Blaming (construed broadly to include both blaming-attitudes and blaming-actions) is a puzzling phenomenon. Even when we grant that someone is blameworthy, we can still sensibly wonder whether we ought to blame him. We sometimes choose to forgive and show mercy, even when it is not asked for. We are naturally led to wonder why we shouldn’t always do this. Wouldn’t it be a better to wholly reject the punitive practices of blame, especially in light of their often undesirable effects, and (...) embrace an ethic of unrelenting forgiveness and mercy? In this paper I seek to address these questions by offering an account of blame that provides a rationale for thinking that to wholly forswear blaming blameworthy agents would be deeply mistaken. This is because, as I will argue, blaming is a way of valuing, it is “a mode of valuation.” I will argue that among the minimal standards of respect generated by valuable objects, notably persons, is the requirement to redress disvalue with blame. It is not just that blame is something additional we are required to do in properly valuing, but rather blame is part of what that it is to properly value. Blaming, given the existence of blameworthy agents, is mode of valuation required by the standards of minimal respect. To forswear blame would be to fail value what we ought to value. (shrink)

Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen’s proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we care about arriving at good (...) aesthetic beliefs for the sake of the values that arise in the process of doing so. The engagement is the point, so we must use our own capacities in first-hand encounters. Here I challenge Nguyen’s account. I argue that it misconstrues the value of aesthetic belief; it conflicts with restrictions on aesthetic testimony; and it has trouble harnessing engagement-value for a theory of aesthetic value. A better approach emphasizes the social character of aesthetic valuing. On this view, aesthetic valuing is a social practice structured around the collaborative exercise and improvement of certain special capacities. The autonomy and acquaintance principles tell us to engage these capacities in forming our aesthetic beliefs. Understood aright, and contrary to consensus, these rules are identical. (shrink)

Valuing something is complicated. Philosophers have offered different stories about what we do when we value something. However, we have not paid enough attention to the thought that, sometimes, valuing something is what makes us the kind of practical agents we are. In this paper, I offer a novel account of valuing, which I call thick valuing, to capture this special phenomenon in which our valuing makes us who we are. This requires us to recognize (...) that the cognitive, motivational, and affective components of thick valuing do not merely co-occur. More importantly, it is key to focusing on how thickly valuing something partially constitutes, and indeed crucially expresses, our practical identities. Beyond that, the account sheds new light on how we can better understand inauthenticity—to act without authenticity is to act from what one thickly values but where that which one thickly values are not values of one’s own. (shrink)

In the past Christine Korsgaard has argued that when Kant claims we value our humanity as an end in itself, he means that we take the value of the power of rational choice to be the condition of the value of our ends, and therefore to be unconditional. Here she reexamines these arguments by raising questions about the nature of valuing. She argues that valuing our moral nature does not imply thinking ourselves superior to non-moral creatures. She identifies (...) two different ways of valuing ourselves that are at work in Kant’s arguments, regarding humanity as a valuable property and as the source of normative standing. She argues that we value ourselves as ends both in the sense of attributing normative standing to ourselves and in the sense that we regard our ends as good because they are good for us, a sense which extends to the other animals. (shrink)

Many philosophers recognize that, as a matter of psychological fact, one can believe something valuable without valuing it. I argue that it is also possible to value something without believing it valuable. Agents can genuinely value things that they neither believe disvaluable nor believe valuable along a scale of impersonal value.

In this landmark work of economic sociology, Lucien Karpik introduces the theory and practical tools needed to analyze markets for singularities. Singularities are goods and services that cannot be studied by standard methods because they are multidimensional, incommensurable, and of uncertain quality. Examples include movies, novels, music, artwork, fine wine, lawyers, and doctors. Valuing the Unique provides a theoretical framework to explain this important class of products and markets that for so long have eluded neoclassical economics. With this innovative (...) theory--called the economics of singularities--Karpik shows that, because of the uncertainty and the highly subjective valuation of singularities, these markets are necessarily equipped with what he calls "judgment devices"--such as labels, brands, guides, critics, and rankings--which provide consumers with the credible knowledge needed to make reasonable choices. He explains why these markets are characterized by the primacy of competition by qualities over competition by prices, and he identifies the conditions under which singularities are constructed or are in danger of losing their uniqueness. After demonstrating how combinations of the numerous and multiform judgment devices can be used to identify different market models, Karpik applies his analytical tools to the functioning of a large number of actual markets, including fine wines, movies, luxury goods, pop music, and legal services. (shrink)

Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse (...) Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain. (shrink)

This article aims to uncover the processes of developing sustainable business models in innovation ecosystems. Innovation ecosystems with sustainability goals often consist of cross-sector partners and need to manage three tensions: the tension of value creation versus value capture, the tension of mutual value versus individual value, and the tension of gaining value versus losing value. The fact that these tensions affect all actors differently makes the process of developing a sustainable business model challenging. Based on a study of four (...) sustainably innovative cross-sector collaborations, we propose that innovation ecosystems that develop a sustainable business model engage in a process of valuing value in which they search for a result that satisfies all actors. We find two different patterns of valuing value: collective orchestration and continuous search. We describe these patterns and the conditions that give rise to them. The identification of the two patterns opens up a research agenda that can shed further light on the conditions that need to be in place in order for an innovation ecosystem to develop effective sustainable business models. For practice, our findings show how cross-sector actors in innovation ecosystems may collaborate when developing a business model around emerging sustainability-oriented innovations. (shrink)

Is graduate school for me? Should I ask him to marry? What does it make sense to do when one’s self-interest and morality sharply conflict? This book articulates and defends one general answer to such questions: subjectivism. Subjectivism maintains that things have value because we value them. Caring about stuff makes stuff matter. In a world without anything that anyone or anything cared about, nothing would matter. Additionally, subjective accounts maintain that the most important values are relational. I care about (...) how well and gracefully Federer is playing and you (most likely) don’t. Because of this difference, I have a reason to check the score or to watch his matches and you do not. Things may be valuable or reason-providing for me but not for you because I care about them and you do not. Getting clearer on exactly what that means and why we might think it is true will be the business of this book. This book aspires to sketch the main contours of the long and winding road from valuing to value and to make a case that the road is sound and bridges that have been purported to be impassable are in fact repairable. (shrink)

우리는 종종 타인이 무엇에 가치 부여하는가, 혹은 무엇을 가치 있게 여기는가를 보고 그 사람에 대한 배경 이해를 형성한다. 누군가는 자신이 가치 있게 여기는 것을 위해 삶을 헌신하기도 하고 또 누군가는 목숨을 바치기도 한다. 이처럼 무언가를 가치 있게 여긴다는 것은 우리가 타인을 이해할 때에도, 우리가 우리 자신의 삶을 어떤 방향으로 이끌어 갈 것인가 하는 문제에도 중요한 고려사항이 된다. 본 논문의 목표는 위와 같은 의미에서 어떤 것을 가치 있게 여긴다는 것(valuing)이 무엇인지에 대해 분석하는 것이다. 이를 위해 본 논문에서는 우선 데이빗 루이스(David (...) Lewis)와 마이클 스미스(Michael Smith)의 선행연구를 검토하고 그들의 이론이 성공적이지 못한다는 것을 지적한다. 그 후 해리 프랭크퍼트(Harry Frankfurt)의 마음 씀(caring) 개념을 분석하고 마음 씀과 가치 있게 여김은 동일한 유형의 마음 상태를 포착하는 개념이라는 것을 보이고자 한다. (shrink)

Growing numbers of human beings live with profound and multiple learning difficulties and disabilities. Exploring the moral, social and political implications of this trend, Valuing Profoundly Disabled People addresses questions that are high on policy and practice agendas in numerous regions around the world, including the UK and the EU, the USA, and Australasia. In this important work Vorhaus examines fundamental moral and social questions about profound disability, and each chapter combines a comprehensive review of existing literature with thought-provoking (...) and original philosophical arguments. Vorhaus argues that there is a pressing need to consider the moral and political claims of people whose lives are characterised by extensive impairments, dependency and vulnerability. The book prompts readers to reflect on complex issues relating to the practices of caring, teaching and treating people with profound disabilities in contexts such as education, health care and social policy. Providing a much-needed contribution to the field, this book will be of interest to postgraduates, academics and researchers in a number of distinct and interrelated fields, including disability and impairment, human rights, philosophy, sociology, health and social policy, and education. The book will also be of great interest to practitioners and policymakers seeking to promote the aims of realising human potential and respecting disability. (shrink)

While many aspects of human life are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, values related to selfhood and community are among the most challenging to preserve. In what follows, I focus on the importance of values and valuing in climate change adaptation. To do so, I will first discuss two alternate approaches to valuing, both of which fail to recognise the loss of valued objects and practices that both of which help to generate a sense of self (...) and deserve to be respected and mourned. Ultimately, I argue that an approach to valuing that is responsive to change and open to loss will enable humans to be more resilient in the face of anthropogenic climate change, in order that we may move forward and construct selves that fit the context in which we live. (shrink)

This thesis concerns the relation between aesthetically valuable objects and the agents that aesthetically value them. An investigation is undertaken into the psychology and rationality of such agents. I argue that self-related elements such as emotions and standing value commitments play an irreducible role in successful aesthetic engagement. I further demonstrate that these psychological elements of aesthetic engagement are both self-related and subject to rational constraints. In this connection, I propose a revisionary account according to which valuing agents are (...) subject to a coherence requirement pertaining to their aesthetic judgments and aesthetic likings. The first essay, “Aesthetic Autonomy: Acquaintance, Competence and Authenticity”, addresses the nature of aesthetic autonomy. What it means to be autonomous and its normative significance is generally considered to be ambiguous in the aesthetic domain. In this essay, I propose a way to disambiguate this elusive concept by distinguishing three varieties of autonomy: experiential autonomy, competency-based autonomy, and personal autonomy. Some important issues concerning the nature of aesthetic agency and appreciation are discussed in the course of this critical discussion. The second essay, “Non-Standard Emotions and Aesthetic Understanding”, discusses the role of our emotional responses in the context of aesthetic appreciation. My main argument will reveal that the non-standard or ‘intellectual’ emotions, the emotions which are in fact most important to appreciation, can play a significant epistemic role in our reason-giving aesthetic practices. The third essay, “The Aesthetic Enkratic Principe”, examines what it means to be aesthetically rational. Although some philosophers claim that aesthetics falls within the scope of rationality, a non-akrasia constraint prohibiting certain akratic combinations of attitudes is yet to be developed in this domain. This essay is concerned with the question of whether or not such a requirement is plausible and, if so, whether it is a true requirement of aesthetic rationality. The fourth essay, “Aesthetic Self-Transformation: A Guide for Aesthetic Aspirants”, investigates the nature of aesthetic self-transformation. Two problems arise in this context. First, aesthetic transformative experiences can lead to cases of local irrationality in the form of a mismatch between what is aesthetically judged and what is aesthetically liked. Second, in attempting to resolve this conflict, we encounter two opposing principles that appear to guide aesthetic appreciation with equal force: self-cultivation and aesthetic improvement. I explain the first issue by invoking a coherence requirement (as defended in the previous essay) and resolve the second by outlining a hybrid view of what constitutes good aesthetic reasoning. (shrink)

Estimates of the burden of disease assess the mortality and morbidity that affect a population by producing summary measures of health such as quality-adjusted life years and disability-adjusted life years. These measures typically do not include stillbirths among the negative health outcomes they count. Priority-setting decisions that rely on these measures are therefore likely to place little value on preventing the more than three million stillbirths that occur annually worldwide. In contrast, neonatal deaths, which occur in comparable numbers, have a (...) substantial impact on burden of disease estimates and are commonly seen as a pressing health concern. In this article we argue in favor of incorporating unintended fetal deaths that occur late in pregnancy into estimates of the burden of disease. Our argument is based on the similarity between late-term fetuses and newborn infants and the assumption that protecting newborns is important. We respond to four objections to counting stillbirths: that fetuses are not yet part of the population and so their deaths should not be included in measures of population health; that valuing the prevention of stillbirths will undermine women's reproductive rights; that including stillbirths implies that miscarriages should also be included; and that birth itself is in fact ethically significant. We conclude that our proposal is ethically preferable to current practice and, if adopted, is likely to lead to improved decisions about health spending. (shrink)

Abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, war, genetic engineering and fetal experimentation, environmental and animal rights--these topics inspire some of today's most heated public controversies. And it is fashionable to pursue these debates in terms of the negative query "Under what conditions may life be disregarded or terminated?" John Kleinig asks a different, more positive question: What may be said in behalf of life? Looking at the full range of appeals to life's value, he considers a variety of issues. Is livingness as (...) such to be affirmed and respected? Is there an ascending order of plant, animal, and human life? Does human life possess a distinctive claim, or must we discriminate between humans that do and humans that do not have claims on us? Kleinig shows that assertions about valuing life camouflage a complex normative vocabulary about worth, reverence, sanctity, dignity, respect, and rights. And "life," too, is subject to an assortment of understandings. Sensitive to the frameworks informing diverse appeals to life's value, this comprehensive work will interest readers concerned with the environment, animal rights, or bioethics. Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Valuing wildlands is complex. (1) In a philosophically oriented analysis, I distinguish seven meaning levels of value, individual preference, market price, individual good, social preference, social good, organismic, and ecosystemic, and itemize twelve types of value carried by wildlands, economic, life support, recreational, scientific, genetic diversity, aesthetic, cultural syrubolization, historical, characterbuilding, therapeutic, religious, and intrinsic. (2) I criticize contingent valuation efforts to price these values. (3) I then propose an axiological model, which interrelates the multiple levels and types of (...) value, and some principles for wildland management policy. (shrink)

Those who are responsible for health policy want to know how seriously diseases, injuries, and risk factors diminish health and how significantly different policies improve health. To provide this information, health economists have attempted to measure generic—that is “overall”—health, whose value they take to be its contribution to well-being, which they measure by eliciting preferences. This book provides a philosophically sophisticated overview of generic health measurement that suggests improvements in standard methods and proposes a radical alternative. It shows how to (...) avoid relying on surveys and offers an account of fundamental evaluation that does not presuppose the assignment of values to the properties and consequences of alternatives. The book defends a naturalistic concept of health and its relations to measures such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). In examining current health-measurement systems, the book clarifies their value commitments and the objections to relying on preference surveys to assign values to health states. Relying on an interpretation of liberal political philosophy, it argues that the public value of health states should be understood in terms of the activity limits and suffering that health states impose. The book also addresses the moral conundrums that arise when policymakers attempt to employ the values of health states to estimate the health benefits of alternative policies and to adopt the most cost-effective. It concludes with a general discussion of the difficulties of combining consequentialist and nonconsequentialist moral considerations in policymaking. (shrink)

Valuing conservation and biodiversity outcomes in economic analysis is difficult, as it is in health economics. Because health economics has previously had to respond to the many challenges currently faced by conservation economics, health economists have developed very successful tools for responding to these challenges which conservation economists can draw upon. What is surprising is that despite rhetorical support for the use of these economic analysis tools in conservation valuations, in practice, these economic tools are used far less frequently (...) in conservation and biodiversity decision then they are in health decisions. Drawing on a simple database search and an analysis of universities that lead in both economics and environmental studies, this paper considers why conservation economists stick with philosophically and pragmatically difficult economic tools when they have other options, and argues that part of the reasons is the way conservation economics is framed and conceptualised. (shrink)

Disability rights activists often claim that disability is not—by itself—something that makes disabled people worse off. A popular objection to such a view of disability is this: were it correct, it would make it permissible to cause disability and impermissible to cause nondisability. The aim of this article is to show that these twin objections don’t succeed.

Valuing Peak Experience in Everyday Lives takes Abraham Maslow's concept of peak experience and compares how people have encountered transcendent peak experiences, and related phenomena such as flow and peak performance in their everyday lives. By examining existing research and sharing people's actual encounters in different contexts such as music, education, sport, creative arts and nature, the importance and value of peak experiences and self-transcendence in our lives can be better understood and fostered. The book explores the challenges, benefits (...) and opportunities presented by understanding peak experience in contemporary contexts. Drawing on research from positive psychology and transpersonal psychology, each of the twelve chapters, reports on a work or leisure context where peak experiences have been generated and studied. The chapters are introduced by drawing on relevant theory and research and then expanded via accounts, vignettes and examples from people immersed in those activities or contexts to provide a blend of case stories and theoretical foundations. The book is valuable reading for professional practitioners such as psychologists, educators, coaches, psychotherapists and those interested in personal development. It will also be relevant for students of transpersonal and positive psychology, humanism and human development, interested in understanding transcendent peak experiences and related concepts, such as flow. (shrink)

Play is typically associated with carefree or frivolous activity, yet Nietzsche makes surprising claims about the nature of play. He insists that playfulness is the appropriate attitude for addressing the challenges of human life, and he describes maturity as the ability to play seriously like children. To understand Nietzsche’s serious play, some have emphasized the affinity between play and fiction. Notably, Nadeem Hussain has offered a fictionalist interpretation, according to which nothing has value in itself and valuing resembles make-believe. (...) I hold that illusions and fictions misconstrue Nietzsche’s play and values. In this paper I argue that Nietzsche embraces play in the context of nihilism, which he considers the fundamental problem of modernity. Play ultimately proves central to Nietzsche’s strategy to avert nihilism. I explicate his comments on play, and I use the features of play to illuminate Nietzsche’s response to nihilism found in his enigmatic project of value creation. (shrink)

Background Palliative care needs in older persons can endanger their dignity. To provide dignity-conserving care to older persons, the Swedish Dignity Care Intervention (DCI-SWE) can be used. The DCI-SWE is built on Chochinov’s dignity model and the original version, developed and tested in UK and Scotland. Aim To describe older persons’ and their relatives’ experiences of dignity and dignity-conserving care when using the DCI-SWE in municipal health care. Research design A mixed method study with convergent parallel design. Participants and research (...) context The DCI-SWE was used and evaluated in a Swedish municipality health care context. Older persons’ ( n=17) dignity-related distress and quality of life were assessed after the intervention. Interviews with older persons ( n=10) and their relatives ( n=8) were analysed using thematic analysis. Ethical considerations The study followed the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical approval was obtained from the Regional Ethical Review Board in Uppsala, Sweden (Reg No. 2014/312) and the National Swedish Ethical Review Authority (Reg. No. Ö 10-2019). Informed consent was collected from older persons and their relatives. Findings The older persons’ dignity-related distress did not significantly change over time ( p = 0.44) neither was their overall quality of life ( p =.64). Only psychological quality of life was decreased significantly ( p = 0.01). The older persons and their relatives emphasized the importance of valuing the individual. Conclusions The DCI-SWE provides a forum to talk about dignity issues, but relevant competence, continuity and resources are needed. Psychological care actions and health care professionals’ communication skills training are important. To fully evaluate, the DCI-SWE a larger sample and validated instruments are necessary. (shrink)

Sabina Alkire shows how Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen's capability approach can be coherently---and practically---put to work in poverty reduction activities so that the voices and values of the poor matter. This provides economists, philosophers, theologians, and development practitioners with a way forward that addresses both theoretical and practical challenges.

The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our (...) interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem. (shrink)

Is blame ever the best response to wrongdoing? Wouldn’t it be better to reject the punitive practices of blame, especially in light of their corrosive and divisive effects, and instead embrace an ethic of unrelenting forgiveness and mercy? This chapter's aim is to defend the value of blame. After arguing that two recent defenses of blame fail, the chapter proceeds to defend “the value account of blame,” according to which blame is essential to valuing objects of moral worth. The (...) chapter defends this contention by arguing that valuing such objects requires that we defend and protect them, and that only blame can play these functional and expressive roles. Sadness and other potential surrogates cannot replace blame because they lack the focus and condemnatory aspect of blame required for taking objects of moral worth seriously. Therefore, to give up blame would be to give up valuing what we ought to value. (shrink)

This 1996 book is the result of a uniquely productive union of philosophy, psychoanalysis and anthropology, and explores the complexity and importance of emotions. Michael Stocker places emotions at the very centre of human identity, life and value. He lays bare how our culture's idealisation of rationality pervades the philosophical tradition and leads those who wrestle with serious ethical and philosophical problems into distortion and misunderstanding. Professor Stocker shows how important are the social and emotional contexts of ethical dilemmas and (...) inner conflicts, and he challenges philosophical theories that try to overgeneralise and over-simplify by leaving out the particulars of each situation. In offering a realistic account of emotions and an in-depth analysis of how psychological factors affect judgments of all kind, this book will interest a broad range of readers across the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.

Book review of David Sobel's "From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism".

We appear to attribute value properties to things: “That was an evil thing to do,” someone says - it apparently has the property, the feature, the quality, of being evil; “This is a beautiful painting,” someone else says; and so forth. But how can there be value properties in the world that science depicts: a world of particles, of atoms and the void (or something like that)? “Value properties are queer,” declared J.L. Mackie. Focusing on the arts, two obvious attempts (...) at defence suggest themselves: science is not an adequate guide to the fundamental nature of reality; or it is and we can fit value properties into a scientific worldview. In this paper, I shall pursue a third line of defence, which is only slightly less obvious and far less demanding to pursue in detail: many of us are interested in knowing about reality, such as what is going on in another country, but it is difficult to take in presentations of reality which lack the artist’s touch, so it is rational for us to turn to the arts as sources of knowledge. (Warning: this is way behind McDowell and Cornell Realists, but it is there: in the club!). (shrink)

To be monetised, a society requires a unit which measures the values of a wide range of goods. Being thus measurable, the values of goods are mutually commensurable, a point which Aristotle theorised in the _Nicomachean Ethics_ (Book V). But whereas Aristotle gives rise to the impression that the stipulation of a currency unit suffices to make goods commensurable, societies themselves must undergo a process of commensurabilisation whereby people become habituated to valuing goods in terms of a unit of (...) value. This essay examines the development of practices of valuation and commensurability in ancient Greece, paying particular attention to the rule of Solon and his division of the citizenry into census classes according to their yearly income. The assessment of citizens’ income presupposes a unit for measuring income. The stipulation of this unit, it is argued, had a decisive influence in developing practices of valuation and commensurability. (shrink)

Judgement internalism claims that our evaluative judgements will motivate us to act appropriately, at least in so far as we are rational. I examine how this claim should be understood, with particular focus on whether valuing enjoys a kind of 'normative priority' over desiring. I consider and reject views according to which valuing something provides one with a reason to be moved; this claim of normative priority and the readings of internalism it suggests are too strong. I also (...) reject an interpretation which eschews claims of normative priority, whilst maintaining that valuing nevertheless rationally commits or requires one to be motivated; this rejection of normative priority and the reading of internalism it supports are too weak. In the final sections I sketch the understanding of judgement internalism I favour, and defend it against objections. (shrink)

In The Minority Body, Elizabeth Barnes rejects prevailing social constructionist accounts of disability for two reasons. First, because they understand disability in terms of oppressive social responses to bodily impairment, they cannot make sense of disability pride. Second, they maintain a problematic distinction between impairment and disability. In response to these challenges, this paper defends a version of the social model of disability, which we call the Social Exclusion Model. On our account, to be disabled is to be in a (...) bodily or psychological state that is represented as an impairment in the prevailing ideology of one’s society, and to be excluded from valuable activities on the basis of this representation. While this model refers to a distinction between disability and impairment, it makes no presuppositions about which bodies function ‘normally’ and which do not. It is the ideology of impairment rather than impairment itself that does any work to determine whether a person is disabled. We argue that this model answers some of the important objections that Barnes raises against prevailing social constructionist accounts of disability, and that it’s focus on the oppressive social positioning of disabled people gives it explanatory power that Barnes’s own account lacks. (shrink)

Respect for the equal dignity of human persons is a distinctively deontic way of valuing humanity. This chapter explores two early attempts to develop this distinctively modern idea in the thought of Grotius and Pufendorf. Dignity is no form of good, which might be appreciated through desire or esteem, but a form of value that calls for, indeed demands, respect (what Pufendorf calls “esteem”). Respect is an attitude we manifest in the formation of our wills by governing our deliberations (...) by the constraints of right (Pufendorf’s “rights of equality”), which the dignity of persons places on us, and by holding ourselves accountable to one another for compliance with these. What is especially remarkable in Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s developments of this idea is the way both tie it to “sociability,” our capacity to engage _with_ and relate _to_ one another from a second-person standpoint. (shrink)

This chapter is a focused exploration of the spiritual aspect of the body-soul-spirit unity that is the human person according to Edith Stein. She argues that we experience the world not just as a world of natural causal connections, but as a world of values and volition. I explore her efforts to differentiate between causality as the “lawfulness” governing the physical events of the material world, and motivation governing the intentional acts of the spiritual world. The spiritual subject encounters the (...) world as meaningful and valuable, and creatively and freely responds to this value. In this way, our valuing is an expression of our personhood. Furthermore, in these spiritual acts, we also allow our own individual nature to unfold to ourselves and we thus “become ourselves.” This becoming is not a movement away from the self, but a revealing of the self and a bringing of it to light. In their creativity and their freedom, spiritual acts are movements out to the world and a transcending of the boundaries of the self, but not a severing from the self or the creation of a new self. The spiritual life is what Stein calls a “superabundant, diffusive life” of self-expression and self-transcendence toward life outside of the self. In unfolding out toward the world and toward other individuals, we also are opened up to receive this self-expression from others (their “going out of themselves”). In this way, our spiritual activity is a sharing of value, meaning, and spiritual products in the life of the human community. It is by nature of our individual personhood that we are able to be spiritually active and expressive, and thereby to be part of a larger whole made up of relationships between individual persons, and it is through this relating that our individual nature is fulfilled. (shrink)

Entrepreneurs generally lack the marketing capabilities necessary to bring their new product to market. To engage the resources required to do this, they must somehow place a value on the enterprise. However, all of the methods of valuation currently available are based on the use of historical or current revenues, and therefore are not applicable to an entrepreneurial enterprise with a first-time product. In Valuing an Entrepreneurial Enterprise, Audretsch and Link present a valuation method uniquely tailored to emerging technology-based (...) ventures that have no revenue history to lean on. Unlike many traditional methods, theirs does not take into account the track record of companies and products similar to that being valuated. Instead, it draws on economic theory to formulate a solution to the problem. The book develops conceptual ground, including trends in entrepreneurship, models of innovation, and the economics of standards and entrepreneurship policy. The authors review the traditional valuation methods and illustrate them numerically with case studies to show how the traditional approach produces an incorrect valuation. The core of the book presents the new methodology and demonstrates how it avoids the pitfalls of past approaches. The authors also show how public policy on technology and infrastructure changes valuations of start-up firms in areas such as stem-cell products and renewable fuels projects. Valuing an Entrepreneurial Enterprise will serve as a valuable resource for advanced students, economists, financial planners, and valuators interested in new valuation methods and the theory behind them, as well as those interested in entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Michael Stocker believes that philosophers idealize reason and demonize emotion, and that this is a bad thing. Valuing Emotions was written with Elizabeth Hegeman, a psychoanalyst and anthropologist who collaborated on four of the book’s ten major chapters, but four of Stocker’s previously published papers are also incorporated in the book. Its central theme is that emotions are more positively important than contemporary ethicists customarily grant: having proper emotions is a crucial part of being a good person and living (...) a good life, and is also crucial for evaluative knowledge. The book develops no overarching theory of the emotions, however, consisting instead of a number of relatively distinct and diverse sections. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Psychedelics, including psilocybin, and other consciousness-altering compounds such as 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), currently are being scientifically investigated for their potential therapeutic uses, with a primary focus on measurable outcomes: for example, alleviation of symptoms or increases in self-reported well-being. Accordingly, much recent discussion about the possible value of these substances has turned on estimates of the magnitude and duration of persisting positive effects in comparison to harms. However, many have described the value of a psychedelic experience with little or no reference (...) to such therapeutic benefits, instead seeming to find the experience valuable in its own right. How can we make sense of such testimony? Could a psychedelic experience be valuable even if there were no persisting beneficial effects? If so, how? Using the concept of psychological richness, combined with insights from the philosophy of aesthetics and the enhancement literature, this essay explores potential sources of value in the acute subjective experience, apart from the value derived from persisting beneficial effects. (shrink)

Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming “knockout” animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal dignitary wrongs.