fruit products. It follows an earlier analysis by Don Ross, which argued for the conclusion that the industry meets key criteria for economically justifiable industrial policy assistance. That is, it offers a premium product that can be amplified in value by brand strengthening, can be positioned more advantageously than (...) at present in international value chains, and would benefit from an environment made more competitive by liberalization of international trade practices and reduction in management of input prices (chiefly tin plate and sugar). In short: the main factors now limiting the competitiveness of the industry’s exports derive neither from its product characteristics nor from independent market dynamics, but from exogenous constraints that are in principle correctible by policy. (shrink)

This article challenges key aspects of theories on norms evolution, transnational advocacy, and social movements. It demonstrates that the “emergence” phase of the “norms life cycle” model (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) is more internally contested than currently interpreted. It develops two alternatives to the “boomerang” model of transnational advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). It highlights and explains differences—rather than similarities—in the framing strategies of actors involved in globalized protests. It explores the influence of several key “microsociological factors” (Giugni 2002) on (...) the evolution of those stragegies. Empirically the article focuses on the World Trade Organization's Third Ministerial meeting at Seattle in 1999. It analyzes why and how social movement actors framed different interpretations of the human rights at stake in the context of international trade. Framing innovations may have had short-term strategic value at Seattle, but did not lead to a unified understanding of human rights, either among activists themselves or among the government and corporate actors they sought to influence through protest. (shrink)

Observers generally assume that firms which engage in lobbying know what they want. Business—government relations and especially the corporate political activities of network operators during the basic telecommunication negotiations of the World Trade Organization present a slightly different picture. European monopoly providers benefited from the old international regime and initially ignored trade discussions in their sector. In the course of negotiations, however, they became part of a three-level game, which obliged them to consider national, European, and multilateral objectives simultaneously. In (...) the course of these complex negotiations, their preferences evolved. Because governments advanced independently on the liberalization project, companies adapted their policy stances from reluctance to support for the negotiations. This article thus cautions against treatments of lobbying that consider preferences as exogenously given. (shrink)

The WTO’s nine day sprint in July 2008 was an attempt to break the logjam on “modalities” for agriculture and NAMA in the marathon Doha Round negotiations. All that observers can know for certain is that the parties did not agree, but understanding the failure is an essential prelude to any attempt to relaunch the Round. This paper is a counterfactual analysis of the various explanations that have been offered for the failure. I consider factors exogenous to the negotiation process, (...) such as the macroeconomic context; and factors endogenous to the process such as the timing and level of participation in the meeting, and the nature of the issues under discussion. I conclude that sprinting during a marathon is unwise. The London G-20 Summit commitment to a balanced outcome is achievable, but assembling a package with so many issues involving 153 members takes time and patience. (shrink)